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https://github.com/AuxXxilium/linux_dsm_epyc7002.git
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453431a549
As said by Linus: A symmetric naming is only helpful if it implies symmetries in use. Otherwise it's actively misleading. In "kzalloc()", the z is meaningful and an important part of what the caller wants. In "kzfree()", the z is actively detrimental, because maybe in the future we really _might_ want to use that "memfill(0xdeadbeef)" or something. The "zero" part of the interface isn't even _relevant_. The main reason that kzfree() exists is to clear sensitive information that should not be leaked to other future users of the same memory objects. Rename kzfree() to kfree_sensitive() to follow the example of the recently added kvfree_sensitive() and make the intention of the API more explicit. In addition, memzero_explicit() is used to clear the memory to make sure that it won't get optimized away by the compiler. The renaming is done by using the command sequence: git grep -w --name-only kzfree |\ xargs sed -i 's/kzfree/kfree_sensitive/' followed by some editing of the kfree_sensitive() kerneldoc and adding a kzfree backward compatibility macro in slab.h. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fs/crypto/inline_crypt.c needs linux/slab.h] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix fs/crypto/inline_crypt.c some more] Suggested-by: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com> Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com> Cc: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Cc: "Jason A . Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200616154311.12314-3-longman@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
369 lines
11 KiB
C
369 lines
11 KiB
C
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
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/*
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* Inline encryption support for fscrypt
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*
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* Copyright 2019 Google LLC
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*/
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/*
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* With "inline encryption", the block layer handles the decryption/encryption
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* as part of the bio, instead of the filesystem doing the crypto itself via
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* crypto API. See Documentation/block/inline-encryption.rst. fscrypt still
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* provides the key and IV to use.
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*/
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#include <linux/blk-crypto.h>
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#include <linux/blkdev.h>
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#include <linux/buffer_head.h>
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#include <linux/sched/mm.h>
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#include <linux/slab.h>
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#include "fscrypt_private.h"
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struct fscrypt_blk_crypto_key {
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struct blk_crypto_key base;
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int num_devs;
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struct request_queue *devs[];
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};
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static int fscrypt_get_num_devices(struct super_block *sb)
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{
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if (sb->s_cop->get_num_devices)
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return sb->s_cop->get_num_devices(sb);
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return 1;
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}
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static void fscrypt_get_devices(struct super_block *sb, int num_devs,
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struct request_queue **devs)
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{
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if (num_devs == 1)
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devs[0] = bdev_get_queue(sb->s_bdev);
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else
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sb->s_cop->get_devices(sb, devs);
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}
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static unsigned int fscrypt_get_dun_bytes(const struct fscrypt_info *ci)
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{
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struct super_block *sb = ci->ci_inode->i_sb;
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unsigned int flags = fscrypt_policy_flags(&ci->ci_policy);
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int ino_bits = 64, lblk_bits = 64;
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if (flags & FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAG_DIRECT_KEY)
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return offsetofend(union fscrypt_iv, nonce);
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if (flags & FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAG_IV_INO_LBLK_64)
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return sizeof(__le64);
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if (flags & FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAG_IV_INO_LBLK_32)
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return sizeof(__le32);
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/* Default case: IVs are just the file logical block number */
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if (sb->s_cop->get_ino_and_lblk_bits)
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sb->s_cop->get_ino_and_lblk_bits(sb, &ino_bits, &lblk_bits);
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return DIV_ROUND_UP(lblk_bits, 8);
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}
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/* Enable inline encryption for this file if supported. */
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int fscrypt_select_encryption_impl(struct fscrypt_info *ci)
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{
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const struct inode *inode = ci->ci_inode;
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struct super_block *sb = inode->i_sb;
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struct blk_crypto_config crypto_cfg;
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int num_devs;
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struct request_queue **devs;
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int i;
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/* The file must need contents encryption, not filenames encryption */
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if (!fscrypt_needs_contents_encryption(inode))
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return 0;
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/* The crypto mode must have a blk-crypto counterpart */
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if (ci->ci_mode->blk_crypto_mode == BLK_ENCRYPTION_MODE_INVALID)
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return 0;
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/* The filesystem must be mounted with -o inlinecrypt */
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if (!(sb->s_flags & SB_INLINECRYPT))
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return 0;
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/*
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* When a page contains multiple logically contiguous filesystem blocks,
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* some filesystem code only calls fscrypt_mergeable_bio() for the first
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* block in the page. This is fine for most of fscrypt's IV generation
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* strategies, where contiguous blocks imply contiguous IVs. But it
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* doesn't work with IV_INO_LBLK_32. For now, simply exclude
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* IV_INO_LBLK_32 with blocksize != PAGE_SIZE from inline encryption.
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*/
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if ((fscrypt_policy_flags(&ci->ci_policy) &
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FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAG_IV_INO_LBLK_32) &&
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sb->s_blocksize != PAGE_SIZE)
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return 0;
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/*
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* On all the filesystem's devices, blk-crypto must support the crypto
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* configuration that the file would use.
