mirror of
https://github.com/AuxXxilium/linux_dsm_epyc7002.git
synced 2024-12-05 10:36:42 +07:00
e114e47377
Smack is the Simplified Mandatory Access Control Kernel. Smack implements mandatory access control (MAC) using labels attached to tasks and data containers, including files, SVIPC, and other tasks. Smack is a kernel based scheme that requires an absolute minimum of application support and a very small amount of configuration data. Smack uses extended attributes and provides a set of general mount options, borrowing technics used elsewhere. Smack uses netlabel for CIPSO labeling. Smack provides a pseudo-filesystem smackfs that is used for manipulation of system Smack attributes. The patch, patches for ls and sshd, a README, a startup script, and x86 binaries for ls and sshd are also available on http://www.schaufler-ca.com Development has been done using Fedora Core 7 in a virtual machine environment and on an old Sony laptop. Smack provides mandatory access controls based on the label attached to a task and the label attached to the object it is attempting to access. Smack labels are deliberately short (1-23 characters) text strings. Single character labels using special characters are reserved for system use. The only operation applied to Smack labels is equality comparison. No wildcards or expressions, regular or otherwise, are used. Smack labels are composed of printable characters and may not include "/". A file always gets the Smack label of the task that created it. Smack defines and uses these labels: "*" - pronounced "star" "_" - pronounced "floor" "^" - pronounced "hat" "?" - pronounced "huh" The access rules enforced by Smack are, in order: 1. Any access requested by a task labeled "*" is denied. 2. A read or execute access requested by a task labeled "^" is permitted. 3. A read or execute access requested on an object labeled "_" is permitted. 4. Any access requested on an object labeled "*" is permitted. 5. Any access requested by a task on an object with the same label is permitted. 6. Any access requested that is explicitly defined in the loaded rule set is permitted. 7. Any other access is denied. Rules may be explicitly defined by writing subject,object,access triples to /smack/load. Smack rule sets can be easily defined that describe Bell&LaPadula sensitivity, Biba integrity, and a variety of interesting configurations. Smack rule sets can be modified on the fly to accommodate changes in the operating environment or even the time of day. Some practical use cases: Hierarchical levels. The less common of the two usual uses for MLS systems is to define hierarchical levels, often unclassified, confidential, secret, and so on. To set up smack to support this, these rules could be defined: C Unclass rx S C rx S Unclass rx TS S rx TS C rx TS Unclass rx A TS process can read S, C, and Unclass data, but cannot write it. An S process can read C and Unclass. Note that specifying that TS can read S and S can read C does not imply TS can read C, it has to be explicitly stated. Non-hierarchical categories. This is the more common of the usual uses for an MLS system. Since the default rule is that a subject cannot access an object with a different label no access rules are required to implement compartmentalization. A case that the Bell & LaPadula policy does not allow is demonstrated with this Smack access rule: A case that Bell&LaPadula does not allow that Smack does: ESPN ABC r ABC ESPN r On my portable video device I have two applications, one that shows ABC programming and the other ESPN programming. ESPN wants to show me sport stories that show up as news, and ABC will only provide minimal information about a sports story if ESPN is covering it. Each side can look at the other's info, neither can change the other. Neither can see what FOX is up to, which is just as well all things considered. Another case that I especially like: SatData Guard w Guard Publish w A program running with the Guard label opens a UDP socket and accepts messages sent by a program running with a SatData label. The Guard program inspects the message to ensure it is wholesome and if it is sends it to a program running with the Publish label. This program then puts the information passed in an appropriate place. Note that the Guard program cannot write to a Publish file system object because file system semanitic require read as well as write. The four cases (categories, levels, mutual read, guardbox) here are all quite real, and problems I've been asked to solve over the years. The first two are easy to do with traditonal MLS systems while the last two you can't without invoking privilege, at least for a while. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Cc: Joshua Brindle <method@manicmethod.com> Cc: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: "Ahmed S. Darwish" <darwish.07@gmail.com> Cc: Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
498 lines
15 KiB
C
498 lines
15 KiB
C
/*
|
|
* This is <linux/capability.h>
|
|
*
|
|
* Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
|
|
* Alexander Kjeldaas <astor@guardian.no>
|
|
* with help from Aleph1, Roland Buresund and Andrew Main.
