linux_dsm_epyc7002/fs/cifs/sess.c
Jeff Layton 8a224d4894 cifs: remove bogus first_time check in NTLMv2 session setup code
This bug appears to be the result of a cut-and-paste mistake from the
NTLMv1 code. The function to generate the MAC key was commented out, but
not the conditional above it. The conditional then ended up causing the
session setup key not to be copied to the buffer unless this was the
first session on the socket, and that made all but the first NTLMv2
session setup fail.

Fix this by removing the conditional and all of the commented clutter
that made it difficult to see.

Cc: Stable <stable@kernel.org>
Reported-by: Gunther Deschner <gdeschne@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
2010-06-16 13:40:18 -04:00

946 lines
28 KiB
C

/*
* fs/cifs/sess.c
*
* SMB/CIFS session setup handling routines
*
* Copyright (c) International Business Machines Corp., 2006, 2009
* Author(s): Steve French (sfrench@us.ibm.com)
*
* This library is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public License as published
* by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2.1 of the License, or
* (at your option) any later version.
*
* This library is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See
* the GNU Lesser General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public License
* along with this library; if not, write to the Free Software
* Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA
*/
#include "cifspdu.h"
#include "cifsglob.h"
#include "cifsproto.h"
#include "cifs_unicode.h"
#include "cifs_debug.h"
#include "ntlmssp.h"
#include "nterr.h"
#include <linux/utsname.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include "cifs_spnego.h"
extern void SMBNTencrypt(unsigned char *passwd, unsigned char *c8,
unsigned char *p24);
/*
* Checks if this is the first smb session to be reconnected after
* the socket has been reestablished (so we know whether to use vc 0).
* Called while holding the cifs_tcp_ses_lock, so do not block
*/
static bool is_first_ses_reconnect(struct cifsSesInfo *ses)
{
struct list_head *tmp;
struct cifsSesInfo *tmp_ses;
list_for_each(tmp, &ses->server->smb_ses_list) {
tmp_ses = list_entry(tmp, struct cifsSesInfo,
smb_ses_list);
if (tmp_ses->need_reconnect == false)
return false;
}
/* could not find a session that was already connected,
this must be the first one we are reconnecting */
return true;
}
/*
* vc number 0 is treated specially by some servers, and should be the
* first one we request. After that we can use vcnumbers up to maxvcs,
* one for each smb session (some Windows versions set maxvcs incorrectly
* so maxvc=1 can be ignored). If we have too many vcs, we can reuse
* any vc but zero (some servers reset the connection on vcnum zero)
*
*/
static __le16 get_next_vcnum(struct cifsSesInfo *ses)
{
__u16 vcnum = 0;
struct list_head *tmp;
struct cifsSesInfo *tmp_ses;
__u16 max_vcs = ses->server->max_vcs;
__u16 i;
int free_vc_found = 0;
/* Quoting the MS-SMB specification: "Windows-based SMB servers set this
field to one but do not enforce this limit, which allows an SMB client
to establish more virtual circuits than allowed by this value ... but
other server implementations can enforce this limit." */
if (max_vcs < 2)
max_vcs = 0xFFFF;
write_lock(&cifs_tcp_ses_lock);
if ((ses->need_reconnect) && is_first_ses_reconnect(ses))
goto get_vc_num_exit; /* vcnum will be zero */
for (i = ses->server->srv_count - 1; i < max_vcs; i++) {
if (i == 0) /* this is the only connection, use vc 0 */
break;
free_vc_found = 1;
list_for_each(tmp, &ses->server->smb_ses_list) {
tmp_ses = list_entry(tmp, struct cifsSesInfo,
smb_ses_list);
if (tmp_ses->vcnum == i) {
free_vc_found = 0;
