Mathieu Desnoyers 8aec0f5d41 Fix: compat_rw_copy_check_uvector() misuse in aio, readv, writev, and security keys ... Looking at mm/process_vm_access.c:process_vm_rw() and comparing it to compat_process_vm_rw() shows that the compatibility code requires an explicit "access_ok()" check before calling compat_rw_copy_check_uvector(). The same difference seems to appear when we compare fs/read_write.c:do_readv_writev() to fs/compat.c:compat_do_readv_writev(). This subtle difference between the compat and non-compat requirements should probably be debated, as it seems to be error-prone. In fact, there are two others sites that use this function in the Linux kernel, and they both seem to get it wrong: Now shifting our attention to fs/aio.c, we see that aio_setup_iocb() also ends up calling compat_rw_copy_check_uvector() through aio_setup_vectored_rw(). Unfortunately, the access_ok() check appears to be missing. Same situation for security/keys/compat.c:compat_keyctl_instantiate_key_iov(). I propose that we add the access_ok() check directly into compat_rw_copy_check_uvector(), so callers don't have to worry about it, and it therefore makes the compat call code similar to its non-compat counterpart. Place the access_ok() check in the same location where copy_from_user() can trigger a -EFAULT error in the non-compat code, so the ABI behaviors are alike on both compat and non-compat. While we are here, fix compat_do_readv_writev() so it checks for compat_rw_copy_check_uvector() negative return values. And also, fix a memory leak in compat_keyctl_instantiate_key_iov() error handling. Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Acked-by: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>		2013-03-12 11:05:45 -07:00
..
apparmor	new helper: file_inode(file)	2013-02-22 23:31:31 -05:00
integrity	hlist: drop the node parameter from iterators	2013-02-27 19:10:24 -08:00
keys	Fix: compat_rw_copy_check_uvector() misuse in aio, readv, writev, and security keys	2013-03-12 11:05:45 -07:00
selinux	Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs	2013-03-03 13:23:03 -08:00
smack	new helper: file_inode(file)	2013-02-22 23:31:31 -05:00
tomoyo	new helper: file_inode(file)	2013-02-22 23:31:31 -05:00
yama	Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace	2012-12-17 15:44:47 -08:00
capability.c	tun: fix LSM/SELinux labeling of tun/tap devices	2013-01-14 18:16:59 -05:00
commoncap.c	kill f_vfsmnt	2013-02-26 02:46:10 -05:00
device_cgroup.c	device_cgroup: don't grab mutex in rcu callback	2013-02-21 17:22:15 -08:00
inode.c	securityfs: fix object creation races	2012-01-10 10:20:35 -05:00
Kconfig	KEYS: Move the key config into security/keys/Kconfig	2012-05-11 10:56:56 +01:00
lsm_audit.c	LSM: BUILD_BUG_ON if the common_audit_data union ever grows	2012-04-09 12:23:03 -04:00
Makefile	security: Yama LSM	2012-02-10 09:18:52 +11:00
min_addr.c	mmap_min_addr check CAP_SYS_RAWIO only for write	2010-04-23 08:56:31 +10:00
security.c	tun: fix LSM/SELinux labeling of tun/tap devices	2013-01-14 18:16:59 -05:00