mirror of
https://github.com/AuxXxilium/linux_dsm_epyc7002.git
synced 2024-12-27 09:05:12 +07:00
c7d606f560
Since we added support to add recovery from some errors inside the kernel in: commitb2f9d678e2
("x86/mce: Check for faults tagged in EXTABLE_CLASS_FAULT exception table entries") we have done a less than stellar job at reporting the cause of recoverable machine checks that occur in other parts of the kernel. The user just gets the unhelpful message: mce: [Hardware Error]: Machine check: Action required: unknown MCACOD doubly unhelpful when they check the manual for the reported IA32_MSR_STATUS.MCACOD and see that it is listed as one of the standard recoverable values. Add an extra rule to the MCE severity table to catch this case and report it as: mce: [Hardware Error]: Machine check: Data load in unrecoverable area of kernel Fixes:b2f9d678e2
("x86/mce: Check for faults tagged in EXTABLE_CLASS_FAULT exception table entries") Signed-off-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Qiuxu Zhuo <qiuxu.zhuo@intel.com> Cc: Ashok Raj <ashok.raj@intel.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.6+ Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/4cc7c465150a9a48b8b9f45d0b840278e77eb9b5.1527283897.git.tony.luck@intel.com
419 lines
11 KiB
C
419 lines
11 KiB
C
/*
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* MCE grading rules.
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* Copyright 2008, 2009 Intel Corporation.
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*
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* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
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* modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
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* as published by the Free Software Foundation; version 2
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* of the License.
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*
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* Author: Andi Kleen
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*/
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#include <linux/kernel.h>
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#include <linux/seq_file.h>
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#include <linux/init.h>
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#include <linux/debugfs.h>
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#include <asm/mce.h>
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#include <linux/uaccess.h>
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#include "mce-internal.h"
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/*
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* Grade an mce by severity. In general the most severe ones are processed
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* first. Since there are quite a lot of combinations test the bits in a
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* table-driven way. The rules are simply processed in order, first
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* match wins.
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*
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* Note this is only used for machine check exceptions, the corrected
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* errors use much simpler rules. The exceptions still check for the corrected
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* errors, but only to leave them alone for the CMCI handler (except for
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* panic situations)
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*/
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enum context { IN_KERNEL = 1, IN_USER = 2, IN_KERNEL_RECOV = 3 };
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enum ser { SER_REQUIRED = 1, NO_SER = 2 };
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enum exception { EXCP_CONTEXT = 1, NO_EXCP = 2 };
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static struct severity {
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u64 mask;
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u64 result;
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unsigned char sev;
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unsigned char mcgmask;
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unsigned char mcgres;
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unsigned char ser;
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unsigned char context;
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unsigned char excp;
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unsigned char covered;
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char *msg;
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} severities[] = {
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#define MCESEV(s, m, c...) { .sev = MCE_ ## s ## _SEVERITY, .msg = m, ## c }
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#define KERNEL .context = IN_KERNEL
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#define USER .context = IN_USER
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#define KERNEL_RECOV .context = IN_KERNEL_RECOV
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#define SER .ser = SER_REQUIRED
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#define NOSER .ser = NO_SER
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#define EXCP .excp = EXCP_CONTEXT
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#define NOEXCP .excp = NO_EXCP
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#define BITCLR(x) .mask = x, .result = 0
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#define BITSET(x) .mask = x, .result = x
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#define MCGMASK(x, y) .mcgmask = x, .mcgres = y
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#define MASK(x, y) .mask = x, .result = y
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#define MCI_UC_S (MCI_STATUS_UC|MCI_STATUS_S)
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#define MCI_UC_AR (MCI_STATUS_UC|MCI_STATUS_AR)
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#define MCI_UC_SAR (MCI_STATUS_UC|MCI_STATUS_S|MCI_STATUS_AR)
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#define MCI_ADDR (MCI_STATUS_ADDRV|MCI_STATUS_MISCV)
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MCESEV(
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NO, "Invalid",
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BITCLR(MCI_STATUS_VAL)
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),
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MCESEV(
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NO, "Not enabled",
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EXCP, BITCLR(MCI_STATUS_EN)
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),
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MCESEV(
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PANIC, "Processor context corrupt",
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BITSET(MCI_STATUS_PCC)