break; /* found duplicate, try next vcnum */
}
}
if (free_vc_found)
break; /* we found a vcnumber that will work - use it */
}
if (i == 0)
vcnum = 0; /* for most common case, ie if one smb session, use
vc zero. Also for case when no free vcnum, zero
is safest to send (some clients only send zero) */
else if (free_vc_found == 0)
vcnum = 1; /* we can not reuse vc=0 safely, since some servers
reset all uids on that, but 1 is ok. */
else
vcnum = i;
ses->vcnum = vcnum;
get_vc_num_exit:
write_unlock(&cifs_tcp_ses_lock);
return cpu_to_le16(vcnum);
}
static __u32 cifs_ssetup_hdr(struct cifsSesInfo *ses, SESSION_SETUP_ANDX *pSMB)
{
__u32 capabilities = 0;
/* init fields common to all four types of SessSetup */
/* Note that offsets for first seven fields in req struct are same */
/* in CIFS Specs so does not matter which of 3 forms of struct */
/* that we use in next few lines */
/* Note that header is initialized to zero in header_assemble */
pSMB->req.AndXCommand = 0xFF;
pSMB->req.MaxBufferSize = cpu_to_le16(ses->server->maxBuf);
pSMB->req.MaxMpxCount = cpu_to_le16(ses->server->maxReq);
pSMB->req.VcNumber = get_next_vcnum(ses);
/* Now no need to set SMBFLG_CASELESS or obsolete CANONICAL PATH */
/* BB verify whether signing required on neg or just on auth frame
(and NTLM case) */
capabilities = CAP_LARGE_FILES | CAP_NT_SMBS | CAP_LEVEL_II_OPLOCKS |
CAP_LARGE_WRITE_X | CAP_LARGE_READ_X;
if (ses->server->secMode &
(SECMODE_SIGN_REQUIRED | SECMODE_SIGN_ENABLED))
pSMB->req.hdr.Flags2 |= SMBFLG2_SECURITY_SIGNATURE;
if (ses->capabilities & CAP_UNICODE) {
pSMB->req.hdr.Flags2 |= SMBFLG2_UNICODE;
capabilities |= CAP_UNICODE;
}
if (ses->capabilities & CAP_STATUS32) {
pSMB->req.hdr.Flags2 |= SMBFLG2_ERR_STATUS;
capabilities |= CAP_STATUS32;
}
if (ses->capabilities & CAP_DFS) {
pSMB->req.hdr.Flags2 |= SMBFLG2_DFS;
capabilities |= CAP_DFS;
}
if (ses->capabilities & CAP_UNIX)
capabilities |= CAP_UNIX;
return capabilities;
}
static void
unicode_oslm_strings(char **pbcc_area, const struct nls_table *nls_cp)
{
char *bcc_ptr = *pbcc_area;
int bytes_ret = 0;
/* Copy OS version */
bytes_ret = cifs_strtoUCS((__le16 *)bcc_ptr, "Linux version ", 32,
nls_cp);
bcc_ptr += 2 * bytes_ret;
bytes_ret = cifs_strtoUCS((__le16 *) bcc_ptr, init_utsname()->release,
32, nls_cp);
bcc_ptr += 2 * bytes_ret;
bcc_ptr += 2; /* trailing null */
bytes_ret = cifs_strtoUCS((__le16 *) bcc_ptr, CIFS_NETWORK_OPSYS,
32, nls_cp);
bcc_ptr += 2 * bytes_ret;
bcc_ptr += 2; /* trailing null */
*pbcc_area = bcc_ptr;
}
static void unicode_domain_string(char **pbcc_area, struct cifsSesInfo *ses,
const struct nls_table *nls_cp)
{
char *bcc_ptr = *pbcc_area;
int bytes_ret = 0;
/* copy domain */
if (ses->domainName == NULL) {
/* Sending null domain better than using a bogus domain name (as
we did briefly in 2.6.18) since server will use its default */
*bcc_ptr = 0;
*(bcc_ptr+1) = 0;
bytes_ret = 0;
} else
bytes_ret = cifs_strtoUCS((__le16 *) bcc_ptr, ses->domainName,
256, nls_cp);
bcc_ptr += 2 * bytes_ret;
bcc_ptr += 2; /* account for null terminator */
*pbcc_area = bcc_ptr;
}
static void unicode_ssetup_strings(char **pbcc_area, struct cifsSesInfo *ses,
const struct nls_table *nls_cp)
{
char *bcc_ptr = *pbcc_area;
int bytes_ret = 0;
/* BB FIXME add check that strings total less
than 335 or will need to send them as arrays */
/* unicode strings, must be word aligned before the call */
/* if ((long) bcc_ptr % 2) {
*bcc_ptr = 0;
bcc_ptr++;
} */
/* copy user */
if (ses->userName == NULL) {
/* null user mount */
*bcc_ptr = 0;
*(bcc_ptr+1) = 0;
} else {
bytes_ret = cifs_strtoUCS((__le16 *) bcc_ptr, ses->userName,
MAX_USERNAME_SIZE, nls_cp);
}
bcc_ptr += 2 * bytes_ret;
