mirror of
https://github.com/AuxXxilium/linux_dsm_epyc7002.git
synced 2024-12-28 11:18:45 +07:00
da9803dfd3
called SEV by also encrypting the guest register state, making the registers inaccessible to the hypervisor by en-/decrypting them on world switches. Thus, it adds additional protection to Linux guests against exfiltration, control flow and rollback attacks. With SEV-ES, the guest is in full control of what registers the hypervisor can access. This is provided by a guest-host exchange mechanism based on a new exception vector called VMM Communication Exception (#VC), a new instruction called VMGEXIT and a shared Guest-Host Communication Block which is a decrypted page shared between the guest and the hypervisor. Intercepts to the hypervisor become #VC exceptions in an SEV-ES guest so in order for that exception mechanism to work, the early x86 init code needed to be made able to handle exceptions, which, in itself, brings a bunch of very nice cleanups and improvements to the early boot code like an early page fault handler, allowing for on-demand building of the identity mapping. With that, !KASLR configurations do not use the EFI page table anymore but switch to a kernel-controlled one. The main part of this series adds the support for that new exchange mechanism. The goal has been to keep this as much as possibly separate from the core x86 code by concentrating the machinery in two SEV-ES-specific files: arch/x86/kernel/sev-es-shared.c arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c Other interaction with core x86 code has been kept at minimum and behind static keys to minimize the performance impact on !SEV-ES setups. Work by Joerg Roedel and Thomas Lendacky and others. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQIzBAABCgAdFiEEzv7L6UO9uDPlPSfHEsHwGGHeVUoFAl+FiKYACgkQEsHwGGHe VUqS5BAAlh5mKwtxXMyFyAIHa5tpsgDjbecFzy1UVmZyxN0JHLlM3NLmb+K52drY PiWjNNMi/cFMFazkuLFHuY0poBWrZml8zRS/mExKgUJC6EtguS9FQnRE9xjDBoWQ gOTSGJWEzT5wnFqo8qHwlC2CDCSF1hfL8ks3cUFW2tCWus4F9pyaMSGfFqD224rg Lh/8+arDMSIKE4uH0cm7iSuyNpbobId0l5JNDfCEFDYRigQZ6pZsQ9pbmbEpncs4 rmjDvBA5eHDlNMXq0ukqyrjxWTX4ZLBOBvuLhpyssSXnnu2T+Tcxg09+ZSTyJAe0 LyC9Wfo0v78JASXMAdeH9b1d1mRYNMqjvnBItNQoqweoqUXWz7kvgxCOp6b/G4xp cX5YhB6BprBW2DXL45frMRT/zX77UkEKYc5+0IBegV2xfnhRsjqQAQaWLIksyEaX nz9/C6+1Sr2IAv271yykeJtY6gtlRjg/usTlYpev+K0ghvGvTmuilEiTltjHrso1 XAMbfWHQGSd61LNXofvx/GLNfGBisS6dHVHwtkayinSjXNdWxI6w9fhbWVjQ+y2V hOF05lmzaJSG5kPLrsFHFqm2YcxOmsWkYYDBHvtmBkMZSf5B+9xxDv97Uy9NETcr eSYk//TEkKQqVazfCQS/9LSm0MllqKbwNO25sl0Tw2k6PnheO2g= =toqi -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Merge tag 'x86_seves_for_v5.10' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip Pull x86 SEV-ES support from Borislav Petkov: "SEV-ES enhances the current guest memory encryption support called SEV by also encrypting the guest register state, making the registers inaccessible to the hypervisor by en-/decrypting them on world switches. Thus, it adds additional protection to Linux guests against exfiltration, control flow and rollback attacks. With SEV-ES, the guest is in full control of what registers the hypervisor can access. This is provided by a guest-host exchange mechanism based on a new exception vector called VMM Communication Exception (#VC), a new instruction called VMGEXIT and a shared Guest-Host Communication Block which is a decrypted page shared between the guest and the hypervisor. Intercepts to the hypervisor become #VC exceptions in an SEV-ES guest so in order for that exception mechanism to work, the early x86 init code needed to be made able to handle exceptions, which, in