Currently, the log-level of show_stack() depends on a platform
realization. It creates situations where the headers are printed with
lower log level or higher than the stacktrace (depending on a platform or
user).
Furthermore, it forces the logic decision from user to an architecture
side. In result, some users as sysrq/kdb/etc are doing tricks with
temporary rising console_loglevel while printing their messages. And in
result it not only may print unwanted messages from other CPUs, but also
omit printing at all in the unlucky case where the printk() was deferred.
Introducing log-level parameter and KERN_UNSUPPRESSED [1] seems an easier
approach than introducing more printk buffers. Also, it will consolidate
printings with headers.
Introduce show_stack_loglvl(), that eventually will substitute
show_stack().
[1]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190528002412.1625-1-dima@arista.com/T/#u
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Safonov <dima@arista.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200418201944.482088-18-dima@arista.com
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Currently, the log-level of show_stack() depends on a platform
realization. It creates situations where the headers are printed with
lower log level or higher than the stacktrace (depending on a platform or
user).
Furthermore, it forces the logic decision from user to an architecture
side. In result, some users as sysrq/kdb/etc are doing tricks with
temporary rising console_loglevel while printing their messages. And in
result it not only may print unwanted messages from other CPUs, but also
omit printing at all in the unlucky case where the printk() was deferred.
Introducing log-level parameter and KERN_UNSUPPRESSED [1] seems an easier
approach than introducing more printk buffers. Also, it will consolidate
printings with headers.
Introduce show_stack_loglvl(), that eventually will substitute
show_stack().
[1]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190528002412.1625-1-dima@arista.com/T/#u
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Safonov <dima@arista.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>
Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200418201944.482088-17-dima@arista.com
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Currently, the log-level of show_stack() depends on a platform
realization. It creates situations where the headers are printed with
lower log level or higher than the stacktrace (depending on a platform or
user).
Furthermore, it forces the logic decision from user to an architecture
side. In result, some users as sysrq/kdb/etc are doing tricks with
temporary rising console_loglevel while printing their messages. And in
result it not only may print unwanted messages from other CPUs, but also
omit printing at all in the unlucky case where the printk() was deferred.
Introducing log-level parameter and KERN_UNSUPPRESSED [1] seems an easier
approach than introducing more printk buffers. Also, it will consolidate
printings with headers.
Add log level argument to ia64_do_show_stack() as a preparation to
introduce show_stack_loglvl(). Also, make ia64_do_show_stack() static as
it's not used outside.
[1]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190528002412.1625-1-dima@arista.com/T/#u
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Safonov <dima@arista.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>
Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200418201944.482088-16-dima@arista.com
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Currently, the log-level of show_stack() depends on a platform
realization. It creates situations where the headers are printed with
lower log level or higher than the stacktrace (depending on a platform or
user).
Furthermore, it forces the logic decision from user to an architecture
side. In result, some users as sysrq/kdb/etc are doing tricks with
temporary rising console_loglevel while printing their messages. And in
result it not only may print unwanted messages from other CPUs, but also
omit printing at all in the unlucky case where the printk() was deferred.
Introducing log-level parameter and KERN_UNSUPPRESSED [1] seems an easier
approach than introducing more printk buffers. Also, it will consolidate
printings with headers.
Introduce show_stack_loglvl(), that eventually will substitute
show_stack().
As a good side-effect die() now prints the stacktrace with KERN_EMERG
aligned with other messages.
[1]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190528002412.1625-1-dima@arista.com/T/#u
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Safonov <dima@arista.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Brian Cain <bcain@codeaurora.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200418201944.482088-15-dima@arista.com
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Currently, the log-level of show_stack() depends on a platform
realization. It creates situations where the headers are printed with
lower log level or higher than the stacktrace (depending on a platform or
user).
Furthermore, it forces the logic decision from user to an architecture
side. In result, some users as sysrq/kdb/etc are doing tricks with
temporary rising console_loglevel while printing their messages. And in
result it not only may print unwanted messages from other CPUs, but also
omit printing at all in the unlucky case where the printk() was deferred.
Introducing log-level parameter and KERN_UNSUPPRESSED [1] seems an easier
approach than introducing more printk buffers. Also, it will consolidate
printings with headers.
Introduce show_stack_loglvl(), that eventually will substitute
show_stack().
[1]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190528002412.1625-1-dima@arista.com/T/#u
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Safonov <dima@arista.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Yoshinori Sato <ysato@users.sourceforge.jp>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200418201944.482088-14-dima@arista.com
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Currently, the log-level of show_stack() depends on a platform
realization. It creates situations where the headers are printed with
lower log level or higher than the stacktrace (depending on a platform or
user).
