The IBPB control code in x86 removed the usage. Remove the functionality
which was introduced for this.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com>
Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
Cc: Waiman Long <longman9394@gmail.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Dave Stewart <david.c.stewart@intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181125185005.559149393@linutronix.de
Pull siginfo updates from Eric Biederman:
"I have been slowly sorting out siginfo and this is the culmination of
that work.
The primary result is in several ways the signal infrastructure has
been made less error prone. The code has been updated so that manually
specifying SEND_SIG_FORCED is never necessary. The conversion to the
new siginfo sending functions is now complete, which makes it
difficult to send a signal without filling in the proper siginfo
fields.
At the tail end of the patchset comes the optimization of decreasing
the size of struct siginfo in the kernel from 128 bytes to about 48
bytes on 64bit. The fundamental observation that enables this is by
definition none of the known ways to use struct siginfo uses the extra
bytes.
This comes at the cost of a small user space observable difference.
For the rare case of siginfo being injected into the kernel only what
can be copied into kernel_siginfo is delivered to the destination, the
rest of the bytes are set to 0. For cases where the signal and the
si_code are known this is safe, because we know those bytes are not
used. For cases where the signal and si_code combination is unknown
the bits that won't fit into struct kernel_siginfo are tested to
verify they are zero, and the send fails if they are not.
I made an extensive search through userspace code and I could not find
anything that would break because of the above change. If it turns out
I did break something it will take just the revert of a single change
to restore kernel_siginfo to the same size as userspace siginfo.
Testing did reveal dependencies on preferring the signo passed to
sigqueueinfo over si->signo, so bit the bullet and added the
complexity necessary to handle that case.
Testing also revealed bad things can happen if a negative signal
number is passed into the system calls. Something no sane application
will do but something a malicious program or a fuzzer might do. So I
have fixed the code that performs the bounds checks to ensure negative
signal numbers are handled"
* 'siginfo-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace: (80 commits)
signal: Guard against negative signal numbers in copy_siginfo_from_user32
signal: Guard against negative signal numbers in copy_siginfo_from_user
signal: In sigqueueinfo prefer sig not si_signo
signal: Use a smaller struct siginfo in the kernel
signal: Distinguish between kernel_siginfo and siginfo
signal: Introduce copy_siginfo_from_user and use it's return value
signal: Remove the need for __ARCH_SI_PREABLE_SIZE and SI_PAD_SIZE
signal: Fail sigqueueinfo if si_signo != sig
signal/sparc: Move EMT_TAGOVF into the generic siginfo.h
signal/unicore32: Use force_sig_fault where appropriate
signal/unicore32: Generate siginfo in ucs32_notify_die
signal/unicore32: Use send_sig_fault where appropriate
signal/arc: Use force_sig_fault where appropriate
signal/arc: Push siginfo generation into unhandled_exception
signal/ia64: Use force_sig_fault where appropriate
signal/ia64: Use the force_sig(SIGSEGV,...) in ia64_rt_sigreturn
signal/ia64: Use the generic force_sigsegv in setup_frame
signal/arm/kvm: Use send_sig_mceerr
signal/arm: Use send_sig_fault where appropriate
signal/arm: Use force_sig_fault where appropriate
...
Linus recently observed that if we did not worry about the padding
member in struct siginfo it is only about 48 bytes, and 48 bytes is
much nicer than 128 bytes for allocating on the stack and copying
around in the kernel.
The obvious thing of only adding the padding when userspace is
including siginfo.h won't work as there are sigframe definitions in
the kernel that embed struct siginfo.
So split siginfo in two; kernel_siginfo and siginfo. Keeping the
traditional name for the userspace definition. While the version that
is used internally to the kernel and ultimately will not be padded to
128 bytes is called kernel_siginfo.
The definition of struct kernel_siginfo I have put in include/signal_types.h
A set of buildtime checks has been added to verify the two structures have
the same field offsets.
To make it easy to verify the change kernel_siginfo retains the same
size as siginfo. The reduction in size comes in a following change.
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Currently, IBPB is only issued in cases when switching into a non-dumpable
process, the rationale being to protect such 'important and security
sensitive' processess (such as GPG) from data leaking into a different
userspace process via spectre v2.
This is however completely insufficient to provide proper userspace-to-userpace
spectrev2 protection, as any process can poison branch buffers before being
scheduled out, and the newly scheduled process immediately becomes spectrev2
victim.
In order to minimize the performance impact (for usecases that do require
spectrev2 protection), issue the barrier only in cases when switching between
processess where the victim can't be ptraced by the potential attacker (as in
such cases, the attacker doesn't have to bother with branch buffers at all).
[ tglx: Split up PTRACE_MODE_NOACCESS_CHK into PTRACE_MODE_SCHED and
PTRACE_MODE_IBPB to be able to do ptrace() context tracking reasonably
fine-grained ]
Fixes: 18bf3c3ea8 ("x86/speculation: Use Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier in context switch")
Originally-by: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: "WoodhouseDavid" <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: "SchauflerCasey" <casey.schaufler@intel.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/nycvar.YFH.7.76.1809251437340.15880@cbobk.fhfr.pm
Replace user_single_step_siginfo with user_single_step_report
that allocates siginfo structure on the stack and sends it.
This allows tracehook_report_syscall_exit to become a simple
if statement that calls user_single_step_report or ptrace_report_syscall
depending on the value of step.
Update the default helper function now called user_single_step_report
to explicitly set si_code to SI_USER and to set si_uid and si_pid to 0.
The default helper has always been doing this (using memset) but it
was far from obvious.
The powerpc helper can now just call force_sig_fault.
The x86 helper can now just call send_sigtrap.