|
|
*
|
|
* See here for the libcap library ("POSIX draft" compliance):
|
|
*
|
|
* ftp://linux.kernel.org/pub/linux/libs/security/linux-privs/kernel-2.6/
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
#ifndef _LINUX_CAPABILITY_H
|
|
#define _LINUX_CAPABILITY_H
|
|
|
|
#include <linux/types.h>
|
|
|
|
struct task_struct;
|
|
|
|
/* User-level do most of the mapping between kernel and user
|
|
capabilities based on the version tag given by the kernel. The
|
|
kernel might be somewhat backwards compatible, but don't bet on
|
|
it. */
|
|
|
|
/* Note, cap_t, is defined by POSIX (draft) to be an "opaque" pointer to
|
|
a set of three capability sets. The transposition of 3*the
|
|
following structure to such a composite is better handled in a user
|
|
library since the draft standard requires the use of malloc/free
|
|
etc.. */
|
|
|
|
#define _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION_1 0x19980330
|
|
#define _LINUX_CAPABILITY_U32S_1 1
|
|
|
|
#define _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION_2 0x20071026
|
|
#define _LINUX_CAPABILITY_U32S_2 2
|
|
|
|
#define _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION_2
|
|
#define _LINUX_CAPABILITY_U32S _LINUX_CAPABILITY_U32S_2
|
|
|
|
typedef struct __user_cap_header_struct {
|
|
__u32 version;
|
|
int pid;
|
|
} __user *cap_user_header_t;
|
|
|
|
typedef struct __user_cap_data_struct {
|
|
__u32 effective;
|
|
__u32 permitted;
|
|
__u32 inheritable;
|
|
} __user *cap_user_data_t;
|
|
|
|
|
|
#define XATTR_CAPS_SUFFIX "capability"
|
|
#define XATTR_NAME_CAPS XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_CAPS_SUFFIX
|
|
|
|
#define VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK 0xFF000000
|
|
#define VFS_CAP_FLAGS_MASK ~VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK
|
|
#define VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE 0x000001
|
|
|
|
#define VFS_CAP_REVISION_1 0x01000000
|
|
#define VFS_CAP_U32_1 1
|
|
#define XATTR_CAPS_SZ_1 (sizeof(__le32)*(1 + 2*VFS_CAP_U32_1))
|
|
|
|
#define VFS_CAP_REVISION_2 0x02000000
|
|
#define VFS_CAP_U32_2 2
|
|
#define XATTR_CAPS_SZ_2 (sizeof(__le32)*(1 + 2*VFS_CAP_U32_2))
|
|
|
|
#define XATTR_CAPS_SZ XATTR_CAPS_SZ_2
|
|
#define VFS_CAP_U32 VFS_CAP_U32_2
|
|
#define VFS_CAP_REVISION VFS_CAP_REVISION_2
|
|
|
|
|
|
struct vfs_cap_data {
|
|
__le32 magic_etc; /* Little endian */
|
|
struct {
|
|
__le32 permitted; /* Little endian */
|
|
__le32 inheritable; /* Little endian */
|
|
} data[VFS_CAP_U32];
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
#ifdef __KERNEL__
|
|
|
|
typedef struct kernel_cap_struct {
|
|
__u32 cap[_LINUX_CAPABILITY_U32S];
|
|
} kernel_cap_t;
|
|
|
|
#define _USER_CAP_HEADER_SIZE (sizeof(struct __user_cap_header_struct))
|
|
#define _KERNEL_CAP_T_SIZE (sizeof(kernel_cap_t))
