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35071 Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Yonghong Song
|
7ae1b1c07f |
bpf: Fix NULL pointer dereference in bpf_get_local_storage() helper
commit b910eaaaa4b89976ef02e5d6448f3f73dc671d91 upstream.
Jiri Olsa reported a bug ([1]) in kernel where cgroup local
storage pointer may be NULL in bpf_get_local_storage() helper.
There are two issues uncovered by this bug:
(1). kprobe or tracepoint prog incorrectly sets cgroup local storage
before prog run,
(2). due to change from preempt_disable to migrate_disable,
preemption is possible and percpu storage might be overwritten
by other tasks.
This issue (1) is fixed in [2]. This patch tried to address issue (2).
The following shows how things can go wrong:
task 1: bpf_cgroup_storage_set() for percpu local storage
preemption happens
task 2: bpf_cgroup_storage_set() for percpu local storage
preemption happens
task 1: run bpf program
task 1 will effectively use the percpu local storage setting by task 2
which will be either NULL or incorrect ones.
Instead of just one common local storage per cpu, this patch fixed
the issue by permitting 8 local storages per cpu and each local
storage is identified by a task_struct pointer. This way, we
allow at most 8 nested preemption between bpf_cgroup_storage_set()
and bpf_cgroup_storage_unset(). The percpu local storage slot
is released (calling bpf_cgroup_storage_unset()) by the same task
after bpf program finished running.
bpf_test_run() is also fixed to use the new bpf_cgroup_storage_set()
interface.
The patch is tested on top of [2] with reproducer in [1].
Without this patch, kernel will emit error in 2-3 minutes.
With this patch, after one hour, still no error.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/CAKH8qBuXCfUz=w8L+Fj74OaUpbosO29niYwTki7e3Ag044_aww@mail.gmail.com/T
[2] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20210309185028.3763817-1-yhs@fb.com
Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20210323055146.3334476-1-yhs@fb.com
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 5.10.x
Signed-off-by: Stanislav Fomichev <sdf@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
||
|
Daniel Borkmann
|
9e9076db5c |
bpf: Fix ringbuf helper function compatibility
commit 5b029a32cfe4600f5e10e36b41778506b90fd4de upstream. Commit |
||
|
Steven Rostedt (VMware)
|
2d326bf12c |
tracing / histogram: Fix NULL pointer dereference on strcmp() on NULL event name
[ Upstream commit 5acce0bff2a0420ce87d4591daeb867f47d552c2 ]
The following commands:
# echo 'read_max u64 size;' > synthetic_events
# echo 'hist:keys=common_pid:count=count:onmax($count).trace(read_max,count)' > events/syscalls/sys_enter_read/trigger
Causes:
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000
#PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
#PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
PGD 0 P4D 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
CPU: 4 PID: 1763 Comm: bash Not tainted 5.14.0-rc2-test+ #155
Hardware name: Hewlett-Packard HP Compaq Pro 6300 SFF/339A, BIOS K01
v03.03 07/14/2016
RIP: 0010:strcmp+0xc/0x20
Code: 75 f7 31 c0 0f b6 0c 06 88 0c 02 48 83 c0 01 84 c9 75 f1 4c 89 c0
c3 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 31 c0 eb 08 48 83 c0 01 84 d2 74 0f <0f> b6 14 07
3a 14 06 74 ef 19 c0 83 c8 01 c3 31 c0 c3 66 90 48 89
RSP: 0018:ffffb5fdc0963ca8 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffffffb3a4e040 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff9714c0d0b640 RDI: 0000000000000000
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 00000022986b7cde R09: ffffffffb3a4dff8
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff9714c50603c8
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff97143fdf9e48 R15: ffff9714c01a2210
FS: 00007f1fa6785740(0000) GS:ffff9714da400000(0000)
knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 000000002d863004 CR4: 00000000001706e0
Call Trace:
__find_event_file+0x4e/0x80
action_create+0x6b7/0xeb0
? kstrdup+0x44/0x60
event_hist_trigger_func+0x1a07/0x2130
trigger_process_regex+0xbd/0x110
event_trigger_write+0x71/0xd0
vfs_write+0xe9/0x310
ksys_write+0x68/0xe0
do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
RIP: 0033:0x7f1fa6879e87
The problem was the "trace(read_max,count)" where the "count" should be
"$count" as "onmax()" only handles variables (although it really should be
able to figure out that "count" is a field of sys_enter_read). But there's
a path that does not find the variable and ends up passing a NULL for the
event, which ends up getting passed to "strcmp()".
Add a check for NULL to return and error on the command with:
# cat error_log
hist:syscalls:sys_enter_read: error: Couldn't create or find variable
Command: hist:keys=common_pid:count=count:onmax($count).trace(read_max,count)
^
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210808003011.4037f8d0@oasis.local.home
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes:
|
||
|
Ilya Leoshkevich
|
a687a4733b |
bpf: Clear zext_dst of dead insns
[ Upstream commit 45c709f8c71b525b51988e782febe84ce933e7e0 ] "access skb fields ok" verifier test fails on s390 with the "verifier bug. zext_dst is set, but no reg is defined" message. The first insns of the test prog are ... 0: 61 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 ldxw %r0,[%r1+0] 8: 35 00 00 01 00 00 00 00 jge %r0,0,1 10: 61 01 00 08 00 00 00 00 ldxw %r0,[%r1+8] ... and the 3rd one is dead (this does not look intentional to me, but this is a separate topic). sanitize_dead_code() converts dead insns into "ja -1", but keeps zext_dst. When opt_subreg_zext_lo32_rnd_hi32() tries to parse such an insn, it sees this discrepancy and bails. This problem can be seen only with JITs whose bpf_jit_needs_zext() returns true. Fix by clearning dead insns' zext_dst. The commits that contributed to this problem are: 1. |
||
|
Ben Dai
|
11635f6e64 |
genirq/timings: Prevent potential array overflow in __irq_timings_store()
commit b9cc7d8a4656a6e815852c27ab50365009cb69c1 upstream.
When the interrupt interval is greater than 2 ^ PREDICTION_BUFFER_SIZE *
PREDICTION_FACTOR us and less than 1s, the calculated index will be greater
than the length of irqs->ema_time[]. Check the calculated index before
using it to prevent array overflow.
Fixes:
|
||
|
Bixuan Cui
|
22e0660e40 |
genirq/msi: Ensure deactivation on teardown
commit dbbc93576e03fbe24b365fab0e901eb442237a8a upstream.
msi_domain_alloc_irqs() invokes irq_domain_activate_irq(), but
msi_domain_free_irqs() does not enforce deactivation before tearing down
the interrupts.
This happens when PCI/MSI interrupts are set up and never used before being
torn down again, e.g. in error handling pathes. The only place which cleans
that up is the error handling path in msi_domain_alloc_irqs().
Move the cleanup from msi_domain_alloc_irqs() into msi_domain_free_irqs()
to cure that.
Fixes:
|
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|
Thomas Gleixner
|
73a17232d1 |
genirq: Provide IRQCHIP_AFFINITY_PRE_STARTUP
commit 826da771291fc25a428e871f9e7fb465e390f852 upstream.
X86 IO/APIC and MSI interrupts (when used without interrupts remapping)
require that the affinity setup on startup is done before the interrupt is
enabled for the first time as the non-remapped operation mode cannot safely
migrate enabled interrupts from arbitrary contexts. Provide a new irq chip
flag which allows affected hardware to request this.
This has to be opt-in because there have been reports in the past that some
interrupt chips cannot handle affinity setting before startup.
Fixes:
|
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Tatsuhiko Yasumatsu
|
730fc2411b |
bpf: Fix integer overflow involving bucket_size
[ Upstream commit c4eb1f403243fc7bbb7de644db8587c03de36da6 ]
In __htab_map_lookup_and_delete_batch(), hash buckets are iterated
over to count the number of elements in each bucket (bucket_size).
If bucket_size is large enough, the multiplication to calculate
kvmalloc() size could overflow, resulting in out-of-bounds write
as reported by KASAN:
[...]
[ 104.986052] BUG: KASAN: vmalloc-out-of-bounds in __htab_map_lookup_and_delete_batch+0x5ce/0xb60
[ 104.986489] Write of size 4194224 at addr ffffc9010503be70 by task crash/112
[ 104.986889]
[ 104.987193] CPU: 0 PID: 112 Comm: crash Not tainted 5.14.0-rc4 #13
[ 104.987552] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.13.0-1ubuntu1.1 04/01/2014
[ 104.988104] Call Trace:
[ 104.988410] dump_stack_lvl+0x34/0x44
[ 104.988706] print_address_description.constprop.0+0x21/0x140
[ 104.988991] ? __htab_map_lookup_and_delete_batch+0x5ce/0xb60
[ 104.989327] ? __htab_map_lookup_and_delete_batch+0x5ce/0xb60
[ 104.989622] kasan_report.cold+0x7f/0x11b
[ 104.989881] ? __htab_map_lookup_and_delete_batch+0x5ce/0xb60
[ 104.990239] kasan_check_range+0x17c/0x1e0
[ 104.990467] memcpy+0x39/0x60
[ 104.990670] __htab_map_lookup_and_delete_batch+0x5ce/0xb60
[ 104.990982] ? __wake_up_common+0x4d/0x230
[ 104.991256] ? htab_of_map_free+0x130/0x130
[ 104.991541] bpf_map_do_batch+0x1fb/0x220
[...]
In hashtable, if the elements' keys have the same jhash() value, the
elements will be put into the same bucket. By putting a lot of elements
into a single bucket, the value of bucket_size can be increased to
trigger the integer overflow.
Triggering the overflow is possible for both callers with CAP_SYS_ADMIN
and callers without CAP_SYS_ADMIN.
It will be trivial for a caller with CAP_SYS_ADMIN to intentionally
reach this overflow by enabling BPF_F_ZERO_SEED. As this flag will set
the random seed passed to jhash() to 0, it will be easy for the caller
to prepare keys which will be hashed into the same value, and thus put
all the elements into the same bucket.
If the caller does not have CAP_SYS_ADMIN, BPF_F_ZERO_SEED cannot be
used. However, it will be still technically possible to trigger the
overflow, by guessing the random seed value passed to jhash() (32bit)
and repeating the attempt to trigger the overflow. In this case,
the probability to trigger the overflow will be low and will take
a very long time.
Fix the integer overflow by calling kvmalloc_array() instead of
kvmalloc() to allocate memory.