Unfortunately the default implementation of user_single_step_report
can not use force_sig_fault as it does not use a SIGTRAP si_code.
So it has to carefully setup the siginfo and use use force_sig_info.
The net result is code that is easier to understand and simpler
to maintain.
Ref: 85ec7fd9f8 ("ptrace: introduce user_single_step_siginfo() helper")
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
The code in calculate_sigpending will now handle this so
it is just redundant and possibly a little confusing
to continue setting TIF_SIGPENDING in ptrace_init_task.
Suggested-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Call clear_siginfo to ensure every stack allocated siginfo is properly
initialized before being passed to the signal sending functions.
Note: It is not safe to depend on C initializers to initialize struct
siginfo on the stack because C is allowed to skip holes when
initializing a structure.
The initialization of struct siginfo in tracehook_report_syscall_exit
was moved from the helper user_single_step_siginfo into
tracehook_report_syscall_exit itself, to make it clear that the local
variable siginfo gets fully initialized.
In a few cases the scope of struct siginfo has been reduced to make it
clear that siginfo siginfo is not used on other paths in the function
in which it is declared.
Instances of using memset to initialize siginfo have been replaced
with calls clear_siginfo for clarity.
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which
makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license.
By default all files without license information are under the default
license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2.
Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0'
SPDX license identifier. The SPDX identifier is a legally binding
shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text.
This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and
Philippe Ombredanne.
How this work was done:
Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of
the use cases:
- file had no licensing information it it.
- file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it,
- file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information,
Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases
where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license
had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords.
The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to
a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the
output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX
tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne. Philippe prepared the
base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files.
The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files
assessed. Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner
results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s)
to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not
immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was:
- Files considered eligible had to be source code files.
- Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5
lines of source
- File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5
lines).
All documentation files were explicitly excluded.
The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license
identifiers to apply.
- when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was
considered to have no license information in it, and the top level
COPYING file license applied.
For non */uapi/* files that summary was:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|-------
GPL-2.0 11139
and resulted in the first patch in this series.
If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH
Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0". Results of that was:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|-------
GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 930
and resulted in the second patch in this series.
- if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one
of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if
any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in
it (per prior point). Results summary:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|------
GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 270
GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 169
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause) 21
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 17
LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 15
GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 14
((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 5
LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 4
LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note 3
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT) 3
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT) 1
and that resulted in the third patch in this series.
- when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became
the concluded license(s).
- when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a
license but the other didn't, or they both detected different
licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred.
- In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file
resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and
which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics).
- When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was
confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
- If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier,
the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later
in time.
In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the
spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the
source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation
by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from
FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners
disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights. The
Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so
they are related.
Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets
for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the
files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks
in about 15000 files.
In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have
copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the
correct identifier.
Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual
inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch
version early this week with:
- a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected
license ids and scores
- reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+
files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct
- reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license
was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied
SPDX license was correct
This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction. This
worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the
different types of files to be modified.
These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg. Thomas wrote a script to
parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the
format that the file expected. This script was further refined by Greg
based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to
distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different
comment types.) Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to
generate the patches.
Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
This fixes debugger syscall restart interactions. A debugger that
modifies the tracee's program counter is expected to set the orig_d0
pseudo register to -1, to disable a possible syscall restart.
This removes the last user of the ptrace_signal_deliver hook in the ptrace
signal handling, so remove that as well.
Signed-off-by: Andreas Schwab <schwab@linux-m68k.org>
Signed-off-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
When I introduced ptracer_cred I failed to consider the weirdness of
fork where the task_struct copies the old value by default. This
winds up leaving ptracer_cred set even when a process forks and
the child process does not wind up being ptraced.
Because ptracer_cred is not set on non-ptraced processes whose
parents were ptraced this has broken the ability of the enlightenment
window manager to start setuid children.
Fix this by properly initializing ptracer_cred in ptrace_init_task
This must be done with a little bit of care to preserve the current value
of ptracer_cred when ptrace carries through fork. Re-reading the
ptracer_cred from the ptracing process at this point is inconsistent
with how PT_PTRACE_CAP has been maintained all of these years.
Tested-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Fixes: 64b875f7ac ("ptrace: Capture the ptracer's creds not PT_PTRACE_CAP")
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
We are going to split <linux/sched/signal.h> out of <linux/sched.h>, which
will have to be picked up from other headers and a couple of .c files.
Create a trivial placeholder <linux/sched/signal.h> file that just
maps to <linux/sched.h> to make this patch obviously correct and
bisectable.
Include the new header in the files that are going to need it.
Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
It is the reasonable expectation that if an executable file is not
readable there will be no way for a user without special privileges to
read the file. This is enforced in ptrace_attach but if ptrace
is already attached before exec there is no enforcement for read-only
executables.
As the only way to read such an mm is through access_process_vm
spin a variant called ptrace_access_vm that will fail if the
target process is not being ptraced by the current process, or
the current process did not have sufficient privileges when ptracing
began to read the target processes mm.
In the ptrace implementations replace access_process_vm by
ptrace_access_vm. There remain several ptrace sites that still use
access_process_vm as they are reading the target executables
instructions (for kernel consumption) or register stacks. As such it
does not appear necessary to add a permission check to those calls.
This bug has always existed in Linux.
Fixes: v1.0
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
When the flag PT_PTRACE_CAP was added the PTRACE_TRACEME path was
overlooked. This can result in incorrect behavior when an application
like strace traces an exec of a setuid executable.
Further PT_PTRACE_CAP does not have enough information for making good
security decisions as it does not report which user namespace the
capability is in. This has already allowed one mistake through
insufficient granulariy.