itself, brings a bunch of very nice cleanups and improvements to the early boot code like an early page fault handler, allowing for on-demand building of the identity mapping. With that, !KASLR configurations do not use the EFI page table anymore but switch to a kernel-controlled one. The main part of this series adds the support for that new exchange mechanism. The goal has been to keep this as much as possibly separate from the core x86 code by concentrating the machinery in two SEV-ES-specific files: arch/x86/kernel/sev-es-shared.c arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c Other interaction with core x86 code has been kept at minimum and behind static keys to minimize the performance impact on !SEV-ES setups. Work by Joerg Roedel and Thomas Lendacky and others" * tag 'x86_seves_for_v5.10' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (73 commits) x86/sev-es: Use GHCB accessor for setting the MMIO scratch buffer x86/sev-es: Check required CPU features for SEV-ES x86/efi: Add GHCB mappings when SEV-ES is active x86/sev-es: Handle NMI State x86/sev-es: Support CPU offline/online x86/head/64: Don't call verify_cpu() on starting APs x86/smpboot: Load TSS and getcpu GDT entry before loading IDT x86/realmode: Setup AP jump table x86/realmode: Add SEV-ES specific trampoline entry point x86/vmware: Add VMware-specific handling for VMMCALL under SEV-ES x86/kvm: Add KVM-specific VMMCALL handling under SEV-ES x86/paravirt: Allow hypervisor-specific VMMCALL handling under SEV-ES x86/sev-es: Handle #DB Events x86/sev-es: Handle #AC Events x86/sev-es: Handle VMMCALL Events x86/sev-es: Handle MWAIT/MWAITX Events x86/sev-es: Handle MONITOR/MONITORX Events x86/sev-es: Handle INVD Events x86/sev-es: Handle RDPMC Events x86/sev-es: Handle RDTSC(P) Events ...
249 lines
7.4 KiB
C
249 lines
7.4 KiB
C
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
|
|
#include <linux/extable.h>
|
|
#include <linux/uaccess.h>
|
|
#include <linux/sched/debug.h>
|
|
#include <xen/xen.h>
|
|
|
|
#include <asm/fpu/internal.h>
|
|
#include <asm/sev-es.h>
|
|
#include <asm/traps.h>
|
|
#include <asm/kdebug.h>
|
|
|
|
typedef bool (*ex_handler_t)(const struct exception_table_entry *,
|
|
struct pt_regs *, int, unsigned long,
|
|
unsigned long);
|
|
|
|
static inline unsigned long
|
|
ex_fixup_addr(const struct exception_table_entry *x)
|
|
{
|
|
return (unsigned long)&x->fixup + x->fixup;
|
|
}
|
|
static inline ex_handler_t
|
|
ex_fixup_handler(const struct exception_table_entry *x)
|
|
{
|
|
return (ex_handler_t)((unsigned long)&x->handler + x->handler);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
__visible bool ex_handler_default(const struct exception_table_entry *fixup,
|
|
struct pt_regs *regs, int trapnr,
|
|
unsigned long error_code,
|
|
unsigned long fault_addr)
|
|
{
|
|
regs->ip = ex_fixup_addr(fixup);
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(ex_handler_default);
|
|
|
|
__visible bool ex_handler_fault(const struct exception_table_entry *fixup,
|
|
struct pt_regs *regs, int trapnr,
|
|
unsigned long error_code,
|
|
unsigned long fault_addr)
|
|
{
|
|
regs->ip = ex_fixup_addr(fixup);
|
|
regs->ax = trapnr;
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ex_handler_fault);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Handler for when we fail to restore a task's FPU state. We should never get
|
|
* here because the FPU state of a task using the FPU (task->thread.fpu.state)
|
|
* should always be valid. However, past bugs have allowed userspace to set
|
|
* reserved bits in the XSAVE area using PTRACE_SETREGSET or sys_rt_sigreturn().