Fixes:
|
||
|
Hsuan-Chi Kuo
|
de3271a0d0 |
seccomp: Fix setting loaded filter count during TSYNC
commit b4d8a58f8dcfcc890f296696cadb76e77be44b5f upstream.
The desired behavior is to set the caller's filter count to thread's.
This value is reported via /proc, so this fixes the inaccurate count
exposed to userspace; it is not used for reference counting, etc.
Signed-off-by: Hsuan-Chi Kuo <hsuanchikuo@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210304233708.420597-1-hsuanchikuo@gmail.com
Co-developed-by: Wiktor Garbacz <wiktorg@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Wiktor Garbacz <wiktorg@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20210810125158.329849-1-wiktorg@google.com
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes:
|
||
|
Daniel Borkmann
|
25af1ec4c5 |
bpf: Add lockdown check for probe_write_user helper
commit 51e1bb9eeaf7868db56e58f47848e364ab4c4129 upstream. Back then, commit |
||
|
Peter Zijlstra
|
cc6fd8e9be |
sched/rt: Fix double enqueue caused by rt_effective_prio
commit f558c2b834ec27e75d37b1c860c139e7b7c3a8e4 upstream.
Double enqueues in rt runqueues (list) have been reported while running
a simple test that spawns a number of threads doing a short sleep/run
pattern while being concurrently setscheduled between rt and fair class.
WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 2825 at kernel/sched/rt.c:1294 enqueue_task_rt+0x355/0x360
CPU: 3 PID: 2825 Comm: setsched__13
RIP: 0010:enqueue_task_rt+0x355/0x360
Call Trace:
__sched_setscheduler+0x581/0x9d0
_sched_setscheduler+0x63/0xa0
do_sched_setscheduler+0xa0/0x150
__x64_sys_sched_setscheduler+0x1a/0x30
do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
list_add double add: new=ffff9867cb629b40, prev=ffff9867cb629b40,
next=ffff98679fc67ca0.
kernel BUG at lib/list_debug.c:31!
invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT_RT SMP PTI
CPU: 3 PID: 2825 Comm: setsched__13
RIP: 0010:__list_add_valid+0x41/0x50
Call Trace:
enqueue_task_rt+0x291/0x360
__sched_setscheduler+0x581/0x9d0
_sched_setscheduler+0x63/0xa0
do_sched_setscheduler+0xa0/0x150
__x64_sys_sched_setscheduler+0x1a/0x30
do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
__sched_setscheduler() uses rt_effective_prio() to handle proper queuing
of priority boosted tasks that are setscheduled while being boosted.
rt_effective_prio() is however called twice per each
__sched_setscheduler() call: first directly by __sched_setscheduler()
before dequeuing the task and then by __setscheduler() to actually do
the priority change. If the priority of the pi_top_task is concurrently
being changed however, it might happen that the two calls return
different results. If, for example, the first call returned the same rt
priority the task was running at and the second one a fair priority, the
task won't be removed by the rt list (on_list still set) and then
enqueued in the fair runqueue. When eventually setscheduled back to rt
it will be seen as enqueued already and the WARNING/BUG be issued.
Fix this by calling rt_effective_prio() only once and then reusing the
return value. While at it refactor code as well for clarity. Concurrent
priority inheritance handling is still safe and will eventually converge
to a new state by following the inheritance chain(s).
Fixes:
|
||
|
Thomas Gleixner
|
2df37d2980 |
timers: Move clearing of base::timer_running under base:: Lock
commit bb7262b295472eb6858b5c49893954794027cd84 upstream.
syzbot reported KCSAN data races vs. timer_base::timer_running being set to
NULL without holding base::lock in expire_timers().
This looks innocent and most reads are clearly not problematic, but
Frederic identified an issue which is:
int data = 0;
void timer_func(struct timer_list *t)
{
data = 1;
}
CPU 0 CPU 1
------------------------------ --------------------------
base = lock_timer_base(timer, &flags); raw_spin_unlock(&base->lock);
if (base->running_timer != timer) call_timer_fn(timer, fn, baseclk);
ret = detach_if_pending(timer, base, true); base->running_timer = NULL;
raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&base->lock, flags); raw_spin_lock(&base->lock);
x = data;
If the timer has previously executed on CPU 1 and then CPU 0 can observe
base->running_timer == NULL and returns, assuming the timer has completed,
but it's not guaranteed on all architectures. The comment for
del_timer_sync() makes that guarantee. Moving the assignment under
base->lock prevents this.
For non-RT kernel it's performance wise completely irrelevant whether the
store happens before or after taking the lock. For an RT kernel moving the
store under the lock requires an extra unlock/lock pair in the case that
there is a waiter for the timer, but that's not the end of the world.
Reported-by: syzbot+aa7c2385d46c5eba0b89@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: syzbot+abea4558531bae1ba9fe@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes:
|
||
|
Mathieu Desnoyers
|
9d945f7169 |
tracepoint: Fix static call function vs data state mismatch
commit 231264d6927f6740af36855a622d0e240be9d94c upstream.
On a 1->0->1 callbacks transition, there is an issue with the new
callback using the old callback's data.
Considering __DO_TRACE_CALL:
do { \
struct tracepoint_func *it_func_ptr; \
void *__data; \
it_func_ptr = \
rcu_dereference_raw((&__tracepoint_##name)->funcs); \
if (it_func_ptr) { \
__data = (it_func_ptr)->data; \
----> [ delayed here on one CPU (e.g. vcpu preempted by the host) ]
static_call(tp_func_##name)(__data, args); \
} \
} while (0)
It has loaded the tp->funcs of the old callback, so it will try to use the old
data. This can be fixed by adding a RCU sync anywhere in the 1->0->1
transition chain.
On a N->2->1 transition, we need an rcu-sync because you may have a
sequence of 3->2->1 (or 1->2->1) where the element 0 data is unchanged
between 2->1, but was changed from 3->2 (or from 1->2), which may be
observed by the static call. This can be fixed by adding an
unconditional RCU sync in transition 2->1.
Note, this fixes a correctness issue at the cost of adding a tremendous
performance regression to the disabling of tracepoints.
Before this commit:
# trace-cmd start -e all
# time trace-cmd start -p nop
real 0m0.778s
user 0m0.000s
sys 0m0.061s
After this commit:
# trace-cmd start -e all
# time trace-cmd start -p nop
real 0m10.593s
user 0m0.017s
sys 0m0.259s
A follow up fix will introduce a more lightweight scheme based on RCU
get_state and cond_sync, that will return the performance back to what it
was. As both this change and the lightweight versions are complex on their
own, for bisecting any issues that this may cause, they are kept as two
separate changes.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210805132717.23813-3-mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/io-uring/4ebea8f0-58c9-e571-fd30-0ce4f6f09c70@samba.org/
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: "Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@kernel.org>
Cc: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Fixes:
|
||
|
Mathieu Desnoyers
|
5db59b334d |
tracepoint: static call: Compare data on transition from 2->1 callees
commit f7ec4121256393e1d03274acdca73eb18958f27e upstream.
On transition from 2->1 callees, we should be comparing .data rather
than .func, because the same callback can be registered twice with
different data, and what we care about here is that the data of array
element 0 is unchanged to skip rcu sync.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210805132717.23813-2-mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/io-uring/4ebea8f0-58c9-e571-fd30-0ce4f6f09c70@samba.org/
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: "Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@kernel.org>
Cc: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Fixes:
|
||
|
Kamal Agrawal
|
05350f5997 |
tracing: Fix NULL pointer dereference in start_creating
commit ff41c28c4b54052942180d8b3f49e75f1445135a upstream.
The event_trace_add_tracer() can fail. In this case, it leads to a crash
in start_creating with below call stack. Handle the error scenario
properly in trace_array_create_dir.
Call trace:
down_write+0x7c/0x204
start_creating.25017+0x6c/0x194
tracefs_create_file+0xc4/0x2b4
init_tracer_tracefs+0x5c/0x940
trace_array_create_dir+0x58/0xb4
trace_array_create+0x1bc/0x2b8
trace_array_get_by_name+0xdc/0x18c
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1627651386-21315-1-git-send-email-kamaagra@codeaurora.org
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes:
|
||
|
Masami Hiramatsu
|
9f18f894cb |
tracing: Reject string operand in the histogram expression
commit a9d10ca4986571bffc19778742d508cc8dd13e02 upstream.
Since the string type can not be the target of the addition / subtraction
operation, it must be rejected. Without this fix, the string type silently
converted to digits.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/162742654278.290973.1523000673366456634.stgit@devnote2
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes:
|
||
|
Steven Rostedt (VMware)
|
16f055efb4 |
tracing / histogram: Give calculation hist_fields a size
commit 2c05caa7ba8803209769b9e4fe02c38d77ae88d0 upstream.
When working on my user space applications, I found a bug in the synthetic
event code where the automated synthetic event field was not matching the
event field calculation it was attached to. Looking deeper into it, it was
because the calculation hist_field was not given a size.
The synthetic event fields are matched to their hist_fields either by
having the field have an identical string type, or if that does not match,
then the size and signed values are used to match the fields.
The problem arose when I tried to match a calculation where the fields
were "unsigned int". My tool created a synthetic event of type "u32". But
it failed to match. The string was:
diff=field1-field2:onmatch(event).trace(synth,$diff)
Adding debugging into the kernel, I found that the size of "diff" was 0.
And since it was given "unsigned int" as a type, the histogram fallback
code used size and signed. The signed matched, but the size of u32 (4) did
not match zero, and the event failed to be created.
This can be worse if the field you want to match is not one of the
acceptable fields for a synthetic event. As event fields can have any type
that is supported in Linux, this can cause an issue. For example, if a
type is an enum. Then there's no way to use that with any calculations.
Have the calculation field simply take on the size of what it is
calculating.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210730171951.59c7743f@oasis.local.home
Cc: Tom Zanussi <zanussi@kernel.org>
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes:
|
||
|
Daniel Borkmann
|
682f75d35f |
bpf: Fix pointer arithmetic mask tightening under state pruning
commit e042aa532c84d18ff13291d00620502ce7a38dda upstream.
In 7fedb63a8307 ("bpf: Tighten speculative pointer arithmetic mask") we
narrowed the offset mask for unprivileged pointer arithmetic in order to
mitigate a corner case where in the speculative domain it is possible to
advance, for example, the map value pointer by up to value_size-1 out-of-
bounds in order to leak kernel memory via side-channel to user space.
