mirror of
https://github.com/AuxXxilium/linux_dsm_epyc7002.git
synced 2024-12-21 19:41:34 +07:00
7c321eb2b8
When the crashkernel kernel command line option is specified, the low 1M memory will always be reserved now. Therefore, it's not necessary to create a backup region anymore and also no need to copy the contents of the first 640k to it. Remove all the code related to handling that backup region. [ bp: Massage commit message. ] Signed-off-by: Lianbo Jiang <lijiang@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: bhe@redhat.com Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Cc: d.hatayama@fujitsu.com Cc: dhowells@redhat.com Cc: ebiederm@xmission.com Cc: horms@verge.net.au Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Jürgen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Cc: kexec@lists.infradead.org Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Cc: vgoyal@redhat.com Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191108090027.11082-3-lijiang@redhat.com
643 lines
16 KiB
C
643 lines
16 KiB
C
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
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/*
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* handle transition of Linux booting another kernel
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* Copyright (C) 2002-2005 Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
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*/
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#define pr_fmt(fmt) "kexec: " fmt
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#include <linux/mm.h>
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#include <linux/kexec.h>
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#include <linux/string.h>
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#include <linux/gfp.h>
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#include <linux/reboot.h>
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#include <linux/numa.h>
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#include <linux/ftrace.h>
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#include <linux/io.h>
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#include <linux/suspend.h>
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#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
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#include <linux/efi.h>
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#include <asm/init.h>
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#include <asm/pgtable.h>
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#include <asm/tlbflush.h>
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#include <asm/mmu_context.h>
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#include <asm/io_apic.h>
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#include <asm/debugreg.h>
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#include <asm/kexec-bzimage64.h>
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#include <asm/setup.h>
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#include <asm/set_memory.h>
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#ifdef CONFIG_ACPI
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/*
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* Used while adding mapping for ACPI tables.
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* Can be reused when other iomem regions need be mapped
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*/
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struct init_pgtable_data {
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struct x86_mapping_info *info;
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pgd_t *level4p;
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};
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static int mem_region_callback(struct resource *res, void *arg)
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{
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struct init_pgtable_data *data = arg;
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unsigned long mstart, mend;
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mstart = res->start;
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mend = mstart + resource_size(res) - 1;
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return kernel_ident_mapping_init(data->info, data->level4p, mstart, mend);
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}
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static int
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map_acpi_tables(struct x86_mapping_info *info, pgd_t *level4p)
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{
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struct init_pgtable_data data;
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unsigned long flags;
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int ret;
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data.info = info;
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data.level4p = level4p;
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flags = IORESOURCE_MEM | IORESOURCE_BUSY;
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ret = walk_iomem_res_desc(IORES_DESC_ACPI_TABLES, flags, 0, -1,
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&data, mem_region_callback);
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if (ret && ret != -EINVAL)
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return ret;
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/* ACPI tables could be located in ACPI Non-volatile Storage region */
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ret = walk_iomem_res_desc(IORES_DESC_ACPI_NV_STORAGE, flags, 0, -1,
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&data, mem_region_callback);
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if (ret && ret != -EINVAL)
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return ret;
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return 0;
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}
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#else
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static int map_acpi_tables(struct x86_mapping_info *info, pgd_t *level4p) { return 0; }
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#endif
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#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_FILE
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const struct kexec_file_ops * const kexec_file_loaders[] = {
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&kexec_bzImage64_ops,
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NULL
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};
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#endif
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static int
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map_efi_systab(struct x86_mapping_info *info, pgd_t *level4p)
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{
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#ifdef CONFIG_EFI
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unsigned long mstart, mend;
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if (!efi_enabled(EFI_BOOT))
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return 0;
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mstart = (boot_params.efi_info.efi_systab |
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((u64)boot_params.efi_info.efi_systab_hi<<32));
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if (efi_enabled(EFI_64BIT))
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mend = mstart + sizeof(efi_system_table_64_t);
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else
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mend = mstart + sizeof(efi_system_table_32_t);
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if (!mstart)
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return 0;
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return kernel_ident_mapping_init(info, level4p, mstart, mend);
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#endif
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return 0;
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}
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static void free_transition_pgtable(struct kimage *image)
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{
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free_page((unsigned long)image->arch.p4d);
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image->arch.p4d = NULL;
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free_page((unsigned long)image->arch.pud);
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image->arch.pud = NULL;
