linux_dsm_epyc7002/kernel/user_namespace.c
Eric W. Biederman 7872559664 Merge branch 'nsfs-ioctls' into HEAD
From: Andrey Vagin <avagin@openvz.org>

Each namespace has an owning user namespace and now there is not way
to discover these relationships.

Pid and user namepaces are hierarchical. There is no way to discover
parent-child relationships too.

Why we may want to know relationships between namespaces?

One use would be visualization, in order to understand the running
system.  Another would be to answer the question: what capability does
process X have to perform operations on a resource governed by namespace
Y?

One more use-case (which usually called abnormal) is checkpoint/restart.
In CRIU we are going to dump and restore nested namespaces.

There [1] was a discussion about which interface to choose to determing
relationships between namespaces.

Eric suggested to add two ioctl-s [2]:
> Grumble, Grumble.  I think this may actually a case for creating ioctls
> for these two cases.  Now that random nsfs file descriptors are bind
> mountable the original reason for using proc files is not as pressing.
>
> One ioctl for the user namespace that owns a file descriptor.
> One ioctl for the parent namespace of a namespace file descriptor.

Here is an implementaions of these ioctl-s.

$ man man7/namespaces.7
...
Since  Linux  4.X,  the  following  ioctl(2)  calls are supported for
namespace file descriptors.  The correct syntax is:

      fd = ioctl(ns_fd, ioctl_type);

where ioctl_type is one of the following:

NS_GET_USERNS
      Returns a file descriptor that refers to an owning user names‐
      pace.

NS_GET_PARENT
      Returns  a  file descriptor that refers to a parent namespace.
      This ioctl(2) can be used for pid  and  user  namespaces.  For
      user namespaces, NS_GET_PARENT and NS_GET_USERNS have the same
      meaning.

In addition to generic ioctl(2) errors, the following  specific  ones
can occur:

EINVAL NS_GET_PARENT was called for a nonhierarchical namespace.

EPERM  The  requested  namespace  is outside of the current namespace
      scope.

[1] https://lkml.org/lkml/2016/7/6/158
[2] https://lkml.org/lkml/2016/7/9/101

Changes for v2:
* don't return ENOENT for init_user_ns and init_pid_ns. There is nothing
  outside of the init namespace, so we can return EPERM in this case too.
  > The fewer special cases the easier the code is to get
  > correct, and the easier it is to read. // Eric

Changes for v3:
* rename ns->get_owner() to ns->owner(). get_* usually means that it
  grabs a reference.

Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
Cc: "Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)" <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Cc: "W. Trevor King" <wking@tremily.us>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
2016-09-22 20:00:36 -05:00