The verifier's state pruning for scalars leaves one corner case open
where in the first verification path R_x holds an unknown scalar with an
aux->alu_limit of e.g. 7, and in a second verification path that same
register R_x, here denoted as R_x', holds an unknown scalar which has
tighter bounds and would thus satisfy range_within(R_x, R_x') as well as
tnum_in(R_x, R_x') for state pruning, yielding an aux->alu_limit of 3:
Given the second path fits the register constraints for pruning, the final
generated mask from aux->alu_limit will remain at 7. While technically
not wrong for the non-speculative domain, it would however be possible
to craft similar cases where the mask would be too wide as in 7fedb63a8307.
One way to fix it is to detect the presence of unknown scalar map pointer
arithmetic and force a deeper search on unknown scalars to ensure that
we do not run into a masking mismatch.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
||
|
Lorenz Bauer
|
068191af8f |
bpf: verifier: Allocate idmap scratch in verifier env
commit c9e73e3d2b1eb1ea7ff068e05007eec3bd8ef1c9 upstream. func_states_equal makes a very short lived allocation for idmap, probably because it's too large to fit on the stack. However the function is called quite often, leading to a lot of alloc / free churn. Replace the temporary allocation with dedicated scratch space in struct bpf_verifier_env. Signed-off-by: Lorenz Bauer <lmb@cloudflare.com> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Edward Cree <ecree.xilinx@gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20210429134656.122225-4-lmb@cloudflare.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> |
||
|
Daniel Borkmann
|
94b18c25d5 |
bpf: Remove superfluous aux sanitation on subprog rejection
commit 59089a189e3adde4cf85f2ce479738d1ae4c514d upstream.
Follow-up to fe9a5ca7e370 ("bpf: Do not mark insn as seen under speculative
path verification"). The sanitize_insn_aux_data() helper does not serve a
particular purpose in today's code. The original intention for the helper
was that if function-by-function verification fails, a given program would
be cleared from temporary insn_aux_data[], and then its verification would
be re-attempted in the context of the main program a second time.
However, a failure in do_check_subprogs() will skip do_check_main() and
propagate the error to the user instead, thus such situation can never occur.
Given its interaction is not compatible to the Spectre v1 mitigation (due to
comparing aux->seen with env->pass_cnt), just remove sanitize_insn_aux_data()
to avoid future bugs in this area.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
||
|
AuxXxilium
|
5fa3ea047a |
init: add dsm gpl source
Signed-off-by: AuxXxilium <info@auxxxilium.tech> |
||
|
Paul E. McKenney
|
86cb49e731 |
rcu-tasks: Don't delete holdouts within trc_wait_for_one_reader()
[ Upstream commit a9ab9cce9367a2cc02a3c7eb57a004dc0b8f380d ] Invoking trc_del_holdout() from within trc_wait_for_one_reader() is only a performance optimization because the RCU Tasks Trace grace-period kthread will eventually do this within check_all_holdout_tasks_trace(). But it is not a particularly important performance optimization because it only applies to the grace-period kthread, of which there is but one. This commit therefore removes this invocation of trc_del_holdout() in favor of the one in check_all_holdout_tasks_trace() in the grace-period kthread. Reported-by: "Xu, Yanfei" <yanfei.xu@windriver.com> Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> |
||
|
Paul E. McKenney
|
55ddab2bfd |
rcu-tasks: Don't delete holdouts within trc_inspect_reader()
[ Upstream commit 1d10bf55d85d34eb73dd8263635f43fd72135d2d ] As Yanfei pointed out, although invoking trc_del_holdout() is safe from the viewpoint of the integrity of the holdout list itself, the put_task_struct() invoked by trc_del_holdout() can result in use-after-free errors due to later accesses to this task_struct structure by the RCU Tasks Trace grace-period kthread. This commit therefore removes this call to trc_del_holdout() from trc_inspect_reader() in favor of the grace-period thread's existing call to trc_del_holdout(), thus eliminating that particular class of use-after-free errors. Reported-by: "Xu, Yanfei" <yanfei.xu@windriver.com> Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> |
||
|
Paul Gortmaker
|
df34f88862 |
cgroup1: fix leaked context root causing sporadic NULL deref in LTP
commit 1e7107c5ef44431bc1ebbd4c353f1d7c22e5f2ec upstream. Richard reported sporadic (roughly one in 10 or so) null dereferences and other strange behaviour for a set of automated LTP tests. Things like: BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000008 #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI CPU: 0 PID: 1516 Comm: umount Not tainted 5.10.0-yocto-standard #1 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.13.0-48-gd9c812dda519-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:kernfs_sop_show_path+0x1b/0x60 ...or these others: RIP: 0010:do_mkdirat+0x6a/0xf0 RIP: 0010:d_alloc_parallel+0x98/0x510 RIP: 0010:do_readlinkat+0x86/0x120 There were other less common instances of some kind of a general scribble but the common theme was mount and cgroup and a dubious dentry triggering the NULL dereference. I was only able to reproduce it under qemu by replicating Richard's setup as closely as possible - I never did get it to happen on bare metal, even while keeping everything else the same. In commit |
||
|
Yang Yingliang
|
dcd00801f3 |
workqueue: fix UAF in pwq_unbound_release_workfn()
commit b42b0bddcbc87b4c66f6497f66fc72d52b712aa7 upstream.
I got a UAF report when doing fuzz test:
[ 152.880091][ T8030] ==================================================================
[ 152.881240][ T8030] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in pwq_unbound_release_workfn+0x50/0x190
[ 152.882442][ T8030] Read of size 4 at addr ffff88810d31bd00 by task kworker/3:2/8030
[ 152.883578][ T8030]
[ 152.883932][ T8030] CPU: 3 PID: 8030 Comm: kworker/3:2 Not tainted 5.13.0+ #249
[ 152.885014][ T8030] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.13.0-1ubuntu1.1 04/01/2014
[ 152.886442][ T8030] Workqueue: events pwq_unbound_release_workfn
[ 152.887358][ T8030] Call Trace:
[ 152.887837][ T8030] dump_stack_lvl+0x75/0x9b
[ 152.888525][ T8030] ? pwq_unbound_release_workfn+0x50/0x190
[ 152.889371][ T8030] print_address_description.constprop.10+0x48/0x70
[ 152.890326][ T8030] ? pwq_unbound_release_workfn+0x50/0x190
[ 152.891163][ T8030] ? pwq_unbound_release_workfn+0x50/0x190
[ 152.891999][ T8030] kasan_report.cold.15+0x82/0xdb
[ 152.892740][ T8030] ? pwq_unbound_release_workfn+0x50/0x190
[ 152.893594][ T8030] __asan_load4+0x69/0x90
[ 152.894243][ T8030] pwq_unbound_release_workfn+0x50/0x190
[ 152.895057][ T8030] process_one_work+0x47b/0x890
[ 152.895778][ T8030] worker_thread+0x5c/0x790
[ 152.896439][ T8030] ? process_one_work+0x890/0x890
[ 152.897163][ T8030] kthread+0x223/0x250
[ 152.897747][ T8030] ? set_kthread_struct+0xb0/0xb0
[ 152.898471][ T8030] ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30
[ 152.899114][ T8030]
[ 152.899446][ T8030] Allocated by task 8884:
[ 152.900084][ T8030] kasan_save_stack+0x21/0x50
[ 152.900769][ T8030] __kasan_kmalloc+0x88/0xb0
[ 152.901416][ T8030] __kmalloc+0x29c/0x460
[ 152.902014][ T8030] alloc_workqueue+0x111/0x8e0
[ 152.902690][ T8030] __btrfs_alloc_workqueue+0x11e/0x2a0
[ 152.903459][ T8030] btrfs_alloc_workqueue+0x6d/0x1d0
[ 152.904198][ T8030] scrub_workers_get+0x1e8/0x490
[ 152.904929][ T8030] btrfs_scrub_dev+0x1b9/0x9c0
[ 152.905599][ T8030] btrfs_ioctl+0x122c/0x4e50
[ 152.906247][ T8030] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x137/0x190
[ 152.906916][ T8030] do_syscall_64+0x34/0xb0
[ 152.907535][ T8030] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
[ 152.908365][ T8030]
[ 152.908688][ T8030] Freed by task 8884:
[ 152.909243][ T8030] kasan_save_stack+0x21/0x50
[ 152.909893][ T8030] kasan_set_track+0x20/0x30
[ 152.910541][ T8030] kasan_set_free_info+0x24/0x40
[ 152.911265][ T8030] __kasan_slab_free+0xf7/0x140
[ 152.911964][ T8030] kfree+0x9e/0x3d0
[ 152.912501][ T8030] alloc_workqueue+0x7d7/0x8e0
[ 152.913182][ T8030] __btrfs_alloc_workqueue+0x11e/0x2a0
[ 152.913949][ T8030] btrfs_alloc_workqueue+0x6d/0x1d0
[ 152.914703][ T8030] scrub_workers_get+0x1e8/0x490
[ 152.915402][ T8030] btrfs_scrub_dev+0x1b9/0x9c0
[ 152.916077][ T8030] btrfs_ioctl+0x122c/0x4e50
[ 152.916729][ T8030] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x137/0x190
[ 152.917414][ T8030] do_syscall_64+0x34/0xb0
[ 152.918034][ T8030] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
[ 152.918872][ T8030]
[ 152.919203][ T8030] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88810d31bc00
[ 152.919203][ T8030] which belongs to the cache kmalloc-512 of size 512
[ 152.921155][ T8030] The buggy address is located 256 bytes inside of
[ 152.921155][ T8030] 512-byte region [ffff88810d31bc00, ffff88810d31be00)
[ 152.922993][ T8030] The buggy address belongs to the page:
[ 152.923800][ T8030] page:ffffea000434c600 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x10d318
[ 152.925249][ T8030] head:ffffea000434c600 order:2 compound_mapcount:0 compound_pincount:0
[ 152.926399][ T8030] flags: 0x57ff00000010200(slab|head|node=1|zone=2|lastcpupid=0x7ff)
[ 152.927515][ T8030] raw: 057ff00000010200 dead000000000100 dead000000000122 ffff888009c42c80
[ 152.928716][ T8030] raw: 0000000000000000 0000000080100010 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
[ 152.929890][ T8030] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
[ 152.930759][ T8030]
[ 152.931076][ T8030] Memory state around the buggy address:
[ 152.931851][ T8030] ffff88810d31bc00: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
[ 152.932967][ T8030] ffff88810d31bc80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
[ 152.934068][ T8030] >ffff88810d31bd00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
[ 152.935189][ T8030] ^
[ 152.935763][ T8030] ffff88810d31bd80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
[ 152.936847][ T8030] ffff88810d31be00: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[ 152.937940][ T8030] ==================================================================
If apply_wqattrs_prepare() fails in alloc_workqueue(), it will call put_pwq()
which invoke a work queue to call pwq_unbound_release_workfn() and use the 'wq'.