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free_page((unsigned long)image->arch.pmd);
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image->arch.pmd = NULL;
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free_page((unsigned long)image->arch.pte);
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image->arch.pte = NULL;
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}
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static int init_transition_pgtable(struct kimage *image, pgd_t *pgd)
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{
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pgprot_t prot = PAGE_KERNEL_EXEC_NOENC;
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unsigned long vaddr, paddr;
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int result = -ENOMEM;
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p4d_t *p4d;
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pud_t *pud;
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pmd_t *pmd;
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pte_t *pte;
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vaddr = (unsigned long)relocate_kernel;
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paddr = __pa(page_address(image->control_code_page)+PAGE_SIZE);
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pgd += pgd_index(vaddr);
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if (!pgd_present(*pgd)) {
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p4d = (p4d_t *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
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if (!p4d)
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goto err;
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image->arch.p4d = p4d;
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set_pgd(pgd, __pgd(__pa(p4d) | _KERNPG_TABLE));
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}
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p4d = p4d_offset(pgd, vaddr);
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if (!p4d_present(*p4d)) {
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pud = (pud_t *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
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if (!pud)
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goto err;
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image->arch.pud = pud;
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set_p4d(p4d, __p4d(__pa(pud) | _KERNPG_TABLE));
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}
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pud = pud_offset(p4d, vaddr);
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if (!pud_present(*pud)) {
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pmd = (pmd_t *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
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if (!pmd)
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goto err;
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image->arch.pmd = pmd;
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set_pud(pud, __pud(__pa(pmd) | _KERNPG_TABLE));
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}
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pmd = pmd_offset(pud, vaddr);
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if (!pmd_present(*pmd)) {
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pte = (pte_t *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
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if (!pte)
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goto err;
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image->arch.pte = pte;
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set_pmd(pmd, __pmd(__pa(pte) | _KERNPG_TABLE));
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}
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pte = pte_offset_kernel(pmd, vaddr);
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if (sev_active())
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prot = PAGE_KERNEL_EXEC;
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set_pte(pte, pfn_pte(paddr >> PAGE_SHIFT, prot));
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return 0;
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err:
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return result;
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}
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static void *alloc_pgt_page(void *data)
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{
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struct kimage *image = (struct kimage *)data;
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struct page *page;
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void *p = NULL;
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page = kimage_alloc_control_pages(image, 0);
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if (page) {
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p = page_address(page);
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clear_page(p);
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}
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return p;
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}
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static int init_pgtable(struct kimage *image, unsigned long start_pgtable)
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{
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struct x86_mapping_info info = {
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.alloc_pgt_page = alloc_pgt_page,
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.context = image,
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.page_flag = __PAGE_KERNEL_LARGE_EXEC,
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.kernpg_flag = _KERNPG_TABLE_NOENC,
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};
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unsigned long mstart, mend;
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pgd_t *level4p;
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int result;
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int i;
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level4p = (pgd_t *)__va(start_pgtable);
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clear_page(level4p);
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if (sev_active()) {
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info.page_flag |= _PAGE_ENC;
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info.kernpg_flag |= _PAGE_ENC;
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}
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if (direct_gbpages)
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info.direct_gbpages = true;
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for (i = 0; i < nr_pfn_mapped; i++) {
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mstart = pfn_mapped[i].start << PAGE_SHIFT;
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mend = pfn_mapped[i].end << PAGE_SHIFT;
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result = kernel_ident_mapping_init(&info,
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level4p, mstart, mend);
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if (result)
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return result;
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}
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/*
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* segments's mem ranges could be outside 0 ~ max_pfn,
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* for example when jump back to original kernel from kexeced kernel.
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* or first kernel is booted with user mem map, and second kernel
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* could be loaded out of that range.
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*/
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for (i = 0; i < image->nr_segments; i++) {
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mstart = image->segment[i].mem;
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mend = mstart + image->segment[i].memsz;
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result = kernel_ident_mapping_init(&info,
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level4p, mstart, mend);
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if (result)
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return result;
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}
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/*
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* Prepare EFI systab and ACPI tables for kexec kernel since they are
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* not covered by pfn_mapped.
