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c131187db2
when the verifier detects that register contains a runtime constant
and it's compared with another constant it will prune exploration
of the branch that is guaranteed not to be taken at runtime.
This is all correct, but malicious program may be constructed
in such a way that it always has a constant comparison and
the other branch is never taken under any conditions.
In this case such path through the program will not be explored
by the verifier. It won't be taken at run-time either, but since
all instructions are JITed the malicious program may cause JITs
to complain about using reserved fields, etc.
To fix the issue we have to track the instructions explored by
the verifier and sanitize instructions that are dead at run time
with NOPs. We cannot reject such dead code, since llvm generates
it for valid C code, since it doesn't do as much data flow
analysis as the verifier does.
Fixes: 17a5267067
("bpf: verifier (add verifier core)")
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
181 lines
6.2 KiB
C
181 lines
6.2 KiB
C
/* Copyright (c) 2011-2014 PLUMgrid, http://plumgrid.com
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*
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* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
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* modify it under the terms of version 2 of the GNU General Public
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* License as published by the Free Software Foundation.
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*/
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#ifndef _LINUX_BPF_VERIFIER_H
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#define _LINUX_BPF_VERIFIER_H 1
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#include <linux/bpf.h> /* for enum bpf_reg_type */
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#include <linux/filter.h> /* for MAX_BPF_STACK */
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#include <linux/tnum.h>
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/* Maximum variable offset umax_value permitted when resolving memory accesses.
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* In practice this is far bigger than any realistic pointer offset; this limit
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* ensures that umax_value + (int)off + (int)size cannot overflow a u64.
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*/
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#define BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF (1ULL << 31)
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/* Maximum variable size permitted for ARG_CONST_SIZE[_OR_ZERO]. This ensures
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* that converting umax_value to int cannot overflow.
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*/
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#define BPF_MAX_VAR_SIZ INT_MAX
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/* Liveness marks, used for registers and spilled-regs (in stack slots).
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* Read marks propagate upwards until they find a write mark; they record that
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* "one of this state's descendants read this reg" (and therefore the reg is
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* relevant for states_equal() checks).
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* Write marks collect downwards and do not propagate; they record that "the
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* straight-line code that reached this state (from its parent) wrote this reg"
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* (and therefore that reads propagated from this state or its descendants
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* should not propagate to its parent).
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* A state with a write mark can receive read marks; it just won't propagate
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* them to its parent, since the write mark is a property, not of the state,
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* but of the link between it and its parent. See mark_reg_read() and
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* mark_stack_slot_read() in kernel/bpf/verifier.c.
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*/
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enum bpf_reg_liveness {
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REG_LIVE_NONE = 0, /* reg hasn't been read or written this branch */
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REG_LIVE_READ, /* reg was read, so we're sensitive to initial value */
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REG_LIVE_WRITTEN, /* reg was written first, screening off later reads */
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};
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struct bpf_reg_state {
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enum bpf_reg_type type;
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union {
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/* valid when type == PTR_TO_PACKET */
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u16 range;
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/* valid when type == CONST_PTR_TO_MAP | PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE |
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* PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL
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*/
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struct bpf_map *map_ptr;
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};
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/* Fixed part of pointer offset, pointer types only */
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s32 off;
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/* For PTR_TO_PACKET, used to find other pointers with the same variable
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* offset, so they can share range knowledge.
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* For PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL this is used to share which map value we
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* came from, when one is tested for != NULL.
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*/
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u32 id;
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/* Ordering of fields matters. See states_equal() */
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/* For scalar types (SCALAR_VALUE), this represents our knowledge of
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* the actual value.
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* For pointer types, this represents the variable part of the offset
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* from the pointed-to object, and is shared with all bpf_reg_states
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* with the same id as us.
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*/
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struct tnum var_off;
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/* Used to determine if any memory access using this register will
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* result in a bad access.