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*/
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crypto_cfg.crypto_mode = ci->ci_mode->blk_crypto_mode;
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crypto_cfg.data_unit_size = sb->s_blocksize;
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crypto_cfg.dun_bytes = fscrypt_get_dun_bytes(ci);
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num_devs = fscrypt_get_num_devices(sb);
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devs = kmalloc_array(num_devs, sizeof(*devs), GFP_NOFS);
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if (!devs)
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return -ENOMEM;
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fscrypt_get_devices(sb, num_devs, devs);
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for (i = 0; i < num_devs; i++) {
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if (!blk_crypto_config_supported(devs[i], &crypto_cfg))
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goto out_free_devs;
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}
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ci->ci_inlinecrypt = true;
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out_free_devs:
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kfree(devs);
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return 0;
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}
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int fscrypt_prepare_inline_crypt_key(struct fscrypt_prepared_key *prep_key,
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const u8 *raw_key,
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const struct fscrypt_info *ci)
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{
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const struct inode *inode = ci->ci_inode;
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struct super_block *sb = inode->i_sb;
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enum blk_crypto_mode_num crypto_mode = ci->ci_mode->blk_crypto_mode;
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int num_devs = fscrypt_get_num_devices(sb);
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int queue_refs = 0;
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struct fscrypt_blk_crypto_key *blk_key;
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int err;
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int i;
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unsigned int flags;
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blk_key = kzalloc(struct_size(blk_key, devs, num_devs), GFP_NOFS);
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if (!blk_key)
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return -ENOMEM;
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blk_key->num_devs = num_devs;
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fscrypt_get_devices(sb, num_devs, blk_key->devs);
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err = blk_crypto_init_key(&blk_key->base, raw_key, crypto_mode,
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fscrypt_get_dun_bytes(ci), sb->s_blocksize);
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if (err) {
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fscrypt_err(inode, "error %d initializing blk-crypto key", err);
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goto fail;
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}
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/*
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* We have to start using blk-crypto on all the filesystem's devices.
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* We also have to save all the request_queue's for later so that the
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* key can be evicted from them. This is needed because some keys
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* aren't destroyed until after the filesystem was already unmounted
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* (namely, the per-mode keys in struct fscrypt_master_key).
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*/
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for (i = 0; i < num_devs; i++) {
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if (!blk_get_queue(blk_key->devs[i])) {
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fscrypt_err(inode, "couldn't get request_queue");
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err = -EAGAIN;
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goto fail;
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}
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queue_refs++;
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flags = memalloc_nofs_save();
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err = blk_crypto_start_using_key(&blk_key->base,
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blk_key->devs[i]);
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memalloc_nofs_restore(flags);
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if (err) {
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fscrypt_err(inode,
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"error %d starting to use blk-crypto", err);
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goto fail;
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}
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}
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/*
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* Pairs with the smp_load_acquire() in fscrypt_is_key_prepared().
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* I.e., here we publish ->blk_key with a RELEASE barrier so that
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* concurrent tasks can ACQUIRE it. Note that this concurrency is only
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* possible for per-mode keys, not for per-file keys.
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*/
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smp_store_release(&prep_key->blk_key, blk_key);
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return 0;
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fail:
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for (i = 0; i < queue_refs; i++)
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blk_put_queue(blk_key->devs[i]);
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kfree_sensitive(blk_key);
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return err;
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}
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void fscrypt_destroy_inline_crypt_key(struct fscrypt_prepared_key *prep_key)
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{
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struct fscrypt_blk_crypto_key *blk_key = prep_key->blk_key;
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int i;
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if (blk_key) {
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for (i = 0; i < blk_key->num_devs; i++) {
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blk_crypto_evict_key(blk_key->devs[i], &blk_key->base);
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blk_put_queue(blk_key->devs[i]);
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}
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kfree_sensitive(blk_key);
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}
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}
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bool __fscrypt_inode_uses_inline_crypto(const struct inode *inode)
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{
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return inode->i_crypt_info->ci_inlinecrypt;
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}
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EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__fscrypt_inode_uses_inline_crypto);
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static void fscrypt_generate_dun(const struct fscrypt_info *ci, u64 lblk_num,
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u64 dun[BLK_CRYPTO_DUN_ARRAY_SIZE])
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{
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union fscrypt_iv iv;
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int i;
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fscrypt_generate_iv(&iv, lblk_num, ci);
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BUILD_BUG_ON(FSCRYPT_MAX_IV_SIZE > BLK_CRYPTO_MAX_IV_SIZE);
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memset(dun, 0, BLK_CRYPTO_MAX_IV_SIZE);
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for (i = 0; i < ci->ci_mode->ivsize/sizeof(dun[0]); i++)
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dun[i] = le64_to_cpu(iv.dun[i]);
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}
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/**
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* fscrypt_set_bio_crypt_ctx() - prepare a file contents bio for inline crypto
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* @bio: a bio which will eventually be submitted to the file
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* @inode: the file's inode
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* @first_lblk: the first file logical block number in the I/O
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* @gfp_mask: memory allocation flags - these must be a waiting mask so that
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* bio_crypt_set_ctx can't fail.
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*
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* If the contents of the file should be encrypted (or decrypted) with inline
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* encryption, then assign the appropriate encryption context to the bio.