1092 lines
27 KiB
C

/*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
* modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
* published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
* License.
*/
#include <linux/export.h>
#include <linux/nsproxy.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/user_namespace.h>
#include <linux/proc_ns.h>
#include <linux/highuid.h>
#include <linux/cred.h>
#include <linux/securebits.h>
#include <linux/keyctl.h>
#include <linux/key-type.h>
#include <keys/user-type.h>
#include <linux/seq_file.h>
#include <linux/fs.h>
#include <linux/uaccess.h>
#include <linux/ctype.h>
#include <linux/projid.h>
#include <linux/fs_struct.h>
static struct kmem_cache *user_ns_cachep __read_mostly;
static DEFINE_MUTEX(userns_state_mutex);
static bool new_idmap_permitted(const struct file *file,
struct user_namespace *ns, int cap_setid,
struct uid_gid_map *map);
static void free_user_ns(struct work_struct *work);
static struct ucounts *inc_user_namespaces(struct user_namespace *ns, kuid_t uid)
{
return inc_ucount(ns, uid, UCOUNT_USER_NAMESPACES);
}
static void dec_user_namespaces(struct ucounts *ucounts)
{
return dec_ucount(ucounts, UCOUNT_USER_NAMESPACES);
}
static void set_cred_user_ns(struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *user_ns)
{
/* Start with the same capabilities as init but useless for doing
* anything as the capabilities are bound to the new user namespace.
*/
cred->securebits = SECUREBITS_DEFAULT;
cred->cap_inheritable = CAP_EMPTY_SET;
cred->cap_permitted = CAP_FULL_SET;
cred->cap_effective = CAP_FULL_SET;
cred->cap_ambient = CAP_EMPTY_SET;
cred->cap_bset = CAP_FULL_SET;
#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
key_put(cred->request_key_auth);
cred->request_key_auth = NULL;
#endif
/* tgcred will be cleared in our caller bc CLONE_THREAD won't be set */
cred->user_ns = user_ns;
}
/*
* Create a new user namespace, deriving the creator from the user in the
* passed credentials, and replacing that user with the new root user for the
* new namespace.
*
* This is called by copy_creds(), which will finish setting the target task's
* credentials.
*/
int create_user_ns(struct cred *new)
{
struct user_namespace *ns, *parent_ns = new->user_ns;
kuid_t owner = new->euid;
kgid_t group = new->egid;
struct ucounts *ucounts;
int ret, i;
ret = -ENOSPC;
if (parent_ns->level > 32)
goto fail;
ucounts = inc_user_namespaces(parent_ns, owner);
if (!ucounts)
goto fail;
/*
* Verify that we can not violate the policy of which files
* may be accessed that is specified by the root directory,
* by verifing that the root directory is at the root of the
* mount namespace which allows all files to be accessed.
*/
ret = -EPERM;
if (current_chrooted())
goto fail_dec;
/* The creator needs a mapping in the parent user namespace
* or else we won't be able to reasonably tell userspace who
* created a user_namespace.
*/
ret = -EPERM;
if (!kuid_has_mapping(parent_ns, owner) ||
!kgid_has_mapping(parent_ns, group))
goto fail_dec;
ret = -ENOMEM;
ns = kmem_cache_zalloc(user_ns_cachep, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!ns)
goto fail_dec;
ret = ns_alloc_inum(&ns->ns);
if (ret)
goto fail_free;
ns->ns.ops = &userns_operations;
atomic_set(&ns->count, 1);
/* Leave the new->user_ns reference with the new user namespace. */
ns->parent = parent_ns;
ns->level = parent_ns->level + 1;
ns->owner = owner;
ns->group = group;
INIT_WORK(&ns->work, free_user_ns);
for (i = 0; i < UCOUNT_COUNTS; i++) {
ns->ucount_max[i] = INT_MAX;
}
ns->ucounts = ucounts;
/* Inherit USERNS_SETGROUPS_ALLOWED from our parent */
mutex_lock(&userns_state_mutex);
ns->flags = parent_ns->flags;
mutex_unlock(&userns_state_mutex);
#ifdef CONFIG_PERSISTENT_KEYRINGS
init_rwsem(&ns->persistent_keyring_register_sem);
#endif
ret = -ENOMEM;
if (!setup_userns_sysctls(ns))
goto fail_keyring;
set_cred_user_ns(new, ns);