I found this issue when I was testing another corner case of exec and
discovered that I could not get strace to set PT_PTRACE_CAP even when
running strace as root with a full set of caps.
This change fixes the above issue with strace allowing stracing as
root a setuid executable without disabling setuid. More fundamentaly
this change allows what is allowable at all times, by using the correct
information in it's decision.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 4214e42f96d4 ("v2.4.9.11 -> v2.4.9.12")
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
By checking the effective credentials instead of the real UID / permitted
capabilities, ensure that the calling process actually intended to use its
credentials.
To ensure that all ptrace checks use the correct caller credentials (e.g.
in case out-of-tree code or newly added code omits the PTRACE_MODE_*CREDS
flag), use two new flags and require one of them to be set.
The problem was that when a privileged task had temporarily dropped its
privileges, e.g. by calling setreuid(0, user_uid), with the intent to
perform following syscalls with the credentials of a user, it still passed
ptrace access checks that the user would not be able to pass.
While an attacker should not be able to convince the privileged task to
perform a ptrace() syscall, this is a problem because the ptrace access
check is reused for things in procfs.
In particular, the following somewhat interesting procfs entries only rely
on ptrace access checks:
/proc/$pid/stat - uses the check for determining whether pointers
should be visible, useful for bypassing ASLR
/proc/$pid/maps - also useful for bypassing ASLR
/proc/$pid/cwd - useful for gaining access to restricted
directories that contain files with lax permissions, e.g. in
this scenario:
lrwxrwxrwx root root /proc/13020/cwd -> /root/foobar
drwx------ root root /root
drwxr-xr-x root root /root/foobar
-rw-r--r-- root root /root/foobar/secret
Therefore, on a system where a root-owned mode 6755 binary changes its
effective credentials as described and then dumps a user-specified file,
this could be used by an attacker to reveal the memory layout of root's
processes or reveal the contents of files he is not allowed to access
(through /proc/$pid/cwd).
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix warning]
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Cc: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
This patch is the first step in enabling checkpoint/restore of processes
with seccomp enabled.
One of the things CRIU does while dumping tasks is inject code into them
via ptrace to collect information that is only available to the process
itself. However, if we are in a seccomp mode where these processes are
prohibited from making these syscalls, then what CRIU does kills the task.
This patch adds a new ptrace option, PTRACE_O_SUSPEND_SECCOMP, that enables
a task from the init user namespace which has CAP_SYS_ADMIN and no seccomp
filters to disable (and re-enable) seccomp filters for another task so that
they can be successfully dumped (and restored). We restrict the set of
processes that can disable seccomp through ptrace because although today
ptrace can be used to bypass seccomp, there is some discussion of closing
this loophole in the future and we would like this patch to not depend on
that behavior and be future proofed for when it is removed.
Note that seccomp can be suspended before any filters are actually
installed; this behavior is useful on criu restore, so that we can suspend
seccomp, restore the filters, unmap our restore code from the restored
process' address space, and then resume the task by detaching and have the
filters resumed as well.
v2 changes:
* require that the tracer have no seccomp filters installed
* drop TIF_NOTSC manipulation from the patch
* change from ptrace command to a ptrace option and use this ptrace option
as the flag to check. This means that as soon as the tracer
detaches/dies, seccomp is re-enabled and as a corrollary that one can not
disable seccomp across PTRACE_ATTACHs.
v3 changes:
* get rid of various #ifdefs everywhere
* report more sensible errors when PTRACE_O_SUSPEND_SECCOMP is incorrectly
used
v4 changes:
* get rid of may_suspend_seccomp() in favor of a capable() check in ptrace
directly
v5 changes:
* check that seccomp is not enabled (or suspended) on the tracer
Signed-off-by: Tycho Andersen <tycho.andersen@canonical.com>
CC: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
CC: Roland McGrath <roland@hack.frob.com>
CC: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>
CC: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
[kees: access seccomp.mode through seccomp_mode() instead]
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Now that forget_original_parent() uses ->ptrace_entry for EXIT_DEAD tasks,
we can simply pass "dead_children" list to exit_ptrace() and remove
another release_task() loop. Plus this way we do not need to drop and
reacquire tasklist_lock.
Also shift the list_empty(ptraced) check, if we want this optimization it
makes sense to eliminate the function call altogether.
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Aaron Tomlin <atomlin@redhat.com>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
Cc: Sterling Alexander <stalexan@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Roland McGrath <roland@hack.frob.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
The 'sysret' fastpath does not correctly restore even all regular
registers, much less any segment registers or reflags values. That is
very much part of why it's faster than 'iret'.
Normally that isn't a problem, because the normal ptrace() interface
catches the process using the signal handler infrastructure, which
always returns with an iret.
However, some paths can get caught using ptrace_event() instead of the
signal path, and for those we need to make sure that we aren't going to
return to user space using 'sysret'. Otherwise the modifications that
may have been done to the register set by the tracer wouldn't
necessarily take effect.
Fix it by forcing IRET path by setting TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME from
arch_ptrace_stop_needed() which is invoked from ptrace_stop().
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Reported-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
When tracing a process in another pid namespace, it's important for fork
event messages to contain the child's pid as seen from the tracer's pid
namespace, not the parent's. Otherwise, the tracer won't be able to
correlate the fork event with later SIGTRAP signals it receives from the
child.
We still risk a race condition if a ptracer from a different pid
namespace attaches after we compute the pid_t value. However, sending a
bogus fork event message in this unlikely scenario is still a vast
improvement over the status quo where we always send bogus fork event
messages to debuggers in a different pid namespace than the forking
process.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Dempsky <mdempsky@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Julien Tinnes <jln@chromium.org>
Cc: Roland McGrath <mcgrathr@chromium.org>
Cc: Jan Kratochvil <jan.kratochvil@redhat.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
This reverts commit bf26c01849 ("Prepare to fix racy accesses on task
breakpoints").
