Pull crypto fixes from Herbert Xu:
"This fixes the following issues:
- fix chacha20 crash on zero-length input due to unset IV
- fix potential race conditions in mcryptd with spinlock
- only wait once at top of algif recvmsg to avoid inconsistencies
- fix potential use-after-free in algif_aead/algif_skcipher"
* 'linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6:
crypto: af_alg - fix race accessing cipher request
crypto: mcryptd - protect the per-CPU queue with a lock
crypto: af_alg - wait for data at beginning of recvmsg
crypto: skcipher - set walk.iv for zero-length inputs
Pull crypto fixes from Herbert Xu:
"This push fixes the following issues:
- buffer overread in RSA
- potential use after free in algif_aead.
- error path null pointer dereference in af_alg
- forbid combinations such as hmac(hmac(sha3)) which may crash
- crash in salsa20 due to incorrect API usage"
* 'linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6:
crypto: salsa20 - fix blkcipher_walk API usage
crypto: hmac - require that the underlying hash algorithm is unkeyed
crypto: af_alg - fix NULL pointer dereference in
crypto: algif_aead - fix reference counting of null skcipher
crypto: rsa - fix buffer overread when stripping leading zeroes
When invoking an asynchronous cipher operation, the invocation of the
callback may be performed before the subsequent operations in the
initial code path are invoked. The callback deletes the cipher request
data structure which implies that after the invocation of the
asynchronous cipher operation, this data structure must not be accessed
any more.
The setting of the return code size with the request data structure must
therefore be moved before the invocation of the asynchronous cipher
operation.
Fixes: e870456d8e ("crypto: algif_skcipher - overhaul memory management")
Fixes: d887c52d6a ("crypto: algif_aead - overhaul memory management")
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.14+
Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Acked-by: Jonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
mcryptd_enqueue_request() grabs the per-CPU queue struct and protects
access to it with disabled preemption. Then it schedules a worker on the
same CPU. The worker in mcryptd_queue_worker() guards access to the same
per-CPU variable with disabled preemption.
If we take CPU-hotplug into account then it is possible that between
queue_work_on() and the actual invocation of the worker the CPU goes
down and the worker will be scheduled on _another_ CPU. And here the
preempt_disable() protection does not work anymore. The easiest thing is
to add a spin_lock() to guard access to the list.
Another detail: mcryptd_queue_worker() is not processing more than
MCRYPTD_BATCH invocation in a row. If there are still items left, then
it will invoke queue_work() to proceed with more later. *I* would
suggest to simply drop that check because it does not use a system
workqueue and the workqueue is already marked as "CPU_INTENSIVE". And if
preemption is required then the scheduler should do it.
However if queue_work() is used then the work item is marked as CPU
unbound. That means it will try to run on the local CPU but it may run
on another CPU as well. Especially with CONFIG_DEBUG_WQ_FORCE_RR_CPU=y.
Again, the preempt_disable() won't work here but lock which was
introduced will help.
In order to keep work-item on the local CPU (and avoid RR) I changed it
to queue_work_on().
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
The wait for data is a non-atomic operation that can sleep and therefore
potentially release the socket lock. The release of the socket lock
allows another thread to modify the context data structure. The waiting
operation for new data therefore must be called at the beginning of
recvmsg. This prevents a race condition where checks of the members of
the context data structure are performed by recvmsg while there is a
potential for modification of these values.
Fixes: e870456d8e ("crypto: algif_skcipher - overhaul memory management")
Fixes: d887c52d6a ("crypto: algif_aead - overhaul memory management")
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.14+
Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
All the ChaCha20 algorithms as well as the ARM bit-sliced AES-XTS
algorithms call skcipher_walk_virt(), then access the IV (walk.iv)
before checking whether any bytes need to be processed (walk.nbytes).
But if the input is empty, then skcipher_walk_virt() doesn't set the IV,
and the algorithms crash trying to use the uninitialized IV pointer.
Fix it by setting the IV earlier in skcipher_walk_virt(). Also fix it
for the AEAD walk functions.
This isn't a perfect solution because we can't actually align the IV to
->cra_alignmask unless there are bytes to process, for one because the
temporary buffer for the aligned IV is freed by skcipher_walk_done(),
which is only called when there are bytes to process. Thus, algorithms
that require aligned IVs will still need to avoid accessing the IV when
walk.nbytes == 0. Still, many algorithms/architectures are fine with
IVs having any alignment, and even for those that aren't, a misaligned
pointer bug is much less severe than an uninitialized pointer bug.