return 0;
fail_keyring:
#ifdef CONFIG_PERSISTENT_KEYRINGS
key_put(ns->persistent_keyring_register);
#endif
ns_free_inum(&ns->ns);
fail_free:
kmem_cache_free(user_ns_cachep, ns);
fail_dec:
dec_user_namespaces(ucounts);
fail:
return ret;
}
int unshare_userns(unsigned long unshare_flags, struct cred **new_cred)
{
struct cred *cred;
int err = -ENOMEM;
if (!(unshare_flags & CLONE_NEWUSER))
return 0;
cred = prepare_creds();
if (cred) {
err = create_user_ns(cred);
if (err)
put_cred(cred);
else
*new_cred = cred;
}
return err;
}
static void free_user_ns(struct work_struct *work)
{
struct user_namespace *parent, *ns =
container_of(work, struct user_namespace, work);
do {
struct ucounts *ucounts = ns->ucounts;
parent = ns->parent;
retire_userns_sysctls(ns);
#ifdef CONFIG_PERSISTENT_KEYRINGS
key_put(ns->persistent_keyring_register);
#endif
ns_free_inum(&ns->ns);
kmem_cache_free(user_ns_cachep, ns);
dec_user_namespaces(ucounts);
ns = parent;
} while (atomic_dec_and_test(&parent->count));
}
void __put_user_ns(struct user_namespace *ns)
{
schedule_work(&ns->work);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(__put_user_ns);
static u32 map_id_range_down(struct uid_gid_map *map, u32 id, u32 count)
{
unsigned idx, extents;
u32 first, last, id2;
id2 = id + count - 1;
/* Find the matching extent */
extents = map->nr_extents;
smp_rmb();
for (idx = 0; idx < extents; idx++) {
first = map->extent[idx].first;
last = first + map->extent[idx].count - 1;
if (id >= first && id <= last &&
(id2 >= first && id2 <= last))
break;
}
/* Map the id or note failure */
if (idx < extents)
id = (id - first) + map->extent[idx].lower_first;
else
id = (u32) -1;
return id;
}
static u32 map_id_down(struct uid_gid_map *map, u32 id)
{
unsigned idx, extents;
u32 first, last;
/* Find the matching extent */
extents = map->nr_extents;
smp_rmb();
for (idx = 0; idx < extents; idx++) {
first = map->extent[idx].first;
last = first + map->extent[idx].count - 1;
if (id >= first && id <= last)
break;
}
/* Map the id or note failure */
if (idx < extents)
id = (id - first) + map->extent[idx].lower_first;
else
id = (u32) -1;
return id;
}
static u32 map_id_up(struct uid_gid_map *map, u32 id)
{
unsigned idx, extents;
u32 first, last;
/* Find the matching extent */
extents = map->nr_extents;
smp_rmb();
for (idx = 0; idx < extents; idx++) {
first = map->extent[idx].lower_first;
last = first + map->extent[idx].count - 1;
if (id >= first && id <= last)
break;
}
/* Map the id or note failure */
if (idx < extents)
id = (id - first) + map->extent[idx].first;
else
id = (u32) -1;
return id;
}
/**
* make_kuid - Map a user-namespace uid pair into a kuid.
* @ns: User namespace that the uid is in
* @uid: User identifier
*
* Maps a user-namespace uid pair into a kernel internal kuid,
* and returns that kuid.
*
* When there is no mapping defined for the user-namespace uid
* pair INVALID_UID is returned. Callers are expected to test
* for and handle INVALID_UID being returned. INVALID_UID
* may be tested for using uid_valid().
*/
kuid_t make_kuid(struct user_namespace *ns, uid_t uid)
{
/* Map the uid to a global kernel uid */
return KUIDT_INIT(map_id_down(&ns->uid_map, uid));
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(make_kuid);
/**
* from_kuid - Create a uid from a kuid user-namespace pair.
* @targ: The user namespace we want a uid in.
* @kuid: The kernel internal uid to start with.
*
* Map @kuid into the user-namespace specified by @targ and
* return the resulting uid.
*
* There is always a mapping into the initial user_namespace.
*
* If @kuid has no mapping in @targ (uid_t)-1 is returned.
*/
uid_t from_kuid(struct user_namespace *targ, kuid_t kuid)
{
/* Map the uid from a global kernel uid */
return map_id_up(&targ->uid_map, __kuid_val(kuid));
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(from_kuid);
/**
* from_kuid_munged - Create a uid from a kuid user-namespace pair.