The patch was fine but we can no longer race with SIGKILL after commit
9899d11f65 ("ptrace: ensure arch_ptrace/ptrace_request can never race
with SIGKILL"), the __TASK_TRACED tracee can't be woken up and
->ptrace_bps[] can't go away.
Now that ptrace_get_breakpoints/ptrace_put_breakpoints have no callers,
we can kill them and remove task->ptrace_bp_refcnt.
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Michael Neuling <mikey@neuling.org>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Jan Kratochvil <jan.kratochvil@redhat.com>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Prasad <prasad@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Russell King <linux@arm.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
The ia64 function "thread_matches()" has no users since commit
e868a55c2a ("[IA64] remove find_thread_for_addr()"). Remove it.
This allows us to make ptrace_check_attach() static to kernel/ptrace.c,
which is good since we'll need to change the semantics of it and fix up
all the callers.
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Pull signal handling cleanups from Al Viro:
"sigaltstack infrastructure + conversion for x86, alpha and um,
COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE infrastructure.
Note that there are several conflicts between "unify
SS_ONSTACK/SS_DISABLE definitions" and UAPI patches in mainline;
resolution is trivial - just remove definitions of SS_ONSTACK and
SS_DISABLED from arch/*/uapi/asm/signal.h; they are all identical and
include/uapi/linux/signal.h contains the unified variant."
Fixed up conflicts as per Al.
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/signal:
alpha: switch to generic sigaltstack
new helpers: __save_altstack/__compat_save_altstack, switch x86 and um to those
generic compat_sys_sigaltstack()
introduce generic sys_sigaltstack(), switch x86 and um to it
new helper: compat_user_stack_pointer()
new helper: restore_altstack()
unify SS_ONSTACK/SS_DISABLE definitions
new helper: current_user_stack_pointer()
missing user_stack_pointer() instances
Bury the conditionals from kernel_thread/kernel_execve series
COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE: infrastructure
Cross-architecture equivalent of rdusp(); default is
user_stack_pointer(current_pt_regs()) - that works for almost all
platforms that have usp saved in pt_regs. The only exception from
that is ia64 - we want memory stack, not the backing store for
register one.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Ptrace jailers want to be sure that the tracee can never escape
from the control. However if the tracer dies unexpectedly the
tracee continues to run in potentially unsafe mode.
Add the new ptrace option PTRACE_O_EXITKILL. If the tracer exits
it sends SIGKILL to every tracee which has this bit set.
Note that the new option is not equal to the last-option << 1. Because
currently all options have an event, and the new one starts the eventless
group. It uses the random 20 bit, so we have the room for 12 more events,
but we can also add the new eventless options below this one.
Suggested by Amnon Shiloh.
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Amnon Shiloh <u3557@miso.sublimeip.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Cc: Chris Evans <scarybeasts@gmail.com>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
the first one is equal to signal_pt_regs(), the second is never used
(and always NULL, while we are at it).
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Always equal to task_pt_regs(current); defined only when we are in
signal delivery. It may be different from current_pt_regs() - e.g.
architectures like m68k may have pt_regs location on exception
different from that on a syscall and signals (just as ptrace handling)
may happen on exceptions as well as on syscalls.
When they are equal, it's often better to have signal_pt_regs
defined (in asm/ptrace.h) as current_pt_regs - that tends to be
optimized better than default would be. However, optimisation is
the only reason why we might want an arch-specific definition;
if current_pt_regs() and task_pt_regs(current) have different
values, the latter one is right.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Pull generic execve() changes from Al Viro:
"This introduces the generic kernel_thread() and kernel_execve()
functions, and switches x86, arm, alpha, um and s390 over to them."
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/signal: (26 commits)
s390: convert to generic kernel_execve()
s390: switch to generic kernel_thread()
s390: fold kernel_thread_helper() into ret_from_fork()
s390: fold execve_tail() into start_thread(), convert to generic sys_execve()
um: switch to generic kernel_thread()
x86, um/x86: switch to generic sys_execve and kernel_execve
x86: split ret_from_fork
alpha: introduce ret_from_kernel_execve(), switch to generic kernel_execve()
alpha: switch to generic kernel_thread()
alpha: switch to generic sys_execve()
arm: get rid of execve wrapper, switch to generic execve() implementation
arm: optimized current_pt_regs()
arm: introduce ret_from_kernel_execve(), switch to generic kernel_execve()
arm: split ret_from_fork, simplify kernel_thread() [based on patch by rmk]
generic sys_execve()
generic kernel_execve()
new helper: current_pt_regs()
preparation for generic kernel_thread()
um: kill thread->forking
um: let signal_delivered() do SIGTRAP on singlestepping into handler
...
Normally (and that's the default) it's just task_pt_regs(current).
However, if an architecture can optimize that, it can do so by
making a macro of its own available from asm/ptrace.h. More
importantly, some architectures have task_pt_regs() working only
for traced tasks blocked on signal delivery. current_pt_regs()
needs to work for *all* processes, so before those architectures
start using stuff relying on current_pt_regs() they'll need a
properly working variant.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
__ptrace_may_access() is used within only kernel/ptrace.c.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
This change adds support for a new ptrace option, PTRACE_O_TRACESECCOMP,
and a new return value for seccomp BPF programs, SECCOMP_RET_TRACE.
When a tracer specifies the PTRACE_O_TRACESECCOMP ptrace option, the
tracer will be notified, via PTRACE_EVENT_SECCOMP, for any syscall that
results in a BPF program returning SECCOMP_RET_TRACE. The 16-bit
SECCOMP_RET_DATA mask of the BPF program return value will be passed as
the ptrace_message and may be retrieved using PTRACE_GETEVENTMSG.