The 'wq' allocated in alloc_workqueue() will be freed in error path when
apply_wqattrs_prepare() fails. So it will lead a UAF.
CPU0 CPU1
alloc_workqueue()
alloc_and_link_pwqs()
apply_wqattrs_prepare() fails
apply_wqattrs_cleanup()
schedule_work(&pwq->unbound_release_work)
kfree(wq)
worker_thread()
pwq_unbound_release_workfn() <- trigger uaf here
If apply_wqattrs_prepare() fails, the new pwq are not linked, it doesn't
hold any reference to the 'wq', 'wq' is invalid to access in the worker,
so add check pwq if linked to fix this.
Fixes:
|
||
|
Frederic Weisbecker
|
6e81e2c38a |
posix-cpu-timers: Fix rearm racing against process tick
commit 1a3402d93c73bf6bb4df6d7c2aac35abfc3c50e2 upstream.
Since the process wide cputime counter is started locklessly from
posix_cpu_timer_rearm(), it can be concurrently stopped by operations
on other timers from the same thread group, such as in the following
unlucky scenario:
CPU 0 CPU 1
----- -----
timer_settime(TIMER B)
posix_cpu_timer_rearm(TIMER A)
cpu_clock_sample_group()
(pct->timers_active already true)
handle_posix_cpu_timers()
check_process_timers()
stop_process_timers()
pct->timers_active = false
arm_timer(TIMER A)
tick -> run_posix_cpu_timers()
// sees !pct->timers_active, ignore
// our TIMER A
Fix this with simply locking process wide cputime counting start and
timer arm in the same block.
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org>
Fixes:
|
||
|
Steven Rostedt (VMware)
|
552b053f1a |
tracing: Synthetic event field_pos is an index not a boolean
commit 3b13911a2fd0dd0146c9777a254840c5466cf120 upstream.
Performing the following:
># echo 'wakeup_lat s32 pid; u64 delta; char wake_comm[]' > synthetic_events
># echo 'hist:keys=pid:__arg__1=common_timestamp.usecs' > events/sched/sched_waking/trigger
># echo 'hist:keys=next_pid:pid=next_pid,delta=common_timestamp.usecs-$__arg__1:onmatch(sched.sched_waking).trace(wakeup_lat,$pid,$delta,prev_comm)'\
> events/sched/sched_switch/trigger
># echo 1 > events/synthetic/enable
Crashed the kernel:
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 000000000000001b
#PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
#PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
PGD 0 P4D 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
CPU: 7 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/7 Not tainted 5.13.0-rc5-test+ #104
Hardware name: Hewlett-Packard HP Compaq Pro 6300 SFF/339A, BIOS K01 v03.03 07/14/2016
RIP: 0010:strlen+0x0/0x20
Code: f6 82 80 2b 0b bc 20 74 11 0f b6 50 01 48 83 c0 01 f6 82 80 2b 0b bc
20 75 ef c3 66 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 40 00 <80> 3f 00 74 10
48 89 f8 48 83 c0 01 80 38 9 f8 c3 31
RSP: 0018:ffffaa75000d79d0 EFLAGS: 00010046
RAX: 0000000000000002 RBX: ffff9cdb55575270 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: ffff9cdb58c7a320 RSI: ffffaa75000d7b40 RDI: 000000000000001b
RBP: ffffaa75000d7b40 R08: ffff9cdb40a4f010 R09: ffffaa75000d7ab8
R10: ffff9cdb4398c700 R11: 0000000000000008 R12: ffff9cdb58c7a320
R13: ffff9cdb55575270 R14: ffff9cdb58c7a000 R15: 0000000000000018
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff9cdb5aa00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 000000000000001b CR3: 00000000c0612006 CR4: 00000000001706e0
Call Trace:
trace_event_raw_event_synth+0x90/0x1d0
action_trace+0x5b/0x70
event_hist_trigger+0x4bd/0x4e0
? cpumask_next_and+0x20/0x30
? update_sd_lb_stats.constprop.0+0xf6/0x840
? __lock_acquire.constprop.0+0x125/0x550
? find_held_lock+0x32/0x90
? sched_clock_cpu+0xe/0xd0
? lock_release+0x155/0x440
? update_load_avg+0x8c/0x6f0
? enqueue_entity+0x18a/0x920
? __rb_reserve_next+0xe5/0x460
? ring_buffer_lock_reserve+0x12a/0x3f0
event_triggers_call+0x52/0xe0
trace_event_buffer_commit+0x1ae/0x240
trace_event_raw_event_sched_switch+0x114/0x170
__traceiter_sched_switch+0x39/0x50
__schedule+0x431/0xb00
schedule_idle+0x28/0x40
do_idle+0x198/0x2e0
cpu_startup_entry+0x19/0x20
secondary_startup_64_no_verify+0xc2/0xcb
The reason is that the dynamic events array keeps track of the field
position of the fields array, via the field_pos variable in the
synth_field structure. Unfortunately, that field is a boolean for some
reason, which means any field_pos greater than 1 will be a bug (in this
case it was 2).
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210721191008.638bce34@oasis.local.home
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes:
|
||
|
Haoran Luo
|
757bdba802 |
tracing: Fix bug in rb_per_cpu_empty() that might cause deadloop.
commit 67f0d6d9883c13174669f88adac4f0ee656cc16a upstream.
The "rb_per_cpu_empty()" misinterpret the condition (as not-empty) when
"head_page" and "commit_page" of "struct ring_buffer_per_cpu" points to
the same buffer page, whose "buffer_data_page" is empty and "read" field
is non-zero.
An error scenario could be constructed as followed (kernel perspective):
1. All pages in the buffer has been accessed by reader(s) so that all of
them will have non-zero "read" field.
2. Read and clear all buffer pages so that "rb_num_of_entries()" will
return 0 rendering there's no more data to read. It is also required
that the "read_page", "commit_page" and "tail_page" points to the same
page, while "head_page" is the next page of them.
3. Invoke "ring_buffer_lock_reserve()" with large enough "length"
so that it shot pass the end of current tail buffer page. Now the
"head_page", "commit_page" and "tail_page" points to the same page.
4. Discard current event with "ring_buffer_discard_commit()", so that
"head_page", "commit_page" and "tail_page" points to a page whose buffer
data page is now empty.
When the error scenario has been constructed, "tracing_read_pipe" will
be trapped inside a deadloop: "trace_empty()" returns 0 since
"rb_per_cpu_empty()" returns 0 when it hits the CPU containing such
constructed ring buffer. Then "trace_find_next_entry_inc()" always
return NULL since "rb_num_of_entries()" reports there's no more entry
to read. Finally "trace_seq_to_user()" returns "-EBUSY" spanking
"tracing_read_pipe" back to the start of the "waitagain" loop.
I've also written a proof-of-concept script to construct the scenario
and trigger the bug automatically, you can use it to trace and validate
my reasoning above:
https://github.com/aegistudio/RingBufferDetonator.git
Tests has been carried out on linux kernel 5.14-rc2
(2734d6c1b1a089fb593ef6a23d4b70903526fe0c), my fixed version
of kernel (for testing whether my update fixes the bug) and
some older kernels (for range of affected kernels). Test result is
also attached to the proof-of-concept repository.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-trace-devel/YPaNxsIlb2yjSi5Y@aegistudio/
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-trace-devel/YPgrN85WL9VyrZ55@aegistudio
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes:
|
||
|
Steven Rostedt (VMware)
|
a5e1aff589 |
tracing/histogram: Rename "cpu" to "common_cpu"
commit 1e3bac71c5053c99d438771fc9fa5082ae5d90aa upstream.
Currently the histogram logic allows the user to write "cpu" in as an
event field, and it will record the CPU that the event happened on.
The problem with this is that there's a lot of events that have "cpu"
as a real field, and using "cpu" as the CPU it ran on, makes it
impossible to run histograms on the "cpu" field of events.
For example, if I want to have a histogram on the count of the
workqueue_queue_work event on its cpu field, running:
># echo 'hist:keys=cpu' > events/workqueue/workqueue_queue_work/trigger
Gives a misleading and wrong result.
Change the command to "common_cpu" as no event should have "common_*"
fields as that's a reserved name for fields used by all events. And
this makes sense here as common_cpu would be a field used by all events.
Now we can even do:
># echo 'hist:keys=common_cpu,cpu if cpu < 100' > events/workqueue/workqueue_queue_work/trigger
># cat events/workqueue/workqueue_queue_work/hist
# event histogram
#
# trigger info: hist:keys=common_cpu,cpu:vals=hitcount:sort=hitcount:size=2048 if cpu < 100 [active]
#
{ common_cpu: 0, cpu: 2 } hitcount: 1
{ common_cpu: 0, cpu: 4 } hitcount: 1
{ common_cpu: 7, cpu: 7 } hitcount: 1
{ common_cpu: 0, cpu: 7 } hitcount: 1
{ common_cpu: 0, cpu: 1 } hitcount: 1
{ common_cpu: 0, cpu: 6 } hitcount: 2
{ common_cpu: 0, cpu: 5 } hitcount: 2
{ common_cpu: 1, cpu: 1 } hitcount: 4
{ common_cpu: 6, cpu: 6 } hitcount: 4
{ common_cpu: 5, cpu: 5 } hitcount: 14
{ common_cpu: 4, cpu: 4 } hitcount: 26
{ common_cpu: 0, cpu: 0 } hitcount: 39
{ common_cpu: 2, cpu: 2 } hitcount: 184
Now for backward compatibility, I added a trick. If "cpu" is used, and
the field is not found, it will fall back to "common_cpu" and work as
it did before. This way, it will still work for old programs that use
"cpu" to get the actual CPU, but if the event has a "cpu" as a field, it
will get that event's "cpu" field, which is probably what it wants
anyway.
I updated the tracefs/README to include documentation about both the
common_timestamp and the common_cpu. This way, if that text is present in
the README, then an application can know that common_cpu is supported over
just plain "cpu".
