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https://github.com/AuxXxilium/linux_dsm_epyc7002.git
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2f97967503
Since commit b89d82ef01
("arm64: kpti: Avoid rewriting early page
tables when KASLR is enabled"), a kernel built with CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE
can decide early whether to use non-global mappings by checking the
kaslr_offset().
A kernel built without CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE, instead checks the
cpufeature static-key.
This leaves a gap where CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE was enabled, no
kaslr seed was provided, but kpti was forced on using the cmdline
option.
When the decision is made late, kpti_install_ng_mappings() will re-write
the page tables, but arm64_kernel_use_ng_mappings()'s value does not
change as it only tests the cpufeature static-key if
CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE is disabled.
This function influences PROT_DEFAULT via PTE_MAYBE_NG, and causes
pgattr_change_is_safe() to catch nG->G transitions when the unchanged
PROT_DEFAULT is used as part of PAGE_KERNEL_RO:
[ 1.942255] alternatives: patching kernel code
[ 1.998288] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 2.000693] kernel BUG at arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c:165!
[ 2.019215] Internal error: Oops - BUG: 0 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
[ 2.020257] Modules linked in:
[ 2.020807] CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 5.0.0-rc2 #51
[ 2.021917] Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
[ 2.022790] pstate: 40000005 (nZcv daif -PAN -UAO)
[ 2.023742] pc : __create_pgd_mapping+0x508/0x6d0
[ 2.024671] lr : __create_pgd_mapping+0x500/0x6d0
[ 2.058059] Process swapper/0 (pid: 1, stack limit = 0x(____ptrval____))
[ 2.059369] Call trace:
[ 2.059845] __create_pgd_mapping+0x508/0x6d0
[ 2.060684] update_mapping_prot+0x48/0xd0
[ 2.061477] mark_linear_text_alias_ro+0xdc/0xe4
[ 2.070502] smp_cpus_done+0x90/0x98
[ 2.071216] smp_init+0x100/0x114
[ 2.071878] kernel_init_freeable+0xd4/0x220
[ 2.072750] kernel_init+0x10/0x100
[ 2.073455] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18
[ 2.075414] ---[ end trace 3572f3a7782292de ]---
[ 2.076389] Kernel panic - not syncing: Attempted to kill init! exitcode=0x0000000b
If arm64_kernel_unmapped_at_el0() is true, arm64_kernel_use_ng_mappings()
should also be true.
Signed-off-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>
CC: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
CC: John Garry <john.garry@huawei.com>
CC: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
147 lines
4.1 KiB
C
147 lines
4.1 KiB
C
/*
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* Copyright (C) 2012 ARM Ltd.
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*
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* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
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* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 as
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* published by the Free Software Foundation.
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*
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* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
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* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
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* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
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* GNU General Public License for more details.
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*
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* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
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* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
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*/
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#ifndef __ASM_MMU_H
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#define __ASM_MMU_H
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#include <asm/cputype.h>
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#define MMCF_AARCH32 0x1 /* mm context flag for AArch32 executables */
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#define USER_ASID_BIT 48
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#define USER_ASID_FLAG (UL(1) << USER_ASID_BIT)
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#define TTBR_ASID_MASK (UL(0xffff) << 48)
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#define BP_HARDEN_EL2_SLOTS 4
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#ifndef __ASSEMBLY__
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typedef struct {
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atomic64_t id;
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void *vdso;
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unsigned long flags;
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} mm_context_t;
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/*
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* This macro is only used by the TLBI code, which cannot race with an
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* ASID change and therefore doesn't need to reload the counter using
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* atomic64_read.
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*/
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#define ASID(mm) ((mm)->context.id.counter & 0xffff)
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static inline bool arm64_kernel_unmapped_at_el0(void)
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{
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return IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0) &&
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cpus_have_const_cap(ARM64_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0);
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}
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static inline bool arm64_kernel_use_ng_mappings(void)
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{
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bool tx1_bug;
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/* What's a kpti? Use global mappings if we don't know. */
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if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0))
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return false;
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/*
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* Note: this function is called before the CPU capabilities have
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* been configured, so our early mappings will be global. If we
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* later determine that kpti is required, then
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* kpti_install_ng_mappings() will make them non-global.
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*/
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if (arm64_kernel_unmapped_at_el0())
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return true;
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if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE))
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return false;
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/*
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* KASLR is enabled so we're going to be enabling kpti on non-broken
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* CPUs regardless of their susceptibility to Meltdown. Rather
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* than force everybody to go through the G -> nG dance later on,
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* just put down non-global mappings from the beginning.
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*/
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if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CAVIUM_ERRATUM_27456)) {
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tx1_bug = false;
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#ifndef MODULE
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} else if (!static_branch_likely(&arm64_const_caps_ready)) {
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extern const struct midr_range cavium_erratum_27456_cpus[];
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tx1_bug = is_midr_in_range_list(read_cpuid_id(),
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cavium_erratum_27456_cpus);
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#endif
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} else {
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tx1_bug = __cpus_have_const_cap(ARM64_WORKAROUND_CAVIUM_27456);
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}
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return !tx1_bug && kaslr_offset() > 0;
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}
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typedef void (*bp_hardening_cb_t)(void);
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struct bp_hardening_data {
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int hyp_vectors_slot;
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bp_hardening_cb_t fn;
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};
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#if (defined(CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR) || \
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defined(CONFIG_HARDEN_EL2_VECTORS))
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extern char __bp_harden_hyp_vecs_start[], __bp_harden_hyp_vecs_end[];
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extern atomic_t arm64_el2_vector_last_slot;
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#endif /* CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR || CONFIG_HARDEN_EL2_VECTORS */
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#ifdef CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR
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DECLARE_PER_CPU_READ_MOSTLY(struct bp_hardening_data, bp_hardening_data);
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static inline struct bp_hardening_data *arm64_get_bp_hardening_data(void)
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{
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return this_cpu_ptr(&bp_hardening_data);
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}
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static inline void arm64_apply_bp_hardening(void)
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{
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struct bp_hardening_data *d;
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if (!cpus_have_const_cap(ARM64_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR))
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return;
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d = arm64_get_bp_hardening_data();
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if (d->fn)
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d->fn();
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}
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#else
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static inline struct bp_hardening_data *arm64_get_bp_hardening_data(void)
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{
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return NULL;
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}
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static inline void arm64_apply_bp_hardening(void) { }
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#endif /* CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR */
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extern void paging_init(void);
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extern void bootmem_init(void);
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extern void __iomem *early_io_map(phys_addr_t phys, unsigned long virt);
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extern void init_mem_pgprot(void);
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extern void create_pgd_mapping(struct mm_struct *mm, phys_addr_t phys,
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unsigned long virt, phys_addr_t size,
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pgprot_t prot, bool page_mappings_only);
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extern void *fixmap_remap_fdt(phys_addr_t dt_phys);
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extern void mark_linear_text_alias_ro(void);
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#define INIT_MM_CONTEXT(name) \
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.pgd = init_pg_dir,
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#endif /* !__ASSEMBLY__ */
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#endif
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