Furthermore, it forces the logic decision from user to an architecture
side. In result, some users as sysrq/kdb/etc are doing tricks with
temporary rising console_loglevel while printing their messages. And in
result it not only may print unwanted messages from other CPUs, but also
omit printing at all in the unlucky case where the printk() was deferred.
Introducing log-level parameter and KERN_UNSUPPRESSED [1] seems an easier
approach than introducing more printk buffers. Also, it will consolidate
printings with headers.
Introduce show_stack_loglvl(), that eventually will substitute
show_stack().
[1]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190528002412.1625-1-dima@arista.com/T/#u
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Safonov <dima@arista.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Guo Ren <guoren@kernel.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200418201944.482088-13-dima@arista.com
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Currently, the log-level of show_stack() depends on a platform
realization. It creates situations where the headers are printed with
lower log level or higher than the stacktrace (depending on a platform or
user).
Furthermore, it forces the logic decision from user to an architecture
side. In result, some users as sysrq/kdb/etc are doing tricks with
temporary rising console_loglevel while printing their messages. And in
result it not only may print unwanted messages from other CPUs, but also
omit printing at all in the unlucky case where the printk() was deferred.
Introducing log-level parameter and KERN_UNSUPPRESSED [1] seems an easier
approach than introducing more printk buffers. Also, it will consolidate
printings with headers.
Introduce show_stack_loglvl(), that eventually will substitute
show_stack().
[1]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190528002412.1625-1-dima@arista.com/T/#u
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Safonov <dima@arista.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Aurelien Jacquiot <jacquiot.aurelien@gmail.com>
Cc: Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200418201944.482088-12-dima@arista.com
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Currently, the log-level of show_stack() depends on a platform
realization. It creates situations where the headers are printed with
lower log level or higher than the stacktrace (depending on a platform or
user).
Furthermore, it forces the logic decision from user to an architecture
side. In result, some users as sysrq/kdb/etc are doing tricks with
temporary rising console_loglevel while printing their messages. And in
result it not only may print unwanted messages from other CPUs, but also
omit printing at all in the unlucky case where the printk() was deferred.
Introducing log-level parameter and KERN_UNSUPPRESSED [1] seems an easier
approach than introducing more printk buffers. Also, it will consolidate
printings with headers.
Introduce show_stack_loglvl(), that eventually will substitute
show_stack().
[1]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190528002412.1625-1-dima@arista.com/T/#u
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Safonov <dima@arista.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200418201944.482088-11-dima@arista.com
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Currently, the log-level of show_stack() depends on a platform
realization. It creates situations where the headers are printed with
lower log level or higher than the stacktrace (depending on a platform or
user).
Furthermore, it forces the logic decision from user to an architecture
side. In result, some users as sysrq/kdb/etc are doing tricks with
temporary rising console_loglevel while printing their messages. And in
result it not only may print unwanted messages from other CPUs, but also
omit printing at all in the unlucky case where the printk() was deferred.
Introducing log-level parameter and KERN_UNSUPPRESSED [1] seems an easier
approach than introducing more printk buffers. Also, it will consolidate
printings with headers.
Add log level argument to dump_backtrace() as a preparation for
introducing show_stack_loglvl().
[1]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190528002412.1625-1-dima@arista.com/T/#u
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Safonov <dima@arista.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200418201944.482088-10-dima@arista.com
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Currently, the log-level of show_stack() depends on a platform
realization. It creates situations where the headers are printed with
lower log level or higher than the stacktrace (depending on a platform or
user).
Furthermore, it forces the logic decision from user to an architecture
side. In result, some users as sysrq/kdb/etc are doing tricks with
temporary rising console_loglevel while printing their messages. And in
result it not only may print unwanted messages from other CPUs, but also
omit printing at all in the unlucky case where the printk() was deferred.
Introducing log-level parameter and KERN_UNSUPPRESSED [1] seems an easier
approach than introducing more printk buffers. Also, it will consolidate
printings with headers.
Introduce show_stack_loglvl(), that eventually will substitute
show_stack().
[1]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190528002412.1625-1-dima@arista.com/T/#u
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Safonov <dima@arista.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200418201944.482088-9-dima@arista.com
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Currently, the log-level of show_stack() depends on a platform
realization. It creates situations where the headers are printed with
lower log level or higher than the stacktrace (depending on a platform or
user).
Furthermore, it forces the logic decision from user to an architecture
side. In result, some users as sysrq/kdb/etc are doing tricks with
temporary rising console_loglevel while printing their messages. And in
result it not only may print unwanted messages from other CPUs, but also
omit printing at all in the unlucky case where the printk() was deferred.
Introducing log-level parameter and KERN_UNSUPPRESSED [1] seems an easier
approach than introducing more printk buffers. Also, it will consolidate
printings with headers.
Now that c_backtrace() always emits correct loglvl, use it for printing.