This change also matches the behavior of the older blkcipher_walk API.
Fixes: 0cabf2af6f ("crypto: skcipher - Fix crash on zero-length input")
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.14+
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
->pkey_algo used to be an enum, but was changed to a string by commit
4e8ae72a75 ("X.509: Make algo identifiers text instead of enum"). But
two comparisons were not updated. Fix them to use strcmp().
This bug broke signature verification in certain configurations,
depending on whether the string constants were deduplicated or not.
Fixes: 4e8ae72a75 ("X.509: Make algo identifiers text instead of enum")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.6+
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Use crypto_shash_digest() instead of crypto_shash_init() followed by
crypto_shash_finup(). (For simplicity only; they are equivalent.)
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
In public_key_verify_signature(), if akcipher_request_alloc() fails, we
return -ENOMEM. But that error code was set 25 lines above, and by
accident someone could easily insert new code in between that assigns to
'ret', which would introduce a signature verification bypass. Make the
code clearer by moving the -ENOMEM down to where it is used.
Additionally, the callers of public_key_verify_signature() only consider
a negative return value to be an error. This means that if any positive
return value is accidentally introduced deeper in the call stack (e.g.
'return EBADMSG' instead of 'return -EBADMSG' somewhere in RSA),
signature verification will be bypassed. Make things more robust by
having public_key_verify_signature() warn about positive errors and
translate them into -EINVAL.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Use crypto_shash_digest() instead of crypto_shash_init() followed by
crypto_shash_finup(). (For simplicity only; they are equivalent.)
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
pkcs7_validate_trust_one() used 'x509->next == x509' to identify a
self-signed certificate. That's wrong; ->next is simply the link in the
linked list of certificates in the PKCS#7 message. It should be
checking ->signer instead. Fix it.
Fortunately this didn't actually matter because when we re-visited
'x509' on the next iteration via 'x509->signer', it was already seen and
not verified, so we returned -ENOKEY anyway.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
If pkcs7_check_authattrs() returns an error code, we should pass that
error code on, rather than using ENOMEM.
Fixes: 99db443506 ("PKCS#7: Appropriately restrict authenticated attributes and content type")
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Adding a specially crafted X.509 certificate whose subjectPublicKey
ASN.1 value is zero-length caused x509_extract_key_data() to set the
public key size to SIZE_MAX, as it subtracted the nonexistent BIT STRING
metadata byte. Then, x509_cert_parse() called kmemdup() with that bogus
size, triggering the WARN_ON_ONCE() in kmalloc_slab().
This appears to be harmless, but it still must be fixed since WARNs are
never supposed to be user-triggerable.
Fix it by updating x509_cert_parse() to validate that the value has a
BIT STRING metadata byte, and that the byte is 0 which indicates that
the number of bits in the bitstring is a multiple of 8.
It would be nice to handle the metadata byte in asn1_ber_decoder()
instead. But that would be tricky because in the general case a BIT
STRING could be implicitly tagged, and/or could legitimately have a
length that is not a whole number of bytes.
Here was the WARN (cleaned up slightly):
WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 202 at mm/slab_common.c:971 kmalloc_slab+0x5d/0x70 mm/slab_common.c:971
Modules linked in:
CPU: 1 PID: 202 Comm: keyctl Tainted: G B 4.14.0-09238-g1d3b78bbc6e9 #26
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.11.0-20171110_100015-anatol 04/01/2014
task: ffff880033014180 task.stack: ffff8800305c8000
Call Trace:
__do_kmalloc mm/slab.c:3706 [inline]
__kmalloc_track_caller+0x22/0x2e0 mm/slab.c:3726
kmemdup+0x17/0x40 mm/util.c:118
kmemdup include/linux/string.h:414 [inline]
x509_cert_parse+0x2cb/0x620 crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c:106
x509_key_preparse+0x61/0x750 crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c:174
asymmetric_key_preparse+0xa4/0x150 crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c:388
key_create_or_update+0x4d4/0x10a0 security/keys/key.c:850
SYSC_add_key security/keys/keyctl.c:122 [inline]
SyS_add_key+0xe8/0x290 security/keys/keyctl.c:62
entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0x96
Fixes: 42d5ec27f8 ("X.509: Add an ASN.1 decoder")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v3.7+
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
When asked to encrypt or decrypt 0 bytes, both the generic and x86
implementations of Salsa20 crash in blkcipher_walk_done(), either when
doing 'kfree(walk->buffer)' or 'free_page((unsigned long)walk->page)',
because walk->buffer and walk->page have not been initialized.