* @targ: The user namespace we want a uid in.
* @kuid: The kernel internal uid to start with.
*
* Map @kuid into the user-namespace specified by @targ and
* return the resulting uid.
*
* There is always a mapping into the initial user_namespace.
*
* Unlike from_kuid from_kuid_munged never fails and always
* returns a valid uid. This makes from_kuid_munged appropriate
* for use in syscalls like stat and getuid where failing the
* system call and failing to provide a valid uid are not an
* options.
*
* If @kuid has no mapping in @targ overflowuid is returned.
*/
uid_t from_kuid_munged(struct user_namespace *targ, kuid_t kuid)
{
uid_t uid;
uid = from_kuid(targ, kuid);
if (uid == (uid_t) -1)
uid = overflowuid;
return uid;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(from_kuid_munged);
/**
* make_kgid - Map a user-namespace gid pair into a kgid.
* @ns: User namespace that the gid is in
* @gid: group identifier
*
* Maps a user-namespace gid pair into a kernel internal kgid,
* and returns that kgid.
*
* When there is no mapping defined for the user-namespace gid
* pair INVALID_GID is returned. Callers are expected to test
* for and handle INVALID_GID being returned. INVALID_GID may be
* tested for using gid_valid().
*/
kgid_t make_kgid(struct user_namespace *ns, gid_t gid)
{
/* Map the gid to a global kernel gid */
return KGIDT_INIT(map_id_down(&ns->gid_map, gid));
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(make_kgid);
/**
* from_kgid - Create a gid from a kgid user-namespace pair.
* @targ: The user namespace we want a gid in.
* @kgid: The kernel internal gid to start with.
*
* Map @kgid into the user-namespace specified by @targ and
* return the resulting gid.
*
* There is always a mapping into the initial user_namespace.
*
* If @kgid has no mapping in @targ (gid_t)-1 is returned.
*/
gid_t from_kgid(struct user_namespace *targ, kgid_t kgid)
{
/* Map the gid from a global kernel gid */
return map_id_up(&targ->gid_map, __kgid_val(kgid));
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(from_kgid);
/**
* from_kgid_munged - Create a gid from a kgid user-namespace pair.
* @targ: The user namespace we want a gid in.
* @kgid: The kernel internal gid to start with.
*
* Map @kgid into the user-namespace specified by @targ and
* return the resulting gid.
*
* There is always a mapping into the initial user_namespace.
*
* Unlike from_kgid from_kgid_munged never fails and always
* returns a valid gid. This makes from_kgid_munged appropriate
* for use in syscalls like stat and getgid where failing the
* system call and failing to provide a valid gid are not options.
*
* If @kgid has no mapping in @targ overflowgid is returned.
*/
gid_t from_kgid_munged(struct user_namespace *targ, kgid_t kgid)
{
gid_t gid;
gid = from_kgid(targ, kgid);
if (gid == (gid_t) -1)
gid = overflowgid;
return gid;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(from_kgid_munged);
/**
* make_kprojid - Map a user-namespace projid pair into a kprojid.
* @ns: User namespace that the projid is in
* @projid: Project identifier
*
* Maps a user-namespace uid pair into a kernel internal kuid,
* and returns that kuid.
*
* When there is no mapping defined for the user-namespace projid
* pair INVALID_PROJID is returned. Callers are expected to test
* for and handle handle INVALID_PROJID being returned. INVALID_PROJID
* may be tested for using projid_valid().
*/
kprojid_t make_kprojid(struct user_namespace *ns, projid_t projid)
{
/* Map the uid to a global kernel uid */
return KPROJIDT_INIT(map_id_down(&ns->projid_map, projid));
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(make_kprojid);
/**
* from_kprojid - Create a projid from a kprojid user-namespace pair.
* @targ: The user namespace we want a projid in.
* @kprojid: The kernel internal project identifier to start with.
*
* Map @kprojid into the user-namespace specified by @targ and
