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96d4f267e4
Nobody has actually used the type (VERIFY_READ vs VERIFY_WRITE) argument of the user address range verification function since we got rid of the old racy i386-only code to walk page tables by hand. It existed because the original 80386 would not honor the write protect bit when in kernel mode, so you had to do COW by hand before doing any user access. But we haven't supported that in a long time, and these days the 'type' argument is a purely historical artifact. A discussion about extending 'user_access_begin()' to do the range checking resulted this patch, because there is no way we're going to move the old VERIFY_xyz interface to that model. And it's best done at the end of the merge window when I've done most of my merges, so let's just get this done once and for all. This patch was mostly done with a sed-script, with manual fix-ups for the cases that weren't of the trivial 'access_ok(VERIFY_xyz' form. There were a couple of notable cases: - csky still had the old "verify_area()" name as an alias. - the iter_iov code had magical hardcoded knowledge of the actual values of VERIFY_{READ,WRITE} (not that they mattered, since nothing really used it) - microblaze used the type argument for a debug printout but other than those oddities this should be a total no-op patch. I tried to fix up all architectures, did fairly extensive grepping for access_ok() uses, and the changes are trivial, but I may have missed something. Any missed conversion should be trivially fixable, though. Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
296 lines
9.8 KiB
C
296 lines
9.8 KiB
C
/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
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#ifndef _ASM_IA64_UACCESS_H
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#define _ASM_IA64_UACCESS_H
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/*
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* This file defines various macros to transfer memory areas across
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* the user/kernel boundary. This needs to be done carefully because
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* this code is executed in kernel mode and uses user-specified
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* addresses. Thus, we need to be careful not to let the user to
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* trick us into accessing kernel memory that would normally be
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* inaccessible. This code is also fairly performance sensitive,
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* so we want to spend as little time doing safety checks as
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* possible.
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*
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* To make matters a bit more interesting, these macros sometimes also
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* called from within the kernel itself, in which case the address
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* validity check must be skipped. The get_fs() macro tells us what
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* to do: if get_fs()==USER_DS, checking is performed, if
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* get_fs()==KERNEL_DS, checking is bypassed.
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*
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* Note that even if the memory area specified by the user is in a
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* valid address range, it is still possible that we'll get a page
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* fault while accessing it. This is handled by filling out an
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* exception handler fixup entry for each instruction that has the
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* potential to fault. When such a fault occurs, the page fault
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* handler checks to see whether the faulting instruction has a fixup
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* associated and, if so, sets r8 to -EFAULT and clears r9 to 0 and
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* then resumes execution at the continuation point.
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*
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* Based on <asm-alpha/uaccess.h>.
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*
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* Copyright (C) 1998, 1999, 2001-2004 Hewlett-Packard Co
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* David Mosberger-Tang <davidm@hpl.hp.com>
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*/
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#include <linux/compiler.h>
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#include <linux/page-flags.h>
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#include <linux/mm.h>
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#include <asm/intrinsics.h>
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#include <asm/pgtable.h>
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#include <asm/io.h>
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#include <asm/extable.h>
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/*
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* For historical reasons, the following macros are grossly misnamed:
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*/
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#define KERNEL_DS ((mm_segment_t) { ~0UL }) /* cf. access_ok() */
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#define USER_DS ((mm_segment_t) { TASK_SIZE-1 }) /* cf. access_ok() */
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#define get_ds() (KERNEL_DS)
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#define get_fs() (current_thread_info()->addr_limit)
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#define set_fs(x) (current_thread_info()->addr_limit = (x))
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#define segment_eq(a, b) ((a).seg == (b).seg)
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/*
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* When accessing user memory, we need to make sure the entire area really is in
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* user-level space. In order to do this efficiently, we make sure that the page at
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* address TASK_SIZE is never valid. We also need to make sure that the address doesn't
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* point inside the virtually mapped linear page table.
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*/
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static inline int __access_ok(const void __user *p, unsigned long size)
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{
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unsigned long addr = (unsigned long)p;
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unsigned long seg = get_fs().seg;
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return likely(addr <= seg) &&
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(seg == KERNEL_DS.seg || likely(REGION_OFFSET(addr) < RGN_MAP_LIMIT));
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}
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#define access_ok(addr, size) __access_ok((addr), (size))
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/*
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* These are the main single-value transfer routines. They automatically
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* use the right size if we just have the right pointer type.