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
** POSIX-draft defined capabilities.
|
|
**/
|
|
|
|
/* In a system with the [_POSIX_CHOWN_RESTRICTED] option defined, this
|
|
overrides the restriction of changing file ownership and group
|
|
ownership. */
|
|
|
|
#define CAP_CHOWN 0
|
|
|
|
/* Override all DAC access, including ACL execute access if
|
|
[_POSIX_ACL] is defined. Excluding DAC access covered by
|
|
CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE. */
|
|
|
|
#define CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE 1
|
|
|
|
/* Overrides all DAC restrictions regarding read and search on files
|
|
and directories, including ACL restrictions if [_POSIX_ACL] is
|
|
defined. Excluding DAC access covered by CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE. */
|
|
|
|
#define CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH 2
|
|
|
|
/* Overrides all restrictions about allowed operations on files, where
|
|
file owner ID must be equal to the user ID, except where CAP_FSETID
|
|
is applicable. It doesn't override MAC and DAC restrictions. */
|
|
|
|
#define CAP_FOWNER 3
|
|
|
|
/* Overrides the following restrictions that the effective user ID
|
|
shall match the file owner ID when setting the S_ISUID and S_ISGID
|
|
bits on that file; that the effective group ID (or one of the
|
|
supplementary group IDs) shall match the file owner ID when setting
|
|
the S_ISGID bit on that file; that the S_ISUID and S_ISGID bits are
|
|
cleared on successful return from chown(2) (not implemented). */
|
|
|
|
#define CAP_FSETID 4
|
|
|
|
/* Overrides the restriction that the real or effective user ID of a
|
|
process sending a signal must match the real or effective user ID
|
|
of the process receiving the signal. */
|
|
|
|
#define CAP_KILL 5
|
|
|
|
/* Allows setgid(2) manipulation */
|
|
/* Allows setgroups(2) */
|
|
/* Allows forged gids on socket credentials passing. */
|
|
|
|
#define CAP_SETGID 6
|
|
|
|
/* Allows set*uid(2) manipulation (including fsuid). */
|
|
/* Allows forged pids on socket credentials passing. */
|
|
|
|
#define CAP_SETUID 7
|
|
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
** Linux-specific capabilities
|
|
**/
|
|
|
|
/* Without VFS support for capabilities:
|
|
* Transfer any capability in your permitted set to any pid,
|
|
* remove any capability in your permitted set from any pid
|
|
* With VFS support for capabilities (neither of above, but)
|
|
* Add any capability from current's capability bounding set
|
|
* to the current process' inheritable set
|
|
* Allow taking bits out of capability bounding set
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
#define CAP_SETPCAP 8
|
|
|
|
/* Allow modification of S_IMMUTABLE and S_APPEND file attributes */
|
|
|
|
#define CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE 9
|
|
|
|
/* Allows binding to TCP/UDP sockets below 1024 */
|
|
/* Allows binding to ATM VCIs below 32 */
|
|
|
|
#define CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE 10
|
|
|
|
/* Allow broadcasting, listen to multicast */
|
|
|
|
#define CAP_NET_BROADCAST 11
|
|
|
|
/* Allow interface configuration */
|
|
/* Allow administration of IP firewall, masquerading and accounting */
|
|
/* Allow setting debug option on sockets */
|
|
/* Allow modification of routing tables */
|
|
/* Allow setting arbitrary process / process group ownership on
|
|
sockets */
|
|
/* Allow binding to any address for transparent proxying */
|
|
/* Allow setting TOS (type of service) */
|
|
/* Allow setting promiscuous mode */
|
|
/* Allow clearing driver statistics */
|
|
/* Allow multicasting */
|
|
/* Allow read/write of device-specific registers */
|
|
/* Allow activation of ATM control sockets */
|
|
|
|
#define CAP_NET_ADMIN 12
|
|
|
|
/* Allow use of RAW sockets */
|
|
/* Allow use of PACKET sockets */
|
|
|
|
#define CAP_NET_RAW 13
|
|
|
|
/* Allow locking of shared memory segments */
|
|
/* Allow mlock and mlockall (which doesn't really have anything to do
|
|
with IPC) */
|
|
|
|
#define CAP_IPC_LOCK 14
|
|
|
|
/* Override IPC ownership checks */