|
|
* These caused XRSTOR to fail when switching to the task, leaking the FPU
|
|
* registers of the task previously executing on the CPU. Mitigate this class
|
|
* of vulnerability by restoring from the initial state (essentially, zeroing
|
|
* out all the FPU registers) if we can't restore from the task's FPU state.
|
|
*/
|
|
__visible bool ex_handler_fprestore(const struct exception_table_entry *fixup,
|
|
struct pt_regs *regs, int trapnr,
|
|
unsigned long error_code,
|
|
unsigned long fault_addr)
|
|
{
|
|
regs->ip = ex_fixup_addr(fixup);
|
|
|
|
WARN_ONCE(1, "Bad FPU state detected at %pB, reinitializing FPU registers.",
|
|
(void *)instruction_pointer(regs));
|
|
|
|
__copy_kernel_to_fpregs(&init_fpstate, -1);
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ex_handler_fprestore);
|
|
|
|
__visible bool ex_handler_uaccess(const struct exception_table_entry *fixup,
|
|
struct pt_regs *regs, int trapnr,
|
|
unsigned long error_code,
|
|
unsigned long fault_addr)
|
|
{
|
|
WARN_ONCE(trapnr == X86_TRAP_GP, "General protection fault in user access. Non-canonical address?");
|
|
regs->ip = ex_fixup_addr(fixup);
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(ex_handler_uaccess);
|
|
|
|
__visible bool ex_handler_copy(const struct exception_table_entry *fixup,
|
|
struct pt_regs *regs, int trapnr,
|
|
unsigned long error_code,
|
|
unsigned long fault_addr)
|
|
{
|
|
WARN_ONCE(trapnr == X86_TRAP_GP, "General protection fault in user access. Non-canonical address?");
|
|
regs->ip = ex_fixup_addr(fixup);
|
|
regs->ax = trapnr;
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(ex_handler_copy);
|
|
|
|
__visible bool ex_handler_rdmsr_unsafe(const struct exception_table_entry *fixup,
|
|
struct pt_regs *regs, int trapnr,
|
|
unsigned long error_code,
|
|
unsigned long fault_addr)
|
|
{
|
|
if (pr_warn_once("unchecked MSR access error: RDMSR from 0x%x at rIP: 0x%lx (%pS)\n",
|
|
(unsigned int)regs->cx, regs->ip, (void *)regs->ip))
|
|
show_stack_regs(regs);
|
|
|
|
/* Pretend that the read succeeded and returned 0. */
|
|
regs->ip = ex_fixup_addr(fixup);
|
|
regs->ax = 0;
|
|
regs->dx = 0;
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(ex_handler_rdmsr_unsafe);
|
|
|
|
__visible bool ex_handler_wrmsr_unsafe(const struct exception_table_entry *fixup,
|
|
struct pt_regs *regs, int trapnr,
|
|
unsigned long error_code,
|
|
unsigned long fault_addr)
|
|
{
|
|
if (pr_warn_once("unchecked MSR access error: WRMSR to 0x%x (tried to write 0x%08x%08x) at rIP: 0x%lx (%pS)\n",
|
|
(unsigned int)regs->cx, (unsigned int)regs->dx,
|
|
(unsigned int)regs->ax, regs->ip, (void *)regs->ip))
|
|
show_stack_regs(regs);
|
|
|
|
/* Pretend that the write succeeded. */
|
|
regs->ip = ex_fixup_addr(fixup);
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(ex_handler_wrmsr_unsafe);
|
|
|
|
__visible bool ex_handler_clear_fs(const struct exception_table_entry *fixup,
|
|
struct pt_regs *regs, int trapnr,
|
|
unsigned long error_code,
|
|
unsigned long fault_addr)
|
|
{
|
|
if (static_cpu_has(X86_BUG_NULL_SEG))
|
|
asm volatile ("mov %0, %%fs" : : "rm" (__USER_DS));
|
|
asm volatile ("mov %0, %%fs" : : "rm" (0));
|
|
return ex_handler_default(fixup, regs, trapnr, error_code, fault_addr);
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(ex_handler_clear_fs);
|
|
|
|
enum handler_type ex_get_fault_handler_type(unsigned long ip)
|
|
{
|
|
const struct exception_table_entry *e;
|
|
ex_handler_t handler;
|
|
|
|