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*/
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result = map_efi_systab(&info, level4p);
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if (result)
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return result;
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result = map_acpi_tables(&info, level4p);
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if (result)
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return result;
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return init_transition_pgtable(image, level4p);
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}
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static void set_idt(void *newidt, u16 limit)
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{
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struct desc_ptr curidt;
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/* x86-64 supports unaliged loads & stores */
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curidt.size = limit;
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curidt.address = (unsigned long)newidt;
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__asm__ __volatile__ (
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"lidtq %0\n"
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: : "m" (curidt)
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);
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};
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static void set_gdt(void *newgdt, u16 limit)
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{
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struct desc_ptr curgdt;
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/* x86-64 supports unaligned loads & stores */
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curgdt.size = limit;
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curgdt.address = (unsigned long)newgdt;
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__asm__ __volatile__ (
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"lgdtq %0\n"
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: : "m" (curgdt)
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);
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};
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static void load_segments(void)
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{
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__asm__ __volatile__ (
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"\tmovl %0,%%ds\n"
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"\tmovl %0,%%es\n"
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"\tmovl %0,%%ss\n"
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"\tmovl %0,%%fs\n"
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"\tmovl %0,%%gs\n"
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: : "a" (__KERNEL_DS) : "memory"
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);
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}
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int machine_kexec_prepare(struct kimage *image)
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{
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unsigned long start_pgtable;
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int result;
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/* Calculate the offsets */
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start_pgtable = page_to_pfn(image->control_code_page) << PAGE_SHIFT;
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/* Setup the identity mapped 64bit page table */
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result = init_pgtable(image, start_pgtable);
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if (result)
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return result;
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return 0;
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}
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void machine_kexec_cleanup(struct kimage *image)
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{
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free_transition_pgtable(image);
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}
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/*
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* Do not allocate memory (or fail in any way) in machine_kexec().
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* We are past the point of no return, committed to rebooting now.
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*/
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void machine_kexec(struct kimage *image)
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{
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unsigned long page_list[PAGES_NR];
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void *control_page;
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int save_ftrace_enabled;
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#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_JUMP
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if (image->preserve_context)
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save_processor_state();
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#endif
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save_ftrace_enabled = __ftrace_enabled_save();
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/* Interrupts aren't acceptable while we reboot */
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local_irq_disable();
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hw_breakpoint_disable();
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if (image->preserve_context) {
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#ifdef CONFIG_X86_IO_APIC
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/*
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* We need to put APICs in legacy mode so that we can
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* get timer interrupts in second kernel. kexec/kdump
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* paths already have calls to restore_boot_irq_mode()
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* in one form or other. kexec jump path also need one.
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*/
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clear_IO_APIC();
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restore_boot_irq_mode();
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#endif
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}
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control_page = page_address(image->control_code_page) + PAGE_SIZE;
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memcpy(control_page, relocate_kernel, KEXEC_CONTROL_CODE_MAX_SIZE);
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page_list[PA_CONTROL_PAGE] = virt_to_phys(control_page);
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page_list[VA_CONTROL_PAGE] = (unsigned long)control_page;
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page_list[PA_TABLE_PAGE] =
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(unsigned long)__pa(page_address(image->control_code_page));
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if (image->type == KEXEC_TYPE_DEFAULT)
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page_list[PA_SWAP_PAGE] = (page_to_pfn(image->swap_page)
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<< PAGE_SHIFT);
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/*
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* The segment registers are funny things, they have both a
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* visible and an invisible part. Whenever the visible part is
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* set to a specific selector, the invisible part is loaded
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* with from a table in memory. At no other time is the
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* descriptor table in memory accessed.
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*
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* I take advantage of this here by force loading the
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* segments, before I zap the gdt with an invalid value.
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*/
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load_segments();
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/*
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* The gdt & idt are now invalid.
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* If you want to load them you must set up your own idt & gdt.