bcc_ptr += 2; /* account for null termination */
unicode_domain_string(&bcc_ptr, ses, nls_cp);
unicode_oslm_strings(&bcc_ptr, nls_cp);
*pbcc_area = bcc_ptr;
}
static void ascii_ssetup_strings(char **pbcc_area, struct cifsSesInfo *ses,
const struct nls_table *nls_cp)
{
char *bcc_ptr = *pbcc_area;
/* copy user */
/* BB what about null user mounts - check that we do this BB */
/* copy user */
if (ses->userName == NULL) {
/* BB what about null user mounts - check that we do this BB */
} else {
strncpy(bcc_ptr, ses->userName, MAX_USERNAME_SIZE);
}
bcc_ptr += strnlen(ses->userName, MAX_USERNAME_SIZE);
*bcc_ptr = 0;
bcc_ptr++; /* account for null termination */
/* copy domain */
if (ses->domainName != NULL) {
strncpy(bcc_ptr, ses->domainName, 256);
bcc_ptr += strnlen(ses->domainName, 256);
} /* else we will send a null domain name
so the server will default to its own domain */
*bcc_ptr = 0;
bcc_ptr++;
/* BB check for overflow here */
strcpy(bcc_ptr, "Linux version ");
bcc_ptr += strlen("Linux version ");
strcpy(bcc_ptr, init_utsname()->release);
bcc_ptr += strlen(init_utsname()->release) + 1;
strcpy(bcc_ptr, CIFS_NETWORK_OPSYS);
bcc_ptr += strlen(CIFS_NETWORK_OPSYS) + 1;
*pbcc_area = bcc_ptr;
}
static void
decode_unicode_ssetup(char **pbcc_area, int bleft, struct cifsSesInfo *ses,
const struct nls_table *nls_cp)
{
int len;
char *data = *pbcc_area;
cFYI(1, "bleft %d", bleft);
/*
* Windows servers do not always double null terminate their final
* Unicode string. Check to see if there are an uneven number of bytes
* left. If so, then add an extra NULL pad byte to the end of the
* response.
*
* See section 2.7.2 in "Implementing CIFS" for details
*/
if (bleft % 2) {
data[bleft] = 0;
++bleft;
}
kfree(ses->serverOS);
ses->serverOS = cifs_strndup_from_ucs(data, bleft, true, nls_cp);
cFYI(1, "serverOS=%s", ses->serverOS);
len = (UniStrnlen((wchar_t *) data, bleft / 2) * 2) + 2;
data += len;
bleft -= len;
if (bleft <= 0)
return;
kfree(ses->serverNOS);
ses->serverNOS = cifs_strndup_from_ucs(data, bleft, true, nls_cp);
cFYI(1, "serverNOS=%s", ses->serverNOS);
len = (UniStrnlen((wchar_t *) data, bleft / 2) * 2) + 2;
data += len;
bleft -= len;
if (bleft <= 0)
return;
kfree(ses->serverDomain);
ses->serverDomain = cifs_strndup_from_ucs(data, bleft, true, nls_cp);
cFYI(1, "serverDomain=%s", ses->serverDomain);
return;
}
static int decode_ascii_ssetup(char **pbcc_area, int bleft,
struct cifsSesInfo *ses,
const struct nls_table *nls_cp)
{
int rc = 0;
int len;
char *bcc_ptr = *pbcc_area;
cFYI(1, "decode sessetup ascii. bleft %d", bleft);
len = strnlen(bcc_ptr, bleft);
if (len >= bleft)
return rc;
kfree(ses->serverOS);
ses->serverOS = kzalloc(len + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
if (ses->serverOS)
strncpy(ses->serverOS, bcc_ptr, len);
if (strncmp(ses->serverOS, "OS/2", 4) == 0) {
cFYI(1, "OS/2 server");
ses->flags |= CIFS_SES_OS2;
}
bcc_ptr += len + 1;
bleft -= len + 1;
len = strnlen(bcc_ptr, bleft);
if (len >= bleft)
return rc;
kfree(ses->serverNOS);
ses->serverNOS = kzalloc(len + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
if (ses->serverNOS)
strncpy(ses->serverNOS, bcc_ptr, len);
bcc_ptr += len + 1;
bleft -= len + 1;
len = strnlen(bcc_ptr, bleft);
if (len > bleft)
return rc;
/* No domain field in LANMAN case. Domain is
returned by old servers in the SMB negprot response */
/* BB For newer servers which do not support Unicode,
but thus do return domain here we could add parsing
for it later, but it is not very important */
cFYI(1, "ascii: bytes left %d", bleft);
return rc;
}
static int decode_ntlmssp_challenge(char *bcc_ptr, int blob_len,
struct cifsSesInfo *ses)
{
CHALLENGE_MESSAGE *pblob = (CHALLENGE_MESSAGE *)bcc_ptr;