If the subordinate process is not using seccomp filter, then no
system call notifications will occur even if the option is specified.
If there is no tracer with PTRACE_O_TRACESECCOMP when SECCOMP_RET_TRACE
is returned, the system call will not be executed and an -ENOSYS errno
will be returned to userspace.
This change adds a dependency on the system call slow path. Any future
efforts to use the system call fast path for seccomp filter will need to
address this restriction.
Signed-off-by: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
v18: - rebase
- comment fatal_signal check
- acked-by
- drop secure_computing_int comment
v17: - ...
v16: - update PT_TRACE_MASK to 0xbf4 so that STOP isn't clear on SETOPTIONS call (indan@nul.nu)
[note PT_TRACE_MASK disappears in linux-next]
v15: - add audit support for non-zero return codes
- clean up style (indan@nul.nu)
v14: - rebase/nochanges
v13: - rebase on to 88ebdda615
(Brings back a change to ptrace.c and the masks.)
v12: - rebase to linux-next
- use ptrace_event and update arch/Kconfig to mention slow-path dependency
- drop all tracehook changes and inclusion (oleg@redhat.com)
v11: - invert the logic to just make it a PTRACE_SYSCALL accelerator
(indan@nul.nu)
v10: - moved to PTRACE_O_SECCOMP / PT_TRACE_SECCOMP
v9: - n/a
v8: - guarded PTRACE_SECCOMP use with an ifdef
v7: - introduced
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
"[RFC - PATCH 0/7] consolidation of BUG support code."
https://lkml.org/lkml/2012/1/26/525
--
The changes shown here are to unify linux's BUG support under
the one <linux/bug.h> file. Due to historical reasons, we have
some BUG code in bug.h and some in kernel.h -- i.e. the support for
BUILD_BUG in linux/kernel.h predates the addition of linux/bug.h,
but old code in kernel.h wasn't moved to bug.h at that time. As
a band-aid, kernel.h was including <asm/bug.h> to pseudo link them.
This has caused confusion[1] and general yuck/WTF[2] reactions.
Here is an example that violates the principle of least surprise:
CC lib/string.o
lib/string.c: In function 'strlcat':
lib/string.c:225:2: error: implicit declaration of function 'BUILD_BUG_ON'
make[2]: *** [lib/string.o] Error 1
$
$ grep linux/bug.h lib/string.c
#include <linux/bug.h>
$
We've included <linux/bug.h> for the BUG infrastructure and yet we
still get a compile fail! [We've not kernel.h for BUILD_BUG_ON.]
Ugh - very confusing for someone who is new to kernel development.
With the above in mind, the goals of this changeset are:
1) find and fix any include/*.h files that were relying on the
implicit presence of BUG code.
2) find and fix any C files that were consuming kernel.h and
hence relying on implicitly getting some/all BUG code.
3) Move the BUG related code living in kernel.h to <linux/bug.h>
4) remove the asm/bug.h from kernel.h to finally break the chain.
During development, the order was more like 3-4, build-test, 1-2.
But to ensure that git history for bisect doesn't get needless
build failures introduced, the commits have been reorderd to fix
the problem areas in advance.
[1] https://lkml.org/lkml/2012/1/3/90
[2] https://lkml.org/lkml/2012/1/17/414
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Merge tag 'bug-for-3.4' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/paulg/linux
Pull <linux/bug.h> cleanup from Paul Gortmaker:
"The changes shown here are to unify linux's BUG support under the one
<linux/bug.h> file. Due to historical reasons, we have some BUG code
in bug.h and some in kernel.h -- i.e. the support for BUILD_BUG in
linux/kernel.h predates the addition of linux/bug.h, but old code in
kernel.h wasn't moved to bug.h at that time. As a band-aid, kernel.h
was including <asm/bug.h> to pseudo link them.
This has caused confusion[1] and general yuck/WTF[2] reactions. Here
is an example that violates the principle of least surprise:
CC lib/string.o
lib/string.c: In function 'strlcat':
lib/string.c:225:2: error: implicit declaration of function 'BUILD_BUG_ON'
make[2]: *** [lib/string.o] Error 1
$
$ grep linux/bug.h lib/string.c
#include <linux/bug.h>
$
We've included <linux/bug.h> for the BUG infrastructure and yet we
still get a compile fail! [We've not kernel.h for BUILD_BUG_ON.] Ugh -
very confusing for someone who is new to kernel development.
With the above in mind, the goals of this changeset are:
1) find and fix any include/*.h files that were relying on the
implicit presence of BUG code.
2) find and fix any C files that were consuming kernel.h and hence
relying on implicitly getting some/all BUG code.
3) Move the BUG related code living in kernel.h to <linux/bug.h>
4) remove the asm/bug.h from kernel.h to finally break the chain.
During development, the order was more like 3-4, build-test, 1-2. But
to ensure that git history for bisect doesn't get needless build
failures introduced, the commits have been reorderd to fix the problem
areas in advance.
[1] https://lkml.org/lkml/2012/1/3/90
[2] https://lkml.org/lkml/2012/1/17/414"
Fix up conflicts (new radeon file, reiserfs header cleanups) as per Paul
and linux-next.
* tag 'bug-for-3.4' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/paulg/linux:
kernel.h: doesn't explicitly use bug.h, so don't include it.
bug: consolidate BUILD_BUG_ON with other bug code
BUG: headers with BUG/BUG_ON etc. need linux/bug.h
bug.h: add include of it to various implicit C users
lib: fix implicit users of kernel.h for TAINT_WARN
spinlock: macroize assert_spin_locked to avoid bug.h dependency
x86: relocate get/set debugreg fcns to include/asm/debugreg.