[1]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190528002412.1625-1-dima@arista.com/T/#u
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Safonov <dima@arista.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200418201944.482088-8-dima@arista.com
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Currently, the log-level of show_stack() depends on a platform
realization. It creates situations where the headers are printed with
lower log level or higher than the stacktrace (depending on a platform or
user).
Furthermore, it forces the logic decision from user to an architecture
side. In result, some users as sysrq/kdb/etc are doing tricks with
temporary rising console_loglevel while printing their messages. And in
result it not only may print unwanted messages from other CPUs, but also
omit printing at all in the unlucky case where the printk() was deferred.
Introducing log-level parameter and KERN_UNSUPPRESSED [1] seems an easier
approach than introducing more printk buffers. Also, it will consolidate
printings with headers.
Add log level argument to dump_backtrace() as a preparation for
introducing show_stack_loglvl().
As a good side-effect __die() now prints not only "Stack:" header with
KERN_EMERG, but the backtrace itself.
[1]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190528002412.1625-1-dima@arista.com/T/#u
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Safonov <dima@arista.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200418201944.482088-7-dima@arista.com
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Currently, the log-level of show_stack() depends on a platform
realization. It creates situations where the headers are printed with
lower log level or higher than the stacktrace (depending on a platform or
user).
Furthermore, it forces the logic decision from user to an architecture
side. In result, some users as sysrq/kdb/etc are doing tricks with
temporary rising console_loglevel while printing their messages. And in
result it not only may print unwanted messages from other CPUs, but also
omit printing at all in the unlucky case where the printk() was deferred.
Introducing log-level parameter and KERN_UNSUPPRESSED [1] seems an easier
approach than introducing more printk buffers. Also, it will consolidate
printings with headers.
Add log level argument to unwind_backtrace() as a preparation for
introducing show_stack_loglvl().
As a good side-effect arm_syscall() is now printing errors with the same
log level as the backtrace.
[1]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190528002412.1625-1-dima@arista.com/T/#u
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Safonov <dima@arista.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200418201944.482088-6-dima@arista.com
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Currently, the log-level of show_stack() depends on a platform
realization. It creates situations where the headers are printed with
lower log level or higher than the stacktrace (depending on a platform or
user).
Furthermore, it forces the logic decision from user to an architecture
side. In result, some users as sysrq/kdb/etc are doing tricks with
temporary rising console_loglevel while printing their messages. And in
result it not only may print unwanted messages from other CPUs, but also
omit printing at all in the unlucky case where the printk() was deferred.
Introducing log-level parameter and KERN_UNSUPPRESSED [1] seems an easier
approach than introducing more printk buffers. Also, it will consolidate
printings with headers.
Add log level argument to c_backtrace() as a preparation for introducing
show_stack_loglvl().
[1]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190528002412.1625-1-dima@arista.com/T/#u
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Safonov <dima@arista.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200418201944.482088-5-dima@arista.com
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Currently, the log-level of show_stack() depends on a platform
realization. It creates situations where the headers are printed with
lower log level or higher than the stacktrace (depending on a platform or
user).
Furthermore, it forces the logic decision from user to an architecture
side. In result, some users as sysrq/kdb/etc are doing tricks with
temporary rising console_loglevel while printing their messages. And in
result it not only may print unwanted messages from other CPUs, but also
omit printing at all in the unlucky case where the printk() was deferred.
Introducing log-level parameter and KERN_UNSUPPRESSED [1] seems an easier
approach than introducing more printk buffers. Also, it will consolidate
printings with headers.
Introduce show_stack_loglvl(), that eventually will substitute
show_stack().
As a good side-effect header "Stack Trace:" is now printed with the same
log level as the rest of backtrace.
[1]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190528002412.1625-1-dima@arista.com/T/#u
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Safonov <dima@arista.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Vineet Gupta <vgupta@synopsys.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200418201944.482088-4-dima@arista.com
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Currently, the log-level of show_stack() depends on a platform
realization. It creates situations where the headers are printed with
lower log level or higher than the stacktrace (depending on a platform or
user).
Furthermore, it forces the logic decision from user to an architecture
side. In result, some users as sysrq/kdb/etc are doing tricks with
temporary rising console_loglevel while printing their messages. And in
result it not only may print unwanted messages from other CPUs, but also
omit printing at all in the unlucky case where the printk() was deferred.
Introducing log-level parameter and KERN_UNSUPPRESSED [1] seems an easier
approach than introducing more printk buffers. Also, it will consolidate
printings with headers.
Introduce show_stack_loglvl(), that eventually will substitute
show_stack().
[1]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190528002412.1625-1-dima@arista.com/T/#u
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Safonov <dima@arista.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Ivan Kokshaysky <ink@jurassic.park.msu.ru>
Cc: Matt Turner <mattst88@gmail.com>
Cc: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200418201944.482088-3-dima@arista.com
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Patch series "Add log level to show_stack()", v3.