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),
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/* When MCIP is not set something is very confused */
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MCESEV(
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PANIC, "MCIP not set in MCA handler",
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EXCP, MCGMASK(MCG_STATUS_MCIP, 0)
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),
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/* Neither return not error IP -- no chance to recover -> PANIC */
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MCESEV(
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PANIC, "Neither restart nor error IP",
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EXCP, MCGMASK(MCG_STATUS_RIPV|MCG_STATUS_EIPV, 0)
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),
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MCESEV(
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PANIC, "In kernel and no restart IP",
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EXCP, KERNEL, MCGMASK(MCG_STATUS_RIPV, 0)
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),
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MCESEV(
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PANIC, "In kernel and no restart IP",
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EXCP, KERNEL_RECOV, MCGMASK(MCG_STATUS_RIPV, 0)
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),
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MCESEV(
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DEFERRED, "Deferred error",
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NOSER, MASK(MCI_STATUS_UC|MCI_STATUS_DEFERRED|MCI_STATUS_POISON, MCI_STATUS_DEFERRED)
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),
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MCESEV(
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KEEP, "Corrected error",
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NOSER, BITCLR(MCI_STATUS_UC)
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),
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/*
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* known AO MCACODs reported via MCE or CMC:
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*
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* SRAO could be signaled either via a machine check exception or
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* CMCI with the corresponding bit S 1 or 0. So we don't need to
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* check bit S for SRAO.
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*/
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MCESEV(
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AO, "Action optional: memory scrubbing error",
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SER, MASK(MCI_STATUS_OVER|MCI_UC_AR|MCACOD_SCRUBMSK, MCI_STATUS_UC|MCACOD_SCRUB)
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),
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MCESEV(
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AO, "Action optional: last level cache writeback error",
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SER, MASK(MCI_STATUS_OVER|MCI_UC_AR|MCACOD, MCI_STATUS_UC|MCACOD_L3WB)
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),
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/* ignore OVER for UCNA */
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MCESEV(
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UCNA, "Uncorrected no action required",
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SER, MASK(MCI_UC_SAR, MCI_STATUS_UC)
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),
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MCESEV(
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PANIC, "Illegal combination (UCNA with AR=1)",
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SER,
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MASK(MCI_STATUS_OVER|MCI_UC_SAR, MCI_STATUS_UC|MCI_STATUS_AR)
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),
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MCESEV(
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KEEP, "Non signalled machine check",
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SER, BITCLR(MCI_STATUS_S)
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),
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MCESEV(
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PANIC, "Action required with lost events",
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SER, BITSET(MCI_STATUS_OVER|MCI_UC_SAR)
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),
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/* known AR MCACODs: */
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#ifdef CONFIG_MEMORY_FAILURE
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MCESEV(
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KEEP, "Action required but unaffected thread is continuable",
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SER, MASK(MCI_STATUS_OVER|MCI_UC_SAR|MCI_ADDR, MCI_UC_SAR|MCI_ADDR),
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MCGMASK(MCG_STATUS_RIPV|MCG_STATUS_EIPV, MCG_STATUS_RIPV)
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),
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MCESEV(
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AR, "Action required: data load in error recoverable area of kernel",
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SER, MASK(MCI_STATUS_OVER|MCI_UC_SAR|MCI_ADDR|MCACOD, MCI_UC_SAR|MCI_ADDR|MCACOD_DATA),
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KERNEL_RECOV
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),
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MCESEV(
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AR, "Action required: data load error in a user process",
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SER, MASK(MCI_STATUS_OVER|MCI_UC_SAR|MCI_ADDR|MCACOD, MCI_UC_SAR|MCI_ADDR|MCACOD_DATA),
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USER
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),
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MCESEV(
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AR, "Action required: instruction fetch error in a user process",
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SER, MASK(MCI_STATUS_OVER|MCI_UC_SAR|MCI_ADDR|MCACOD, MCI_UC_SAR|MCI_ADDR|MCACOD_INSTR),
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USER
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),
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MCESEV(
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PANIC, "Data load in unrecoverable area of kernel",
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SER, MASK(MCI_STATUS_OVER|MCI_UC_SAR|MCI_ADDR|MCACOD, MCI_UC_SAR|MCI_ADDR|MCACOD_DATA),
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KERNEL
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),
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#endif
