linux_dsm_epyc7002/include/linux/namei.h
Aleksa Sarai 4b99d49969 namei: LOOKUP_NO_MAGICLINKS: block magic-link resolution
/* Background. */
There has always been a special class of symlink-like objects in procfs
(and a few other pseudo-filesystems) which allow for non-lexical
resolution of paths using nd_jump_link(). These "magic-links" do not
follow traditional mount namespace boundaries, and have been used
consistently in container escape attacks because they can be used to
trick unsuspecting privileged processes into resolving unexpected paths.

It is also non-trivial for userspace to unambiguously avoid resolving
magic-links, because they do not have a reliable indication that they
are a magic-link (in order to verify them you'd have to manually open
the path given by readlink(2) and then verify that the two file
descriptors reference the same underlying file, which is plagued with
possible race conditions or supplementary attack scenarios).

It would therefore be very helpful for userspace to be able to avoid
these symlinks easily, thus hopefully removing a tool from attackers'
toolboxes.

This is part of a refresh of Al's AT_NO_JUMPS patchset[1] (which was a
variation on David Drysdale's O_BENEATH patchset[2], which in turn was
based on the Capsicum project[3]).

/* Userspace API. */
LOOKUP_NO_MAGICLINKS will be exposed to userspace through openat2(2).

/* Semantics. */
Unlike most other LOOKUP flags (most notably LOOKUP_FOLLOW),
LOOKUP_NO_MAGICLINKS applies to all components of the path.

With LOOKUP_NO_MAGICLINKS, any magic-link path component encountered
during path resolution will yield -ELOOP. The handling of ~LOOKUP_FOLLOW
for a trailing magic-link is identical to LOOKUP_NO_SYMLINKS.

LOOKUP_NO_SYMLINKS implies LOOKUP_NO_MAGICLINKS.

/* Testing. */
LOOKUP_NO_MAGICLINKS is tested as part of the openat2(2) selftests.

[1]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20170429220414.GT29622@ZenIV.linux.org.uk/
[2]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/1415094884-18349-1-git-send-email-drysdale@google.com/
[3]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/1404124096-21445-1-git-send-email-drysdale@google.com/

Cc: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Suggested-by: David Drysdale <drysdale@google.com>
Suggested-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Suggested-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2019-12-08 19:09:40 -05:00

100 lines
3.5 KiB
C

/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
#ifndef _LINUX_NAMEI_H
#define _LINUX_NAMEI_H
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/path.h>
#include <linux/fcntl.h>
#include <linux/errno.h>
enum { MAX_NESTED_LINKS = 8 };
#define MAXSYMLINKS 40
/*
* Type of the last component on LOOKUP_PARENT
*/
enum {LAST_NORM, LAST_ROOT, LAST_DOT, LAST_DOTDOT, LAST_BIND};
/* pathwalk mode */
#define LOOKUP_FOLLOW 0x0001 /* follow links at the end */
#define LOOKUP_DIRECTORY 0x0002 /* require a directory */
#define LOOKUP_AUTOMOUNT 0x0004 /* force terminal automount */
#define LOOKUP_EMPTY 0x4000 /* accept empty path [user_... only] */
#define LOOKUP_DOWN 0x8000 /* follow mounts in the starting point */
#define LOOKUP_REVAL 0x0020 /* tell ->d_revalidate() to trust no cache */
#define LOOKUP_RCU 0x0040 /* RCU pathwalk mode; semi-internal */
/* These tell filesystem methods that we are dealing with the final component... */
#define LOOKUP_OPEN 0x0100 /* ... in open */
#define LOOKUP_CREATE 0x0200 /* ... in object creation */
#define LOOKUP_EXCL 0x0400 /* ... in exclusive creation */
#define LOOKUP_RENAME_TARGET 0x0800 /* ... in destination of rename() */
/* internal use only */
#define LOOKUP_PARENT 0x0010
#define LOOKUP_NO_REVAL 0x0080
#define LOOKUP_JUMPED 0x1000
#define LOOKUP_ROOT 0x2000
#define LOOKUP_ROOT_GRABBED 0x0008
/* Scoping flags for lookup. */
#define LOOKUP_NO_SYMLINKS 0x010000 /* No symlink crossing. */
#define LOOKUP_NO_MAGICLINKS 0x020000 /* No nd_jump_link() crossing. */
extern int path_pts(struct path *path);
extern int user_path_at_empty(int, const char __user *, unsigned, struct path *, int *empty);
static inline int user_path_at(int dfd, const char __user *name, unsigned flags,
struct path *path)
{
return user_path_at_empty(dfd, name, flags, path, NULL);
}
extern int kern_path(const char *, unsigned, struct path *);
extern struct dentry *kern_path_create(int, const char *, struct path *, unsigned int);
extern struct dentry *user_path_create(int, const char __user *, struct path *, unsigned int);
extern void done_path_create(struct path *, struct dentry *);
extern struct dentry *kern_path_locked(const char *, struct path *);
extern int kern_path_mountpoint(int, const char *, struct path *, unsigned int);
extern struct dentry *try_lookup_one_len(const char *, struct dentry *, int);
extern struct dentry *lookup_one_len(const char *, struct dentry *, int);
extern struct dentry *lookup_one_len_unlocked(const char *, struct dentry *, int);
extern struct dentry *lookup_positive_unlocked(const char *, struct dentry *, int);
extern int follow_down_one(struct path *);
extern int follow_down(struct path *);
extern int follow_up(struct path *);
extern struct dentry *lock_rename(struct dentry *, struct dentry *);
extern void unlock_rename(struct dentry *, struct dentry *);
extern int __must_check nd_jump_link(struct path *path);
static inline void nd_terminate_link(void *name, size_t len, size_t maxlen)
{
((char *) name)[min(len, maxlen)] = '\0';
}
/**
* retry_estale - determine whether the caller should retry an operation
* @error: the error that would currently be returned
* @flags: flags being used for next lookup attempt
*
* Check to see if the error code was -ESTALE, and then determine whether
* to retry the call based on whether "flags" already has LOOKUP_REVAL set.
*
* Returns true if the caller should try the operation again.
*/
static inline bool
retry_estale(const long error, const unsigned int flags)
{
return error == -ESTALE && !(flags & LOOKUP_REVAL);
}
#endif /* _LINUX_NAMEI_H */