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*
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* Careful to not
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* (a) re-use the arguments for side effects (sizeof/typeof is ok)
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* (b) require any knowledge of processes at this stage
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*/
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#define put_user(x, ptr) __put_user_check((__typeof__(*(ptr))) (x), (ptr), sizeof(*(ptr)))
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#define get_user(x, ptr) __get_user_check((x), (ptr), sizeof(*(ptr)))
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/*
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* The "__xxx" versions do not do address space checking, useful when
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* doing multiple accesses to the same area (the programmer has to do the
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* checks by hand with "access_ok()")
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*/
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#define __put_user(x, ptr) __put_user_nocheck((__typeof__(*(ptr))) (x), (ptr), sizeof(*(ptr)))
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#define __get_user(x, ptr) __get_user_nocheck((x), (ptr), sizeof(*(ptr)))
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#ifdef ASM_SUPPORTED
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struct __large_struct { unsigned long buf[100]; };
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# define __m(x) (*(struct __large_struct __user *)(x))
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/* We need to declare the __ex_table section before we can use it in .xdata. */
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asm (".section \"__ex_table\", \"a\"\n\t.previous");
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# define __get_user_size(val, addr, n, err) \
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do { \
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register long __gu_r8 asm ("r8") = 0; \
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register long __gu_r9 asm ("r9"); \
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asm ("\n[1:]\tld"#n" %0=%2%P2\t// %0 and %1 get overwritten by exception handler\n" \
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"\t.xdata4 \"__ex_table\", 1b-., 1f-.+4\n" \
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"[1:]" \
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: "=r"(__gu_r9), "=r"(__gu_r8) : "m"(__m(addr)), "1"(__gu_r8)); \
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(err) = __gu_r8; \
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(val) = __gu_r9; \
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} while (0)
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/*
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* The "__put_user_size()" macro tells gcc it reads from memory instead of writing it. This
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* is because they do not write to any memory gcc knows about, so there are no aliasing
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* issues.
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*/
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# define __put_user_size(val, addr, n, err) \
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do { \
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register long __pu_r8 asm ("r8") = 0; \
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asm volatile ("\n[1:]\tst"#n" %1=%r2%P1\t// %0 gets overwritten by exception handler\n" \
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"\t.xdata4 \"__ex_table\", 1b-., 1f-.\n" \
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"[1:]" \
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: "=r"(__pu_r8) : "m"(__m(addr)), "rO"(val), "0"(__pu_r8)); \
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(err) = __pu_r8; \
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} while (0)
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#else /* !ASM_SUPPORTED */
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# define RELOC_TYPE 2 /* ip-rel */
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# define __get_user_size(val, addr, n, err) \
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do { \
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__ld_user("__ex_table", (unsigned long) addr, n, RELOC_TYPE); \
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(err) = ia64_getreg(_IA64_REG_R8); \
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(val) = ia64_getreg(_IA64_REG_R9); \
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} while (0)
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# define __put_user_size(val, addr, n, err) \
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do { \
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__st_user("__ex_table", (unsigned long) addr, n, RELOC_TYPE, \
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(__force unsigned long) (val)); \
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(err) = ia64_getreg(_IA64_REG_R8); \
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} while (0)
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#endif /* !ASM_SUPPORTED */
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extern void __get_user_unknown (void);
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/*
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* Evaluating arguments X, PTR, SIZE, and SEGMENT may involve subroutine-calls, which
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* could clobber r8 and r9 (among others). Thus, be careful not to evaluate it while
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* using r8/r9.
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*/
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#define __do_get_user(check, x, ptr, size) \
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({ \
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const __typeof__(*(ptr)) __user *__gu_ptr = (ptr); \
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__typeof__ (size) __gu_size = (size); \
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long __gu_err = -EFAULT; \
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unsigned long __gu_val = 0; \
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if (!check || __access_ok(__gu_ptr, size)) \
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switch (__gu_size) { \
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case 1: __get_user_size(__gu_val, __gu_ptr, 1, __gu_err); break; \
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case 2: __get_user_size(__gu_val, __gu_ptr, 2, __gu_err); break; \
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case 4: __get_user_size(__gu_val, __gu_ptr, 4, __gu_err); break; \
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case 8: __get_user_size(__gu_val, __gu_ptr, 8, __gu_err); break; \
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default: __get_user_unknown(); break; \
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} \
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(x) = (__force __typeof__(*(__gu_ptr))) __gu_val; \
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__gu_err; \
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})
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#define __get_user_nocheck(x, ptr, size) __do_get_user(0, x, ptr, size)
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#define __get_user_check(x, ptr, size) __do_get_user(1, x, ptr, size)
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extern void __put_user_unknown (void);
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/*
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* Evaluating arguments X, PTR, SIZE, and SEGMENT may involve subroutine-calls, which
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* could clobber r8 (among others). Thus, be careful not to evaluate them while using r8.