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*/
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set_gdt(phys_to_virt(0), 0);
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set_idt(phys_to_virt(0), 0);
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/* now call it */
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image->start = relocate_kernel((unsigned long)image->head,
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(unsigned long)page_list,
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image->start,
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image->preserve_context,
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sme_active());
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#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_JUMP
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if (image->preserve_context)
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restore_processor_state();
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#endif
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__ftrace_enabled_restore(save_ftrace_enabled);
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}
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void arch_crash_save_vmcoreinfo(void)
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{
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u64 sme_mask = sme_me_mask;
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VMCOREINFO_NUMBER(phys_base);
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VMCOREINFO_SYMBOL(init_top_pgt);
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vmcoreinfo_append_str("NUMBER(pgtable_l5_enabled)=%d\n",
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pgtable_l5_enabled());
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#ifdef CONFIG_NUMA
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VMCOREINFO_SYMBOL(node_data);
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VMCOREINFO_LENGTH(node_data, MAX_NUMNODES);
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#endif
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vmcoreinfo_append_str("KERNELOFFSET=%lx\n",
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kaslr_offset());
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VMCOREINFO_NUMBER(KERNEL_IMAGE_SIZE);
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VMCOREINFO_NUMBER(sme_mask);
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}
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/* arch-dependent functionality related to kexec file-based syscall */
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#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_FILE
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void *arch_kexec_kernel_image_load(struct kimage *image)
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{
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vfree(image->arch.elf_headers);
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image->arch.elf_headers = NULL;
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if (!image->fops || !image->fops->load)
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return ERR_PTR(-ENOEXEC);
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return image->fops->load(image, image->kernel_buf,
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image->kernel_buf_len, image->initrd_buf,
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image->initrd_buf_len, image->cmdline_buf,
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image->cmdline_buf_len);
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}
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/*
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* Apply purgatory relocations.
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*
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* @pi: Purgatory to be relocated.
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* @section: Section relocations applying to.
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* @relsec: Section containing RELAs.
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* @symtabsec: Corresponding symtab.
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*
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* TODO: Some of the code belongs to generic code. Move that in kexec.c.
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*/
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int arch_kexec_apply_relocations_add(struct purgatory_info *pi,
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Elf_Shdr *section, const Elf_Shdr *relsec,
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const Elf_Shdr *symtabsec)
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{
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unsigned int i;
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Elf64_Rela *rel;
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Elf64_Sym *sym;
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void *location;
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unsigned long address, sec_base, value;
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const char *strtab, *name, *shstrtab;
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const Elf_Shdr *sechdrs;
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/* String & section header string table */
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sechdrs = (void *)pi->ehdr + pi->ehdr->e_shoff;
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strtab = (char *)pi->ehdr + sechdrs[symtabsec->sh_link].sh_offset;
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shstrtab = (char *)pi->ehdr + sechdrs[pi->ehdr->e_shstrndx].sh_offset;
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rel = (void *)pi->ehdr + relsec->sh_offset;
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pr_debug("Applying relocate section %s to %u\n",
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shstrtab + relsec->sh_name, relsec->sh_info);
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for (i = 0; i < relsec->sh_size / sizeof(*rel); i++) {
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/*
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* rel[i].r_offset contains byte offset from beginning
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* of section to the storage unit affected.
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*
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* This is location to update. This is temporary buffer
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* where section is currently loaded. This will finally be
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* loaded to a different address later, pointed to by
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* ->sh_addr. kexec takes care of moving it
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* (kexec_load_segment()).
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*/
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location = pi->purgatory_buf;
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location += section->sh_offset;
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location += rel[i].r_offset;
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/* Final address of the location */
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address = section->sh_addr + rel[i].r_offset;
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/*
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* rel[i].r_info contains information about symbol table index
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* w.r.t which relocation must be made and type of relocation
|
|
* to apply. ELF64_R_SYM() and ELF64_R_TYPE() macros get
|
|
* these respectively.
