mirror of
https://github.com/AuxXxilium/linux_dsm_epyc7002.git
synced 2024-12-05 12:46:39 +07:00
026ee1f66a
Commit 6e6f0a1f0f
("panic: don't print redundant backtraces on oops")
causes a regression where no stack trace will be printed at all for the
case where kernel code calls panic() directly while not processing an
oops, and of course there are 100's of instances of this type of call.
The original commit executed the check (!oops_in_progress), but this will
always be false because just before the dump_stack() there is a call to
bust_spinlocks(1), which does the following:
void __attribute__((weak)) bust_spinlocks(int yes)
{
if (yes) {
++oops_in_progress;
The proper way to resolve the problem that original commit tried to
solve is to avoid printing a stack dump from panic() when the either of
the following conditions is true:
1) TAINT_DIE has been set (this is done by oops_end())
This indicates and oops has already been printed.
2) oops_in_progress > 1
This guards against the rare case where panic() is invoked
a second time, or in between oops_begin() and oops_end()
Signed-off-by: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> [3.3+]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
479 lines
11 KiB
C
479 lines
11 KiB
C
/*
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* linux/kernel/panic.c
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*
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* Copyright (C) 1991, 1992 Linus Torvalds
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*/
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/*
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* This function is used through-out the kernel (including mm and fs)
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* to indicate a major problem.
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*/
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#include <linux/debug_locks.h>
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#include <linux/interrupt.h>
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#include <linux/kmsg_dump.h>
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#include <linux/kallsyms.h>
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#include <linux/notifier.h>
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#include <linux/module.h>
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#include <linux/random.h>
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#include <linux/reboot.h>
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#include <linux/delay.h>
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#include <linux/kexec.h>
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#include <linux/sched.h>
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#include <linux/sysrq.h>
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#include <linux/init.h>
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#include <linux/nmi.h>
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#include <linux/dmi.h>
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#define PANIC_TIMER_STEP 100
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#define PANIC_BLINK_SPD 18
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int panic_on_oops;
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static unsigned long tainted_mask;
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static int pause_on_oops;
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static int pause_on_oops_flag;
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static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(pause_on_oops_lock);
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int panic_timeout;
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EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(panic_timeout);
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ATOMIC_NOTIFIER_HEAD(panic_notifier_list);
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EXPORT_SYMBOL(panic_notifier_list);
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static long no_blink(int state)
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{
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return 0;
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}
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/* Returns how long it waited in ms */
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long (*panic_blink)(int state);
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EXPORT_SYMBOL(panic_blink);
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/*
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* Stop ourself in panic -- architecture code may override this
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*/
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void __weak panic_smp_self_stop(void)
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{
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while (1)
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cpu_relax();
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}
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/**
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* panic - halt the system
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* @fmt: The text string to print
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*
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* Display a message, then perform cleanups.
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*
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* This function never returns.
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*/
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void panic(const char *fmt, ...)
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{
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static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(panic_lock);
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static char buf[1024];
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va_list args;
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long i, i_next = 0;
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int state = 0;
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/*
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* It's possible to come here directly from a panic-assertion and
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* not have preempt disabled. Some functions called from here want
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* preempt to be disabled. No point enabling it later though...
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*
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* Only one CPU is allowed to execute the panic code from here. For
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* multiple parallel invocations of panic, all other CPUs either
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* stop themself or will wait until they are stopped by the 1st CPU
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* with smp_send_stop().
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*/
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if (!spin_trylock(&panic_lock))
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panic_smp_self_stop();
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console_verbose();
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bust_spinlocks(1);
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va_start(args, fmt);
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vsnprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), fmt, args);
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va_end(args);
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printk(KERN_EMERG "Kernel panic - not syncing: %s\n",buf);
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#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_BUGVERBOSE
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/*
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* Avoid nested stack-dumping if a panic occurs during oops processing
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*/
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if (!test_taint(TAINT_DIE) && oops_in_progress <= 1)
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dump_stack();
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#endif
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/*
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* If we have crashed and we have a crash kernel loaded let it handle
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* everything else.
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* Do we want to call this before we try to display a message?
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*/
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crash_kexec(NULL);
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kmsg_dump(KMSG_DUMP_PANIC);
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/*
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* Note smp_send_stop is the usual smp shutdown function, which
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* unfortunately means it may not be hardened to work in a panic
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* situation.
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*/
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smp_send_stop();
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atomic_notifier_call_chain(&panic_notifier_list, 0, buf);
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bust_spinlocks(0);
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if (!panic_blink)
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panic_blink = no_blink;
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if (panic_timeout > 0) {
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/*
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* Delay timeout seconds before rebooting the machine.
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* We can't use the "normal" timers since we just panicked.
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*/
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printk(KERN_EMERG "Rebooting in %d seconds..", panic_timeout);
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for (i = 0; i < panic_timeout * 1000; i += PANIC_TIMER_STEP) {
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touch_nmi_watchdog();
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if (i >= i_next) {
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i += panic_blink(state ^= 1);
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i_next = i + 3600 / PANIC_BLINK_SPD;
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}
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mdelay(PANIC_TIMER_STEP);
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}
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}
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if (panic_timeout != 0) {
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/*
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* This will not be a clean reboot, with everything
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* shutting down. But if there is a chance of
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* rebooting the system it will be rebooted.