Add log level argument to show_stack().
Done in three stages:
1. Introducing show_stack_loglvl() for every architecture
2. Migrating old users with an explicit log level
3. Renaming show_stack_loglvl() into show_stack()
Justification:
- It's a design mistake to move a business-logic decision into platform
realization detail.
- I have currently two patches sets that would benefit from this work:
Removing console_loglevel jumps in sysrq driver [1] Hung task warning
before panic [2] - suggested by Tetsuo (but he probably didn't realise
what it would involve).
- While doing (1), (2) the backtraces were adjusted to headers and other
messages for each situation - so there won't be a situation when the
backtrace is printed, but the headers are missing because they have
lesser log level (or the reverse).
- As the result in (2) plays with console_loglevel for kdb are removed.
The least important for upstream, but maybe still worth to note that every
company I've worked in so far had an off-list patch to print backtrace
with the needed log level (but only for the architecture they cared
about). If you have other ideas how you will benefit from show_stack()
with a log level - please, reply to this cover letter.
See also discussion on v1:
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-riscv/20191106083538.z5nlpuf64cigxigh@pathway.suse.cz/
This patch (of 50):
print_ip_sym() needs to have a log level parameter to comply with other
parts being printed. Otherwise, half of the expected backtrace would be
printed and other may be missing with some logging level.
The following callee(s) are using now the adjusted log level:
- microblaze/unwind: the same level as headers & userspace unwind.
Note that pr_debug()'s there are for debugging the unwinder itself.
- nds32/traps: symbol addresses are printed with the same log level
as backtrace headers.
- lockdep: ip for locking issues is printed with the same log level
as other part of the warning.
- sched: ip where preemption was disabled is printed as error like
the rest part of the message.
- ftrace: bug reports are now consistent in the log level being used.
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Safonov <dima@arista.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Albert Ou <aou@eecs.berkeley.edu>
Cc: Ben Segall <bsegall@google.com>
Cc: Dietmar Eggemann <dietmar.eggemann@arm.com>
Cc: Greentime Hu <green.hu@gmail.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: James Hogan <jhogan@kernel.org>
Cc: Juri Lelli <juri.lelli@redhat.com>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Michal Simek <monstr@monstr.eu>
Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com>
Cc: Paul Burton <paulburton@kernel.org>
Cc: Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@sifive.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Vincent Chen <deanbo422@gmail.com>
Cc: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Cc: Dmitry Safonov <0x7f454c46@gmail.com>
Cc: Dmitry Safonov <dima@arista.com>
Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.com>
Cc: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
Cc: Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky@gmail.com>
Cc: Ivan Kokshaysky <ink@jurassic.park.msu.ru>
Cc: Matt Turner <mattst88@gmail.com>
Cc: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net>
Cc: Vineet Gupta <vgupta@synopsys.com>
Cc: Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Aurelien Jacquiot <jacquiot.aurelien@gmail.com>
Cc: Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com>
Cc: Guo Ren <guoren@kernel.org>
Cc: Yoshinori Sato <ysato@users.sourceforge.jp>
Cc: Brian Cain <bcain@codeaurora.org>
Cc: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>
Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Cc: Ley Foon Tan <lftan@altera.com>
Cc: Jonas Bonn <jonas@southpole.se>
Cc: Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com>
Cc: Stefan Kristiansson <stefan.kristiansson@saunalahti.fi>
Cc: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
Cc: "James E.J. Bottomley" <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Rich Felker <dalias@libc.org>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Anton Ivanov <anton.ivanov@cambridgegreys.com>
Cc: Jeff Dike <jdike@addtoit.com>
Cc: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Cc: Guan Xuetao <gxt@pku.edu.cn>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Chris Zankel <chris@zankel.net>
Cc: Max Filippov <jcmvbkbc@gmail.com>
Cc: Len Brown <len.brown@intel.com>
Cc: Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>
Cc: "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rjw@rjwysocki.net>
Cc: "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
Cc: Daniel Thompson <daniel.thompson@linaro.org>
Cc: Douglas Anderson <dianders@chromium.org>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200418201944.482088-2-dima@arista.com
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Pull x86 srbds fixes from Thomas Gleixner:
"The 9th episode of the dime novel "The performance killer" with the
subtitle "Slow Randomizing Boosts Denial of Service".
SRBDS is an MDS-like speculative side channel that can leak bits from
the random number generator (RNG) across cores and threads. New
microcode serializes the processor access during the execution of
RDRAND and RDSEED. This ensures that the shared buffer is overwritten
before it is released for reuse. This is equivalent to a full bus
lock, which means that many threads running the RNG instructions in
parallel have the same effect as the same amount of threads issuing a
locked instruction targeting an address which requires locking of two
cachelines at once.