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MCESEV(
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PANIC, "Action required: unknown MCACOD",
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SER, MASK(MCI_STATUS_OVER|MCI_UC_SAR, MCI_UC_SAR)
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),
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MCESEV(
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SOME, "Action optional: unknown MCACOD",
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SER, MASK(MCI_STATUS_OVER|MCI_UC_SAR, MCI_UC_S)
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),
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MCESEV(
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SOME, "Action optional with lost events",
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SER, MASK(MCI_STATUS_OVER|MCI_UC_SAR, MCI_STATUS_OVER|MCI_UC_S)
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),
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MCESEV(
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PANIC, "Overflowed uncorrected",
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BITSET(MCI_STATUS_OVER|MCI_STATUS_UC)
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),
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MCESEV(
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UC, "Uncorrected",
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BITSET(MCI_STATUS_UC)
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),
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MCESEV(
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SOME, "No match",
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BITSET(0)
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) /* always matches. keep at end */
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};
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#define mc_recoverable(mcg) (((mcg) & (MCG_STATUS_RIPV|MCG_STATUS_EIPV)) == \
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(MCG_STATUS_RIPV|MCG_STATUS_EIPV))
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/*
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* If mcgstatus indicated that ip/cs on the stack were
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* no good, then "m->cs" will be zero and we will have
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* to assume the worst case (IN_KERNEL) as we actually
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* have no idea what we were executing when the machine
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* check hit.
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* If we do have a good "m->cs" (or a faked one in the
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* case we were executing in VM86 mode) we can use it to
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* distinguish an exception taken in user from from one
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* taken in the kernel.
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*/
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static int error_context(struct mce *m)
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{
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if ((m->cs & 3) == 3)
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return IN_USER;
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if (mc_recoverable(m->mcgstatus) && ex_has_fault_handler(m->ip))
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return IN_KERNEL_RECOV;
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return IN_KERNEL;
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}
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static int mce_severity_amd_smca(struct mce *m, enum context err_ctx)
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{
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u32 addr = MSR_AMD64_SMCA_MCx_CONFIG(m->bank);
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u32 low, high;
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/*
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* We need to look at the following bits:
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* - "succor" bit (data poisoning support), and
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* - TCC bit (Task Context Corrupt)
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* in MCi_STATUS to determine error severity.
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*/
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if (!mce_flags.succor)
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return MCE_PANIC_SEVERITY;
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if (rdmsr_safe(addr, &low, &high))
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return MCE_PANIC_SEVERITY;
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/* TCC (Task context corrupt). If set and if IN_KERNEL, panic. */
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if ((low & MCI_CONFIG_MCAX) &&
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(m->status & MCI_STATUS_TCC) &&
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(err_ctx == IN_KERNEL))
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return MCE_PANIC_SEVERITY;
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/* ...otherwise invoke hwpoison handler. */
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return MCE_AR_SEVERITY;
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}
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/*
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* See AMD Error Scope Hierarchy table in a newer BKDG. For example
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* 49125_15h_Models_30h-3Fh_BKDG.pdf, section "RAS Features"
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*/
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static int mce_severity_amd(struct mce *m, int tolerant, char **msg, bool is_excp)
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{
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enum context ctx = error_context(m);
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/* Processor Context Corrupt, no need to fumble too much, die! */
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if (m->status & MCI_STATUS_PCC)
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return MCE_PANIC_SEVERITY;
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if (m->status & MCI_STATUS_UC) {
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if (ctx == IN_KERNEL)
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return MCE_PANIC_SEVERITY;
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/*
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* On older systems where overflow_recov flag is not present, we
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* should simply panic if an error overflow occurs. If
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* overflow_recov flag is present and set, then software can try
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* to at least kill process to prolong system operation.