The bug is that Salsa20 is calling blkcipher_walk_done() even when
nothing is in 'walk.nbytes'. But blkcipher_walk_done() is only meant to
be called when a nonzero number of bytes have been provided.
The broken code is part of an optimization that tries to make only one
call to salsa20_encrypt_bytes() to process inputs that are not evenly
divisible by 64 bytes. To fix the bug, just remove this "optimization"
and use the blkcipher_walk API the same way all the other users do.
Reproducer:
#include <linux/if_alg.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <unistd.h>
int main()
{
int algfd, reqfd;
struct sockaddr_alg addr = {
.salg_type = "skcipher",
.salg_name = "salsa20",
};
char key[16] = { 0 };
algfd = socket(AF_ALG, SOCK_SEQPACKET, 0);
bind(algfd, (void *)&addr, sizeof(addr));
reqfd = accept(algfd, 0, 0);
setsockopt(algfd, SOL_ALG, ALG_SET_KEY, key, sizeof(key));
read(reqfd, key, sizeof(key));
}
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Fixes: eb6f13eb9f ("[CRYPTO] salsa20_generic: Fix multi-page processing")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v2.6.25+
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Because the HMAC template didn't check that its underlying hash
algorithm is unkeyed, trying to use "hmac(hmac(sha3-512-generic))"
through AF_ALG or through KEYCTL_DH_COMPUTE resulted in the inner HMAC
being used without having been keyed, resulting in sha3_update() being
called without sha3_init(), causing a stack buffer overflow.
This is a very old bug, but it seems to have only started causing real
problems when SHA-3 support was added (requires CONFIG_CRYPTO_SHA3)
because the innermost hash's state is ->import()ed from a zeroed buffer,
and it just so happens that other hash algorithms are fine with that,
but SHA-3 is not. However, there could be arch or hardware-dependent
hash algorithms also affected; I couldn't test everything.
Fix the bug by introducing a function crypto_shash_alg_has_setkey()
which tests whether a shash algorithm is keyed. Then update the HMAC
template to require that its underlying hash algorithm is unkeyed.
Here is a reproducer:
#include <linux/if_alg.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
int main()
{
int algfd;
struct sockaddr_alg addr = {
.salg_type = "hash",
.salg_name = "hmac(hmac(sha3-512-generic))",
};
char key[4096] = { 0 };
algfd = socket(AF_ALG, SOCK_SEQPACKET, 0);
bind(algfd, (const struct sockaddr *)&addr, sizeof(addr));
setsockopt(algfd, SOL_ALG, ALG_SET_KEY, key, sizeof(key));
}
Here was the KASAN report from syzbot:
BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in memcpy include/linux/string.h:341 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in sha3_update+0xdf/0x2e0 crypto/sha3_generic.c:161
Write of size 4096 at addr ffff8801cca07c40 by task syzkaller076574/3044
CPU: 1 PID: 3044 Comm: syzkaller076574 Not tainted 4.14.0-mm1+ #25
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:17 [inline]
dump_stack+0x194/0x257 lib/dump_stack.c:53
print_address_description+0x73/0x250 mm/kasan/report.c:252
kasan_report_error mm/kasan/report.c:351 [inline]
kasan_report+0x25b/0x340 mm/kasan/report.c:409
check_memory_region_inline mm/kasan/kasan.c:260 [inline]
check_memory_region+0x137/0x190 mm/kasan/kasan.c:267
memcpy+0x37/0x50 mm/kasan/kasan.c:303
memcpy include/linux/string.h:341 [inline]
sha3_update+0xdf/0x2e0 crypto/sha3_generic.c:161
crypto_shash_update+0xcb/0x220 crypto/shash.c:109
shash_finup_unaligned+0x2a/0x60 crypto/shash.c:151
crypto_shash_finup+0xc4/0x120 crypto/shash.c:165
hmac_finup+0x182/0x330 crypto/hmac.c:152
crypto_shash_finup+0xc4/0x120 crypto/shash.c:165
shash_digest_unaligned+0x9e/0xd0 crypto/shash.c:172
crypto_shash_digest+0xc4/0x120 crypto/shash.c:186
hmac_setkey+0x36a/0x690 crypto/hmac.c:66
crypto_shash_setkey+0xad/0x190 crypto/shash.c:64
shash_async_setkey+0x47/0x60 crypto/shash.c:207
crypto_ahash_setkey+0xaf/0x180 crypto/ahash.c:200
hash_setkey+0x40/0x90 crypto/algif_hash.c:446
alg_setkey crypto/af_alg.c:221 [inline]
alg_setsockopt+0x2a1/0x350 crypto/af_alg.c:254
SYSC_setsockopt net/socket.c:1851 [inline]
SyS_setsockopt+0x189/0x360 net/socket.c:1830
entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0x96
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
af_alg_free_areq_sgls()
If allocating the ->tsgl member of 'struct af_alg_async_req' failed,
during cleanup we dereferenced the NULL ->tsgl pointer in
af_alg_free_areq_sgls(), because ->tsgl_entries was nonzero.
Fix it by only freeing the ->tsgl list if it is non-NULL.
This affected both algif_skcipher and algif_aead.
Fixes: e870456d8e ("crypto: algif_skcipher - overhaul memory management")
Fixes: d887c52d6a ("crypto: algif_aead - overhaul memory management")
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.14+
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
In the AEAD interface for AF_ALG, the reference to the "null skcipher"
held by each tfm was being dropped in the wrong place -- when each
af_alg_ctx was freed instead of when the aead_tfm was freed. As
discovered by syzkaller, a specially crafted program could use this to
cause the null skcipher to be freed while it is still in use.
Fix it by dropping the reference in the right place.
Fixes: 72548b093e ("crypto: algif_aead - copy AAD from src to dst")
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.14+
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
In rsa_get_n(), if the buffer contained all 0's and "FIPS mode" is
enabled, we would read one byte past the end of the buffer while
scanning the leading zeroes. Fix it by checking 'n_sz' before '!*ptr'.
This bug was reachable by adding a specially crafted key of type
"asymmetric" (requires CONFIG_RSA and CONFIG_X509_CERTIFICATE_PARSER).
KASAN report:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in rsa_get_n+0x19e/0x1d0 crypto/rsa_helper.c:33
Read of size 1 at addr ffff88003501a708 by task keyctl/196
CPU: 1 PID: 196 Comm: keyctl Not tainted 4.14.0-09238-g1d3b78bbc6e9 #26
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.11.0-20171110_100015-anatol 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
rsa_get_n+0x19e/0x1d0 crypto/rsa_helper.c:33
asn1_ber_decoder+0x82a/0x1fd0 lib/asn1_decoder.c:328
rsa_set_pub_key+0xd3/0x320 crypto/rsa.c:278
crypto_akcipher_set_pub_key ./include/crypto/akcipher.h:364 [inline]
pkcs1pad_set_pub_key+0xae/0x200 crypto/rsa-pkcs1pad.c:117
crypto_akcipher_set_pub_key ./include/crypto/akcipher.h:364 [inline]
public_key_verify_signature+0x270/0x9d0 crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c:106
x509_check_for_self_signed+0x2ea/0x480 crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c:141
x509_cert_parse+0x46a/0x620 crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c:129
x509_key_preparse+0x61/0x750 crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c:174
asymmetric_key_preparse+0xa4/0x150 crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c:388
key_create_or_update+0x4d4/0x10a0 security/keys/key.c:850
SYSC_add_key security/keys/keyctl.c:122 [inline]
SyS_add_key+0xe8/0x290 security/keys/keyctl.c:62
entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0x96
Allocated by task 196:
__do_kmalloc mm/slab.c:3711 [inline]
__kmalloc_track_caller+0x118/0x2e0 mm/slab.c:3726
kmemdup+0x17/0x40 mm/util.c:118
kmemdup ./include/linux/string.h:414 [inline]
x509_cert_parse+0x2cb/0x620 crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c:106
x509_key_preparse+0x61/0x750 crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c:174
asymmetric_key_preparse+0xa4/0x150 crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c:388
key_create_or_update+0x4d4/0x10a0 security/keys/key.c:850
SYSC_add_key security/keys/keyctl.c:122 [inline]
SyS_add_key+0xe8/0x290 security/keys/keyctl.c:62
entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0x96
Fixes: 5a7de97309 ("crypto: rsa - return raw integers for the ASN.1 parser")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.8+
Cc: Tudor Ambarus <tudor-dan.ambarus@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
The skcipher_walk_aead_common function calls scatterwalk_copychunks on
the input and output walks to skip the associated data. If the AD end
at an SG list entry boundary, then after these calls the walks will
still be pointing to the end of the skipped region.
