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https://github.com/AuxXxilium/linux_dsm_epyc7002.git
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c1a85a00ea
This patch provides a general mechanism for passing flags to the security_capable LSM hook. It replaces the specific 'audit' flag that is used to tell security_capable whether it should log an audit message for the given capability check. The reason for generalizing this flag passing is so we can add an additional flag that signifies whether security_capable is being called by a setid syscall (which is needed by the proposed SafeSetID LSM). Signed-off-by: Micah Morton <mortonm@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
192 lines
5.2 KiB
C
192 lines
5.2 KiB
C
/*
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* AppArmor security module
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*
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* This file contains AppArmor resource mediation and attachment
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*
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* Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
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* Copyright 2009-2010 Canonical Ltd.
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*
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* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
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* modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
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* published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
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* License.
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*/
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#include <linux/audit.h>
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#include <linux/security.h>
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#include "include/audit.h"
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#include "include/cred.h"
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#include "include/resource.h"
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#include "include/policy.h"
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/*
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* Table of rlimit names: we generate it from resource.h.
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*/
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#include "rlim_names.h"
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struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_rlimit[] = {
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AA_SFS_FILE_STRING("mask", AA_SFS_RLIMIT_MASK),
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{ }
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};
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/* audit callback for resource specific fields */
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static void audit_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va)
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{
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struct common_audit_data *sa = va;
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audit_log_format(ab, " rlimit=%s value=%lu",
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rlim_names[aad(sa)->rlim.rlim], aad(sa)->rlim.max);
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if (aad(sa)->peer) {
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audit_log_format(ab, " peer=");
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aa_label_xaudit(ab, labels_ns(aad(sa)->label), aad(sa)->peer,
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FLAGS_NONE, GFP_ATOMIC);
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}
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}
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/**
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* audit_resource - audit setting resource limit
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* @profile: profile being enforced (NOT NULL)
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* @resource: rlimit being auditing
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* @value: value being set
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* @error: error value
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*
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* Returns: 0 or sa->error else other error code on failure
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*/
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static int audit_resource(struct aa_profile *profile, unsigned int resource,
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unsigned long value, struct aa_label *peer,
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const char *info, int error)
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{
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DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(sa, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE, OP_SETRLIMIT);
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aad(&sa)->rlim.rlim = resource;
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aad(&sa)->rlim.max = value;
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aad(&sa)->peer = peer;
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aad(&sa)->info = info;
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aad(&sa)->error = error;
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return aa_audit(AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUTO, profile, &sa, audit_cb);
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}
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/**
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* aa_map_resouce - map compiled policy resource to internal #
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* @resource: flattened policy resource number
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*
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* Returns: resource # for the current architecture.
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*
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* rlimit resource can vary based on architecture, map the compiled policy
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* resource # to the internal representation for the architecture.
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*/
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int aa_map_resource(int resource)
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{
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return rlim_map[resource];
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}
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static int profile_setrlimit(struct aa_profile *profile, unsigned int resource,
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struct rlimit *new_rlim)
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{
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int e = 0;
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if (profile->rlimits.mask & (1 << resource) && new_rlim->rlim_max >
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profile->rlimits.limits[resource].rlim_max)
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e = -EACCES;
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return audit_resource(profile, resource, new_rlim->rlim_max, NULL, NULL,
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e);
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}
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/**
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* aa_task_setrlimit - test permission to set an rlimit
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* @label - label confining the task (NOT NULL)
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* @task - task the resource is being set on
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* @resource - the resource being set
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* @new_rlim - the new resource limit (NOT NULL)
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*
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* Control raising the processes hard limit.
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*
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* Returns: 0 or error code if setting resource failed
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*/
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int aa_task_setrlimit(struct aa_label *label, struct task_struct *task,
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unsigned int resource, struct rlimit *new_rlim)
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{
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struct aa_profile *profile;
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struct aa_label *peer;
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int error = 0;
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rcu_read_lock();
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peer = aa_get_newest_cred_label(__task_cred(task));
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rcu_read_unlock();
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/* TODO: extend resource control to handle other (non current)
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* profiles. AppArmor rules currently have the implicit assumption
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* that the task is setting the resource of a task confined with
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* the same profile or that the task setting the resource of another
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* task has CAP_SYS_RESOURCE.
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*/
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if (label != peer &&
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aa_capable(label, CAP_SYS_RESOURCE, CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT) != 0)
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error = fn_for_each(label, profile,
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audit_resource(profile, resource,
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new_rlim->rlim_max, peer,
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"cap_sys_resource", -EACCES));
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else
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error = fn_for_each_confined(label, profile,
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profile_setrlimit(profile, resource, new_rlim));
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aa_put_label(peer);
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return error;
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}
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/**
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* __aa_transition_rlimits - apply new profile rlimits
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* @old_l: old label on task (NOT NULL)
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* @new_l: new label with rlimits to apply (NOT NULL)
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*/
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void __aa_transition_rlimits(struct aa_label *old_l, struct aa_label *new_l)
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{
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unsigned int mask = 0;
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struct rlimit *rlim, *initrlim;
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struct aa_profile *old, *new;
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struct label_it i;
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old = labels_profile(old_l);
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new = labels_profile(new_l);
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/* for any rlimits the profile controlled, reset the soft limit
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* to the lesser of the tasks hard limit and the init tasks soft limit
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*/
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label_for_each_confined(i, old_l, old) {
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if (old->rlimits.mask) {
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int j;
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for (j = 0, mask = 1; j < RLIM_NLIMITS; j++,
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mask <<= 1) {
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if (old->rlimits.mask & mask) {
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rlim = current->signal->rlim + j;
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initrlim = init_task.signal->rlim + j;
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rlim->rlim_cur = min(rlim->rlim_max,
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initrlim->rlim_cur);
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}
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}
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}
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}
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/* set any new hard limits as dictated by the new profile */
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label_for_each_confined(i, new_l, new) {
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int j;
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if (!new->rlimits.mask)
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continue;
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for (j = 0, mask = 1; j < RLIM_NLIMITS; j++, mask <<= 1) {
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if (!(new->rlimits.mask & mask))
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continue;
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rlim = current->signal->rlim + j;
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rlim->rlim_max = min(rlim->rlim_max,
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new->rlimits.limits[j].rlim_max);
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/* soft limit should not exceed hard limit */
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rlim->rlim_cur = min(rlim->rlim_cur, rlim->rlim_max);
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}
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}
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}
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