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210721110053.26b4f641@oasis.local.home
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes:
|
||
|
Steven Rostedt (VMware)
|
0edad8b9f6 |
tracepoints: Update static_call before tp_funcs when adding a tracepoint
commit 352384d5c84ebe40fa77098cc234fe173247d8ef upstream.
Because of the significant overhead that retpolines pose on indirect
calls, the tracepoint code was updated to use the new "static_calls" that
can modify the running code to directly call a function instead of using
an indirect caller, and this function can be changed at runtime.
In the tracepoint code that calls all the registered callbacks that are
attached to a tracepoint, the following is done:
it_func_ptr = rcu_dereference_raw((&__tracepoint_##name)->funcs);
if (it_func_ptr) {
__data = (it_func_ptr)->data;
static_call(tp_func_##name)(__data, args);
}
If there's just a single callback, the static_call is updated to just call
that callback directly. Once another handler is added, then the static
caller is updated to call the iterator, that simply loops over all the
funcs in the array and calls each of the callbacks like the old method
using indirect calling.
The issue was discovered with a race between updating the funcs array and
updating the static_call. The funcs array was updated first and then the
static_call was updated. This is not an issue as long as the first element
in the old array is the same as the first element in the new array. But
that assumption is incorrect, because callbacks also have a priority
field, and if there's a callback added that has a higher priority than the
callback on the old array, then it will become the first callback in the
new array. This means that it is possible to call the old callback with
the new callback data element, which can cause a kernel panic.
static_call = callback1()
funcs[] = {callback1,data1};
callback2 has higher priority than callback1
CPU 1 CPU 2
----- -----
new_funcs = {callback2,data2},
{callback1,data1}
rcu_assign_pointer(tp->funcs, new_funcs);
/*
* Now tp->funcs has the new array
* but the static_call still calls callback1
*/
it_func_ptr = tp->funcs [ new_funcs ]
data = it_func_ptr->data [ data2 ]
static_call(callback1, data);
/* Now callback1 is called with
* callback2's data */
[ KERNEL PANIC ]
update_static_call(iterator);
To prevent this from happening, always switch the static_call to the
iterator before assigning the tp->funcs to the new array. The iterator will
always properly match the callback with its data.
To trigger this bug:
In one terminal:
while :; do hackbench 50; done
In another terminal
echo 1 > /sys/kernel/tracing/events/sched/sched_waking/enable
while :; do
echo 1 > /sys/kernel/tracing/set_event_pid;
sleep 0.5
echo 0 > /sys/kernel/tracing/set_event_pid;
sleep 0.5
done
And it doesn't take long to crash. This is because the set_event_pid adds
a callback to the sched_waking tracepoint with a high priority, which will
be called before the sched_waking trace event callback is called.
Note, the removal to a single callback updates the array first, before
changing the static_call to single callback, which is the proper order as
the first element in the array is the same as what the static_call is
being changed to.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/io-uring/4ebea8f0-58c9-e571-fd30-0ce4f6f09c70@samba.org/
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes:
|
||
|
Roman Skakun
|
8983766903 |
dma-mapping: handle vmalloc addresses in dma_common_{mmap,get_sgtable}
[ Upstream commit 40ac971eab89330d6153e7721e88acd2d98833f9 ]
xen-swiotlb can use vmalloc backed addresses for dma coherent allocations
and uses the common helpers. Properly handle them to unbreak Xen on
ARM platforms.
Fixes:
|
||
|
Nicolas Saenz Julienne
|
0ff2ea9d8f |
timers: Fix get_next_timer_interrupt() with no timers pending
[ Upstream commit aebacb7f6ca1926918734faae14d1f0b6fae5cb7 ] |
||
|
Daniel Borkmann
|
39f1735c81 |
bpf: Fix tail_call_reachable rejection for interpreter when jit failed
[ Upstream commit 5dd0a6b8582ffbfa88351949d50eccd5b6694ade ]
During testing of f263a81451c1 ("bpf: Track subprog poke descriptors correctly
and fix use-after-free") under various failure conditions, for example, when
jit_subprogs() fails and tries to clean up the program to be run under the
interpreter, we ran into the following freeze:
[...]
#127/8 tailcall_bpf2bpf_3:FAIL
[...]
[ 92.041251] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in ___bpf_prog_run+0x1b9d/0x2e20
[ 92.042408] Read of size 8 at addr ffff88800da67f68 by task test_progs/682
[ 92.043707]
[ 92.044030] CPU: 1 PID: 682 Comm: test_progs Tainted: G O 5.13.0-53301-ge6c08cb33a30-dirty #87
[ 92.045542] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.13.0-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
[ 92.046785] Call Trace:
[ 92.047171] ? __bpf_prog_run_args64+0xc0/0xc0
[ 92.047773] ? __bpf_prog_run_args32+0x8b/0xb0
[ 92.048389] ? __bpf_prog_run_args64+0xc0/0xc0
[ 92.049019] ? ktime_get+0x117/0x130
[...] // few hundred [similar] lines more
[ 92.659025] ? ktime_get+0x117/0x130
[ 92.659845] ? __bpf_prog_run_args64+0xc0/0xc0
[ 92.660738] ? __bpf_prog_run_args32+0x8b/0xb0
[ 92.661528] ? __bpf_prog_run_args64+0xc0/0xc0
[ 92.662378] ? print_usage_bug+0x50/0x50
[ 92.663221] ? print_usage_bug+0x50/0x50
[ 92.664077] ? bpf_ksym_find+0x9c/0xe0
[ 92.664887] ? ktime_get+0x117/0x130
[ 92.665624] ? kernel_text_address+0xf5/0x100
[ 92.666529] ? __kernel_text_address+0xe/0x30
[ 92.667725] ? unwind_get_return_address+0x2f/0x50
[ 92.668854] ? ___bpf_prog_run+0x15d4/0x2e20
[ 92.670185] ? ktime_get+0x117/0x130
[ 92.671130] ? __bpf_prog_run_args64+0xc0/0xc0
[ 92.672020] ? __bpf_prog_run_args32+0x8b/0xb0
[ 92.672860] ? __bpf_prog_run_args64+0xc0/0xc0
[ 92.675159] ? ktime_get+0x117/0x130
[ 92.677074] ? lock_is_held_type+0xd5/0x130
[ 92.678662] ? ___bpf_prog_run+0x15d4/0x2e20
[ 92.680046] ? ktime_get+0x117/0x130
[ 92.681285] ? __bpf_prog_run32+0x6b/0x90
[ 92.682601] ? __bpf_prog_run64+0x90/0x90
[ 92.683636] ? lock_downgrade+0x370/0x370
[ 92.684647] ? mark_held_locks+0x44/0x90
[ 92.685652] ? ktime_get+0x117/0x130
[ 92.686752] ? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x79/0x100
[ 92.688004] ? ktime_get+0x117/0x130
[ 92.688573] ? __cant_migrate+0x2b/0x80
[ 92.689192] ? bpf_test_run+0x2f4/0x510
[ 92.689869] ? bpf_test_timer_continue+0x1c0/0x1c0
[ 92.690856] ? rcu_read_lock_bh_held+0x90/0x90
[ 92.691506] ? __kasan_slab_alloc+0x61/0x80
[ 92.692128] ? eth_type_trans+0x128/0x240
[ 92.692737] ? __build_skb+0x46/0x50
[ 92.693252] ? bpf_prog_test_run_skb+0x65e/0xc50
[ 92.693954] ? bpf_prog_test_run_raw_tp+0x2d0/0x2d0
[ 92.694639] ? __fget_light+0xa1/0x100
[ 92.695162] ? bpf_prog_inc+0x23/0x30
[ 92.695685] ? __sys_bpf+0xb40/0x2c80
[ 92.696324] ? bpf_link_get_from_fd+0x90/0x90
[ 92.697150] ? mark_held_locks+0x24/0x90
[ 92.698007] ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x124/0x220
[ 92.699045] ? finish_task_switch+0xe6/0x370
[ 92.700072] ? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x79/0x100
[ 92.701233] ? finish_task_switch+0x11d/0x370
[ 92.702264] ? __switch_to+0x2c0/0x740
[ 92.703148] ? mark_held_locks+0x24/0x90
[ 92.704155] ? __x64_sys_bpf+0x45/0x50
[ 92.705146] ? do_syscall_64+0x35/0x80
[ 92.706953] ? entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
[...]