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*/
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if (mce_flags.overflow_recov) {
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if (mce_flags.smca)
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return mce_severity_amd_smca(m, ctx);
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/* kill current process */
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return MCE_AR_SEVERITY;
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} else {
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/* at least one error was not logged */
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if (m->status & MCI_STATUS_OVER)
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return MCE_PANIC_SEVERITY;
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}
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/*
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* For any other case, return MCE_UC_SEVERITY so that we log the
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* error and exit #MC handler.
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*/
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return MCE_UC_SEVERITY;
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}
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/*
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* deferred error: poll handler catches these and adds to mce_ring so
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* memory-failure can take recovery actions.
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*/
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if (m->status & MCI_STATUS_DEFERRED)
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return MCE_DEFERRED_SEVERITY;
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/*
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* corrected error: poll handler catches these and passes responsibility
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* of decoding the error to EDAC
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*/
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return MCE_KEEP_SEVERITY;
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}
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static int mce_severity_intel(struct mce *m, int tolerant, char **msg, bool is_excp)
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{
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enum exception excp = (is_excp ? EXCP_CONTEXT : NO_EXCP);
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enum context ctx = error_context(m);
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struct severity *s;
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for (s = severities;; s++) {
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if ((m->status & s->mask) != s->result)
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continue;
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if ((m->mcgstatus & s->mcgmask) != s->mcgres)
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continue;
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if (s->ser == SER_REQUIRED && !mca_cfg.ser)
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continue;
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if (s->ser == NO_SER && mca_cfg.ser)
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continue;
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if (s->context && ctx != s->context)
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continue;
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if (s->excp && excp != s->excp)
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continue;
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if (msg)
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*msg = s->msg;
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s->covered = 1;
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if (s->sev >= MCE_UC_SEVERITY && ctx == IN_KERNEL) {
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if (tolerant < 1)
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return MCE_PANIC_SEVERITY;
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}
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return s->sev;
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}
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}
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/* Default to mce_severity_intel */
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int (*mce_severity)(struct mce *m, int tolerant, char **msg, bool is_excp) =
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mce_severity_intel;
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void __init mcheck_vendor_init_severity(void)
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{
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if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_AMD)
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mce_severity = mce_severity_amd;
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}
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#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_FS
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static void *s_start(struct seq_file *f, loff_t *pos)
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{
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if (*pos >= ARRAY_SIZE(severities))
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return NULL;
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return &severities[*pos];
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}
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static void *s_next(struct seq_file *f, void *data, loff_t *pos)
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{
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if (++(*pos) >= ARRAY_SIZE(severities))
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return NULL;
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return &severities[*pos];
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}
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static void s_stop(struct seq_file *f, void *data)
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{
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}
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static int s_show(struct seq_file *f, void *data)
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{
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struct severity *ser = data;
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seq_printf(f, "%d\t%s\n", ser->covered, ser->msg);
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return 0;
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}
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static const struct seq_operations severities_seq_ops = {
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.start = s_start,
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.next = s_next,
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.stop = s_stop,
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.show = s_show,
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};
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static int severities_coverage_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
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{
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return seq_open(file, &severities_seq_ops);
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}
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static ssize_t severities_coverage_write(struct file *file,
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const char __user *ubuf,
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size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
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{
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int i;
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for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(severities); i++)
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severities[i].covered = 0;
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return count;
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}
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static const struct file_operations severities_coverage_fops = {
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.open = severities_coverage_open,
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.release = seq_release,
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.read = seq_read,
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.write = severities_coverage_write,
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.llseek = seq_lseek,
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};
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static int __init severities_debugfs_init(void)
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{
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struct dentry *dmce, *fsev;
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dmce = mce_get_debugfs_dir();
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if (!dmce)
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goto err_out;
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fsev = debugfs_create_file("severities-coverage", 0444, dmce, NULL,
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&severities_coverage_fops);
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if (!fsev)
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goto err_out;
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return 0;
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err_out:
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return -ENOMEM;
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}
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late_initcall(severities_debugfs_init);
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#endif /* CONFIG_DEBUG_FS */
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