The mitigation support comes with the usual pile of unpleasant
ingredients:
- command line options
- sysfs file
- microcode checks
- a list of vulnerable CPUs identified by model and stepping this
time which requires stepping match support for the cpu match logic.
- the inevitable slowdown of affected CPUs"
* branch 'x86/srbds' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
x86/speculation: Add Ivy Bridge to affected list
x86/speculation: Add SRBDS vulnerability and mitigation documentation
x86/speculation: Add Special Register Buffer Data Sampling (SRBDS) mitigation
x86/cpu: Add 'table' argument to cpu_matches()
Fix afs_compare_addrs() to use WARN_ON(1) instead of BUG() and return 1
(ie. srx_a > srx_b).
There's no point trying to put actual error handling in as this should not
occur unless a new transport address type is allowed by AFS. And even if
it does, in this particular case, it'll just never match unknown types of
addresses. This BUG() was more of a 'you need to add a case here'
indicator.
Reported-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
We've had a couple of changes that introduce regressions with the
multi-cpu DAI solutions, and while trying to fix them we found
additional inconsistencies that should also go to stable branches.
Bard Liao (1):
ASoC: core: only convert non DPCM link to DPCM link
Pierre-Louis Bossart (3):
ASoC: soc-pcm: dpcm: fix playback/capture checks
ASoC: Intel: boards: replace capture_only by dpcm_capture
ASoC: SOF: nocodec: conditionally set dpcm_capture/dpcm_playback flags
sound/soc/intel/boards/glk_rt5682_max98357a.c | 2 +-
sound/soc/intel/boards/kbl_da7219_max98927.c | 4 +-
sound/soc/intel/boards/kbl_rt5663_max98927.c | 2 +-
.../intel/boards/kbl_rt5663_rt5514_max98927.c | 2 +-
sound/soc/soc-core.c | 22 ++++++++--
sound/soc/soc-pcm.c | 44 ++++++++++++++-----
sound/soc/sof/nocodec.c | 6 ++-
7 files changed, 62 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)
base-commit: 8a9144c1cf
--
2.20.1
The Asus T101HA uses the default jack-detect mode 3, but instead of
using an analog microphone it is using a DMIC on dmic-data-pin 1,
like the Asus T100HA. Note unlike the T100HA its jack-detect is not
inverted.
Add a DMI quirk with the correct settings for this model.
Signed-off-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Pierre-Louis Bossart <pierre-louis.bossart@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200608204634.93407-2-hdegoede@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
The Toshiba Encore WT10-A tablet almost fully works with the default
settings for Bay Trail CR devices. The only issue is that it uses a
digital mic. connected the the DMIC1 input instead of an analog mic.
Add a quirk for this model using the default settings with the input-map
replaced with BYT_RT5640_DMIC1_MAP.
Signed-off-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Pierre-Louis Bossart <pierre-louis.bossart@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200608204634.93407-1-hdegoede@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
The conversion of x86 VDSO to the generic clock mode storage broke the
paravirt and hyperv clocksource logic. These clock sources have their own
internal sequence counter to validate the clocksource at the point of
reading it. This is necessary because the hypervisor can invalidate the
clocksource asynchronously so a check during the VDSO data update is not
sufficient. If the internal check during read invalidates the clocksource
the read return U64_MAX. The original code checked this efficiently by
testing whether the result (casted to signed) is negative, i.e. bit 63 is
set. This was done that way because an extra indicator for the validity had
more overhead.
The conversion broke this check because the check was replaced by a check
for a valid VDSO clock mode.
The wreckage manifests itself when the paravirt clock is installed as a
valid VDSO clock and during runtime invalidated by the hypervisor,
e.g. after a host suspend/resume cycle. After the invalidation the read
function returns U64_MAX which is used as cycles and makes the clock jump
by ~2200 seconds, and become stale until the 2200 seconds have elapsed
where it starts to jump again. The period of this effect depends on the
shift/mult pair of the clocksource and the jumps and staleness are an
artifact of undefined but reproducible behaviour of math overflow.
Implement an x86 version of the new vdso_cycles_ok() inline which adds this
check back and a variant of vdso_clocksource_ok() which lets the compiler
optimize it out to avoid the extra conditional. That's suboptimal when the
system does not have a VDSO capable clocksource, but that's not the case
which is optimized for.
Fixes: 5d51bee725 ("clocksource: Add common vdso clock mode storage")
Reported-by: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200606221532.080560273@linutronix.de
The original x86 VDSO implementation checked for the validity of the clock
source read by testing whether the returned signed cycles value is less
than zero. This check was also used by the vdso read function to signal
that the current selected clocksource is not VDSO capable.
During the rework of the VDSO code the check was removed and replaced with
a check for the clocksource mode being != NONE.