These offsets are later checked for alignment in skcipher_walk_next,
so the skcipher_walk may detect the alignment incorrectly.
This patch fixes it by calling scatterwalk_done after the copychunks
calls to ensure that the offsets refer to the right SG list entry.
Fixes: b286d8b1a6 ("crypto: skcipher - Add skcipher walk interface")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnacek@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
The code paths protected by the socket-lock do not use or modify the
socket in a non-atomic fashion. The actions pertaining the socket do not
even need to be handled as an atomic operation. Thus, the socket-lock
can be safely ignored.
This fixes a bug regarding scheduling in atomic as the callback function
may be invoked in interrupt context.
In addition, the sock_hold is moved before the AIO encrypt/decrypt
operation to ensure that the socket is always present. This avoids a
tiny race window where the socket is unprotected and yet used by the AIO
operation.
Finally, the release of resources for a crypto operation is moved into a
common function of af_alg_free_resources.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Fixes: e870456d8e ("crypto: algif_skcipher - overhaul memory management")
Fixes: d887c52d6a ("crypto: algif_aead - overhaul memory management")
Reported-by: Romain Izard <romain.izard.pro@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Tested-by: Romain Izard <romain.izard.pro@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
The TX SGL may contain SGL entries that are assigned a NULL page. This
may happen if a multi-stage AIO operation is performed where the data
for each stage is pointed to by one SGL entry. Upon completion of that
stage, af_alg_pull_tsgl will assign NULL to the SGL entry.
The NULL cipher used to copy the AAD from TX SGL to the destination
buffer, however, cannot handle the case where the SGL starts with an SGL
entry having a NULL page. Thus, the code needs to advance the start
pointer into the SGL to the first non-NULL entry.
This fixes a crash visible on Intel x86 32 bit using the libkcapi test
suite.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Fixes: 72548b093e ("crypto: algif_aead - copy AAD from src to dst")
Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Convert all allocations that used a NOTRACK flag to stop using it.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171007030159.22241-3-alexander.levin@verizon.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Tim Hansen <devtimhansen@gmail.com>
Cc: Vegard Nossum <vegardno@ifi.uio.no>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Set the module licence to prevent the kernel from being tainted if loaded
as a module.
Reported-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Pull crypto updates from Herbert Xu:
"Here is the crypto update for 4.15:
API:
- Disambiguate EBUSY when queueing crypto request by adding ENOSPC.
This change touches code outside the crypto API.
- Reset settings when empty string is written to rng_current.
Algorithms:
- Add OSCCA SM3 secure hash.
Drivers:
- Remove old mv_cesa driver (replaced by marvell/cesa).
- Enable rfc3686/ecb/cfb/ofb AES in crypto4xx.
- Add ccm/gcm AES in crypto4xx.
- Add support for BCM7278 in iproc-rng200.
- Add hash support on Exynos in s5p-sss.
- Fix fallback-induced error in vmx.
- Fix output IV in atmel-aes.
- Fix empty GCM hash in mediatek.
Others:
- Fix DoS potential in lib/mpi.