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*/
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#define __do_put_user(check, x, ptr, size) \
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({ \
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__typeof__ (x) __pu_x = (x); \
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__typeof__ (*(ptr)) __user *__pu_ptr = (ptr); \
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__typeof__ (size) __pu_size = (size); \
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long __pu_err = -EFAULT; \
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\
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if (!check || __access_ok(__pu_ptr, __pu_size)) \
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switch (__pu_size) { \
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case 1: __put_user_size(__pu_x, __pu_ptr, 1, __pu_err); break; \
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case 2: __put_user_size(__pu_x, __pu_ptr, 2, __pu_err); break; \
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case 4: __put_user_size(__pu_x, __pu_ptr, 4, __pu_err); break; \
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case 8: __put_user_size(__pu_x, __pu_ptr, 8, __pu_err); break; \
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default: __put_user_unknown(); break; \
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} \
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__pu_err; \
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})
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#define __put_user_nocheck(x, ptr, size) __do_put_user(0, x, ptr, size)
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#define __put_user_check(x, ptr, size) __do_put_user(1, x, ptr, size)
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/*
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* Complex access routines
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*/
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extern unsigned long __must_check __copy_user (void __user *to, const void __user *from,
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unsigned long count);
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static inline unsigned long
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raw_copy_to_user(void __user *to, const void *from, unsigned long count)
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{
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return __copy_user(to, (__force void __user *) from, count);
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}
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static inline unsigned long
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raw_copy_from_user(void *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long count)
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{
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return __copy_user((__force void __user *) to, from, count);
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}
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#define INLINE_COPY_FROM_USER
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#define INLINE_COPY_TO_USER
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extern unsigned long __do_clear_user (void __user *, unsigned long);
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#define __clear_user(to, n) __do_clear_user(to, n)
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#define clear_user(to, n) \
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({ \
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unsigned long __cu_len = (n); \
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if (__access_ok(to, __cu_len)) \
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__cu_len = __do_clear_user(to, __cu_len); \
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__cu_len; \
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})
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/*
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* Returns: -EFAULT if exception before terminator, N if the entire buffer filled, else
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* strlen.
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*/
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extern long __must_check __strncpy_from_user (char *to, const char __user *from, long to_len);
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#define strncpy_from_user(to, from, n) \
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({ \
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const char __user * __sfu_from = (from); \
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long __sfu_ret = -EFAULT; \
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if (__access_ok(__sfu_from, 0)) \
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__sfu_ret = __strncpy_from_user((to), __sfu_from, (n)); \
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__sfu_ret; \
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})
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/*
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* Returns: 0 if exception before NUL or reaching the supplied limit
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* (N), a value greater than N if the limit would be exceeded, else
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* strlen.
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*/
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extern unsigned long __strnlen_user (const char __user *, long);
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#define strnlen_user(str, len) \
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({ \
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const char __user *__su_str = (str); \
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unsigned long __su_ret = 0; \
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if (__access_ok(__su_str, 0)) \
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__su_ret = __strnlen_user(__su_str, len); \
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__su_ret; \
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})
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#define ARCH_HAS_TRANSLATE_MEM_PTR 1
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static __inline__ void *
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xlate_dev_mem_ptr(phys_addr_t p)
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{
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struct page *page;
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void *ptr;
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page = pfn_to_page(p >> PAGE_SHIFT);
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if (PageUncached(page))
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ptr = (void *)p + __IA64_UNCACHED_OFFSET;
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else
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ptr = __va(p);
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return ptr;
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}
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/*
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* Convert a virtual cached kernel memory pointer to an uncached pointer
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*/
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static __inline__ void *
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xlate_dev_kmem_ptr(void *p)
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{
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struct page *page;
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void *ptr;
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page = virt_to_page((unsigned long)p);
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if (PageUncached(page))
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ptr = (void *)__pa(p) + __IA64_UNCACHED_OFFSET;
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else
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ptr = p;
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return ptr;
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}
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#endif /* _ASM_IA64_UACCESS_H */
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