This turned out to be a mistake because the check is necessary for paravirt
and hyperv clock sources. The reason is that these clock sources have their
own internal sequence counter to validate the clocksource at the point of
reading it. This is necessary because the hypervisor can invalidate the
clocksource asynchronously so a check during the VDSO data update is not
sufficient. Having a separate indicator for the validity is slower than
just validating the cycles value. The check for it being negative turned
out to be the fastest implementation and safe as it would require an uptime
of ~73 years with a 4GHz counter frequency to result in a false positive.
Add an optional function to validate the cycles with a default
implementation which allows the compiler to optimize it out for
architectures which do not require it.
Fixes: 5d51bee725 ("clocksource: Add common vdso clock mode storage")
Reported-by: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200606221531.963970768@linutronix.de
CONFIG_GENERIC_VDSO_CLOCK_MODE was a transitional config switch which got
removed after all architectures got converted to the new storage model.
But the removal forgot to remove the #ifdef which guards the
vdso_clock_mode sanity check, which effectively disables the sanity check.
Remove it now.
Fixes: f86fd32db7 ("lib/vdso: Cleanup clock mode storage leftovers")
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200606221531.845475036@linutronix.de
With additional checks on dailinks, we see errors such as
[ 3.000418] sof-nocodec sof-nocodec: CPU DAI DMIC01 Pin for rtd
NoCodec-6 does not support playback
It's not clear why we set the dpcm_playback and dpcm_capture flags
unconditionally, add a check on number of channels for each direction
to avoid invalid configurations.
Fixes: 8017b8fd37 ('ASoC: SOF: Add Nocodec machine driver support')
Signed-off-by: Pierre-Louis Bossart <pierre-louis.bossart@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Guennadi Liakhovetski <guennadi.liakhovetski@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Baluta <daniel.baluta@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Bard Liao <yung-chuan.liao@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200608194415.4663-5-pierre-louis.bossart@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
It's not clear why specific FE dailinks use capture_only flags, likely
blind copy/paste from Chromebook driver to the other. Replace by
dpcm_capture, this will make future alignment and removal of flags
easier.
Signed-off-by: Pierre-Louis Bossart <pierre-louis.bossart@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Guennadi Liakhovetski <guennadi.liakhovetski@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Baluta <daniel.baluta@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Bard Liao <yung-chuan.liao@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200608194415.4663-4-pierre-louis.bossart@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Additional checks for valid DAIs expose a corner case, where existing
BE dailinks get modified, e.g. HDMI links are tagged with
dpcm_capture=1 even if the DAIs are for playback.
This patch makes those changes conditional and flags configuration
issues when a BE dailink is has no_pcm=0 but dpcm_playback or
dpcm_capture=1 (which makes no sense).
As discussed on the alsa-devel mailing list, there are redundant flags
for dpcm_playback, dpcm_capture, playback_only, capture_only. This
will have to be cleaned-up in a future update. For now only correct
and flag problematic configurations.
Fixes: 218fe9b7ec ("ASoC: soc-core: Set dpcm_playback / dpcm_capture")
Suggested-by: Daniel Baluta <daniel.baluta@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Bard Liao <yung-chuan.liao@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Pierre-Louis Bossart <pierre-louis.bossart@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Guennadi Liakhovetski <guennadi.liakhovetski@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Baluta <daniel.baluta@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Bard Liao <yung-chuan.liao@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200608194415.4663-3-pierre-louis.bossart@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Recent changes in the ASoC core prevent multi-cpu BE dailinks from
being used. DPCM does support multi-cpu DAIs for BE Dailinks, but not
for FE.
Handle the FE checks first, and make sure all DAIs support the same
capabilities within the same dailink.
Fixes: 9b5db05936 ("ASoC: soc-pcm: dpcm: Only allow playback/capture if supported")
Signed-off-by: Pierre-Louis Bossart <pierre-louis.bossart@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Bard Liao <yung-chuan.liao@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Guennadi Liakhovetski <guennadi.liakhovetski@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Ranjani Sridharan <ranjani.sridharan@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Baluta <daniel.baluta@gmail.com>
BugLink: https://github.com/thesofproject/linux/issues/2031
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200608194415.4663-2-pierre-louis.bossart@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Fix AFS file locking to use the correct vnode pointer and remove a member
of the afs_operation struct that is never set, but it is read and followed,
causing an oops.
This can be triggered by:
flock -s /afs/example.com/foo sleep 1
when it calls the kernel to get a file lock.
Fixes: e49c7b2f6d ("afs: Build an abstraction around an "operation" concept")
Reported-by: Dave Botsch <botsch@cnf.cornell.edu>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Dave Botsch <botsch@cnf.cornell.edu>
Fix afs_put_sysnames() to actually free the specified afs_sysnames
object after its reference count has been decreased to zero and
its contents have been released.