PTRACE_SEIZE code is tested and ready for production use, remove the
code which requires special bit in data argument to make PTRACE_SEIZE
work.
Strace team prepares for a new release of strace, and we would like to
ship the code which uses PTRACE_SEIZE, preferably after this change goes
into released kernel.
Signed-off-by: Denys Vlasenko <vda.linux@googlemail.com>
Acked-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Pedro Alves <palves@redhat.com>
Cc: Jan Kratochvil <jan.kratochvil@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
PTRACE_EVENT_foo and PTRACE_O_TRACEfoo used to match.
New PTRACE_EVENT_STOP is the first event which has no corresponding
PTRACE_O_TRACE option. If we will ever want to add another such option,
its PTRACE_EVENT's value will collide with PTRACE_EVENT_STOP's value.
This patch changes PTRACE_EVENT_STOP value to prevent this.
While at it, added a comment - the one atop PTRACE_EVENT block, saying
"Wait extended result codes for the above trace options", is not true
for PTRACE_EVENT_STOP.
Signed-off-by: Denys Vlasenko <vda.linux@googlemail.com>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Pedro Alves <palves@redhat.com>
Cc: Jan Kratochvil <jan.kratochvil@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Exchange PT_TRACESYSGOOD and PT_PTRACE_CAP bit positions, which makes
PT_option bits contiguous and therefore makes code in
ptrace_setoptions() much simpler.
Every PTRACE_O_TRACEevent is defined to (1 << PTRACE_EVENT_event)
instead of using explicit numeric constants, to ensure we don't mess up
relationship between bit positions and event ids.
PT_EVENT_FLAG_SHIFT was not particularly useful, PT_OPT_FLAG_SHIFT with
value of PT_EVENT_FLAG_SHIFT-1 is easier to use.
PT_TRACE_MASK constant is nuked, the only its use is replaced by
(PTRACE_O_MASK << PT_OPT_FLAG_SHIFT).
Signed-off-by: Denys Vlasenko <vda.linux@googlemail.com>
Acked-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Pedro Alves <palves@redhat.com>
Cc: Jan Kratochvil <jan.kratochvil@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
ptrace_event(PTRACE_EVENT_EXEC) sends SIGTRAP if PT_TRACE_EXEC is not
set. This is because this SIGTRAP predates PTRACE_O_TRACEEXEC option,
we do not need/want this with PT_SEIZED which can set the options during
attach.
Suggested-by: Pedro Alves <palves@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Chris Evans <scarybeasts@gmail.com>
Cc: Indan Zupancic <indan@nul.nu>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <vda.linux@googlemail.com>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Pedro Alves <palves@redhat.com>
Cc: Jan Kratochvil <jan.kratochvil@redhat.com>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
If a header file is making use of BUG, BUG_ON, BUILD_BUG_ON, or any
other BUG variant in a static inline (i.e. not in a #define) then
that header really should be including <linux/bug.h> and not just
expecting it to be implicitly present.
We can make this change risk-free, since if the files using these
headers didn't have exposure to linux/bug.h already, they would have
been causing compile failures/warnings.
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/audit: (29 commits)
audit: no leading space in audit_log_d_path prefix
audit: treat s_id as an untrusted string
audit: fix signedness bug in audit_log_execve_info()
audit: comparison on interprocess fields
audit: implement all object interfield comparisons
audit: allow interfield comparison between gid and ogid
audit: complex interfield comparison helper
audit: allow interfield comparison in audit rules
Kernel: Audit Support For The ARM Platform
audit: do not call audit_getname on error
audit: only allow tasks to set their loginuid if it is -1
audit: remove task argument to audit_set_loginuid
audit: allow audit matching on inode gid
audit: allow matching on obj_uid
audit: remove audit_finish_fork as it can't be called
audit: reject entry,always rules
audit: inline audit_free to simplify the look of generic code
audit: drop audit_set_macxattr as it doesn't do anything
audit: inline checks for not needing to collect aux records
audit: drop some potentially inadvisable likely notations
...
Use evil merge to fix up grammar mistakes in Kconfig file.
Bad speling and horrible grammar (and copious swearing) is to be
expected, but let's keep it to commit messages and comments, rather than
expose it to users in config help texts or printouts.
The audit system previously expected arches calling to audit_syscall_exit to
supply as arguments if the syscall was a success and what the return code was.
Audit also provides a helper AUDITSC_RESULT which was supposed to simplify things
by converting from negative retcodes to an audit internal magic value stating
success or failure. This helper was wrong and could indicate that a valid
pointer returned to userspace was a failed syscall. The fix is to fix the
layering foolishness. We now pass audit_syscall_exit a struct pt_reg and it
in turns calls back into arch code to collect the return value and to
determine if the syscall was a success or failure. We also define a generic
is_syscall_success() macro which determines success/failure based on if the
value is < -MAX_ERRNO. This works for arches like x86 which do not use a
separate mechanism to indicate syscall failure.
We make both the is_syscall_success() and regs_return_value() static inlines
instead of macros. The reason is because the audit function must take a void*
for the regs. (uml calls theirs struct uml_pt_regs instead of just struct
pt_regs so audit_syscall_exit can't take a struct pt_regs). Since the audit
function takes a void* we need to use static inlines to cast it back to the
arch correct structure to dereference it.
The other major change is that on some arches, like ia64, MIPS and ppc, we
change regs_return_value() to give us the negative value on syscall failure.
THE only other user of this macro, kretprobe_example.c, won't notice and it
makes the value signed consistently for the audit functions across all archs.
