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https://github.com/AuxXxilium/linux_dsm_epyc7002.git
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453431a549
As said by Linus: A symmetric naming is only helpful if it implies symmetries in use. Otherwise it's actively misleading. In "kzalloc()", the z is meaningful and an important part of what the caller wants. In "kzfree()", the z is actively detrimental, because maybe in the future we really _might_ want to use that "memfill(0xdeadbeef)" or something. The "zero" part of the interface isn't even _relevant_. The main reason that kzfree() exists is to clear sensitive information that should not be leaked to other future users of the same memory objects. Rename kzfree() to kfree_sensitive() to follow the example of the recently added kvfree_sensitive() and make the intention of the API more explicit. In addition, memzero_explicit() is used to clear the memory to make sure that it won't get optimized away by the compiler. The renaming is done by using the command sequence: git grep -w --name-only kzfree |\ xargs sed -i 's/kzfree/kfree_sensitive/' followed by some editing of the kfree_sensitive() kerneldoc and adding a kzfree backward compatibility macro in slab.h. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fs/crypto/inline_crypt.c needs linux/slab.h] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix fs/crypto/inline_crypt.c some more] Suggested-by: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com> Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com> Cc: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Cc: "Jason A . Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200616154311.12314-3-longman@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
295 lines
6.6 KiB
C
295 lines
6.6 KiB
C
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
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/* Large capacity key type
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*
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* Copyright (C) 2017-2020 Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>. All Rights Reserved.
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* Copyright (C) 2013 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
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* Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
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*/
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#define pr_fmt(fmt) "big_key: "fmt
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#include <linux/init.h>
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#include <linux/seq_file.h>
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#include <linux/file.h>
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#include <linux/shmem_fs.h>
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#include <linux/err.h>
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#include <linux/random.h>
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#include <keys/user-type.h>
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#include <keys/big_key-type.h>
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#include <crypto/chacha20poly1305.h>
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/*
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* Layout of key payload words.
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*/
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enum {
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big_key_data,
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big_key_path,
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big_key_path_2nd_part,
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big_key_len,
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};
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/*
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* If the data is under this limit, there's no point creating a shm file to
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* hold it as the permanently resident metadata for the shmem fs will be at
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* least as large as the data.
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*/
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#define BIG_KEY_FILE_THRESHOLD (sizeof(struct inode) + sizeof(struct dentry))
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/*
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* big_key defined keys take an arbitrary string as the description and an
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* arbitrary blob of data as the payload
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*/
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struct key_type key_type_big_key = {
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.name = "big_key",
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.preparse = big_key_preparse,
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.free_preparse = big_key_free_preparse,
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.instantiate = generic_key_instantiate,
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.revoke = big_key_revoke,
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.destroy = big_key_destroy,
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.describe = big_key_describe,
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.read = big_key_read,
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.update = big_key_update,
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};
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/*
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* Preparse a big key
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*/
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int big_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
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{
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struct path *path = (struct path *)&prep->payload.data[big_key_path];
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struct file *file;
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u8 *buf, *enckey;
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ssize_t written;
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size_t datalen = prep->datalen;
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size_t enclen = datalen + CHACHA20POLY1305_AUTHTAG_SIZE;
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int ret;
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if (datalen <= 0 || datalen > 1024 * 1024 || !prep->data)
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return -EINVAL;
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/* Set an arbitrary quota */
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prep->quotalen = 16;
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prep->payload.data[big_key_len] = (void *)(unsigned long)datalen;
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if (datalen > BIG_KEY_FILE_THRESHOLD) {
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/* Create a shmem file to store the data in. This will permit the data
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* to be swapped out if needed.
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*
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* File content is stored encrypted with randomly generated key.
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* Since the key is random for each file, we can set the nonce
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* to zero, provided we never define a ->update() call.
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*/
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loff_t pos = 0;
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buf = kvmalloc(enclen, GFP_KERNEL);
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if (!buf)
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return -ENOMEM;
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/* generate random key */
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enckey = kmalloc(CHACHA20POLY1305_KEY_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
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if (!enckey) {
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ret = -ENOMEM;
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goto error;
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}
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ret = get_random_bytes_wait(enckey, CHACHA20POLY1305_KEY_SIZE);
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if (unlikely(ret))
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goto err_enckey;
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/* encrypt data */
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chacha20poly1305_encrypt(buf, prep->data, datalen, NULL, 0,
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0, enckey);
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/* save aligned data to file */
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file = shmem_kernel_file_setup("", enclen, 0);
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if (IS_ERR(file)) {
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ret = PTR_ERR(file);
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goto err_enckey;
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}
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written = kernel_write(file, buf, enclen, &pos);
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if (written != enclen) {
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ret = written;
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if (written >= 0)
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ret = -EIO;
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goto err_fput;
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}
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/* Pin the mount and dentry to the key so that we can open it again
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* later
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*/
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prep->payload.data[big_key_data] = enckey;
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*path = file->f_path;
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path_get(path);
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fput(file);
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memzero_explicit(buf, enclen);
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kvfree(buf);
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} else {
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/* Just store the data in a buffer */
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void *data = kmalloc(datalen, GFP_KERNEL);
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if (!data)
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return -ENOMEM;
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prep->payload.data[big_key_data] = data;
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memcpy(data, prep->data, prep->datalen);
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}
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return 0;
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err_fput:
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fput(file);
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err_enckey:
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kfree_sensitive(enckey);
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error:
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memzero_explicit(buf, enclen);
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kvfree(buf);
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return ret;
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}
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/*
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* Clear preparsement.