if (blob_len < sizeof(CHALLENGE_MESSAGE)) {
cERROR(1, "challenge blob len %d too small", blob_len);
return -EINVAL;
}
if (memcmp(pblob->Signature, "NTLMSSP", 8)) {
cERROR(1, "blob signature incorrect %s", pblob->Signature);
return -EINVAL;
}
if (pblob->MessageType != NtLmChallenge) {
cERROR(1, "Incorrect message type %d", pblob->MessageType);
return -EINVAL;
}
memcpy(ses->server->cryptKey, pblob->Challenge, CIFS_CRYPTO_KEY_SIZE);
/* BB we could decode pblob->NegotiateFlags; some may be useful */
/* In particular we can examine sign flags */
/* BB spec says that if AvId field of MsvAvTimestamp is populated then
we must set the MIC field of the AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE */
return 0;
}
#ifdef CONFIG_CIFS_EXPERIMENTAL
/* BB Move to ntlmssp.c eventually */
/* We do not malloc the blob, it is passed in pbuffer, because
it is fixed size, and small, making this approach cleaner */
static void build_ntlmssp_negotiate_blob(unsigned char *pbuffer,
struct cifsSesInfo *ses)
{
NEGOTIATE_MESSAGE *sec_blob = (NEGOTIATE_MESSAGE *)pbuffer;
__u32 flags;
memcpy(sec_blob->Signature, NTLMSSP_SIGNATURE, 8);
sec_blob->MessageType = NtLmNegotiate;
/* BB is NTLMV2 session security format easier to use here? */
flags = NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_56 | NTLMSSP_REQUEST_TARGET |
NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_128 | NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_UNICODE |
NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_NT_ONLY | NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_NTLM;
if (ses->server->secMode &
(SECMODE_SIGN_REQUIRED | SECMODE_SIGN_ENABLED))
flags |= NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_SIGN;
if (ses->server->secMode & SECMODE_SIGN_REQUIRED)
flags |= NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_ALWAYS_SIGN;
sec_blob->NegotiateFlags |= cpu_to_le32(flags);
sec_blob->WorkstationName.BufferOffset = 0;
sec_blob->WorkstationName.Length = 0;
sec_blob->WorkstationName.MaximumLength = 0;
/* Domain name is sent on the Challenge not Negotiate NTLMSSP request */
sec_blob->DomainName.BufferOffset = 0;
sec_blob->DomainName.Length = 0;
sec_blob->DomainName.MaximumLength = 0;
}
/* We do not malloc the blob, it is passed in pbuffer, because its
maximum possible size is fixed and small, making this approach cleaner.
This function returns the length of the data in the blob */
static int build_ntlmssp_auth_blob(unsigned char *pbuffer,
struct cifsSesInfo *ses,
const struct nls_table *nls_cp, bool first)
{
AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE *sec_blob = (AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE *)pbuffer;
__u32 flags;
unsigned char *tmp;
char ntlm_session_key[CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE];
memcpy(sec_blob->Signature, NTLMSSP_SIGNATURE, 8);
sec_blob->MessageType = NtLmAuthenticate;
flags = NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_56 |
NTLMSSP_REQUEST_TARGET | NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_TARGET_INFO |
NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_128 | NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_UNICODE |
NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_NT_ONLY | NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_NTLM;
if (ses->server->secMode &
(SECMODE_SIGN_REQUIRED | SECMODE_SIGN_ENABLED))
flags |= NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_SIGN;
if (ses->server->secMode & SECMODE_SIGN_REQUIRED)
flags |= NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_ALWAYS_SIGN;
tmp = pbuffer + sizeof(AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE);
sec_blob->NegotiateFlags |= cpu_to_le32(flags);