e = search_exception_tables(ip);
|
|
if (!e)
|
|
return EX_HANDLER_NONE;
|
|
handler = ex_fixup_handler(e);
|
|
if (handler == ex_handler_fault)
|
|
return EX_HANDLER_FAULT;
|
|
else if (handler == ex_handler_uaccess || handler == ex_handler_copy)
|
|
return EX_HANDLER_UACCESS;
|
|
else
|
|
return EX_HANDLER_OTHER;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int fixup_exception(struct pt_regs *regs, int trapnr, unsigned long error_code,
|
|
unsigned long fault_addr)
|
|
{
|
|
const struct exception_table_entry *e;
|
|
ex_handler_t handler;
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_PNPBIOS
|
|
if (unlikely(SEGMENT_IS_PNP_CODE(regs->cs))) {
|
|
extern u32 pnp_bios_fault_eip, pnp_bios_fault_esp;
|
|
extern u32 pnp_bios_is_utter_crap;
|
|
pnp_bios_is_utter_crap = 1;
|
|
printk(KERN_CRIT "PNPBIOS fault.. attempting recovery.\n");
|
|
__asm__ volatile(
|
|
"movl %0, %%esp\n\t"
|
|
"jmp *%1\n\t"
|
|
: : "g" (pnp_bios_fault_esp), "g" (pnp_bios_fault_eip));
|
|
panic("do_trap: can't hit this");
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
e = search_exception_tables(regs->ip);
|
|
if (!e)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
handler = ex_fixup_handler(e);
|
|
return handler(e, regs, trapnr, error_code, fault_addr);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
extern unsigned int early_recursion_flag;
|
|
|
|
/* Restricted version used during very early boot */
|
|
void __init early_fixup_exception(struct pt_regs *regs, int trapnr)
|
|
{
|
|
/* Ignore early NMIs. */
|
|
if (trapnr == X86_TRAP_NMI)
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
if (early_recursion_flag > 2)
|
|
goto halt_loop;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Old CPUs leave the high bits of CS on the stack
|
|
* undefined. I'm not sure which CPUs do this, but at least
|
|
* the 486 DX works this way.
|
|
* Xen pv domains are not using the default __KERNEL_CS.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!xen_pv_domain() && regs->cs != __KERNEL_CS)
|
|
goto fail;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* The full exception fixup machinery is available as soon as
|
|
* the early IDT is loaded. This means that it is the
|
|
* responsibility of extable users to either function correctly
|
|
* when handlers are invoked early or to simply avoid causing
|
|
* exceptions before they're ready to handle them.
|
|
*
|
|
* This is better than filtering which handlers can be used,
|
|
* because refusing to call a handler here is guaranteed to
|
|
* result in a hard-to-debug panic.
|
|
*
|
|
* Keep in mind that not all vectors actually get here. Early
|
|
* page faults, for example, are special.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (fixup_exception(regs, trapnr, regs->orig_ax, 0))
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
if (trapnr == X86_TRAP_UD) {
|
|
if (report_bug(regs->ip, regs) == BUG_TRAP_TYPE_WARN) {
|
|
/* Skip the ud2. */
|
|
regs->ip += LEN_UD2;
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* If this was a BUG and report_bug returns or if this
|
|
* was just a normal #UD, we want to continue onward and
|
|
* crash.
|
|
*/
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
fail:
|
|
early_printk("PANIC: early exception 0x%02x IP %lx:%lx error %lx cr2 0x%lx\n",
|
|
(unsigned)trapnr, (unsigned long)regs->cs, regs->ip,
|
|
regs->orig_ax, read_cr2());
|
|
|
|
show_regs(regs);
|
|
|
|
halt_loop:
|
|
while (true)
|
|
halt();
|
|
}
|