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*/
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emergency_restart();
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}
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#ifdef __sparc__
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{
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extern int stop_a_enabled;
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/* Make sure the user can actually press Stop-A (L1-A) */
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stop_a_enabled = 1;
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printk(KERN_EMERG "Press Stop-A (L1-A) to return to the boot prom\n");
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}
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#endif
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#if defined(CONFIG_S390)
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{
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unsigned long caller;
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caller = (unsigned long)__builtin_return_address(0);
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disabled_wait(caller);
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}
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#endif
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local_irq_enable();
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for (i = 0; ; i += PANIC_TIMER_STEP) {
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touch_softlockup_watchdog();
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if (i >= i_next) {
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i += panic_blink(state ^= 1);
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i_next = i + 3600 / PANIC_BLINK_SPD;
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}
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mdelay(PANIC_TIMER_STEP);
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}
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}
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EXPORT_SYMBOL(panic);
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struct tnt {
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u8 bit;
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char true;
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char false;
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};
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static const struct tnt tnts[] = {
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{ TAINT_PROPRIETARY_MODULE, 'P', 'G' },
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{ TAINT_FORCED_MODULE, 'F', ' ' },
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{ TAINT_UNSAFE_SMP, 'S', ' ' },
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{ TAINT_FORCED_RMMOD, 'R', ' ' },
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{ TAINT_MACHINE_CHECK, 'M', ' ' },
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{ TAINT_BAD_PAGE, 'B', ' ' },
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{ TAINT_USER, 'U', ' ' },
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{ TAINT_DIE, 'D', ' ' },
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{ TAINT_OVERRIDDEN_ACPI_TABLE, 'A', ' ' },
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{ TAINT_WARN, 'W', ' ' },
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{ TAINT_CRAP, 'C', ' ' },
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{ TAINT_FIRMWARE_WORKAROUND, 'I', ' ' },
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{ TAINT_OOT_MODULE, 'O', ' ' },
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};
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/**
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* print_tainted - return a string to represent the kernel taint state.
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*
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* 'P' - Proprietary module has been loaded.
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* 'F' - Module has been forcibly loaded.
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* 'S' - SMP with CPUs not designed for SMP.
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* 'R' - User forced a module unload.
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* 'M' - System experienced a machine check exception.
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* 'B' - System has hit bad_page.
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* 'U' - Userspace-defined naughtiness.
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* 'D' - Kernel has oopsed before
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* 'A' - ACPI table overridden.
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* 'W' - Taint on warning.
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* 'C' - modules from drivers/staging are loaded.
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* 'I' - Working around severe firmware bug.
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* 'O' - Out-of-tree module has been loaded.
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*
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* The string is overwritten by the next call to print_tainted().
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*/
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const char *print_tainted(void)
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{
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static char buf[ARRAY_SIZE(tnts) + sizeof("Tainted: ") + 1];
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if (tainted_mask) {
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char *s;
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int i;
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s = buf + sprintf(buf, "Tainted: ");
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for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(tnts); i++) {
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const struct tnt *t = &tnts[i];
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*s++ = test_bit(t->bit, &tainted_mask) ?
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t->true : t->false;
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}
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*s = 0;
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} else
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snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "Not tainted");
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return buf;
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}
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int test_taint(unsigned flag)
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{
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return test_bit(flag, &tainted_mask);
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}
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EXPORT_SYMBOL(test_taint);
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unsigned long get_taint(void)
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{
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return tainted_mask;
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}
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void add_taint(unsigned flag)
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{
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/*
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* Can't trust the integrity of the kernel anymore.
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* We don't call directly debug_locks_off() because the issue
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* is not necessarily serious enough to set oops_in_progress to 1
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* Also we want to keep up lockdep for staging/out-of-tree
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* development and post-warning case.
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*/
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switch (flag) {
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case TAINT_CRAP:
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case TAINT_OOT_MODULE:
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case TAINT_WARN:
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case TAINT_FIRMWARE_WORKAROUND:
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break;
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default:
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if (__debug_locks_off())
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printk(KERN_WARNING "Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint\n");
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}
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set_bit(flag, &tainted_mask);
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}
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EXPORT_SYMBOL(add_taint);
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static void spin_msec(int msecs)
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{
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int i;
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for (i = 0; i < msecs; i++) {
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touch_nmi_watchdog();
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mdelay(1);
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}
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}
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/*
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* It just happens that oops_enter() and oops_exit() are identically
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* implemented...