|
|
*/
|
|
sym = (void *)pi->ehdr + symtabsec->sh_offset;
|
|
sym += ELF64_R_SYM(rel[i].r_info);
|
|
|
|
if (sym->st_name)
|
|
name = strtab + sym->st_name;
|
|
else
|
|
name = shstrtab + sechdrs[sym->st_shndx].sh_name;
|
|
|
|
pr_debug("Symbol: %s info: %02x shndx: %02x value=%llx size: %llx\n",
|
|
name, sym->st_info, sym->st_shndx, sym->st_value,
|
|
sym->st_size);
|
|
|
|
if (sym->st_shndx == SHN_UNDEF) {
|
|
pr_err("Undefined symbol: %s\n", name);
|
|
return -ENOEXEC;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (sym->st_shndx == SHN_COMMON) {
|
|
pr_err("symbol '%s' in common section\n", name);
|
|
return -ENOEXEC;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (sym->st_shndx == SHN_ABS)
|
|
sec_base = 0;
|
|
else if (sym->st_shndx >= pi->ehdr->e_shnum) {
|
|
pr_err("Invalid section %d for symbol %s\n",
|
|
sym->st_shndx, name);
|
|
return -ENOEXEC;
|
|
} else
|
|
sec_base = pi->sechdrs[sym->st_shndx].sh_addr;
|
|
|
|
value = sym->st_value;
|
|
value += sec_base;
|
|
value += rel[i].r_addend;
|
|
|
|
switch (ELF64_R_TYPE(rel[i].r_info)) {
|
|
case R_X86_64_NONE:
|
|
break;
|
|
case R_X86_64_64:
|
|
*(u64 *)location = value;
|
|
break;
|
|
case R_X86_64_32:
|
|
*(u32 *)location = value;
|
|
if (value != *(u32 *)location)
|
|
goto overflow;
|
|
break;
|
|
case R_X86_64_32S:
|
|
*(s32 *)location = value;
|
|
if ((s64)value != *(s32 *)location)
|
|
goto overflow;
|
|
break;
|
|
case R_X86_64_PC32:
|
|
case R_X86_64_PLT32:
|
|
value -= (u64)address;
|
|
*(u32 *)location = value;
|
|
break;
|
|
default:
|
|
pr_err("Unknown rela relocation: %llu\n",
|
|
ELF64_R_TYPE(rel[i].r_info));
|
|
return -ENOEXEC;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
overflow:
|
|
pr_err("Overflow in relocation type %d value 0x%lx\n",
|
|
(int)ELF64_R_TYPE(rel[i].r_info), value);
|
|
return -ENOEXEC;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_KEXEC_FILE */
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
kexec_mark_range(unsigned long start, unsigned long end, bool protect)
|
|
{
|
|
struct page *page;
|
|
unsigned int nr_pages;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* For physical range: [start, end]. We must skip the unassigned
|
|
* crashk resource with zero-valued "end" member.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!end || start > end)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
page = pfn_to_page(start >> PAGE_SHIFT);
|
|
nr_pages = (end >> PAGE_SHIFT) - (start >> PAGE_SHIFT) + 1;
|
|
if (protect)
|
|
return set_pages_ro(page, nr_pages);
|
|
else
|
|
return set_pages_rw(page, nr_pages);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void kexec_mark_crashkres(bool protect)
|
|
{
|
|
unsigned long control;
|
|
|
|
kexec_mark_range(crashk_low_res.start, crashk_low_res.end, protect);
|
|
|
|
/* Don't touch the control code page used in crash_kexec().*/
|
|
control = PFN_PHYS(page_to_pfn(kexec_crash_image->control_code_page));
|
|
/* Control code page is located in the 2nd page. */
|
|
kexec_mark_range(crashk_res.start, control + PAGE_SIZE - 1, protect);
|
|
control += KEXEC_CONTROL_PAGE_SIZE;
|
|
kexec_mark_range(control, crashk_res.end, protect);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void arch_kexec_protect_crashkres(void)
|
|
{
|
|
kexec_mark_crashkres(true);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void arch_kexec_unprotect_crashkres(void)
|
|
{
|
|
kexec_mark_crashkres(false);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* During a traditional boot under SME, SME will encrypt the kernel,
|
|
* so the SME kexec kernel also needs to be un-encrypted in order to
|
|
* replicate a normal SME boot.
|
|
*
|
|
* During a traditional boot under SEV, the kernel has already been
|
|
* loaded encrypted, so the SEV kexec kernel needs to be encrypted in
|
|
* order to replicate a normal SEV boot.
|
|
*/
|
|
int arch_kexec_post_alloc_pages(void *vaddr, unsigned int pages, gfp_t gfp)
|
|
{
|
|
if (sev_active())
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* If SME is active we need to be sure that kexec pages are
|
|
* not encrypted because when we boot to the new kernel the
|
|
* pages won't be accessed encrypted (initially).
|
|
*/
|
|
return set_memory_decrypted((unsigned long)vaddr, pages);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void arch_kexec_pre_free_pages(void *vaddr, unsigned int pages)
|
|
{
|
|
if (sev_active())
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* If SME is active we need to reset the pages back to being
|
|
* an encrypted mapping before freeing them.
|
|
*/
|
|
set_memory_encrypted((unsigned long)vaddr, pages);
|
|
}
|