|
|
|
|
#define CAP_IPC_OWNER 15
|
|
|
|
/* Insert and remove kernel modules - modify kernel without limit */
|
|
#define CAP_SYS_MODULE 16
|
|
|
|
/* Allow ioperm/iopl access */
|
|
/* Allow sending USB messages to any device via /proc/bus/usb */
|
|
|
|
#define CAP_SYS_RAWIO 17
|
|
|
|
/* Allow use of chroot() */
|
|
|
|
#define CAP_SYS_CHROOT 18
|
|
|
|
/* Allow ptrace() of any process */
|
|
|
|
#define CAP_SYS_PTRACE 19
|
|
|
|
/* Allow configuration of process accounting */
|
|
|
|
#define CAP_SYS_PACCT 20
|
|
|
|
/* Allow configuration of the secure attention key */
|
|
/* Allow administration of the random device */
|
|
/* Allow examination and configuration of disk quotas */
|
|
/* Allow configuring the kernel's syslog (printk behaviour) */
|
|
/* Allow setting the domainname */
|
|
/* Allow setting the hostname */
|
|
/* Allow calling bdflush() */
|
|
/* Allow mount() and umount(), setting up new smb connection */
|
|
/* Allow some autofs root ioctls */
|
|
/* Allow nfsservctl */
|
|
/* Allow VM86_REQUEST_IRQ */
|
|
/* Allow to read/write pci config on alpha */
|
|
/* Allow irix_prctl on mips (setstacksize) */
|
|
/* Allow flushing all cache on m68k (sys_cacheflush) */
|
|
/* Allow removing semaphores */
|
|
/* Used instead of CAP_CHOWN to "chown" IPC message queues, semaphores
|
|
and shared memory */
|
|
/* Allow locking/unlocking of shared memory segment */
|
|
/* Allow turning swap on/off */
|
|
/* Allow forged pids on socket credentials passing */
|
|
/* Allow setting readahead and flushing buffers on block devices */
|
|
/* Allow setting geometry in floppy driver */
|
|
/* Allow turning DMA on/off in xd driver */
|
|
/* Allow administration of md devices (mostly the above, but some
|
|
extra ioctls) */
|
|
/* Allow tuning the ide driver */
|
|
/* Allow access to the nvram device */
|
|
/* Allow administration of apm_bios, serial and bttv (TV) device */
|
|
/* Allow manufacturer commands in isdn CAPI support driver */
|
|
/* Allow reading non-standardized portions of pci configuration space */
|
|
/* Allow DDI debug ioctl on sbpcd driver */
|
|
/* Allow setting up serial ports */
|
|
/* Allow sending raw qic-117 commands */
|
|
/* Allow enabling/disabling tagged queuing on SCSI controllers and sending
|
|
arbitrary SCSI commands */
|
|
/* Allow setting encryption key on loopback filesystem */
|
|
/* Allow setting zone reclaim policy */
|
|
|
|
#define CAP_SYS_ADMIN 21
|
|
|
|
/* Allow use of reboot() */
|
|
|
|
#define CAP_SYS_BOOT 22
|
|
|
|
/* Allow raising priority and setting priority on other (different
|
|
UID) processes */
|
|
/* Allow use of FIFO and round-robin (realtime) scheduling on own
|
|
processes and setting the scheduling algorithm used by another
|
|
process. */
|
|
/* Allow setting cpu affinity on other processes */
|
|
|
|
#define CAP_SYS_NICE 23
|
|
|
|
/* Override resource limits. Set resource limits. */
|
|
/* Override quota limits. */
|
|
/* Override reserved space on ext2 filesystem */
|
|
/* Modify data journaling mode on ext3 filesystem (uses journaling
|
|
resources) */
|
|
/* NOTE: ext2 honors fsuid when checking for resource overrides, so
|
|
you can override using fsuid too */
|
|
/* Override size restrictions on IPC message queues */
|
|
/* Allow more than 64hz interrupts from the real-time clock */
|
|
/* Override max number of consoles on console allocation */
|
|
/* Override max number of keymaps */
|
|
|
|
#define CAP_SYS_RESOURCE 24
|
|
|
|
/* Allow manipulation of system clock */
|
|
/* Allow irix_stime on mips */
|
|
/* Allow setting the real-time clock */
|
|
|
|
#define CAP_SYS_TIME 25
|
|
|
|
/* Allow configuration of tty devices */
|
|
/* Allow vhangup() of tty */
|
|
|
|
#define CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG 26
|
|
|
|
/* Allow the privileged aspects of mknod() */
|
|
|
|
#define CAP_MKNOD 27
|
|
|
|
/* Allow taking of leases on files */
|
|
|
|
#define CAP_LEASE 28
|
|
|
|
#define CAP_AUDIT_WRITE 29
|
|
|
|
#define CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL 30
|
|
|
|
#define CAP_SETFCAP 31
|
|
|
|
/* Override MAC access.