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*/
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static void do_oops_enter_exit(void)
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{
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unsigned long flags;
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static int spin_counter;
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if (!pause_on_oops)
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return;
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spin_lock_irqsave(&pause_on_oops_lock, flags);
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if (pause_on_oops_flag == 0) {
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/* This CPU may now print the oops message */
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pause_on_oops_flag = 1;
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} else {
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/* We need to stall this CPU */
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if (!spin_counter) {
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/* This CPU gets to do the counting */
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spin_counter = pause_on_oops;
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do {
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spin_unlock(&pause_on_oops_lock);
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spin_msec(MSEC_PER_SEC);
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spin_lock(&pause_on_oops_lock);
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} while (--spin_counter);
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pause_on_oops_flag = 0;
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} else {
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/* This CPU waits for a different one */
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while (spin_counter) {
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spin_unlock(&pause_on_oops_lock);
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spin_msec(1);
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spin_lock(&pause_on_oops_lock);
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}
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}
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}
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spin_unlock_irqrestore(&pause_on_oops_lock, flags);
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}
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/*
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* Return true if the calling CPU is allowed to print oops-related info.
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* This is a bit racy..
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*/
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int oops_may_print(void)
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{
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return pause_on_oops_flag == 0;
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}
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/*
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* Called when the architecture enters its oops handler, before it prints
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* anything. If this is the first CPU to oops, and it's oopsing the first
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* time then let it proceed.
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*
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* This is all enabled by the pause_on_oops kernel boot option. We do all
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* this to ensure that oopses don't scroll off the screen. It has the
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* side-effect of preventing later-oopsing CPUs from mucking up the display,
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* too.
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*
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* It turns out that the CPU which is allowed to print ends up pausing for
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* the right duration, whereas all the other CPUs pause for twice as long:
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* once in oops_enter(), once in oops_exit().
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*/
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void oops_enter(void)
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{
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tracing_off();
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/* can't trust the integrity of the kernel anymore: */
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debug_locks_off();
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do_oops_enter_exit();
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}
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/*
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* 64-bit random ID for oopses:
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*/
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static u64 oops_id;
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static int init_oops_id(void)
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{
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if (!oops_id)
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get_random_bytes(&oops_id, sizeof(oops_id));
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else
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oops_id++;
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return 0;
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}
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late_initcall(init_oops_id);
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void print_oops_end_marker(void)
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{
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init_oops_id();
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printk(KERN_WARNING "---[ end trace %016llx ]---\n",
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(unsigned long long)oops_id);
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}
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/*
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* Called when the architecture exits its oops handler, after printing
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* everything.
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*/
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void oops_exit(void)
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{
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do_oops_enter_exit();
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print_oops_end_marker();
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kmsg_dump(KMSG_DUMP_OOPS);
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}
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#ifdef WANT_WARN_ON_SLOWPATH
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struct slowpath_args {
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const char *fmt;
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va_list args;
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};
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static void warn_slowpath_common(const char *file, int line, void *caller,
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unsigned taint, struct slowpath_args *args)
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{
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const char *board;
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printk(KERN_WARNING "------------[ cut here ]------------\n");
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printk(KERN_WARNING "WARNING: at %s:%d %pS()\n", file, line, caller);
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board = dmi_get_system_info(DMI_PRODUCT_NAME);
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if (board)
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printk(KERN_WARNING "Hardware name: %s\n", board);
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if (args)
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vprintk(args->fmt, args->args);
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print_modules();
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dump_stack();
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print_oops_end_marker();
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add_taint(taint);
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}
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void warn_slowpath_fmt(const char *file, int line, const char *fmt, ...)
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{
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struct slowpath_args args;
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args.fmt = fmt;
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va_start(args.args, fmt);
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warn_slowpath_common(file, line, __builtin_return_address(0),
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TAINT_WARN, &args);
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va_end(args.args);
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}
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EXPORT_SYMBOL(warn_slowpath_fmt);
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void warn_slowpath_fmt_taint(const char *file, int line,
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unsigned taint, const char *fmt, ...)
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{
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struct slowpath_args args;
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args.fmt = fmt;
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va_start(args.args, fmt);
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warn_slowpath_common(file, line, __builtin_return_address(0),
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taint, &args);
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va_end(args.args);
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}
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EXPORT_SYMBOL(warn_slowpath_fmt_taint);
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void warn_slowpath_null(const char *file, int line)
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{
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warn_slowpath_common(file, line, __builtin_return_address(0),
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TAINT_WARN, NULL);
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}
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EXPORT_SYMBOL(warn_slowpath_null);
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#endif
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#ifdef CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR
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/*
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* Called when gcc's -fstack-protector feature is used, and
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* gcc detects corruption of the on-stack canary value
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*/
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void __stack_chk_fail(void)
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{
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panic("stack-protector: Kernel stack is corrupted in: %p\n",
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__builtin_return_address(0));
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}
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EXPORT_SYMBOL(__stack_chk_fail);
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#endif
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core_param(panic, panic_timeout, int, 0644);
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core_param(pause_on_oops, pause_on_oops, int, 0644);
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static int __init oops_setup(char *s)
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{
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if (!s)
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return -EINVAL;
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if (!strcmp(s, "panic"))
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panic_on_oops = 1;
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return 0;
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}
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early_param("oops", oops_setup);
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