Turns out that the program rejection from
|
||
|
John Fastabend
|
a9f36bf361 |
bpf: Track subprog poke descriptors correctly and fix use-after-free
commit f263a81451c12da5a342d90572e317e611846f2c upstream. Subprograms are calling map_poke_track(), but on program release there is no hook to call map_poke_untrack(). However, on program release, the aux memory (and poke descriptor table) is freed even though we still have a reference to it in the element list of the map aux data. When we run map_poke_run(), we then end up accessing free'd memory, triggering KASAN in prog_array_map_poke_run(): [...] [ 402.824689] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in prog_array_map_poke_run+0xc2/0x34e [ 402.824698] Read of size 4 at addr ffff8881905a7940 by task hubble-fgs/4337 [ 402.824705] CPU: 1 PID: 4337 Comm: hubble-fgs Tainted: G I 5.12.0+ #399 [ 402.824715] Call Trace: [ 402.824719] dump_stack+0x93/0xc2 [ 402.824727] print_address_description.constprop.0+0x1a/0x140 [ 402.824736] ? prog_array_map_poke_run+0xc2/0x34e [ 402.824740] ? prog_array_map_poke_run+0xc2/0x34e [ 402.824744] kasan_report.cold+0x7c/0xd8 [ 402.824752] ? prog_array_map_poke_run+0xc2/0x34e [ 402.824757] prog_array_map_poke_run+0xc2/0x34e [ 402.824765] bpf_fd_array_map_update_elem+0x124/0x1a0 [...] The elements concerned are walked as follows: for (i = 0; i < elem->aux->size_poke_tab; i++) { poke = &elem->aux->poke_tab[i]; [...] The access to size_poke_tab is a 4 byte read, verified by checking offsets in the KASAN dump: [ 402.825004] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff8881905a7800 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-1k of size 1024 [ 402.825008] The buggy address is located 320 bytes inside of 1024-byte region [ffff8881905a7800, ffff8881905a7c00) The pahole output of bpf_prog_aux: struct bpf_prog_aux { [...] /* --- cacheline 5 boundary (320 bytes) --- */ u32 size_poke_tab; /* 320 4 */ [...] In general, subprograms do not necessarily manage their own data structures. For example, BTF func_info and linfo are just pointers to the main program structure. This allows reference counting and cleanup to be done on the latter which simplifies their management a bit. The aux->poke_tab struct, however, did not follow this logic. The initial proposed fix for this use-after-free bug further embedded poke data tracking into the subprogram with proper reference counting. However, Daniel and Alexei questioned why we were treating these objects special; I agree, its unnecessary. The fix here removes the per subprogram poke table allocation and map tracking and instead simply points the aux->poke_tab pointer at the main programs poke table. This way, map tracking is simplified to the main program and we do not need to manage them per subprogram. This also means, bpf_prog_free_deferred(), which unwinds the program reference counting and kfrees objects, needs to ensure that we don't try to double free the poke_tab when free'ing the subprog structures. This is easily solved by NULL'ing the poke_tab pointer. The second detail is to ensure that per subprogram JIT logic only does fixups on poke_tab[] entries it owns. To do this, we add a pointer in the poke structure to point at the subprogram value so JITs can easily check while walking the poke_tab structure if the current entry belongs to the current program. The aux pointer is stable and therefore suitable for such comparison. On the jit_subprogs() error path, we omit cleaning up the poke->aux field because these are only ever referenced from the JIT side, but on error we will never make it to the JIT, so its fine to leave them dangling. Removing these pointers would complicate the error path for no reason. However, we do need to untrack all poke descriptors from the main program as otherwise they could race with the freeing of JIT memory from the subprograms. Lastly, |
||
|
Odin Ugedal
|
892387e761 |
sched/fair: Fix CFS bandwidth hrtimer expiry type
[ Upstream commit 72d0ad7cb5bad265adb2014dbe46c4ccb11afaba ] The time remaining until expiry of the refresh_timer can be negative. Casting the type to an unsigned 64-bit value will cause integer underflow, making the runtime_refresh_within return false instead of true. These situations are rare, but they do happen. This does not cause user-facing issues or errors; other than possibly unthrottling cfs_rq's using runtime from the previous period(s), making the CFS bandwidth enforcement less strict in those (special) situations. Signed-off-by: Odin Ugedal <odin@uged.al> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Reviewed-by: Ben Segall <bsegall@google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210629121452.18429-1-odin@uged.al Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> |
||
|
Peter Zijlstra
|
53c5c2496f |
static_call: Fix static_call_text_reserved() vs __init
[ Upstream commit 2bee6d16e4379326b1eea454e68c98b17456769e ]
It turns out that static_call_text_reserved() was reporting __init
text as being reserved past the time when the __init text was freed
and re-used.
This is mostly harmless and will at worst result in refusing a kprobe.
Fixes:
|
||
|
Peter Zijlstra
|
59ae35884c |
jump_label: Fix jump_label_text_reserved() vs __init
[ Upstream commit 9e667624c291753b8a5128f620f493d0b5226063 ]
It turns out that jump_label_text_reserved() was reporting __init text
as being reserved past the time when the __init text was freed and
re-used.
For a long time, this resulted in, at worst, not being able to kprobe
text that happened to land at the re-used address. However a recent
commit e7bf1ba97afd ("jump_label, x86: Emit short JMP") made it a
fatal mistake because it now needs to read the instruction in order to
determine the conflict -- an instruction that's no longer there.
Fixes:
|
||
|
Xuewen Yan
|
143a6b8ec5 |
sched/uclamp: Ignore max aggregation if rq is idle
[ Upstream commit 3e1493f46390618ea78607cb30c58fc19e2a5035 ]
When a task wakes up on an idle rq, uclamp_rq_util_with() would max
aggregate with rq value. But since there is no task enqueued yet, the
values are stale based on the last task that was running. When the new
task actually wakes up and enqueued, then the rq uclamp values should
reflect that of the newly woken up task effective uclamp values.
This is a problem particularly for uclamp_max because it default to
1024. If a task p with uclamp_max = 512 wakes up, then max aggregation
would ignore the capping that should apply when this task is enqueued,
which is wrong.
Fix that by ignoring max aggregation if the rq is idle since in that
case the effective uclamp value of the rq will be the ones of the task
that will wake up.
Fixes:
|
||
|
Paul E. McKenney
|
35a35909ec |
rcu: Reject RCU_LOCKDEP_WARN() false positives
[ Upstream commit 3066820034b5dd4e89bd74a7739c51c2d6f5e554 ] If another lockdep report runs concurrently with an RCU lockdep report from RCU_LOCKDEP_WARN(), the following sequence of events can occur: 1. debug_lockdep_rcu_enabled() sees that lockdep is enabled when called from (say) synchronize_rcu(). 2. Lockdep is disabled by a concurrent lockdep report. 3. debug_lockdep_rcu_enabled() evaluates its lockdep-expression argument, for example, lock_is_held(&rcu_bh_lock_map). 4. Because lockdep is now disabled, lock_is_held() plays it safe and returns the constant 1. 5. But in this case, the constant 1 is not safe, because invoking synchronize_rcu() under rcu_read_lock_bh() is disallowed. 6. debug_lockdep_rcu_enabled() wrongly invokes lockdep_rcu_suspicious(), resulting in a false-positive splat. This commit therefore changes RCU_LOCKDEP_WARN() to check debug_lockdep_rcu_enabled() after checking the lockdep expression, so that any "safe" returns from lock_is_held() are rejected by debug_lockdep_rcu_enabled(). This requires memory ordering, which is supplied by READ_ONCE(debug_locks). The resulting volatile accesses prevent the compiler from reordering and the fact that only one variable is being accessed prevents the underlying hardware from reordering. The combination works for IA64, which can reorder reads to the same location, but this is defeated by the volatile accesses, which compile to load instructions that provide ordering. Reported-by: syzbot+dde0cc33951735441301@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Reported-by: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Reported-by: syzbot+88e4f02896967fe1ab0d@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Reported-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Suggested-by: Boqun Feng <boqun.feng@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Boqun Feng <boqun.feng@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> |
||
|
Frederic Weisbecker
|
23597afbe0 |
srcu: Fix broken node geometry after early ssp init
[ Upstream commit b5befe842e6612cf894cf4a199924ee872d8b7d8 ]
An srcu_struct structure that is initialized before rcu_init_geometry()
will have its srcu_node hierarchy based on CONFIG_NR_CPUS. Once
rcu_init_geometry() is called, this hierarchy is compressed as needed
for the actual maximum number of CPUs for this system.
Later on, that srcu_struct structure is confused, sometimes referring
to its initial CONFIG_NR_CPUS-based hierarchy, and sometimes instead
to the new num_possible_cpus() hierarchy. For example, each of its
->mynode fields continues to reference the original leaf rcu_node
structures, some of which might no longer exist. On the other hand,
srcu_for_each_node_breadth_first() traverses to the new node hierarchy.
There are at least two bad possible outcomes to this:
1) a) A callback enqueued early on an srcu_data structure (call it
*sdp) is recorded pending on sdp->mynode->srcu_data_have_cbs in
srcu_funnel_gp_start() with sdp->mynode pointing to a deep leaf
(say 3 levels).
b) The grace period ends after rcu_init_geometry() shrinks the
nodes level to a single one. srcu_gp_end() walks through the new
srcu_node hierarchy without ever reaching the old leaves so the
callback is never executed.
This is easily reproduced on an 8 CPUs machine with CONFIG_NR_CPUS >= 32
and "rcupdate.rcu_self_test=1". The srcu_barrier() after early tests
verification never completes and the boot hangs:
[ 5413.141029] INFO: task swapper/0:1 blocked for more than 4915 seconds.
[ 5413.147564] Not tainted 5.12.0-rc4+ #28
[ 5413.151927] "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message.
[ 5413.159753] task:swapper/0 state:D stack: 0 pid: 1 ppid: 0 flags:0x00004000
[ 5413.168099] Call Trace:
[ 5413.170555] __schedule+0x36c/0x930
[ 5413.174057] ? wait_for_completion+0x88/0x110
[ 5413.178423] schedule+0x46/0xf0
[ 5413.181575] schedule_timeout+0x284/0x380
[ 5413.185591] ? wait_for_completion+0x88/0x110
[ 5413.189957] ? mark_held_locks+0x61/0x80
[ 5413.193882] ? mark_held_locks+0x61/0x80
[ 5413.197809] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x24/0x50
[ 5413.202173] ? wait_for_completion+0x88/0x110
[ 5413.206535] wait_for_completion+0xb4/0x110
[ 5413.210724] ? srcu_torture_stats_print+0x110/0x110
[ 5413.215610] srcu_barrier+0x187/0x200
[ 5413.219277] ? rcu_tasks_verify_self_tests+0x50/0x50
[ 5413.224244] ? rdinit_setup+0x2b/0x2b
[ 5413.227907] rcu_verify_early_boot_tests+0x2d/0x40
[ 5413.232700] do_one_initcall+0x63/0x310
[ 5413.236541] ? rdinit_setup+0x2b/0x2b
[ 5413.240207] ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x52/0x80
[ 5413.244912] kernel_init_freeable+0x253/0x28f
[ 5413.249273] ? rest_init+0x250/0x250
[ 5413.252846] kernel_init+0xa/0x110
[ 5413.256257] ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30
2) An srcu_struct structure that is initialized before rcu_init_geometry()
and used afterward will always have stale rdp->mynode references,
resulting in callbacks to be missed in srcu_gp_end(), just like in
the previous scenario.
This commit therefore causes init_srcu_struct_nodes to initialize the
geometry, if needed. This ensures that the srcu_node hierarchy is
properly built and distributed from the get-go.
Suggested-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org>
Cc: Boqun Feng <boqun.feng@gmail.com>
Cc: Lai Jiangshan <jiangshanlai@gmail.com>
Cc: Neeraj Upadhyay <neeraju@codeaurora.org>
Cc: Josh Triplett <josh@joshtriplett.org>
Cc: Joel Fernandes <joel@joelfernandes.org>
Cc: Uladzislau Rezki <urezki@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
||
|
Christian Brauner
|
811763e3be |
cgroup: verify that source is a string
commit 3b0462726e7ef281c35a7a4ae33e93ee2bc9975b upstream.