In arch/sh/kernel/ptrace_64.c I see that we were using regs[9] in the old
audit code as the return value. But the ptrace_64.h code defined the macro
regs_return_value() as regs[3]. I have no idea which one is correct, but this
patch now uses the regs_return_value() function, so it now uses regs[3].
For powerpc we previously used regs->result but now use the
regs_return_value() function which uses regs->gprs[3]. regs->gprs[3] is
always positive so the regs_return_value(), much like ia64 makes it negative
before calling the audit code when appropriate.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> [for x86 portion]
Acked-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> [for ia64]
Acked-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at> [for uml]
Acked-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> [for sparc]
Acked-by: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org> [for mips]
Acked-by: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> [for ppc]
Reading /proc/pid/stat of another process checks if one has ptrace permissions
on that process. If one does have permissions it outputs some data about the
process which might have security and attack implications. If the current
task does not have ptrace permissions the read still works, but those fields
are filled with inocuous (0) values. Since this check and a subsequent denial
is not a violation of the security policy we should not audit such denials.
This can be quite useful to removing ptrace broadly across a system without
flooding the logs when ps is run or something which harmlessly walks proc.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
The fake SIGSTOP during attach has numerous problems. PTRACE_SEIZE
is already fine, but we have basically the same problems is SIGSTOP
is sent on auto-attach, the tracer can't know if this signal signal
should be cancelled or not.
Change ptrace_event() to set JOBCTL_TRAP_STOP if the new child is
PT_SEIZED, this triggers the PTRACE_EVENT_STOP report.
Thereafter a PT_SEIZED task can never report the bogus SIGSTOP.
Test-case:
#define PTRACE_SEIZE 0x4206
#define PTRACE_SEIZE_DEVEL 0x80000000
#define PTRACE_EVENT_STOP 7
#define WEVENT(s) ((s & 0xFF0000) >> 16)
int main(void)
{
int child, grand_child, status;
long message;
child = fork();
if (!child) {
kill(getpid(), SIGSTOP);
fork();
assert(0);
return 0x23;
}
assert(ptrace(PTRACE_SEIZE, child, 0,PTRACE_SEIZE_DEVEL) == 0);
assert(wait(&status) == child);
assert(WIFSTOPPED(status) && WSTOPSIG(status) == SIGSTOP);
assert(ptrace(PTRACE_SETOPTIONS, child, 0, PTRACE_O_TRACEFORK) == 0);
assert(ptrace(PTRACE_CONT, child, 0,0) == 0);
assert(waitpid(child, &status, 0) == child);
assert(WIFSTOPPED(status) && WSTOPSIG(status) == SIGTRAP);
assert(WEVENT(status) == PTRACE_EVENT_FORK);
assert(ptrace(PTRACE_GETEVENTMSG, child, 0, &message) == 0);
grand_child = message;
assert(waitpid(grand_child, &status, 0) == grand_child);
assert(WIFSTOPPED(status) && WSTOPSIG(status) == SIGTRAP);
assert(WEVENT(status) == PTRACE_EVENT_STOP);
kill(child, SIGKILL);
kill(grand_child, SIGKILL);
return 0;
}
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
If the new child is traced, do_fork() adds the pending SIGSTOP.
It assumes that either it is traced because of auto-attach or the
tracer attached later, in both cases sigaddset/set_thread_flag is
correct even if SIGSTOP is already pending.
Now that we have PTRACE_SEIZE this is no longer right in the latter
case. If the tracer does PTRACE_SEIZE after copy_process() makes the
child visible the queued SIGSTOP is wrong.
We could check PT_SEIZED bit and change ptrace_attach() to set both
PT_PTRACED and PT_SEIZED bits simultaneously but see the next patch,
we need to know whether this child was auto-attached or not anyway.
So this patch simply moves this code to ptrace_init_task(), this
way we can never race with ptrace_attach().
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
new_child->jobctl is not initialized during the fork, it is copied
from parent->jobctl. Currently this is harmless, the forking task
is running and copy_process() can't succeed if signal_pending() is
true, so only JOBCTL_STOP_DEQUEUED can be copied. Still this is a
bit fragile, it would be more clean to set ->jobctl = 0 explicitly.
Also, check ->ptrace != 0 instead of PT_PTRACED, move the
CONFIG_HAVE_HW_BREAKPOINT code up.
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
ptrace_reparented() naively does parent != real_parent, this means
it returns true even if the tracer _is_ the real parent. This is per
process thing, not per-thread. The only reason ->real_parent can
point to the non-leader thread is that we have __WNOTHREAD.
Change it to check !same_thread_group(parent, real_parent).
It has two callers, and in both cases the current check does not
look right.
exit_notify: we should respect ->exit_signal if the exiting leader
is traced by any thread from the parent thread group. It is the
child of the whole group, and we are going to send the signal to
the whole group.
wait_task_zombie: without __WNOTHREAD do_wait() should do the same
for any thread, only sys_ptrace() is "bound" to the single thread.
However do_wait(WEXITED) succeeds but does not release a traced
natural child unless the caller is the tracer.
Test-case:
void *tfunc(void *arg)
{
assert(ptrace(PTRACE_ATTACH, (long)arg, 0,0) == 0);
pause();
return NULL;
}
int main(void)
{
pthread_t thr;
pid_t pid, stat, ret;
pid = fork();
if (!pid) {
pause();
assert(0);
}
assert(pthread_create(&thr, NULL, tfunc, (void*)(long)pid) == 0);
assert(waitpid(-1, &stat, 0) == pid);
assert(WIFSTOPPED(stat));
kill(pid, SIGKILL);
assert(waitpid(-1, &stat, 0) == pid);
assert(WIFSIGNALED(stat) && WTERMSIG(stat) == SIGKILL);
ret = waitpid(pid, &stat, 0);
if (ret < 0)
return 0;
printf("WTF? %d is dead, but: wait=%d stat=%x\n",
pid, ret, stat);
return 1;
}
Note that the main thread simply does
pid = fork();
kill(pid, SIGKILL);
and then without the patch wait4(WEXITED) succeeds twice and reports
WTERMSIG(stat) == SIGKILL.