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*
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* Normally the bio should be newly allocated (i.e. no pages added yet), as
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* otherwise fscrypt_mergeable_bio() won't work as intended.
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*
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* The encryption context will be freed automatically when the bio is freed.
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*/
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void fscrypt_set_bio_crypt_ctx(struct bio *bio, const struct inode *inode,
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u64 first_lblk, gfp_t gfp_mask)
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{
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const struct fscrypt_info *ci;
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u64 dun[BLK_CRYPTO_DUN_ARRAY_SIZE];
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if (!fscrypt_inode_uses_inline_crypto(inode))
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return;
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ci = inode->i_crypt_info;
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fscrypt_generate_dun(ci, first_lblk, dun);
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bio_crypt_set_ctx(bio, &ci->ci_enc_key.blk_key->base, dun, gfp_mask);
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}
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EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(fscrypt_set_bio_crypt_ctx);
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/* Extract the inode and logical block number from a buffer_head. */
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static bool bh_get_inode_and_lblk_num(const struct buffer_head *bh,
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const struct inode **inode_ret,
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u64 *lblk_num_ret)
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{
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struct page *page = bh->b_page;
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const struct address_space *mapping;
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const struct inode *inode;
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/*
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* The ext4 journal (jbd2) can submit a buffer_head it directly created
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* for a non-pagecache page. fscrypt doesn't care about these.
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*/
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mapping = page_mapping(page);
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if (!mapping)
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return false;
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inode = mapping->host;
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*inode_ret = inode;
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*lblk_num_ret = ((u64)page->index << (PAGE_SHIFT - inode->i_blkbits)) +
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(bh_offset(bh) >> inode->i_blkbits);
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return true;
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}
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/**
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* fscrypt_set_bio_crypt_ctx_bh() - prepare a file contents bio for inline
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* crypto
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* @bio: a bio which will eventually be submitted to the file
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* @first_bh: the first buffer_head for which I/O will be submitted
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* @gfp_mask: memory allocation flags
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*
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* Same as fscrypt_set_bio_crypt_ctx(), except this takes a buffer_head instead
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* of an inode and block number directly.
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*/
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void fscrypt_set_bio_crypt_ctx_bh(struct bio *bio,
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const struct buffer_head *first_bh,
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gfp_t gfp_mask)
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{
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const struct inode *inode;
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u64 first_lblk;
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if (bh_get_inode_and_lblk_num(first_bh, &inode, &first_lblk))
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fscrypt_set_bio_crypt_ctx(bio, inode, first_lblk, gfp_mask);
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}
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EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(fscrypt_set_bio_crypt_ctx_bh);
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/**
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* fscrypt_mergeable_bio() - test whether data can be added to a bio
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* @bio: the bio being built up
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* @inode: the inode for the next part of the I/O
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* @next_lblk: the next file logical block number in the I/O
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*
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* When building a bio which may contain data which should undergo inline
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* encryption (or decryption) via fscrypt, filesystems should call this function
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* to ensure that the resulting bio contains only contiguous data unit numbers.
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* This will return false if the next part of the I/O cannot be merged with the
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* bio because either the encryption key would be different or the encryption
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* data unit numbers would be discontiguous.
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*
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* fscrypt_set_bio_crypt_ctx() must have already been called on the bio.
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*
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* Return: true iff the I/O is mergeable
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*/
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bool fscrypt_mergeable_bio(struct bio *bio, const struct inode *inode,
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u64 next_lblk)
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{
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const struct bio_crypt_ctx *bc = bio->bi_crypt_context;
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u64 next_dun[BLK_CRYPTO_DUN_ARRAY_SIZE];
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if (!!bc != fscrypt_inode_uses_inline_crypto(inode))
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return false;
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if (!bc)
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return true;
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/*
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* Comparing the key pointers is good enough, as all I/O for each key
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* uses the same pointer. I.e., there's currently no need to support
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* merging requests where the keys are the same but the pointers differ.
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*/
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if (bc->bc_key != &inode->i_crypt_info->ci_enc_key.blk_key->base)
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return false;
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fscrypt_generate_dun(inode->i_crypt_info, next_lblk, next_dun);
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return bio_crypt_dun_is_contiguous(bc, bio->bi_iter.bi_size, next_dun);
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}
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EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(fscrypt_mergeable_bio);
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/**
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* fscrypt_mergeable_bio_bh() - test whether data can be added to a bio
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* @bio: the bio being built up
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* @next_bh: the next buffer_head for which I/O will be submitted
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*
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* Same as fscrypt_mergeable_bio(), except this takes a buffer_head instead of
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* an inode and block number directly.
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*
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* Return: true iff the I/O is mergeable
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*/
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bool fscrypt_mergeable_bio_bh(struct bio *bio,
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const struct buffer_head *next_bh)
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{
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const struct inode *inode;
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u64 next_lblk;
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if (!bh_get_inode_and_lblk_num(next_bh, &inode, &next_lblk))
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return !bio->bi_crypt_context;
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return fscrypt_mergeable_bio(bio, inode, next_lblk);
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}
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EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(fscrypt_mergeable_bio_bh);
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