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https://github.com/AuxXxilium/linux_dsm_epyc7002.git
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8b68150883
Pull integrity updates from Mimi Zohar: "Bug fixes, code clean up, and new features: - IMA policy rules can be defined in terms of LSM labels, making the IMA policy dependent on LSM policy label changes, in particular LSM label deletions. The new environment, in which IMA-appraisal is being used, frequently updates the LSM policy and permits LSM label deletions. - Prevent an mmap'ed shared file opened for write from also being mmap'ed execute. In the long term, making this and other similar changes at the VFS layer would be preferable. - The IMA per policy rule template format support is needed for a couple of new/proposed features (eg. kexec boot command line measurement, appended signatures, and VFS provided file hashes). - Other than the "boot-aggregate" record in the IMA measuremeent list, all other measurements are of file data. Measuring and storing the kexec boot command line in the IMA measurement list is the first buffer based measurement included in the measurement list" * 'next-integrity' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity: integrity: Introduce struct evm_xattr ima: Update MAX_TEMPLATE_NAME_LEN to fit largest reasonable definition KEXEC: Call ima_kexec_cmdline to measure the boot command line args IMA: Define a new template field buf IMA: Define a new hook to measure the kexec boot command line arguments IMA: support for per policy rule template formats integrity: Fix __integrity_init_keyring() section mismatch ima: Use designated initializers for struct ima_event_data ima: use the lsm policy update notifier LSM: switch to blocking policy update notifiers x86/ima: fix the Kconfig dependency for IMA_ARCH_POLICY ima: Make arch_policy_entry static ima: prevent a file already mmap'ed write to be mmap'ed execute x86/ima: check EFI SetupMode too
390 lines
11 KiB
C
390 lines
11 KiB
C
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
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/*
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* Copyright (C) 2008 IBM Corporation
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*
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* Author: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
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*
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* File: ima_api.c
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* Implements must_appraise_or_measure, collect_measurement,
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* appraise_measurement, store_measurement and store_template.
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*/
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#include <linux/slab.h>
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#include <linux/file.h>
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#include <linux/fs.h>
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#include <linux/xattr.h>
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#include <linux/evm.h>
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#include <linux/iversion.h>
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#include "ima.h"
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/*
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* ima_free_template_entry - free an existing template entry
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*/
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void ima_free_template_entry(struct ima_template_entry *entry)
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{
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int i;
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for (i = 0; i < entry->template_desc->num_fields; i++)
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kfree(entry->template_data[i].data);
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kfree(entry);
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}
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/*
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* ima_alloc_init_template - create and initialize a new template entry
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*/
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int ima_alloc_init_template(struct ima_event_data *event_data,
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struct ima_template_entry **entry,
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struct ima_template_desc *desc)
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{
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struct ima_template_desc *template_desc;
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int i, result = 0;
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if (desc)
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template_desc = desc;
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else
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template_desc = ima_template_desc_current();
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*entry = kzalloc(sizeof(**entry) + template_desc->num_fields *
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sizeof(struct ima_field_data), GFP_NOFS);
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if (!*entry)
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return -ENOMEM;
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(*entry)->template_desc = template_desc;
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for (i = 0; i < template_desc->num_fields; i++) {
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const struct ima_template_field *field =
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template_desc->fields[i];
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u32 len;
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result = field->field_init(event_data,
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&((*entry)->template_data[i]));
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if (result != 0)
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goto out;
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len = (*entry)->template_data[i].len;
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(*entry)->template_data_len += sizeof(len);
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(*entry)->template_data_len += len;
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}
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return 0;
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out:
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ima_free_template_entry(*entry);
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*entry = NULL;
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return result;
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}
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/*
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* ima_store_template - store ima template measurements
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*
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* Calculate the hash of a template entry, add the template entry
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* to an ordered list of measurement entries maintained inside the kernel,
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* and also update the aggregate integrity value (maintained inside the
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* configured TPM PCR) over the hashes of the current list of measurement
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* entries.
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*
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* Applications retrieve the current kernel-held measurement list through
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* the securityfs entries in /sys/kernel/security/ima. The signed aggregate
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* TPM PCR (called quote) can be retrieved using a TPM user space library
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* and is used to validate the measurement list.