sec_blob->LmChallengeResponse.BufferOffset =
cpu_to_le32(sizeof(AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE));
sec_blob->LmChallengeResponse.Length = 0;
sec_blob->LmChallengeResponse.MaximumLength = 0;
/* calculate session key, BB what about adding similar ntlmv2 path? */
SMBNTencrypt(ses->password, ses->server->cryptKey, ntlm_session_key);
if (first)
cifs_calculate_mac_key(&ses->server->mac_signing_key,
ntlm_session_key, ses->password);
memcpy(tmp, ntlm_session_key, CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE);
sec_blob->NtChallengeResponse.BufferOffset = cpu_to_le32(tmp - pbuffer);
sec_blob->NtChallengeResponse.Length = cpu_to_le16(CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE);
sec_blob->NtChallengeResponse.MaximumLength =
cpu_to_le16(CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE);
tmp += CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE;
if (ses->domainName == NULL) {
sec_blob->DomainName.BufferOffset = cpu_to_le32(tmp - pbuffer);
sec_blob->DomainName.Length = 0;
sec_blob->DomainName.MaximumLength = 0;
tmp += 2;
} else {
int len;
len = cifs_strtoUCS((__le16 *)tmp, ses->domainName,
MAX_USERNAME_SIZE, nls_cp);
len *= 2; /* unicode is 2 bytes each */
len += 2; /* trailing null */
sec_blob->DomainName.BufferOffset = cpu_to_le32(tmp - pbuffer);
sec_blob->DomainName.Length = cpu_to_le16(len);
sec_blob->DomainName.MaximumLength = cpu_to_le16(len);
tmp += len;
}
if (ses->userName == NULL) {
sec_blob->UserName.BufferOffset = cpu_to_le32(tmp - pbuffer);
sec_blob->UserName.Length = 0;
sec_blob->UserName.MaximumLength = 0;
tmp += 2;
} else {
int len;
len = cifs_strtoUCS((__le16 *)tmp, ses->userName,
MAX_USERNAME_SIZE, nls_cp);
len *= 2; /* unicode is 2 bytes each */
len += 2; /* trailing null */
sec_blob->UserName.BufferOffset = cpu_to_le32(tmp - pbuffer);
sec_blob->UserName.Length = cpu_to_le16(len);
sec_blob->UserName.MaximumLength = cpu_to_le16(len);
tmp += len;
}
sec_blob->WorkstationName.BufferOffset = cpu_to_le32(tmp - pbuffer);
sec_blob->WorkstationName.Length = 0;
sec_blob->WorkstationName.MaximumLength = 0;
tmp += 2;
sec_blob->SessionKey.BufferOffset = cpu_to_le32(tmp - pbuffer);
sec_blob->SessionKey.Length = 0;
sec_blob->SessionKey.MaximumLength = 0;
return tmp - pbuffer;
}
static void setup_ntlmssp_neg_req(SESSION_SETUP_ANDX *pSMB,
struct cifsSesInfo *ses)
{
build_ntlmssp_negotiate_blob(&pSMB->req.SecurityBlob[0], ses);
pSMB->req.SecurityBlobLength = cpu_to_le16(sizeof(NEGOTIATE_MESSAGE));
return;
}
static int setup_ntlmssp_auth_req(SESSION_SETUP_ANDX *pSMB,
struct cifsSesInfo *ses,
const struct nls_table *nls, bool first_time)
{
int bloblen;
bloblen = build_ntlmssp_auth_blob(&pSMB->req.SecurityBlob[0], ses, nls,
first_time);
pSMB->req.SecurityBlobLength = cpu_to_le16(bloblen);
return bloblen;
}
#endif
int
CIFS_SessSetup(unsigned int xid, struct cifsSesInfo *ses,
const struct nls_table *nls_cp)
{
int rc = 0;
int wct;
struct smb_hdr *smb_buf;
char *bcc_ptr;
char *str_area;
SESSION_SETUP_ANDX *pSMB;
__u32 capabilities;
int count;
int resp_buf_type;
struct kvec iov[3];
enum securityEnum type;
__u16 action;
int bytes_remaining;
struct key *spnego_key = NULL;
__le32 phase = NtLmNegotiate; /* NTLMSSP, if needed, is multistage */
bool first_time;
if (ses == NULL)
return -EINVAL;
read_lock(&cifs_tcp_ses_lock);
first_time = is_first_ses_reconnect(ses);
read_unlock(&cifs_tcp_ses_lock);
type = ses->server->secType;
cFYI(1, "sess setup type %d", type);
ssetup_ntlmssp_authenticate:
if (phase == NtLmChallenge)
phase = NtLmAuthenticate; /* if ntlmssp, now final phase */
if (type == LANMAN) {
#ifndef CONFIG_CIFS_WEAK_PW_HASH
/* LANMAN and plaintext are less secure and off by default.