* return the resulting projid.
*
* There is always a mapping into the initial user_namespace.
*
* If @kprojid has no mapping in @targ (projid_t)-1 is returned.
*/
projid_t from_kprojid(struct user_namespace *targ, kprojid_t kprojid)
{
/* Map the uid from a global kernel uid */
return map_id_up(&targ->projid_map, __kprojid_val(kprojid));
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(from_kprojid);
/**
* from_kprojid_munged - Create a projiid from a kprojid user-namespace pair.
* @targ: The user namespace we want a projid in.
* @kprojid: The kernel internal projid to start with.
*
* Map @kprojid into the user-namespace specified by @targ and
* return the resulting projid.
*
* There is always a mapping into the initial user_namespace.
*
* Unlike from_kprojid from_kprojid_munged never fails and always
* returns a valid projid. This makes from_kprojid_munged
* appropriate for use in syscalls like stat and where
* failing the system call and failing to provide a valid projid are
* not an options.
*
* If @kprojid has no mapping in @targ OVERFLOW_PROJID is returned.
*/
projid_t from_kprojid_munged(struct user_namespace *targ, kprojid_t kprojid)
{
projid_t projid;
projid = from_kprojid(targ, kprojid);
if (projid == (projid_t) -1)
projid = OVERFLOW_PROJID;
return projid;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(from_kprojid_munged);
static int uid_m_show(struct seq_file *seq, void *v)
{
struct user_namespace *ns = seq->private;
struct uid_gid_extent *extent = v;
struct user_namespace *lower_ns;
uid_t lower;
lower_ns = seq_user_ns(seq);
if ((lower_ns == ns) && lower_ns->parent)
lower_ns = lower_ns->parent;
lower = from_kuid(lower_ns, KUIDT_INIT(extent->lower_first));
seq_printf(seq, "%10u %10u %10u\n",
extent->first,
lower,
extent->count);
return 0;
}
static int gid_m_show(struct seq_file *seq, void *v)
{
struct user_namespace *ns = seq->private;
struct uid_gid_extent *extent = v;
struct user_namespace *lower_ns;
gid_t lower;
lower_ns = seq_user_ns(seq);
if ((lower_ns == ns) && lower_ns->parent)
lower_ns = lower_ns->parent;
lower = from_kgid(lower_ns, KGIDT_INIT(extent->lower_first));
seq_printf(seq, "%10u %10u %10u\n",
extent->first,
lower,
extent->count);
return 0;
}
static int projid_m_show(struct seq_file *seq, void *v)
{
struct user_namespace *ns = seq->private;
struct uid_gid_extent *extent = v;
struct user_namespace *lower_ns;
projid_t lower;
lower_ns = seq_user_ns(seq);
if ((lower_ns == ns) && lower_ns->parent)
lower_ns = lower_ns->parent;
lower = from_kprojid(lower_ns, KPROJIDT_INIT(extent->lower_first));
seq_printf(seq, "%10u %10u %10u\n",
extent->first,
lower,
extent->count);
return 0;
}
static void *m_start(struct seq_file *seq, loff_t *ppos,
struct uid_gid_map *map)
{
struct uid_gid_extent *extent = NULL;
loff_t pos = *ppos;
if (pos < map->nr_extents)
extent = &map->extent[pos];
return extent;
}
static void *uid_m_start(struct seq_file *seq, loff_t *ppos)
{
struct user_namespace *ns = seq->private;
return m_start(seq, ppos, &ns->uid_map);
}
static void *gid_m_start(struct seq_file *seq, loff_t *ppos)
{
struct user_namespace *ns = seq->private;
return m_start(seq, ppos, &ns->gid_map);
}
static void *projid_m_start(struct seq_file *seq, loff_t *ppos)
{
struct user_namespace *ns = seq->private;
return m_start(seq, ppos, &ns->projid_map);
}
static void *m_next(struct seq_file *seq, void *v, loff_t *pos)
{
(*pos)++;
return seq->op->start(seq, pos);
}
static void m_stop(struct seq_file *seq, void *v)
{
return;
}
const struct seq_operations proc_uid_seq_operations = {
.start = uid_m_start,
.stop = m_stop,
.next = m_next,
.show = uid_m_show,
};
const struct seq_operations proc_gid_seq_operations = {
.start = gid_m_start,
.stop = m_stop,
.next = m_next,
.show = gid_m_show,
};
const struct seq_operations proc_projid_seq_operations = {
.start = projid_m_start,
.stop = m_stop,
.next = m_next,
.show = projid_m_show,