|
|
The base kernel enforces no MAC policy.
|
|
An LSM may enforce a MAC policy, and if it does and it chooses
|
|
to implement capability based overrides of that policy, this is
|
|
the capability it should use to do so. */
|
|
|
|
#define CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE 32
|
|
|
|
/* Allow MAC configuration or state changes.
|
|
The base kernel requires no MAC configuration.
|
|
An LSM may enforce a MAC policy, and if it does and it chooses
|
|
to implement capability based checks on modifications to that
|
|
policy or the data required to maintain it, this is the
|
|
capability it should use to do so. */
|
|
|
|
#define CAP_MAC_ADMIN 33
|
|
|
|
#define CAP_LAST_CAP CAP_MAC_ADMIN
|
|
|
|
#define cap_valid(x) ((x) >= 0 && (x) <= CAP_LAST_CAP)
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Bit location of each capability (used by user-space library and kernel)
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
#define CAP_TO_INDEX(x) ((x) >> 5) /* 1 << 5 == bits in __u32 */
|
|
#define CAP_TO_MASK(x) (1 << ((x) & 31)) /* mask for indexed __u32 */
|
|
|
|
#ifdef __KERNEL__
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Internal kernel functions only
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
#define CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(__capi) \
|
|
for (__capi = 0; __capi < _LINUX_CAPABILITY_U32S; ++__capi)
|
|
|
|
# define CAP_FS_MASK_B0 (CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_CHOWN) \
|
|
| CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE) \
|
|
| CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH) \
|
|
| CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_FOWNER) \
|
|
| CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_FSETID))
|
|
|
|
# define CAP_FS_MASK_B1 (CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
|
|
|
|
#if _LINUX_CAPABILITY_U32S != 2
|
|
# error Fix up hand-coded capability macro initializers
|
|
#else /* HAND-CODED capability initializers */
|
|
|
|
# define CAP_EMPTY_SET {{ 0, 0 }}
|
|
# define CAP_FULL_SET {{ ~0, ~0 }}
|
|
# define CAP_INIT_EFF_SET {{ ~CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SETPCAP), ~0 }}
|
|
# define CAP_FS_SET {{ CAP_FS_MASK_B0, CAP_FS_MASK_B1 } }
|
|
# define CAP_NFSD_SET {{ CAP_FS_MASK_B0|CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE), \
|
|
CAP_FS_MASK_B1 } }
|
|
|
|
#endif /* _LINUX_CAPABILITY_U32S != 2 */
|
|
|
|
#define CAP_INIT_INH_SET CAP_EMPTY_SET
|
|
|
|
# define cap_clear(c) do { (c) = __cap_empty_set; } while (0)
|
|
# define cap_set_full(c) do { (c) = __cap_full_set; } while (0)
|
|
# define cap_set_init_eff(c) do { (c) = __cap_init_eff_set; } while (0)
|
|
|
|
#define cap_raise(c, flag) ((c).cap[CAP_TO_INDEX(flag)] |= CAP_TO_MASK(flag))
|
|
#define cap_lower(c, flag) ((c).cap[CAP_TO_INDEX(flag)] &= ~CAP_TO_MASK(flag))
|
|
#define cap_raised(c, flag) ((c).cap[CAP_TO_INDEX(flag)] & CAP_TO_MASK(flag))
|
|
|
|
#define CAP_BOP_ALL(c, a, b, OP) \
|
|
do { \
|
|
unsigned __capi; \
|
|
CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(__capi) { \
|
|
c.cap[__capi] = a.cap[__capi] OP b.cap[__capi]; \
|
|
} \
|
|