Fixes: 6f8880d8e6 ("afs: Implement @sys substitution handling")
Signed-off-by: Zhihao Cheng <chengzhihao1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Thomas Hellstrom will be handing over VMware's maintainership of these
interfaces to Deep Shah.
Signed-off-by: Deep Shah <sdeep@vmware.com>
Acked-by: Thomas Hellstrom <thellstrom@vmware.com>
Acked-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200416234520.GA1700@prme-mon-cfl-mlw-07
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Avoid a NULL dereference for a mismatched encoder type, hit when
probing state for all encoders.
This is a band aid to prevent the OOPS as the right fix is "probably to
swap the psr vs infoframes.enable checks, or outright disappear from
this function" (Ville).
Closes: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/drm/intel/-/issues/1892
Signed-off-by: Chris Wilson <chris@chris-wilson.co.uk>
Acked-by: Ville Syrjälä <ville.syrjala@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20200525124912.16019-1-chris@chris-wilson.co.uk
(cherry picked from commit 22da5d846d)
Signed-off-by: Joonas Lahtinen <joonas.lahtinen@linux.intel.com>
free_irq() is missing in case of error, fix that.
Signed-off-by: Pavel Machek (CIP) <pavel@denx.de>
Reviewed-by: Jerome Brunet <jbrunet@baylibre.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200606153103.GA17905@amd
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Pass a flag to request kernel thread use.
Fixes: 01fcb1cbc8 ("vhost: allow device that does not depend on vhost worker")
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
If subblock size is large (e.g. 1G) 32 bit math involving it
can overflow. Rather than try to catch all instances of that,
let's tweak block size to 64 bit.
It ripples through UAPI which is an ABI change, but it's not too late to
make it, and it will allow supporting >4Gbyte blocks while might
become necessary down the road.
Fixes: 5f1f79bbc9 ("virtio-mem: Paravirtualized memory hotplug")
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Acked-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
For very long, we have kept this pointer back to the per-cpu
host state, despite having working per-cpu accessors at EL2
for some time now.
Recent investigations have shown that this pointer is easy
to abuse in preemptible context, which is a sure sign that
it would better be gone. Not to mention that a per-cpu
pointer is faster to access at all times.
Reported-by: Andrew Scull <ascull@google.com>
Acked-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com
Reviewed-by: Andrew Scull <ascull@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Sparse complains that __hyp_this_cpu_ptr() returns something
that is flagged noderef and not in the correct address space
(both being the result of the __percpu annotation).
Pretend that __hyp_this_cpu_ptr() knows what it is doing by
forcefully casting the pointer with __kernel __force.
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
The current way we deal with PtrAuth is a bit heavy handed:
- We forcefully save the host's keys on each vcpu_load()
- Handling the PtrAuth trap forces us to go all the way back
to the exit handling code to just set the HCR bits
Overall, this is pretty cumbersome. A better approach would be
to handle it the same way we deal with the FPSIMD registers:
- On vcpu_load() disable PtrAuth for the guest
- On first use, save the host's keys, enable PtrAuth in the
guest
Crucially, this can happen as a fixup, which is done very early
on exit. We can then reenter the guest immediately without
leaving the hypervisor role.
Another thing is that it simplify the rest of the host handling:
exiting all the way to the host means that the only possible
outcome for this trap is to inject an UNDEF.
Reviewed-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Make x86_fpu_cache static now that FPU allocation and destruction is
handled entirely by common x86 code.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Message-Id: <20200608180218.20946-1-sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Explicitly set the VA width to 48 bits for the x86_64-only PXXV48_4K VM
mode instead of asserting the guest VA width is 48 bits. The fact that
KVM supports 5-level paging is irrelevant unless the selftests opt-in to
5-level paging by setting CR4.LA57 for the guest. The overzealous
assert prevents running the selftests on a kernel with 5-level paging
enabled.
Incorporate LA57 into the assert instead of removing the assert entirely
as a sanity check of KVM's CPUID output.
Fixes: 567a9f1e9d ("KVM: selftests: Introduce VM_MODE_PXXV48_4K")
Reported-by: Sergio Perez Gonzalez <sergio.perez.gonzalez@intel.com>
Cc: Adriana Cervantes Jimenez <adriana.cervantes.jimenez@intel.com>
Cc: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Message-Id: <20200528021530.28091-1-sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
When using the PtrAuth feature in a guest, we need to save the host's
keys before allowing the guest to program them. For that, we dump
them in a per-CPU data structure (the so called host context).
But both call sites that do this are in preemptible context,
which may end up in disaster should the vcpu thread get preempted
before reentering the guest.