};
static bool mappings_overlap(struct uid_gid_map *new_map,
struct uid_gid_extent *extent)
{
u32 upper_first, lower_first, upper_last, lower_last;
unsigned idx;
upper_first = extent->first;
lower_first = extent->lower_first;
upper_last = upper_first + extent->count - 1;
lower_last = lower_first + extent->count - 1;
for (idx = 0; idx < new_map->nr_extents; idx++) {
u32 prev_upper_first, prev_lower_first;
u32 prev_upper_last, prev_lower_last;
struct uid_gid_extent *prev;
prev = &new_map->extent[idx];
prev_upper_first = prev->first;
prev_lower_first = prev->lower_first;
prev_upper_last = prev_upper_first + prev->count - 1;
prev_lower_last = prev_lower_first + prev->count - 1;
/* Does the upper range intersect a previous extent? */
if ((prev_upper_first <= upper_last) &&
(prev_upper_last >= upper_first))
return true;
/* Does the lower range intersect a previous extent? */
if ((prev_lower_first <= lower_last) &&
(prev_lower_last >= lower_first))
return true;
}
return false;
}
static ssize_t map_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
size_t count, loff_t *ppos,
int cap_setid,
struct uid_gid_map *map,
struct uid_gid_map *parent_map)
{
struct seq_file *seq = file->private_data;
struct user_namespace *ns = seq->private;
struct uid_gid_map new_map;
unsigned idx;
struct uid_gid_extent *extent = NULL;
char *kbuf = NULL, *pos, *next_line;
ssize_t ret = -EINVAL;
/*
* The userns_state_mutex serializes all writes to any given map.
*
* Any map is only ever written once.
*
* An id map fits within 1 cache line on most architectures.
*
* On read nothing needs to be done unless you are on an
* architecture with a crazy cache coherency model like alpha.
*
* There is a one time data dependency between reading the
* count of the extents and the values of the extents. The
* desired behavior is to see the values of the extents that
* were written before the count of the extents.
*
* To achieve this smp_wmb() is used on guarantee the write
* order and smp_rmb() is guaranteed that we don't have crazy
* architectures returning stale data.
*/
mutex_lock(&userns_state_mutex);
ret = -EPERM;
/* Only allow one successful write to the map */
if (map->nr_extents != 0)
goto out;
/*
* Adjusting namespace settings requires capabilities on the target.
*/
if (cap_valid(cap_setid) && !file_ns_capable(file, ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
goto out;
/* Only allow < page size writes at the beginning of the file */
ret = -EINVAL;
if ((*ppos != 0) || (count >= PAGE_SIZE))
goto out;
/* Slurp in the user data */
kbuf = memdup_user_nul(buf, count);
if (IS_ERR(kbuf)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(kbuf);
kbuf = NULL;
goto out;
}
/* Parse the user data */
ret = -EINVAL;
pos = kbuf;
new_map.nr_extents = 0;
for (; pos; pos = next_line) {
extent = &new_map.extent[new_map.nr_extents];
/* Find the end of line and ensure I don't look past it */
next_line = strchr(pos, '\n');
if (next_line) {
*next_line = '\0';
next_line++;
if (*next_line == '\0')
next_line = NULL;
}
pos = skip_spaces(pos);
extent->first = simple_strtoul(pos, &pos, 10);
if (!isspace(*pos))
goto out;
pos = skip_spaces(pos);
extent->lower_first = simple_strtoul(pos, &pos, 10);
if (!isspace(*pos))
goto out;
pos = skip_spaces(pos);
extent->count = simple_strtoul(pos, &pos, 10);
if (*pos && !isspace(*pos))
goto out;
/* Verify there is not trailing junk on the line */
pos = skip_spaces(pos);
if (*pos != '\0')
goto out;
/* Verify we have been given valid starting values */
if ((extent->first == (u32) -1) ||
(extent->lower_first == (u32) -1))
goto out;
/* Verify count is not zero and does not cause the
* extent to wrap
*/
if ((extent->first + extent->count) <= extent->first)
goto out;
if ((extent->lower_first + extent->count) <=
extent->lower_first)
goto out;
/* Do the ranges in extent overlap any previous extents? */
if (mappings_overlap(&new_map, extent))
