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4e7c22d447
The issue is that the stack for processes is not properly randomized on
64 bit architectures due to an integer overflow.
The affected function is randomize_stack_top() in file
"fs/binfmt_elf.c":
static unsigned long randomize_stack_top(unsigned long stack_top)
{
unsigned int random_variable = 0;
if ((current->flags & PF_RANDOMIZE) &&
!(current->personality & ADDR_NO_RANDOMIZE)) {
random_variable = get_random_int() & STACK_RND_MASK;
random_variable <<= PAGE_SHIFT;
}
return PAGE_ALIGN(stack_top) + random_variable;
return PAGE_ALIGN(stack_top) - random_variable;
}
Note that, it declares the "random_variable" variable as "unsigned int".
Since the result of the shifting operation between STACK_RND_MASK (which
is 0x3fffff on x86_64, 22 bits) and PAGE_SHIFT (which is 12 on x86_64):
random_variable <<= PAGE_SHIFT;
then the two leftmost bits are dropped when storing the result in the
"random_variable". This variable shall be at least 34 bits long to hold
the (22+12) result.
These two dropped bits have an impact on the entropy of process stack.
Concretely, the total stack entropy is reduced by four: from 2^28 to
2^30 (One fourth of expected entropy).
This patch restores back the entropy by correcting the types involved
in the operations in the functions randomize_stack_top() and
stack_maxrandom_size().
The successful fix can be tested with:
$ for i in `seq 1 10`; do cat /proc/self/maps | grep stack; done
7ffeda566000-7ffeda587000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [stack]
7fff5a332000-7fff5a353000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [stack]
7ffcdb7a1000-7ffcdb7c2000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [stack]
7ffd5e2c4000-7ffd5e2e5000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [stack]
...
Once corrected, the leading bytes should be between 7ffc and 7fff,
rather than always being 7fff.
Signed-off-by: Hector Marco-Gisbert <hecmargi@upv.es>
Signed-off-by: Ismael Ripoll <iripoll@upv.es>
[ Rebased, fixed 80 char bugs, cleaned up commit message, added test example and CVE ]
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Fixes: CVE-2015-1593
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20150214173350.GA18393@www.outflux.net
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
125 lines
3.1 KiB
C
125 lines
3.1 KiB
C
/*
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* Flexible mmap layout support
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*
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* Based on code by Ingo Molnar and Andi Kleen, copyrighted
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* as follows:
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*
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* Copyright 2003-2009 Red Hat Inc.
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* All Rights Reserved.
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* Copyright 2005 Andi Kleen, SUSE Labs.
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* Copyright 2007 Jiri Kosina, SUSE Labs.
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*
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* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
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* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
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* the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
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* (at your option) any later version.
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*
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* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
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* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
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* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
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* GNU General Public License for more details.
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*
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* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
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* along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
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* Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA
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*/
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#include <linux/personality.h>
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#include <linux/mm.h>
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#include <linux/random.h>
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#include <linux/limits.h>
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#include <linux/sched.h>
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#include <asm/elf.h>
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struct va_alignment __read_mostly va_align = {
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.flags = -1,
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};
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static unsigned long stack_maxrandom_size(void)
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{
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unsigned long max = 0;
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if ((current->flags & PF_RANDOMIZE) &&
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!(current->personality & ADDR_NO_RANDOMIZE)) {
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max = ((-1UL) & STACK_RND_MASK) << PAGE_SHIFT;
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}
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return max;
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}
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/*
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* Top of mmap area (just below the process stack).
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*
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* Leave an at least ~128 MB hole with possible stack randomization.
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*/
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#define MIN_GAP (128*1024*1024UL + stack_maxrandom_size())
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#define MAX_GAP (TASK_SIZE/6*5)
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static int mmap_is_legacy(void)
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{
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if (current->personality & ADDR_COMPAT_LAYOUT)
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return 1;
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if (rlimit(RLIMIT_STACK) == RLIM_INFINITY)
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return 1;
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return sysctl_legacy_va_layout;
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}
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static unsigned long mmap_rnd(void)
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{
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unsigned long rnd = 0;
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/*
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* 8 bits of randomness in 32bit mmaps, 20 address space bits
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* 28 bits of randomness in 64bit mmaps, 40 address space bits
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*/
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if (current->flags & PF_RANDOMIZE) {
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if (mmap_is_ia32())
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rnd = get_random_int() % (1<<8);
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else
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rnd = get_random_int() % (1<<28);
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}
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return rnd << PAGE_SHIFT;
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}
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static unsigned long mmap_base(void)
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{
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unsigned long gap = rlimit(RLIMIT_STACK);
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if (gap < MIN_GAP)
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gap = MIN_GAP;
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else if (gap > MAX_GAP)
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gap = MAX_GAP;
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return PAGE_ALIGN(TASK_SIZE - gap - mmap_rnd());
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}
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/*
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* Bottom-up (legacy) layout on X86_32 did not support randomization, X86_64
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* does, but not when emulating X86_32
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*/
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static unsigned long mmap_legacy_base(void)
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{
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if (mmap_is_ia32())
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return TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE;
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else
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return TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE + mmap_rnd();
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}
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/*
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* This function, called very early during the creation of a new
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* process VM image, sets up which VM layout function to use:
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*/
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void arch_pick_mmap_layout(struct mm_struct *mm)
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{
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mm->mmap_legacy_base = mmap_legacy_base();
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mm->mmap_base = mmap_base();
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if (mmap_is_legacy()) {
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mm->mmap_base = mm->mmap_legacy_base;
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mm->get_unmapped_area = arch_get_unmapped_area;
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} else {
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mm->get_unmapped_area = arch_get_unmapped_area_topdown;
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}
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}
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