} while (0)
|
|
|
|
#define CAP_UOP_ALL(c, a, OP) \
|
|
do { \
|
|
unsigned __capi; \
|
|
CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(__capi) { \
|
|
c.cap[__capi] = OP a.cap[__capi]; \
|
|
} \
|
|
} while (0)
|
|
|
|
static inline kernel_cap_t cap_combine(const kernel_cap_t a,
|
|
const kernel_cap_t b)
|
|
{
|
|
kernel_cap_t dest;
|
|
CAP_BOP_ALL(dest, a, b, |);
|
|
return dest;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static inline kernel_cap_t cap_intersect(const kernel_cap_t a,
|
|
const kernel_cap_t b)
|
|
{
|
|
kernel_cap_t dest;
|
|
CAP_BOP_ALL(dest, a, b, &);
|
|
return dest;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static inline kernel_cap_t cap_drop(const kernel_cap_t a,
|
|
const kernel_cap_t drop)
|
|
{
|
|
kernel_cap_t dest;
|
|
CAP_BOP_ALL(dest, a, drop, &~);
|
|
return dest;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static inline kernel_cap_t cap_invert(const kernel_cap_t c)
|
|
{
|
|
kernel_cap_t dest;
|
|
CAP_UOP_ALL(dest, c, ~);
|
|
return dest;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static inline int cap_isclear(const kernel_cap_t a)
|
|
{
|
|
unsigned __capi;
|
|
CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(__capi) {
|
|
if (a.cap[__capi] != 0)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static inline int cap_issubset(const kernel_cap_t a, const kernel_cap_t set)
|
|
{
|
|
kernel_cap_t dest;
|
|
dest = cap_drop(a, set);
|
|
return cap_isclear(dest);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Used to decide between falling back on the old suser() or fsuser(). */
|
|
|
|
static inline int cap_is_fs_cap(int cap)
|
|
{
|
|
const kernel_cap_t __cap_fs_set = CAP_FS_SET;
|
|
return !!(CAP_TO_MASK(cap) & __cap_fs_set.cap[CAP_TO_INDEX(cap)]);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static inline kernel_cap_t cap_drop_fs_set(const kernel_cap_t a)
|
|
{
|
|
const kernel_cap_t __cap_fs_set = CAP_FS_SET;
|
|
return cap_drop(a, __cap_fs_set);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static inline kernel_cap_t cap_raise_fs_set(const kernel_cap_t a,
|
|
const kernel_cap_t permitted)
|
|
{
|
|
const kernel_cap_t __cap_fs_set = CAP_FS_SET;
|
|
return cap_combine(a,
|
|
cap_intersect(permitted, __cap_fs_set));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static inline kernel_cap_t cap_drop_nfsd_set(const kernel_cap_t a)
|
|
{
|
|
const kernel_cap_t __cap_fs_set = CAP_NFSD_SET;
|
|
return cap_drop(a, __cap_fs_set);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static inline kernel_cap_t cap_raise_nfsd_set(const kernel_cap_t a,
|
|
const kernel_cap_t permitted)
|
|
{
|
|
const kernel_cap_t __cap_nfsd_set = CAP_NFSD_SET;
|
|
return cap_combine(a,
|
|
cap_intersect(permitted, __cap_nfsd_set));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
extern const kernel_cap_t __cap_empty_set;
|
|
extern const kernel_cap_t __cap_full_set;
|
|
extern const kernel_cap_t __cap_init_eff_set;
|
|
|
|
int capable(int cap);
|
|
int __capable(struct task_struct *t, int cap);
|
|
|
|
extern long cap_prctl_drop(unsigned long cap);
|
|
|
|
#endif /* __KERNEL__ */
|
|
|
|
#endif /* !_LINUX_CAPABILITY_H */
|