So we make this explicitly be turned on in kconfig (in the
build) and turned on at runtime (changed from the default)
in proc/fs/cifs or via mount parm. Unfortunately this is
needed for old Win (e.g. Win95), some obscure NAS and OS/2 */
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
#endif
wct = 10; /* lanman 2 style sessionsetup */
} else if ((type == NTLM) || (type == NTLMv2)) {
/* For NTLMv2 failures eventually may need to retry NTLM */
wct = 13; /* old style NTLM sessionsetup */
} else /* same size: negotiate or auth, NTLMSSP or extended security */
wct = 12;
rc = small_smb_init_no_tc(SMB_COM_SESSION_SETUP_ANDX, wct, ses,
(void **)&smb_buf);
if (rc)
return rc;
pSMB = (SESSION_SETUP_ANDX *)smb_buf;
capabilities = cifs_ssetup_hdr(ses, pSMB);
/* we will send the SMB in three pieces:
a fixed length beginning part, an optional
SPNEGO blob (which can be zero length), and a
last part which will include the strings
and rest of bcc area. This allows us to avoid
a large buffer 17K allocation */
iov[0].iov_base = (char *)pSMB;
iov[0].iov_len = smb_buf->smb_buf_length + 4;
/* setting this here allows the code at the end of the function
to free the request buffer if there's an error */
resp_buf_type = CIFS_SMALL_BUFFER;
/* 2000 big enough to fit max user, domain, NOS name etc. */
str_area = kmalloc(2000, GFP_KERNEL);
if (str_area == NULL) {
rc = -ENOMEM;
goto ssetup_exit;
}
bcc_ptr = str_area;
ses->flags &= ~CIFS_SES_LANMAN;
iov[1].iov_base = NULL;
iov[1].iov_len = 0;
if (type == LANMAN) {
#ifdef CONFIG_CIFS_WEAK_PW_HASH
char lnm_session_key[CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE];
pSMB->req.hdr.Flags2 &= ~SMBFLG2_UNICODE;
/* no capabilities flags in old lanman negotiation */
pSMB->old_req.PasswordLength = cpu_to_le16(CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE);
/* BB calculate hash with password */
/* and copy into bcc */
calc_lanman_hash(ses->password, ses->server->cryptKey,
ses->server->secMode & SECMODE_PW_ENCRYPT ?
true : false, lnm_session_key);
ses->flags |= CIFS_SES_LANMAN;
memcpy(bcc_ptr, (char *)lnm_session_key, CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE);
bcc_ptr += CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE;
/* can not sign if LANMAN negotiated so no need
to calculate signing key? but what if server
changed to do higher than lanman dialect and
we reconnected would we ever calc signing_key? */
cFYI(1, "Negotiating LANMAN setting up strings");
/* Unicode not allowed for LANMAN dialects */
ascii_ssetup_strings(&bcc_ptr, ses, nls_cp);
#endif
} else if (type == NTLM) {
char ntlm_session_key[CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE];
pSMB->req_no_secext.Capabilities = cpu_to_le32(capabilities);
pSMB->req_no_secext.CaseInsensitivePasswordLength =
cpu_to_le16(CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE);
pSMB->req_no_secext.CaseSensitivePasswordLength =
cpu_to_le16(CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE);
/* calculate session key */
SMBNTencrypt(ses->password, ses->server->cryptKey,
ntlm_session_key);
if (first_time) /* should this be moved into common code
with similar ntlmv2 path? */
cifs_calculate_mac_key(&ses->server->mac_signing_key,
ntlm_session_key, ses->password);
/* copy session key */
memcpy(bcc_ptr, (char *)ntlm_session_key, CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE);
bcc_ptr += CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE;