- Fix potential out-of-order issues with padata"
* 'linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6: (162 commits)
lib/mpi: call cond_resched() from mpi_powm() loop
crypto: stm32/hash - Fix return issue on update
crypto: dh - Remove pointless checks for NULL 'p' and 'g'
crypto: qat - Clean up error handling in qat_dh_set_secret()
crypto: dh - Don't permit 'key' or 'g' size longer than 'p'
crypto: dh - Don't permit 'p' to be 0
crypto: dh - Fix double free of ctx->p
hwrng: iproc-rng200 - Add support for BCM7278
dt-bindings: rng: Document BCM7278 RNG200 compatible
crypto: chcr - Replace _manual_ swap with swap macro
crypto: marvell - Add a NULL entry at the end of mv_cesa_plat_id_table[]
hwrng: virtio - Virtio RNG devices need to be re-registered after suspend/resume
crypto: atmel - remove empty functions
crypto: ecdh - remove empty exit()
MAINTAINERS: update maintainer for qat
crypto: caam - remove unused param of ctx_map_to_sec4_sg()
crypto: caam - remove unneeded edesc zeroization
crypto: atmel-aes - Reset the controller before each use
crypto: atmel-aes - properly set IV after {en,de}crypt
hwrng: core - Reset user selected rng by writing "" to rng_current
...
Neither 'p' nor 'g' can be NULL, as they were unpacked using
crypto_dh_decode_key(). And it makes no sense for them to be optional.
So remove the NULL checks that were copy-and-pasted into both modules.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Tudor Ambarus <tudor.ambarus@microchip.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
The "qat-dh" DH implementation assumes that 'key' and 'g' can be copied
into a buffer with size 'p_size'. However it was never checked that
that was actually the case, which most likely allowed users to cause a
buffer underflow via KEYCTL_DH_COMPUTE.
Fix this by updating crypto_dh_decode_key() to verify this precondition
for all DH implementations.
Fixes: c9839143eb ("crypto: qat - Add DH support")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.8+
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Tudor Ambarus <tudor.ambarus@microchip.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Pull crypto fixes from Herbert Xu:
"This fixes an unaligned panic in x86/sha-mb and a bug in ccm that
triggers with certain underlying implementations"
* 'linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6:
crypto: ccm - preserve the IV buffer
crypto: x86/sha1-mb - fix panic due to unaligned access
crypto: x86/sha256-mb - fix panic due to unaligned access
Pointer members of an object with static storage duration, if not
explicitly initialized, will be initialized to a NULL pointer. The crypto
API checks if this pointer is not NULL before using it, we are safe to
remove the function.
Signed-off-by: Tudor Ambarus <tudor.ambarus@microchip.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
tcrypt starts several async crypto ops and waits for their completions.
Move it over to generic code doing the same.
Signed-off-by: Gilad Ben-Yossef <gilad@benyossef.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
testmgr is starting async. crypto ops and waiting for them to complete.
Move it over to generic code doing the same.
This also provides a test of the generic crypto async. wait code.
Signed-off-by: Gilad Ben-Yossef <gilad@benyossef.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
gcm is starting an async. crypto op and waiting for it complete.
Move it over to generic code doing the same.
Signed-off-by: Gilad Ben-Yossef <gilad@benyossef.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
DRBG is starting an async. crypto op and waiting for it complete.
Move it over to generic code doing the same.
The code now also passes CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP flag indicating
crypto request memory allocation may use GFP_KERNEL which should
be perfectly fine as the code is obviously sleeping for the
completion of the request any way.
Signed-off-by: Gilad Ben-Yossef <gilad@benyossef.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
public_key_verify_signature() is starting an async crypto op and
waiting for it to complete. Move it over to generic code doing
the same.
Signed-off-by: Gilad Ben-Yossef <gilad@benyossef.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
algif starts several async crypto ops and waits for their completion.
Move it over to generic code doing the same.
Signed-off-by: Gilad Ben-Yossef <gilad@benyossef.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Invoking a possibly async. crypto op and waiting for completion
while correctly handling backlog processing is a common task
in the crypto API implementation and outside users of it.
This patch adds a generic implementation for doing so in
preparation for using it across the board instead of hand
rolled versions.
Signed-off-by: Gilad Ben-Yossef <gilad@benyossef.com>
CC: Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@gmail.com>
CC: Jonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Now that -EBUSY return code only indicates backlog queueing
we can safely remove the now redundant check for the
CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG flag when -EBUSY is returned.
Signed-off-by: Gilad Ben-Yossef <gilad@benyossef.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
The crypto API was using the -EBUSY return value to indicate
both a hard failure to submit a crypto operation into a
transformation provider when the latter was busy and the backlog
mechanism was not enabled as well as a notification that the
operation was queued into the backlog when the backlog mechanism
was enabled.
