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2c8340eda4
Use the ascii-armor canary to prevent unterminated C string overflows from being able to successfully overwrite the canary, even if they somehow obtain the canary value. Inspired by execshield ascii-armor and Daniel Micay's linux-hardened tree. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170524123446.78510066@annuminas.surriel.com Signed-off-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com> Cc: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Yoshinori Sato <ysato@users.sourceforge.jp> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
29 lines
672 B
C
29 lines
672 B
C
#ifndef __ASM_SH_STACKPROTECTOR_H
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#define __ASM_SH_STACKPROTECTOR_H
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#include <linux/random.h>
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#include <linux/version.h>
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extern unsigned long __stack_chk_guard;
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/*
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* Initialize the stackprotector canary value.
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*
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* NOTE: this must only be called from functions that never return,
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* and it must always be inlined.
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*/
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static __always_inline void boot_init_stack_canary(void)
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{
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unsigned long canary;
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/* Try to get a semi random initial value. */
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get_random_bytes(&canary, sizeof(canary));
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canary ^= LINUX_VERSION_CODE;
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canary &= CANARY_MASK;
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current->stack_canary = canary;
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__stack_chk_guard = current->stack_canary;
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}
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#endif /* __ASM_SH_STACKPROTECTOR_H */
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