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* These refer to the same value as var_off, not necessarily the actual
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* contents of the register.
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*/
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s64 smin_value; /* minimum possible (s64)value */
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s64 smax_value; /* maximum possible (s64)value */
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u64 umin_value; /* minimum possible (u64)value */
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u64 umax_value; /* maximum possible (u64)value */
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/* This field must be last, for states_equal() reasons. */
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enum bpf_reg_liveness live;
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};
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enum bpf_stack_slot_type {
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STACK_INVALID, /* nothing was stored in this stack slot */
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STACK_SPILL, /* register spilled into stack */
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STACK_MISC /* BPF program wrote some data into this slot */
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};
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#define BPF_REG_SIZE 8 /* size of eBPF register in bytes */
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struct bpf_stack_state {
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struct bpf_reg_state spilled_ptr;
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u8 slot_type[BPF_REG_SIZE];
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};
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/* state of the program:
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* type of all registers and stack info
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*/
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struct bpf_verifier_state {
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struct bpf_reg_state regs[MAX_BPF_REG];
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struct bpf_verifier_state *parent;
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int allocated_stack;
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struct bpf_stack_state *stack;
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};
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/* linked list of verifier states used to prune search */
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struct bpf_verifier_state_list {
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struct bpf_verifier_state state;
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struct bpf_verifier_state_list *next;
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};
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struct bpf_insn_aux_data {
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union {
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enum bpf_reg_type ptr_type; /* pointer type for load/store insns */
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struct bpf_map *map_ptr; /* pointer for call insn into lookup_elem */
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};
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int ctx_field_size; /* the ctx field size for load insn, maybe 0 */
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bool seen; /* this insn was processed by the verifier */
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};
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#define MAX_USED_MAPS 64 /* max number of maps accessed by one eBPF program */
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#define BPF_VERIFIER_TMP_LOG_SIZE 1024
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struct bpf_verifer_log {
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u32 level;
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char kbuf[BPF_VERIFIER_TMP_LOG_SIZE];
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char __user *ubuf;
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u32 len_used;
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u32 len_total;
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};
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static inline bool bpf_verifier_log_full(const struct bpf_verifer_log *log)
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{
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return log->len_used >= log->len_total - 1;
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}
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struct bpf_verifier_env;
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struct bpf_ext_analyzer_ops {
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int (*insn_hook)(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
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int insn_idx, int prev_insn_idx);
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};
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/* single container for all structs
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* one verifier_env per bpf_check() call
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*/
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struct bpf_verifier_env {
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struct bpf_prog *prog; /* eBPF program being verified */
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const struct bpf_verifier_ops *ops;
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struct bpf_verifier_stack_elem *head; /* stack of verifier states to be processed */
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int stack_size; /* number of states to be processed */
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bool strict_alignment; /* perform strict pointer alignment checks */
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struct bpf_verifier_state *cur_state; /* current verifier state */
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struct bpf_verifier_state_list **explored_states; /* search pruning optimization */
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const struct bpf_ext_analyzer_ops *dev_ops; /* device analyzer ops */
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struct bpf_map *used_maps[MAX_USED_MAPS]; /* array of map's used by eBPF program */
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u32 used_map_cnt; /* number of used maps */
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u32 id_gen; /* used to generate unique reg IDs */
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bool allow_ptr_leaks;
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bool seen_direct_write;
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struct bpf_insn_aux_data *insn_aux_data; /* array of per-insn state */
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struct bpf_verifer_log log;
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};
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static inline struct bpf_reg_state *cur_regs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
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{
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return env->cur_state->regs;
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}
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#if defined(CONFIG_NET) && defined(CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL)
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int bpf_prog_offload_verifier_prep(struct bpf_verifier_env *env);
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#else
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static inline int bpf_prog_offload_verifier_prep(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
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{
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return -EOPNOTSUPP;
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}
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#endif
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#endif /* _LINUX_BPF_VERIFIER_H */
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