Having the same return code indicate two very different conditions
depending on a flag is both error prone and requires extra runtime
check like the following to discern between the cases:
if (err == -EINPROGRESS ||
(err == -EBUSY && (ahash_request_flags(req) &
CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG)))
This patch changes the return code used to indicate a crypto op
failed due to the transformation provider being transiently busy
to -ENOSPC.
Signed-off-by: Gilad Ben-Yossef <gilad@benyossef.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Fix the way the length of the buffers used for
encryption / decryption are computed.
For e.g. in case of encryption, input buffer does not contain
an authentication tag.
Signed-off-by: Robert Baronescu <robert.baronescu@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
In preparation to enabling -Wimplicit-fallthrough, mark switch cases
where we are expecting to fall through.
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
It multiply GF(2^128) elements in the ble format.
It will be used by chelsio driver to speed up gf multiplication.
Signed-off-by: Harsh Jain <harsh@chelsio.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
The IV buffer used during CCM operations is used twice, during both the
hashing step and the ciphering step.
When using a hardware accelerator that updates the contents of the IV
buffer at the end of ciphering operations, the value will be modified.
In the decryption case, the subsequent setup of the hashing algorithm
will interpret the updated IV instead of the original value, which can
lead to out-of-bounds writes.
Reuse the idata buffer, only used in the hashing step, to preserve the
IV's value during the ciphering step in the decryption case.
Signed-off-by: Romain Izard <romain.izard.pro@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Tudor Ambarus <tudor.ambarus@microchip.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which
makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license.
By default all files without license information are under the default
license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2.
Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0'
SPDX license identifier. The SPDX identifier is a legally binding
shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text.
This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and
Philippe Ombredanne.
How this work was done:
Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of
the use cases:
- file had no licensing information it it.
- file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it,
- file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information,
Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases
where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license
had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords.
The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to
a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the
output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX
tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne. Philippe prepared the
base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files.
The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files
assessed. Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner
results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s)
to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not
immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was:
- Files considered eligible had to be source code files.
- Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5
lines of source
- File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5
lines).
All documentation files were explicitly excluded.
The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license
identifiers to apply.
- when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was
considered to have no license information in it, and the top level
COPYING file license applied.
For non */uapi/* files that summary was:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|-------
GPL-2.0 11139
and resulted in the first patch in this series.
If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH
Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0". Results of that was:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|-------
GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 930
and resulted in the second patch in this series.
- if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one
of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if
any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in
it (per prior point). Results summary:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|------
GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 270
GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 169
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause) 21
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 17
LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 15
GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 14
((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 5
LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 4
LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note 3
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT) 3
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT) 1
and that resulted in the third patch in this series.
- when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became
the concluded license(s).
- when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a
license but the other didn't, or they both detected different
licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred.
- In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file
resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and
which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics).
- When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was
confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
- If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier,
the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later
in time.
In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the
spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the
source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation
by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from
FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners
disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights. The
Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so
they are related.
Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets
for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the
files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks
in about 15000 files.
In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have
copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the
correct identifier.
Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual
inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch
version early this week with:
- a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected
license ids and scores
- reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+
files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct
- reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license
was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied
SPDX license was correct
This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction. This
worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the
different types of files to be modified.
These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg. Thomas wrote a script to
parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the
format that the file expected. This script was further refined by Greg
based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to
distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different
comment types.) Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to
generate the patches.
Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
The ASN.1 parser does not necessarily set the sinfo field,
this patch prevents a NULL pointer dereference on broken
input.
Fixes: 99db443506 ("PKCS#7: Appropriately restrict authenticated attributes and content type")
Signed-off-by: Eric Sesterhenn <eric.sesterhenn@x41-dsec.de>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.3+
For finding asymmetric key, the input id_0 and id_1 parameters can
not be NULL at the same time. This patch adds the BUG_ON checking
for id_0 and id_1.
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Chun-Yi Lee <jlee@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Fix the wrong index number when checking the existence of second
id in function of finding asymmetric key. The id_1 is the second
id that the index in array must be 1 but not 0.
Fixes: 9eb029893a (KEYS: Generalise x509_request_asymmetric_key())
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Chun-Yi Lee <jlee@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