The following sequence can be used to trigger a UAF:
int fscontext_fd = fsopen("cgroup");
int fd_null = open("/dev/null, O_RDONLY);
int fsconfig(fscontext_fd, FSCONFIG_SET_FD, "source", fd_null);
close_range(3, ~0U, 0);
The cgroup v1 specific fs parser expects a string for the "source"
parameter. However, it is perfectly legitimate to e.g. specify a file
descriptor for the "source" parameter. The fs parser doesn't know what
a filesystem allows there. So it's a bug to assume that "source" is
always of type fs_value_is_string when it can reasonably also be
fs_value_is_file.
This assumption in the cgroup code causes a UAF because struct
fs_parameter uses a union for the actual value. Access to that union is
guarded by the param->type member. Since the cgroup paramter parser
didn't check param->type but unconditionally moved param->string into
fc->source a close on the fscontext_fd would trigger a UAF during
put_fs_context() which frees fc->source thereby freeing the file stashed
in param->file causing a UAF during a close of the fd_null.
Fix this by verifying that param->type is actually a string and report
an error if not.
In follow up patches I'll add a new generic helper that can be used here
and by other filesystems instead of this error-prone copy-pasta fix.
But fixing it in here first makes backporting a it to stable a lot
easier.
Fixes:
|
||
|
Steven Rostedt (VMware)
|
905169794d |
tracing: Do not reference char * as a string in histograms
commit 704adfb5a9978462cd861f170201ae2b5e3d3a80 upstream. The histogram logic was allowing events with char * pointers to be used as normal strings. But it was easy to crash the kernel with: # echo 'hist:keys=filename' > events/syscalls/sys_enter_openat/trigger And open some files, and boom! BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: 00007f2ced0c3280 #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page PGD 1173fa067 P4D 1173fa067 PUD 1171b6067 PMD 1171dd067 PTE 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP CPU: 6 PID: 1810 Comm: cat Not tainted 5.13.0-rc5-test+ #61 Hardware name: Hewlett-Packard HP Compaq Pro 6300 SFF/339A, BIOS K01 v03.03 07/14/2016 RIP: 0010:strlen+0x0/0x20 Code: f6 82 80 2a 0b a9 20 74 11 0f b6 50 01 48 83 c0 01 f6 82 80 2a 0b a9 20 75 ef c3 66 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 40 00 <80> 3f 00 74 10 48 89 f8 48 83 c0 01 80 38 00 75 f7 48 29 f8 c3 RSP: 0018:ffffbdbf81567b50 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000003 RBX: ffff93815cdb3800 RCX: ffff9382401a22d0 RDX: 0000000000000100 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 00007f2ced0c3280 RBP: 0000000000000100 R08: ffff9382409ff074 R09: ffffbdbf81567c98 R10: ffff9382409ff074 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff9382409ff074 R13: 0000000000000001 R14: ffff93815a744f00 R15: 00007f2ced0c3280 FS: 00007f2ced0f8580(0000) GS:ffff93825a800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007f2ced0c3280 CR3: 0000000107069005 CR4: 00000000001706e0 Call Trace: event_hist_trigger+0x463/0x5f0 ? find_held_lock+0x32/0x90 ? sched_clock_cpu+0xe/0xd0 ? lock_release+0x155/0x440 ? kernel_init_free_pages+0x6d/0x90 ? preempt_count_sub+0x9b/0xd0 ? kernel_init_free_pages+0x6d/0x90 ? get_page_from_freelist+0x12c4/0x1680 ? __rb_reserve_next+0xe5/0x460 ? ring_buffer_lock_reserve+0x12a/0x3f0 event_triggers_call+0x52/0xe0 ftrace_syscall_enter+0x264/0x2c0 syscall_trace_enter.constprop.0+0x1ee/0x210 do_syscall_64+0x1c/0x80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae Where it triggered a fault on strlen(key) where key was the filename. The reason is that filename is a char * to user space, and the histogram code just blindly dereferenced it, with obvious bad results. I originally tried to use strncpy_from_user/kernel_nofault() but found that there's other places that its dereferenced and not worth the effort. Just do not allow "char *" to act like strings. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210715000206.025df9d2@rorschach.local.home Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org> Cc: Tzvetomir Stoyanov <tz.stoyanov@gmail.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Acked-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org> Acked-by: Tom Zanussi <zanussi@kernel.org> Fixes: |
||
|
Paul Burton
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eb81b5a37d |
tracing: Resize tgid_map to pid_max, not PID_MAX_DEFAULT
commit 4030a6e6a6a4a42ff8c18414c9e0c93e24cc70b8 upstream.
Currently tgid_map is sized at PID_MAX_DEFAULT entries, which means that
on systems where pid_max is configured higher than PID_MAX_DEFAULT the
ftrace record-tgid option doesn't work so well. Any tasks with PIDs
higher than PID_MAX_DEFAULT are simply not recorded in tgid_map, and
don't show up in the saved_tgids file.
In particular since systemd v243 & above configure pid_max to its
highest possible 1<<22 value by default on 64 bit systems this renders
the record-tgids option of little use.
Increase the size of tgid_map to the configured pid_max instead,
allowing it to cover the full range of PIDs up to the maximum value of
PID_MAX_LIMIT if the system is configured that way.
On 64 bit systems with pid_max == PID_MAX_LIMIT this will increase the
size of tgid_map from 256KiB to 16MiB. Whilst this 64x increase in
memory overhead sounds significant 64 bit systems are presumably best
placed to accommodate it, and since tgid_map is only allocated when the
record-tgid option is actually used presumably the user would rather it
spends sufficient memory to actually record the tgids they expect.
The size of tgid_map could also increase for CONFIG_BASE_SMALL=y
configurations, but these seem unlikely to be systems upon which people
are both configuring a large pid_max and running ftrace with record-tgid
anyway.
Of note is that we only allocate tgid_map once, the first time that the
record-tgid option is enabled. Therefore its size is only set once, to
the value of pid_max at the time the record-tgid option is first
enabled. If a user increases pid_max after that point, the saved_tgids
file will not contain entries for any tasks with pids beyond the earlier
value of pid_max.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210701172407.889626-2-paulburton@google.com
Fixes:
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Paul Burton
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3cda5b7f4e |
tracing: Simplify & fix saved_tgids logic
commit b81b3e959adb107cd5b36c7dc5ba1364bbd31eb2 upstream.
The tgid_map array records a mapping from pid to tgid, where the index
of an entry within the array is the pid & the value stored at that index
is the tgid.
The saved_tgids_next() function iterates over pointers into the tgid_map
array & dereferences the pointers which results in the tgid, but then it
passes that dereferenced value to trace_find_tgid() which treats it as a
pid & does a further lookup within the tgid_map array. It seems likely
that the intent here was to skip over entries in tgid_map for which the
recorded tgid is zero, but instead we end up skipping over entries for
which the thread group leader hasn't yet had its own tgid recorded in
tgid_map.
A minimal fix would be to remove the call to trace_find_tgid, turning:
if (trace_find_tgid(*ptr))
into:
if (*ptr)
..but it seems like this logic can be much simpler if we simply let
seq_read() iterate over the whole tgid_map array & filter out empty
entries by returning SEQ_SKIP from saved_tgids_show(). Here we take that
approach, removing the incorrect logic here entirely.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210630003406.4013668-1-paulburton@google.com
Fixes:
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Jan Kara
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8cc58a6e2c |
rq-qos: fix missed wake-ups in rq_qos_throttle try two
commit 11c7aa0ddea8611007768d3e6b58d45dc60a19e1 upstream. Commit |
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Thomas Gleixner
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b5e26be407 |
cpu/hotplug: Cure the cpusets trainwreck
commit b22afcdf04c96ca58327784e280e10288cfd3303 upstream.
Alexey and Joshua tried to solve a cpusets related hotplug problem which is
user space visible and results in unexpected behaviour for some time after
a CPU has been plugged in and the corresponding uevent was delivered.
cpusets delegate the hotplug work (rebuilding cpumasks etc.) to a
workqueue. This is done because the cpusets code has already a lock
nesting of cgroups_mutex -> cpu_hotplug_lock. A synchronous callback or
waiting for the work to finish with cpu_hotplug_lock held can and will
deadlock because that results in the reverse lock order.
As a consequence the uevent can be delivered before cpusets have consistent
state which means that a user space invocation of sched_setaffinity() to
move a task to the plugged CPU fails up to the point where the scheduled
work has been processed.
The same is true for CPU unplug, but that does not create user observable
failure (yet).
It's still inconsistent to claim that an operation is finished before it
actually is and that's the real issue at hand. uevents just make it
reliably observable.
Obviously the problem should be fixed in cpusets/cgroups, but untangling
that is pretty much impossible because according to the changelog of the
commit which introduced this 8 years ago:
3a5a6d0c2b03("cpuset: don't nest cgroup_mutex inside get_online_cpus()")
the lock order cgroups_mutex -> cpu_hotplug_lock is a design decision and
the whole code is built around that.
So bite the bullet and invoke the relevant cpuset function, which waits for
the work to finish, in _cpu_up/down() after dropping cpu_hotplug_lock and
only when tasks are not frozen by suspend/hibernate because that would
obviously wait forever.
Waiting there with cpu_add_remove_lock, which is protecting the present
and possible CPU maps, held is not a problem at all because neither work
queues nor cpusets/cgroups have any lockchains related to that lock.
Waiting in the hotplug machinery is not problematic either because there
are already state callbacks which wait for hardware queues to drain. It
makes the operations slightly slower, but hotplug is slow anyway.
This ensures that state is consistent before returning from a hotplug
up/down operation. It's still inconsistent during the operation, but that's
a different story.
Add a large comment which explains why this is done and why this is not a
dump ground for the hack of the day to work around half thought out locking
schemes. Document also the implications vs. hotplug operations and
serialization or the lack of it.
Thanks to Alexy and Joshua for analyzing why this temporary
sched_setaffinity() failure happened.
Fixes: 3a5a6d0c2b03("cpuset: don't nest cgroup_mutex inside get_online_cpus()")
Reported-by: Alexey Klimov <aklimov@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Joshua Baker <jobaker@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: Alexey Klimov <aklimov@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/87tuowcnv3.ffs@nanos.tec.linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Rustam Kovhaev
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a61af01141 |
bpf: Fix false positive kmemleak report in bpf_ringbuf_area_alloc()
[ Upstream commit ccff81e1d028bbbf8573d3364a87542386c707bf ]
kmemleak scans struct page, but it does not scan the page content. If we
allocate some memory with kmalloc(), then allocate page with alloc_page(),
and if we put kmalloc pointer somewhere inside that page, kmemleak will
report kmalloc pointer as a false positive.