memcpy(bcc_ptr, (char *)ntlm_session_key, CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE);
bcc_ptr += CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE;
if (ses->capabilities & CAP_UNICODE) {
/* unicode strings must be word aligned */
if (iov[0].iov_len % 2) {
*bcc_ptr = 0;
bcc_ptr++;
}
unicode_ssetup_strings(&bcc_ptr, ses, nls_cp);
} else
ascii_ssetup_strings(&bcc_ptr, ses, nls_cp);
} else if (type == NTLMv2) {
char *v2_sess_key =
kmalloc(sizeof(struct ntlmv2_resp), GFP_KERNEL);
/* BB FIXME change all users of v2_sess_key to
struct ntlmv2_resp */
if (v2_sess_key == NULL) {
rc = -ENOMEM;
goto ssetup_exit;
}
pSMB->req_no_secext.Capabilities = cpu_to_le32(capabilities);
/* LM2 password would be here if we supported it */
pSMB->req_no_secext.CaseInsensitivePasswordLength = 0;
/* cpu_to_le16(LM2_SESS_KEY_SIZE); */
pSMB->req_no_secext.CaseSensitivePasswordLength =
cpu_to_le16(sizeof(struct ntlmv2_resp));
/* calculate session key */
setup_ntlmv2_rsp(ses, v2_sess_key, nls_cp);
/* FIXME: calculate MAC key */
memcpy(bcc_ptr, (char *)v2_sess_key,
sizeof(struct ntlmv2_resp));
bcc_ptr += sizeof(struct ntlmv2_resp);
kfree(v2_sess_key);
if (ses->capabilities & CAP_UNICODE) {
if (iov[0].iov_len % 2) {
*bcc_ptr = 0;
bcc_ptr++;
}
unicode_ssetup_strings(&bcc_ptr, ses, nls_cp);
} else
ascii_ssetup_strings(&bcc_ptr, ses, nls_cp);
} else if (type == Kerberos) {
#ifdef CONFIG_CIFS_UPCALL
struct cifs_spnego_msg *msg;
spnego_key = cifs_get_spnego_key(ses);
if (IS_ERR(spnego_key)) {
rc = PTR_ERR(spnego_key);
spnego_key = NULL;
goto ssetup_exit;
}
msg = spnego_key->payload.data;
/* check version field to make sure that cifs.upcall is
sending us a response in an expected form */
if (msg->version != CIFS_SPNEGO_UPCALL_VERSION) {
cERROR(1, "incorrect version of cifs.upcall (expected"
" %d but got %d)",
CIFS_SPNEGO_UPCALL_VERSION, msg->version);
rc = -EKEYREJECTED;
goto ssetup_exit;
}
/* bail out if key is too long */
if (msg->sesskey_len >
sizeof(ses->server->mac_signing_key.data.krb5)) {
cERROR(1, "Kerberos signing key too long (%u bytes)",
msg->sesskey_len);
rc = -EOVERFLOW;
goto ssetup_exit;
}
if (first_time) {
ses->server->mac_signing_key.len = msg->sesskey_len;
memcpy(ses->server->mac_signing_key.data.krb5,
msg->data, msg->sesskey_len);
}
pSMB->req.hdr.Flags2 |= SMBFLG2_EXT_SEC;
capabilities |= CAP_EXTENDED_SECURITY;
pSMB->req.Capabilities = cpu_to_le32(capabilities);
iov[1].iov_base = msg->data + msg->sesskey_len;
iov[1].iov_len = msg->secblob_len;
pSMB->req.SecurityBlobLength = cpu_to_le16(iov[1].iov_len);
if (ses->capabilities & CAP_UNICODE) {
/* unicode strings must be word aligned */
if ((iov[0].iov_len + iov[1].iov_len) % 2) {
*bcc_ptr = 0;
bcc_ptr++;
}
unicode_oslm_strings(&bcc_ptr, nls_cp);
unicode_domain_string(&bcc_ptr, ses, nls_cp);
} else
/* BB: is this right? */
ascii_ssetup_strings(&bcc_ptr, ses, nls_cp);
#else /* ! CONFIG_CIFS_UPCALL */
cERROR(1, "Kerberos negotiated but upcall support disabled!");
rc = -ENOSYS;
goto ssetup_exit;
#endif /* CONFIG_CIFS_UPCALL */
} else {
#ifdef CONFIG_CIFS_EXPERIMENTAL
if (type == RawNTLMSSP) {
if ((pSMB->req.hdr.Flags2 & SMBFLG2_UNICODE) == 0) {
cERROR(1, "NTLMSSP requires Unicode support");
rc = -ENOSYS;
goto ssetup_exit;
}
cFYI(1, "ntlmssp session setup phase %d", phase);
pSMB->req.hdr.Flags2 |= SMBFLG2_EXT_SEC;
capabilities |= CAP_EXTENDED_SECURITY;
pSMB->req.Capabilities |= cpu_to_le32(capabilities);
if (phase == NtLmNegotiate) {
setup_ntlmssp_neg_req(pSMB, ses);
iov[1].iov_len = sizeof(NEGOTIATE_MESSAGE);