goto out;
new_map.nr_extents++;
/* Fail if the file contains too many extents */
if ((new_map.nr_extents == UID_GID_MAP_MAX_EXTENTS) &&
(next_line != NULL))
goto out;
}
/* Be very certaint the new map actually exists */
if (new_map.nr_extents == 0)
goto out;
ret = -EPERM;
/* Validate the user is allowed to use user id's mapped to. */
if (!new_idmap_permitted(file, ns, cap_setid, &new_map))
goto out;
/* Map the lower ids from the parent user namespace to the
* kernel global id space.
*/
for (idx = 0; idx < new_map.nr_extents; idx++) {
u32 lower_first;
extent = &new_map.extent[idx];
lower_first = map_id_range_down(parent_map,
extent->lower_first,
extent->count);
/* Fail if we can not map the specified extent to
* the kernel global id space.
*/
if (lower_first == (u32) -1)
goto out;
extent->lower_first = lower_first;
}
/* Install the map */
memcpy(map->extent, new_map.extent,
new_map.nr_extents*sizeof(new_map.extent[0]));
smp_wmb();
map->nr_extents = new_map.nr_extents;
*ppos = count;
ret = count;
out:
mutex_unlock(&userns_state_mutex);
kfree(kbuf);
return ret;
}
ssize_t proc_uid_map_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
size_t size, loff_t *ppos)
{
struct seq_file *seq = file->private_data;
struct user_namespace *ns = seq->private;
struct user_namespace *seq_ns = seq_user_ns(seq);
if (!ns->parent)
return -EPERM;
if ((seq_ns != ns) && (seq_ns != ns->parent))
return -EPERM;
return map_write(file, buf, size, ppos, CAP_SETUID,
&ns->uid_map, &ns->parent->uid_map);
}
ssize_t proc_gid_map_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
size_t size, loff_t *ppos)
{
struct seq_file *seq = file->private_data;
struct user_namespace *ns = seq->private;
struct user_namespace *seq_ns = seq_user_ns(seq);
if (!ns->parent)
return -EPERM;
if ((seq_ns != ns) && (seq_ns != ns->parent))
return -EPERM;
return map_write(file, buf, size, ppos, CAP_SETGID,
&ns->gid_map, &ns->parent->gid_map);
}
ssize_t proc_projid_map_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
size_t size, loff_t *ppos)
{
struct seq_file *seq = file->private_data;
struct user_namespace *ns = seq->private;
struct user_namespace *seq_ns = seq_user_ns(seq);
if (!ns->parent)
return -EPERM;
if ((seq_ns != ns) && (seq_ns != ns->parent))
return -EPERM;
/* Anyone can set any valid project id no capability needed */
return map_write(file, buf, size, ppos, -1,
&ns->projid_map, &ns->parent->projid_map);
}
static bool new_idmap_permitted(const struct file *file,
struct user_namespace *ns, int cap_setid,
struct uid_gid_map *new_map)
{
const struct cred *cred = file->f_cred;
/* Don't allow mappings that would allow anything that wouldn't
* be allowed without the establishment of unprivileged mappings.
*/
if ((new_map->nr_extents == 1) && (new_map->extent[0].count == 1) &&
uid_eq(ns->owner, cred->euid)) {
u32 id = new_map->extent[0].lower_first;
if (cap_setid == CAP_SETUID) {
kuid_t uid = make_kuid(ns->parent, id);
if (uid_eq(uid, cred->euid))
return true;
} else if (cap_setid == CAP_SETGID) {
kgid_t gid = make_kgid(ns->parent, id);
if (!(ns->flags & USERNS_SETGROUPS_ALLOWED) &&
gid_eq(gid, cred->egid))
return true;
}
}
/* Allow anyone to set a mapping that doesn't require privilege */
if (!cap_valid(cap_setid))
return true;
/* Allow the specified ids if we have the appropriate capability
* (CAP_SETUID or CAP_SETGID) over the parent user namespace.
* And the opener of the id file also had the approprpiate capability.
*/
if (ns_capable(ns->parent, cap_setid) &&
file_ns_capable(file, ns->parent, cap_setid))
return true;
return false;
}
int proc_setgroups_show(struct seq_file *seq, void *v)
{
struct user_namespace *ns = seq->private;
unsigned long userns_flags = ACCESS_ONCE(ns->flags);
seq_printf(seq, "%s\n",
(userns_flags & USERNS_SETGROUPS_ALLOWED) ?
"allow" : "deny");
return 0;
}
ssize_t proc_setgroups_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
{