We can instruct kmemleak to scan the memory area by calling kmemleak_alloc()
and kmemleak_free(), but part of struct bpf_ringbuf is mmaped to user space,
and if struct bpf_ringbuf changes we would have to revisit and review size
argument in kmemleak_alloc(), because we do not want kmemleak to scan the
user space memory. Let's simplify things and use kmemleak_not_leak() here.
For posterity, also adding additional prior analysis from Andrii:
I think either kmemleak or syzbot are misreporting this. I've added a
bunch of printks around all allocations performed by BPF ringbuf. [...]
On repro side I get these two warnings:
[vmuser@archvm bpf]$ sudo ./repro
BUG: memory leak
unreferenced object 0xffff88810d538c00 (size 64):
comm "repro", pid 2140, jiffies 4294692933 (age 14.540s)
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
00 af 19 04 00 ea ff ff c0 ae 19 04 00 ea ff ff ................
80 ae 19 04 00 ea ff ff c0 29 2e 04 00 ea ff ff .........)......
backtrace:
[<0000000077bfbfbd>] __bpf_map_area_alloc+0x31/0xc0
[<00000000587fa522>] ringbuf_map_alloc.cold.4+0x48/0x218
[<0000000044d49e96>] __do_sys_bpf+0x359/0x1d90
[<00000000f601d565>] do_syscall_64+0x2d/0x40
[<0000000043d3112a>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
BUG: memory leak
unreferenced object 0xffff88810d538c80 (size 64):
comm "repro", pid 2143, jiffies 4294699025 (age 8.448s)
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
80 aa 19 04 00 ea ff ff 00 ab 19 04 00 ea ff ff ................
c0 ab 19 04 00 ea ff ff 80 44 28 04 00 ea ff ff .........D(.....
backtrace:
[<0000000077bfbfbd>] __bpf_map_area_alloc+0x31/0xc0
[<00000000587fa522>] ringbuf_map_alloc.cold.4+0x48/0x218
[<0000000044d49e96>] __do_sys_bpf+0x359/0x1d90
[<00000000f601d565>] do_syscall_64+0x2d/0x40
[<0000000043d3112a>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
Note that both reported leaks (ffff88810d538c80 and ffff88810d538c00)
correspond to pages array bpf_ringbuf is allocating and tracking properly
internally. Note also that syzbot repro doesn't close FD of created BPF
ringbufs, and even when ./repro itself exits with error, there are still
two forked processes hanging around in my system. So clearly ringbuf maps
are alive at that point. So reporting any memory leak looks weird at that
point, because that memory is being used by active referenced BPF ringbuf.
It's also a question why repro doesn't clean up its forks. But if I do a
`pkill repro`, I do see that all the allocated memory is /properly/ cleaned
up [and the] "leaks" are deallocated properly.
BTW, if I add close() right after bpf() syscall in syzbot repro, I see that
everything is immediately deallocated, like designed. And no memory leak
is reported. So I don't think the problem is anywhere in bpf_ringbuf code,
rather in the leak detection and/or repro itself.
Reported-by: syzbot+5d895828587f49e7fe9b@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Rustam Kovhaev <rkovhaev@gmail.com>
[ Daniel: also included analysis from Andrii to the commit log ]
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Tested-by: syzbot+5d895828587f49e7fe9b@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/CAEf4BzYk+dqs+jwu6VKXP-RttcTEGFe+ySTGWT9CRNkagDiJVA@mail.gmail.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/YNTAqiE7CWJhOK2M@nuc10
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20210615101515.GC26027@arm.com
Link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=5d895828587f49e7fe9b
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20210626181156.1873604-1-rkovhaev@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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Odin Ugedal
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20285dc271 |
sched/fair: Ensure _sum and _avg values stay consistent
[ Upstream commit 1c35b07e6d3986474e5635be566e7bc79d97c64d ] The _sum and _avg values are in general sync together with the PELT divider. They are however not always completely in perfect sync, resulting in situations where _sum gets to zero while _avg stays positive. Such situations are undesirable. This comes from the fact that PELT will increase period_contrib, also increasing the PELT divider, without updating _sum and _avg values to stay in perfect sync where (_sum == _avg * divider). However, such PELT change will never lower _sum, making it impossible to end up in a situation where _sum is zero and _avg is not. Therefore, we need to ensure that when subtracting load outside PELT, that when _sum is zero, _avg is also set to zero. This occurs when (_sum < _avg * divider), and the subtracted (_avg * divider) is bigger or equal to the current _sum, while the subtracted _avg is smaller than the current _avg. Reported-by: Sachin Sant <sachinp@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Reported-by: Naresh Kamboju <naresh.kamboju@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Odin Ugedal <odin@uged.al> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Reviewed-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org> Tested-by: Sachin Sant <sachinp@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210624111815.57937-1-odin@uged.al Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> |
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Daniel Borkmann
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2e66c36f13 |
bpf: Fix up register-based shifts in interpreter to silence KUBSAN
[ Upstream commit 28131e9d933339a92f78e7ab6429f4aaaa07061c ] syzbot reported a shift-out-of-bounds that KUBSAN observed in the interpreter: [...] UBSAN: shift-out-of-bounds in kernel/bpf/core.c:1420:2 shift exponent 255 is too large for 64-bit type 'long long unsigned int' CPU: 1 PID: 11097 Comm: syz-executor.4 Not tainted 5.12.0-rc2-syzkaller #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:79 [inline] dump_stack+0x141/0x1d7 lib/dump_stack.c:120 ubsan_epilogue+0xb/0x5a lib/ubsan.c:148 __ubsan_handle_shift_out_of_bounds.cold+0xb1/0x181 lib/ubsan.c:327 ___bpf_prog_run.cold+0x19/0x56c kernel/bpf/core.c:1420 __bpf_prog_run32+0x8f/0xd0 kernel/bpf/core.c:1735 bpf_dispatcher_nop_func include/linux/bpf.h:644 [inline] bpf_prog_run_pin_on_cpu include/linux/filter.h:624 [inline] bpf_prog_run_clear_cb include/linux/filter.h:755 [inline] run_filter+0x1a1/0x470 net/packet/af_packet.c:2031 packet_rcv+0x313/0x13e0 net/packet/af_packet.c:2104 dev_queue_xmit_nit+0x7c2/0xa90 net/core/dev.c:2387 xmit_one net/core/dev.c:3588 [inline] dev_hard_start_xmit+0xad/0x920 net/core/dev.c:3609 __dev_queue_xmit+0x2121/0x2e00 net/core/dev.c:4182 __bpf_tx_skb net/core/filter.c:2116 [inline] __bpf_redirect_no_mac net/core/filter.c:2141 [inline] __bpf_redirect+0x548/0xc80 net/core/filter.c:2164 ____bpf_clone_redirect net/core/filter.c:2448 [inline] bpf_clone_redirect+0x2ae/0x420 net/core/filter.c:2420 ___bpf_prog_run+0x34e1/0x77d0 kernel/bpf/core.c:1523 __bpf_prog_run512+0x99/0xe0 kernel/bpf/core.c:1737 bpf_dispatcher_nop_func include/linux/bpf.h:644 [inline] bpf_test_run+0x3ed/0xc50 net/bpf/test_run.c:50 bpf_prog_test_run_skb+0xabc/0x1c50 net/bpf/test_run.c:582 bpf_prog_test_run kernel/bpf/syscall.c:3127 [inline] __do_sys_bpf+0x1ea9/0x4f00 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:4406 do_syscall_64+0x2d/0x70 arch/x86/entry/common.c:46 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae [...] Generally speaking, KUBSAN reports from the kernel should be fixed. However, in case of BPF, this particular report caused concerns since the large shift is not wrong from BPF point of view, just undefined. In the verifier, K-based shifts that are >= {64,32} (depending on the bitwidth of the instruction) are already rejected. The register-based cases were not given their content might not be known at verification time. Ideas such as verifier instruction rewrite with an additional AND instruction for the source register were brought up, but regularly rejected due to the additional runtime overhead they incur. As Edward Cree rightly put it: Shifts by more than insn bitness are legal in the BPF ISA; they are implementation-defined behaviour [of the underlying architecture], rather than UB, and have been made legal for performance reasons. Each of the JIT backends compiles the BPF shift operations to machine instructions which produce implementation-defined results in such a case; the resulting contents of the register may be arbitrary but program behaviour as a whole remains defined. Guard checks in the fast path (i.e. affecting JITted code) will thus not be accepted. The case of division by zero is not truly analogous here, as division instructions on many of the JIT-targeted architectures will raise a machine exception / fault on division by zero, whereas (to the best of my knowledge) none will do so on an out-of-bounds shift. Given the KUBSAN report only affects the BPF interpreter, but not JITs, one solution is to add the ANDs with 63 or 31 into ___bpf_prog_run(). That would make the shifts defined, and thus shuts up KUBSAN, and the compiler would optimize out the AND on any CPU that interprets the shift amounts modulo the width anyway (e.g., confirmed from disassembly that on x86-64 and arm64 the generated interpreter code is the same before and after this fix). The BPF interpreter is slow path, and most likely compiled out anyway as distros select BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON to avoid speculative execution of BPF instructions by the interpreter. Given the main argument was to avoid sacrificing performance, the fact that the AND is optimized away from compiler for mainstream archs helps as well as a solution moving forward. Also add a comment on LSH/RSH/ARSH translation for JIT authors to provide guidance when they see the ___bpf_prog_run() interpreter code and use it as a model for a new JIT backend. Reported-by: syzbot+bed360704c521841c85d@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Reported-by: Kurt Manucredo <fuzzybritches0@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org> Co-developed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Tested-by: syzbot+bed360704c521841c85d@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Cc: Edward Cree <ecree.xilinx@gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/0000000000008f912605bd30d5d7@google.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/bac16d8d-c174-bdc4-91bd-bfa62b410190@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> |
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Yang Yingliang
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0855952ed4 |
cred: add missing return error code when set_cred_ucounts() failed
commit 5e6b8a50a7cec5686ee2c4bda1d49899c79a7eae upstream.
If set_cred_ucounts() failed, we need return the error code.
Fixes: 905ae01c4ae2 ("Add a reference to ucounts for each cred")
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Yang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210526143805.2549649-1-yangyingliang@huawei.com
Reviewed-by: Alexey Gladkov <legion@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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