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
tracehook.h is on the way out. Rename tracehook_tracer_task() to
ptrace_parent() and move it from tracehook.h to ptrace.h.
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Cc: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Move SIGTRAP on exec(2) logic from tracehook_report_exec() to
ptrace_event(). This is part of changes to make ptrace_event()
smarter and handle ptrace event related details in one place.
This doesn't introduce any behavior change.
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
This patch implements ptrace_event_enabled() which tests whether a
given PTRACE_EVENT_* is enabled and use it to simplify ptrace_event()
and tracehook_prepare_clone().
PT_EVENT_FLAG() macro is added which calculates PT_TRACE_* flag from
PTRACE_EVENT_*. This is used to define PT_TRACE_* flags and by
ptrace_event_enabled() to find the matching flag.
This is used to make ptrace_event() and tracehook_prepare_clone()
simpler.
* ptrace_event() callers were responsible for providing mask to test
whether the event was enabled. This patch implements
ptrace_event_enabled() and make ptrace_event() drop @mask and
determine whether the event is enabled from @event. Note that
@event is constant and this conversion doesn't add runtime overhead.
All conversions except tracehook_report_clone_complete() are
trivial. tracehook_report_clone_complete() used to use 0 for @mask
(always enabled) but now tests whether the specified event is
enabled. This doesn't cause any behavior difference as it's
guaranteed that the event specified by @trace is enabled.
* tracehook_prepare_clone() now only determines which event is
applicable and use ptrace_event_enabled() for enable test.
This doesn't introduce any behavior change.
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
task_ptrace(task) simply dereferences task->ptrace and isn't even used
consistently only adding confusion. Kill it and directly access
->ptrace instead.
This doesn't introduce any behavior change.
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
The previous patch implemented async notification for ptrace but it
only worked while trace is running. This patch introduces
PTRACE_LISTEN which is suggested by Oleg Nestrov.
It's allowed iff tracee is in STOP trap and puts tracee into
quasi-running state - tracee never really runs but wait(2) and
ptrace(2) consider it to be running. While ptracer is listening,
tracee is allowed to re-enter STOP to notify an async event.
Listening state is cleared on the first notification. Ptracer can
also clear it by issuing INTERRUPT - tracee will re-trap into STOP
with listening state cleared.
This allows ptracer to monitor group stop state without running tracee
- use INTERRUPT to put tracee into STOP trap, issue LISTEN and then
wait(2) to wait for the next group stop event. When it happens,
PTRACE_GETSIGINFO provides information to determine the current state.
Test program follows.
#define PTRACE_SEIZE 0x4206
#define PTRACE_INTERRUPT 0x4207
#define PTRACE_LISTEN 0x4208
#define PTRACE_SEIZE_DEVEL 0x80000000
static const struct timespec ts1s = { .tv_sec = 1 };
int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
pid_t tracee, tracer;
int i;
tracee = fork();
if (!tracee)
while (1)
pause();
tracer = fork();
if (!tracer) {
siginfo_t si;
ptrace(PTRACE_SEIZE, tracee, NULL,
(void *)(unsigned long)PTRACE_SEIZE_DEVEL);
ptrace(PTRACE_INTERRUPT, tracee, NULL, NULL);
repeat:
waitid(P_PID, tracee, NULL, WSTOPPED);
ptrace(PTRACE_GETSIGINFO, tracee, NULL, &si);
if (!si.si_code) {
printf("tracer: SIG %d\n", si.si_signo);
ptrace(PTRACE_CONT, tracee, NULL,
(void *)(unsigned long)si.si_signo);
goto repeat;
}
printf("tracer: stopped=%d signo=%d\n",
si.si_signo != SIGTRAP, si.si_signo);
if (si.si_signo != SIGTRAP)
ptrace(PTRACE_LISTEN, tracee, NULL, NULL);
else
ptrace(PTRACE_CONT, tracee, NULL, NULL);
goto repeat;
}
for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) {
nanosleep(&ts1s, NULL);
printf("mother: SIGSTOP\n");
kill(tracee, SIGSTOP);
nanosleep(&ts1s, NULL);
printf("mother: SIGCONT\n");
kill(tracee, SIGCONT);
}
nanosleep(&ts1s, NULL);
kill(tracer, SIGKILL);
kill(tracee, SIGKILL);
return 0;
}
This is identical to the program to test TRAP_NOTIFY except that
tracee is PTRACE_LISTEN'd instead of PTRACE_CONT'd when group stopped.
This allows ptracer to monitor when group stop ends without running
tracee.
# ./test-listen
tracer: stopped=0 signo=5
mother: SIGSTOP
tracer: SIG 19
tracer: stopped=1 signo=19
mother: SIGCONT
tracer: stopped=0 signo=5
tracer: SIG 18
mother: SIGSTOP
tracer: SIG 19
tracer: stopped=1 signo=19
mother: SIGCONT
tracer: stopped=0 signo=5
tracer: SIG 18
mother: SIGSTOP
tracer: SIG 19
tracer: stopped=1 signo=19
mother: SIGCONT
tracer: stopped=0 signo=5
tracer: SIG 18
-v2: Moved JOBCTL_LISTENING check in wait_task_stopped() into
task_stopped_code() as suggested by Oleg.
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