struct seq_file *seq = file->private_data;
struct user_namespace *ns = seq->private;
char kbuf[8], *pos;
bool setgroups_allowed;
ssize_t ret;
/* Only allow a very narrow range of strings to be written */
ret = -EINVAL;
if ((*ppos != 0) || (count >= sizeof(kbuf)))
goto out;
/* What was written? */
ret = -EFAULT;
if (copy_from_user(kbuf, buf, count))
goto out;
kbuf[count] = '\0';
pos = kbuf;
/* What is being requested? */
ret = -EINVAL;
if (strncmp(pos, "allow", 5) == 0) {
pos += 5;
setgroups_allowed = true;
}
else if (strncmp(pos, "deny", 4) == 0) {
pos += 4;
setgroups_allowed = false;
}
else
goto out;
/* Verify there is not trailing junk on the line */
pos = skip_spaces(pos);
if (*pos != '\0')
goto out;
ret = -EPERM;
mutex_lock(&userns_state_mutex);
if (setgroups_allowed) {
/* Enabling setgroups after setgroups has been disabled
* is not allowed.
*/
if (!(ns->flags & USERNS_SETGROUPS_ALLOWED))
goto out_unlock;
} else {
/* Permanently disabling setgroups after setgroups has
* been enabled by writing the gid_map is not allowed.
*/
if (ns->gid_map.nr_extents != 0)
goto out_unlock;
ns->flags &= ~USERNS_SETGROUPS_ALLOWED;
}
mutex_unlock(&userns_state_mutex);
/* Report a successful write */
*ppos = count;
ret = count;
out:
return ret;
out_unlock:
mutex_unlock(&userns_state_mutex);
goto out;
}
bool userns_may_setgroups(const struct user_namespace *ns)
{
bool allowed;
mutex_lock(&userns_state_mutex);
/* It is not safe to use setgroups until a gid mapping in
* the user namespace has been established.
*/
allowed = ns->gid_map.nr_extents != 0;
/* Is setgroups allowed? */
allowed = allowed && (ns->flags & USERNS_SETGROUPS_ALLOWED);
mutex_unlock(&userns_state_mutex);
return allowed;
}
/*
* Returns true if @ns is the same namespace as or a descendant of
* @target_ns.
*/
bool current_in_userns(const struct user_namespace *target_ns)
{
struct user_namespace *ns;
for (ns = current_user_ns(); ns; ns = ns->parent) {
if (ns == target_ns)
return true;
}
return false;
}
static inline struct user_namespace *to_user_ns(struct ns_common *ns)
{
return container_of(ns, struct user_namespace, ns);
}
static struct ns_common *userns_get(struct task_struct *task)
{
struct user_namespace *user_ns;
rcu_read_lock();
user_ns = get_user_ns(__task_cred(task)->user_ns);
rcu_read_unlock();
return user_ns ? &user_ns->ns : NULL;
}
static void userns_put(struct ns_common *ns)
{
put_user_ns(to_user_ns(ns));
}
static int userns_install(struct nsproxy *nsproxy, struct ns_common *ns)
{
struct user_namespace *user_ns = to_user_ns(ns);
struct cred *cred;
/* Don't allow gaining capabilities by reentering
* the same user namespace.
*/
if (user_ns == current_user_ns())
return -EINVAL;
/* Tasks that share a thread group must share a user namespace */
if (!thread_group_empty(current))
return -EINVAL;
if (current->fs->users != 1)
return -EINVAL;
if (!ns_capable(user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
cred = prepare_creds();
if (!cred)
return -ENOMEM;
put_user_ns(cred->user_ns);
set_cred_user_ns(cred, get_user_ns(user_ns));
return commit_creds(cred);
}
struct ns_common *ns_get_owner(struct ns_common *ns)
{
struct user_namespace *my_user_ns = current_user_ns();
struct user_namespace *owner, *p;
/* See if the owner is in the current user namespace */
owner = p = ns->ops->owner(ns);
for (;;) {
if (!p)
return ERR_PTR(-EPERM);
if (p == my_user_ns)
break;
p = p->parent;
}
return &get_user_ns(owner)->ns;
}
static struct user_namespace *userns_owner(struct ns_common *ns)
{
return to_user_ns(ns)->parent;
}
const struct proc_ns_operations userns_operations = {
.name = "user",
.type = CLONE_NEWUSER,
.get = userns_get,
.put = userns_put,
.install = userns_install,
.owner = userns_owner,
.get_parent = ns_get_owner,
};
static __init int user_namespaces_init(void)
{
user_ns_cachep = KMEM_CACHE(user_namespace, SLAB_PANIC);
return 0;
}
subsys_initcall(user_namespaces_init);