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*
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* Returns 0 on success, error code otherwise
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*/
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int ima_store_template(struct ima_template_entry *entry,
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int violation, struct inode *inode,
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const unsigned char *filename, int pcr)
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{
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static const char op[] = "add_template_measure";
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static const char audit_cause[] = "hashing_error";
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char *template_name = entry->template_desc->name;
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int result;
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struct {
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struct ima_digest_data hdr;
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char digest[TPM_DIGEST_SIZE];
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} hash;
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if (!violation) {
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int num_fields = entry->template_desc->num_fields;
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/* this function uses default algo */
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hash.hdr.algo = HASH_ALGO_SHA1;
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result = ima_calc_field_array_hash(&entry->template_data[0],
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entry->template_desc,
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num_fields, &hash.hdr);
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if (result < 0) {
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integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_PCR, inode,
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template_name, op,
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audit_cause, result, 0);
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return result;
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}
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memcpy(entry->digest, hash.hdr.digest, hash.hdr.length);
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}
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entry->pcr = pcr;
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result = ima_add_template_entry(entry, violation, op, inode, filename);
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return result;
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}
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/*
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* ima_add_violation - add violation to measurement list.
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*
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* Violations are flagged in the measurement list with zero hash values.
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* By extending the PCR with 0xFF's instead of with zeroes, the PCR
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* value is invalidated.
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*/
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void ima_add_violation(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
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struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
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const char *op, const char *cause)
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{
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struct ima_template_entry *entry;
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struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
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struct ima_event_data event_data = { .iint = iint,
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.file = file,
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.filename = filename,
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.violation = cause };
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int violation = 1;
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int result;
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/* can overflow, only indicator */
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atomic_long_inc(&ima_htable.violations);
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result = ima_alloc_init_template(&event_data, &entry, NULL);
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if (result < 0) {
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result = -ENOMEM;
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goto err_out;
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}
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result = ima_store_template(entry, violation, inode,
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filename, CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_PCR_IDX);
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if (result < 0)
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ima_free_template_entry(entry);
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err_out:
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integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_PCR, inode, filename,
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op, cause, result, 0);
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}
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/**
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* ima_get_action - appraise & measure decision based on policy.
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* @inode: pointer to inode to measure
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* @cred: pointer to credentials structure to validate
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* @secid: secid of the task being validated
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* @mask: contains the permission mask (MAY_READ, MAY_WRITE, MAY_EXEC,
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* MAY_APPEND)
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* @func: caller identifier
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* @pcr: pointer filled in if matched measure policy sets pcr=
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* @template_desc: pointer filled in if matched measure policy sets template=
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*
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* The policy is defined in terms of keypairs:
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* subj=, obj=, type=, func=, mask=, fsmagic=
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* subj,obj, and type: are LSM specific.
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* func: FILE_CHECK | BPRM_CHECK | CREDS_CHECK | MMAP_CHECK | MODULE_CHECK
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* | KEXEC_CMDLINE
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* mask: contains the permission mask
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* fsmagic: hex value
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*
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* Returns IMA_MEASURE, IMA_APPRAISE mask.
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*
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*/
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int ima_get_action(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred, u32 secid,
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int mask, enum ima_hooks func, int *pcr,
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struct ima_template_desc **template_desc)
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{
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int flags = IMA_MEASURE | IMA_AUDIT | IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_HASH;
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flags &= ima_policy_flag;
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return ima_match_policy(inode, cred, secid, func, mask, flags, pcr,
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template_desc);
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}
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/*
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* ima_collect_measurement - collect file measurement
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*
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* Calculate the file hash, if it doesn't already exist,
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* storing the measurement and i_version in the iint.
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*
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* Must be called with iint->mutex held.
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*
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* Return 0 on success, error code otherwise
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*/
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int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
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struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
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enum hash_algo algo)
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{
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const char *audit_cause = "failed";
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struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
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const char *filename = file->f_path.dentry->d_name.name;
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int result = 0;
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int length;
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void *tmpbuf;
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u64 i_version;
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struct {
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struct ima_digest_data hdr;
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char digest[IMA_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE];
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} hash;
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if (iint->flags & IMA_COLLECTED)
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goto out;
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/*
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* Dectecting file change is based on i_version. On filesystems
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* which do not support i_version, support is limited to an initial
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* measurement/appraisal/audit.