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*/
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void big_key_free_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
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{
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if (prep->datalen > BIG_KEY_FILE_THRESHOLD) {
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struct path *path = (struct path *)&prep->payload.data[big_key_path];
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path_put(path);
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}
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kfree_sensitive(prep->payload.data[big_key_data]);
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}
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/*
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* dispose of the links from a revoked keyring
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* - called with the key sem write-locked
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*/
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void big_key_revoke(struct key *key)
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{
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struct path *path = (struct path *)&key->payload.data[big_key_path];
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/* clear the quota */
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key_payload_reserve(key, 0);
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if (key_is_positive(key) &&
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(size_t)key->payload.data[big_key_len] > BIG_KEY_FILE_THRESHOLD)
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vfs_truncate(path, 0);
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}
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/*
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* dispose of the data dangling from the corpse of a big_key key
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*/
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void big_key_destroy(struct key *key)
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{
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size_t datalen = (size_t)key->payload.data[big_key_len];
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if (datalen > BIG_KEY_FILE_THRESHOLD) {
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struct path *path = (struct path *)&key->payload.data[big_key_path];
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path_put(path);
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path->mnt = NULL;
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path->dentry = NULL;
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}
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kfree_sensitive(key->payload.data[big_key_data]);
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key->payload.data[big_key_data] = NULL;
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}
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/*
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* Update a big key
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*/
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int big_key_update(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
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{
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int ret;
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ret = key_payload_reserve(key, prep->datalen);
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if (ret < 0)
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return ret;
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if (key_is_positive(key))
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big_key_destroy(key);
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return generic_key_instantiate(key, prep);
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}
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/*
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* describe the big_key key
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*/
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void big_key_describe(const struct key *key, struct seq_file *m)
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{
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size_t datalen = (size_t)key->payload.data[big_key_len];
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seq_puts(m, key->description);
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if (key_is_positive(key))
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seq_printf(m, ": %zu [%s]",
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datalen,
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datalen > BIG_KEY_FILE_THRESHOLD ? "file" : "buff");
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}
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/*
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* read the key data
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* - the key's semaphore is read-locked
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*/
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long big_key_read(const struct key *key, char *buffer, size_t buflen)
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{
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size_t datalen = (size_t)key->payload.data[big_key_len];
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long ret;
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if (!buffer || buflen < datalen)
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return datalen;
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if (datalen > BIG_KEY_FILE_THRESHOLD) {
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struct path *path = (struct path *)&key->payload.data[big_key_path];
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struct file *file;
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u8 *buf, *enckey = (u8 *)key->payload.data[big_key_data];
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size_t enclen = datalen + CHACHA20POLY1305_AUTHTAG_SIZE;
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loff_t pos = 0;
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buf = kvmalloc(enclen, GFP_KERNEL);
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if (!buf)
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return -ENOMEM;
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file = dentry_open(path, O_RDONLY, current_cred());
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if (IS_ERR(file)) {
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ret = PTR_ERR(file);
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goto error;
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}
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/* read file to kernel and decrypt */
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ret = kernel_read(file, buf, enclen, &pos);
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if (ret != enclen) {
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if (ret >= 0)
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ret = -EIO;
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goto err_fput;
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}
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ret = chacha20poly1305_decrypt(buf, buf, enclen, NULL, 0, 0,
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enckey) ? 0 : -EBADMSG;
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if (unlikely(ret))
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goto err_fput;
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ret = datalen;
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/* copy out decrypted data */
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memcpy(buffer, buf, datalen);
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err_fput:
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fput(file);
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error:
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memzero_explicit(buf, enclen);
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kvfree(buf);
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} else {
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ret = datalen;
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memcpy(buffer, key->payload.data[big_key_data], datalen);
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}
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return ret;
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}
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/*
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* Register key type
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*/
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static int __init big_key_init(void)
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{
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return register_key_type(&key_type_big_key);
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}
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late_initcall(big_key_init);
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