} else if (phase == NtLmAuthenticate) {
int blob_len;
blob_len = setup_ntlmssp_auth_req(pSMB, ses,
nls_cp,
first_time);
iov[1].iov_len = blob_len;
/* Make sure that we tell the server that we
are using the uid that it just gave us back
on the response (challenge) */
smb_buf->Uid = ses->Suid;
} else {
cERROR(1, "invalid phase %d", phase);
rc = -ENOSYS;
goto ssetup_exit;
}
iov[1].iov_base = &pSMB->req.SecurityBlob[0];
/* unicode strings must be word aligned */
if ((iov[0].iov_len + iov[1].iov_len) % 2) {
*bcc_ptr = 0;
bcc_ptr++;
}
unicode_oslm_strings(&bcc_ptr, nls_cp);
} else {
cERROR(1, "secType %d not supported!", type);
rc = -ENOSYS;
goto ssetup_exit;
}
#else
cERROR(1, "secType %d not supported!", type);
rc = -ENOSYS;
goto ssetup_exit;
#endif
}
iov[2].iov_base = str_area;
iov[2].iov_len = (long) bcc_ptr - (long) str_area;
count = iov[1].iov_len + iov[2].iov_len;
smb_buf->smb_buf_length += count;
BCC_LE(smb_buf) = cpu_to_le16(count);
rc = SendReceive2(xid, ses, iov, 3 /* num_iovecs */, &resp_buf_type,
CIFS_STD_OP /* not long */ | CIFS_LOG_ERROR);
/* SMB request buf freed in SendReceive2 */
cFYI(1, "ssetup rc from sendrecv2 is %d", rc);
pSMB = (SESSION_SETUP_ANDX *)iov[0].iov_base;
smb_buf = (struct smb_hdr *)iov[0].iov_base;
if ((type == RawNTLMSSP) && (smb_buf->Status.CifsError ==
cpu_to_le32(NT_STATUS_MORE_PROCESSING_REQUIRED))) {
if (phase != NtLmNegotiate) {
cERROR(1, "Unexpected more processing error");
goto ssetup_exit;
}
/* NTLMSSP Negotiate sent now processing challenge (response) */
phase = NtLmChallenge; /* process ntlmssp challenge */
rc = 0; /* MORE_PROC rc is not an error here, but expected */
}
if (rc)
goto ssetup_exit;
if ((smb_buf->WordCount != 3) && (smb_buf->WordCount != 4)) {
rc = -EIO;
cERROR(1, "bad word count %d", smb_buf->WordCount);
goto ssetup_exit;
}
action = le16_to_cpu(pSMB->resp.Action);
if (action & GUEST_LOGIN)
cFYI(1, "Guest login"); /* BB mark SesInfo struct? */
ses->Suid = smb_buf->Uid; /* UID left in wire format (le) */
cFYI(1, "UID = %d ", ses->Suid);
/* response can have either 3 or 4 word count - Samba sends 3 */
/* and lanman response is 3 */
bytes_remaining = BCC(smb_buf);
bcc_ptr = pByteArea(smb_buf);
if (smb_buf->WordCount == 4) {
__u16 blob_len;
blob_len = le16_to_cpu(pSMB->resp.SecurityBlobLength);
if (blob_len > bytes_remaining) {
cERROR(1, "bad security blob length %d", blob_len);
rc = -EINVAL;
goto ssetup_exit;
}
if (phase == NtLmChallenge) {
rc = decode_ntlmssp_challenge(bcc_ptr, blob_len, ses);
/* now goto beginning for ntlmssp authenticate phase */
if (rc)
goto ssetup_exit;
}
bcc_ptr += blob_len;
bytes_remaining -= blob_len;
}
/* BB check if Unicode and decode strings */
if (smb_buf->Flags2 & SMBFLG2_UNICODE) {
/* unicode string area must be word-aligned */
if (((unsigned long) bcc_ptr - (unsigned long) smb_buf) % 2) {
++bcc_ptr;
--bytes_remaining;
}
decode_unicode_ssetup(&bcc_ptr, bytes_remaining, ses, nls_cp);
} else {
rc = decode_ascii_ssetup(&bcc_ptr, bytes_remaining,
ses, nls_cp);
}
ssetup_exit:
if (spnego_key) {
key_revoke(spnego_key);
key_put(spnego_key);
}
kfree(str_area);
if (resp_buf_type == CIFS_SMALL_BUFFER) {
cFYI(1, "ssetup freeing small buf %p", iov[0].iov_base);
cifs_small_buf_release(iov[0].iov_base);
} else if (resp_buf_type == CIFS_LARGE_BUFFER)
cifs_buf_release(iov[0].iov_base);
/* if ntlmssp, and negotiate succeeded, proceed to authenticate phase */
if ((phase == NtLmChallenge) && (rc == 0))
goto ssetup_ntlmssp_authenticate;
return rc;
}