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*/
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i_version = inode_query_iversion(inode);
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hash.hdr.algo = algo;
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/* Initialize hash digest to 0's in case of failure */
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memset(&hash.digest, 0, sizeof(hash.digest));
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if (buf)
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result = ima_calc_buffer_hash(buf, size, &hash.hdr);
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else
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result = ima_calc_file_hash(file, &hash.hdr);
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if (result && result != -EBADF && result != -EINVAL)
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goto out;
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length = sizeof(hash.hdr) + hash.hdr.length;
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tmpbuf = krealloc(iint->ima_hash, length, GFP_NOFS);
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if (!tmpbuf) {
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result = -ENOMEM;
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goto out;
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}
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iint->ima_hash = tmpbuf;
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memcpy(iint->ima_hash, &hash, length);
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iint->version = i_version;
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/* Possibly temporary failure due to type of read (eg. O_DIRECT) */
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if (!result)
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iint->flags |= IMA_COLLECTED;
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out:
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if (result) {
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if (file->f_flags & O_DIRECT)
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audit_cause = "failed(directio)";
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integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_DATA, inode,
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filename, "collect_data", audit_cause,
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result, 0);
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}
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return result;
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}
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/*
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* ima_store_measurement - store file measurement
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*
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* Create an "ima" template and then store the template by calling
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* ima_store_template.
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*
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* We only get here if the inode has not already been measured,
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* but the measurement could already exist:
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* - multiple copies of the same file on either the same or
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* different filesystems.
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* - the inode was previously flushed as well as the iint info,
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* containing the hashing info.
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*
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* Must be called with iint->mutex held.
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*/
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void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
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struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
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struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value,
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int xattr_len, int pcr,
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struct ima_template_desc *template_desc)
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{
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static const char op[] = "add_template_measure";
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static const char audit_cause[] = "ENOMEM";
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int result = -ENOMEM;
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struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
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struct ima_template_entry *entry;
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struct ima_event_data event_data = { .iint = iint,
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.file = file,
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.filename = filename,
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.xattr_value = xattr_value,
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.xattr_len = xattr_len };
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int violation = 0;
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if (iint->measured_pcrs & (0x1 << pcr))
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return;
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result = ima_alloc_init_template(&event_data, &entry, template_desc);
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if (result < 0) {
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integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_PCR, inode, filename,
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op, audit_cause, result, 0);
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return;
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}
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result = ima_store_template(entry, violation, inode, filename, pcr);
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if ((!result || result == -EEXIST) && !(file->f_flags & O_DIRECT)) {
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iint->flags |= IMA_MEASURED;
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iint->measured_pcrs |= (0x1 << pcr);
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}
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if (result < 0)
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ima_free_template_entry(entry);
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}
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void ima_audit_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
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const unsigned char *filename)
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{
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struct audit_buffer *ab;
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char *hash;
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const char *algo_name = hash_algo_name[iint->ima_hash->algo];
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int i;
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if (iint->flags & IMA_AUDITED)
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return;
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hash = kzalloc((iint->ima_hash->length * 2) + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
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if (!hash)
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return;
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for (i = 0; i < iint->ima_hash->length; i++)
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hex_byte_pack(hash + (i * 2), iint->ima_hash->digest[i]);
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hash[i * 2] = '\0';
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ab = audit_log_start(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL,
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AUDIT_INTEGRITY_RULE);
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if (!ab)
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goto out;
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audit_log_format(ab, "file=");
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audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, filename);
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audit_log_format(ab, " hash=\"%s:%s\"", algo_name, hash);
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audit_log_task_info(ab);
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audit_log_end(ab);
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iint->flags |= IMA_AUDITED;
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out:
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kfree(hash);
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return;
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}
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/*
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* ima_d_path - return a pointer to the full pathname
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*
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* Attempt to return a pointer to the full pathname for use in the
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* IMA measurement list, IMA audit records, and auditing logs.
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*
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* On failure, return a pointer to a copy of the filename, not dname.
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* Returning a pointer to dname, could result in using the pointer
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* after the memory has been freed.
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*/
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const char *ima_d_path(const struct path *path, char **pathbuf, char *namebuf)
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{
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char *pathname = NULL;
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*pathbuf = __getname();
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if (*pathbuf) {
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pathname = d_absolute_path(path, *pathbuf, PATH_MAX);
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if (IS_ERR(pathname)) {
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__putname(*pathbuf);
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*pathbuf = NULL;
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pathname = NULL;
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}
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}
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if (!pathname) {
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strlcpy(namebuf, path->dentry->d_name.name, NAME_MAX);
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pathname = namebuf;
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}
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return pathname;
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}
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