Instead, save the keys eagerly on each vcpu_load(). This has an
increased overhead, but is at least safe.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
'jiffies' and 'jiffies_64' are meant to alias (two different symbols that
share the same address). Most architectures make the symbols alias to the
same address via a linker script assignment in their
arch/<arch>/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S:
jiffies = jiffies_64;
which is effectively a definition of jiffies.
jiffies and jiffies_64 are both forward declared for all architectures in
include/linux/jiffies.h. jiffies_64 is defined in kernel/time/timer.c.
x86_64 was peculiar in that it wasn't doing the above linker script
assignment, but rather was:
1. defining jiffies in arch/x86/kernel/time.c instead via the linker script.
2. overriding the symbol jiffies_64 from kernel/time/timer.c in
arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.s via 'jiffies_64 = jiffies;'.
As Fangrui notes:
In LLD, symbol assignments in linker scripts override definitions in
object files. GNU ld appears to have the same behavior. It would
probably make sense for LLD to error "duplicate symbol" but GNU ld
is unlikely to adopt for compatibility reasons.
This results in an ODR violation (UB), which seems to have survived
thus far. Where it becomes harmful is when;
1. -fno-semantic-interposition is used:
As Fangrui notes:
Clang after LLVM commit 5b22bcc2b70d
("[X86][ELF] Prefer to lower MC_GlobalAddress operands to .Lfoo$local")
defaults to -fno-semantic-interposition similar semantics which help
-fpic/-fPIC code avoid GOT/PLT when the referenced symbol is defined
within the same translation unit. Unlike GCC
-fno-semantic-interposition, Clang emits such relocations referencing
local symbols for non-pic code as well.
This causes references to jiffies to refer to '.Ljiffies$local' when
jiffies is defined in the same translation unit. Likewise, references to
jiffies_64 become references to '.Ljiffies_64$local' in translation units
that define jiffies_64. Because these differ from the names used in the
linker script, they will not be rewritten to alias one another.
2. Full LTO
Full LTO effectively treats all source files as one translation
unit, causing these local references to be produced everywhere. When
the linker processes the linker script, there are no longer any
references to jiffies_64' anywhere to replace with 'jiffies'. And
thus '.Ljiffies$local' and '.Ljiffies_64$local' no longer alias
at all.
In the process of porting patches enabling Full LTO from arm64 to x86_64,
spooky bugs have been observed where the kernel appeared to boot, but init
doesn't get scheduled.
Avoid the ODR violation by matching other architectures and define jiffies
only by linker script. For -fno-semantic-interposition + Full LTO, there
is no longer a global definition of jiffies for the compiler to produce a
local symbol which the linker script won't ensure aliases to jiffies_64.
Fixes: 40747ffa5a ("asmlinkage: Make jiffies visible")
Reported-by: Nathan Chancellor <natechancellor@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Alistair Delva <adelva@google.com>
Debugged-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
Debugged-by: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com>
Suggested-by: Fangrui Song <maskray@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Bob Haarman <inglorion@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: Sedat Dilek <sedat.dilek@gmail.com> # build+boot on
Reviewed-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://github.com/ClangBuiltLinux/linux/issues/852
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200602193100.229287-1-inglorion@google.com
Currently, it is possible to enable indirect branch speculation even after
it was force-disabled using the PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE option. Moreover, the
PR_GET_SPECULATION_CTRL command gives afterwards an incorrect result
(force-disabled when it is in fact enabled). This also is inconsistent
vs. STIBP and the documention which cleary states that
PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE cannot be undone.
Fix this by actually enforcing force-disabled indirect branch
speculation. PR_SPEC_ENABLE called after PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE now fails
with -EPERM as described in the documentation.
Fixes: 9137bb27e6 ("x86/speculation: Add prctl() control for indirect branch speculation")
Signed-off-by: Anthony Steinhauser <asteinhauser@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
On context switch the change of TIF_SSBD and TIF_SPEC_IB are evaluated
to adjust the mitigations accordingly. This is optimized to avoid the
expensive MSR write if not needed.
This optimization is buggy and allows an attacker to shutdown the SSBD
protection of a victim process.
The update logic reads the cached base value for the speculation control
MSR which has neither the SSBD nor the STIBP bit set. It then OR's the
SSBD bit only when TIF_SSBD is different and requests the MSR update.
That means if TIF_SSBD of the previous and next task are the same, then
the base value is not updated, even if TIF_SSBD is set. The MSR write is
not requested.
Subsequently if the TIF_STIBP bit differs then the STIBP bit is updated
in the base value and the MSR is written with a wrong SSBD value.
This was introduced when the per task/process conditional STIPB
switching was added on top of the existing SSBD switching.
It is exploitable if the attacker creates a process which enforces SSBD
and has the contrary value of STIBP than the victim process (i.e. if the
victim process enforces STIBP, the attacker process must not enforce it;
if the victim process does not enforce STIBP, the attacker process must
enforce it) and schedule it on the same core as the victim process. If
the victim runs after the attacker the victim becomes vulnerable to
Spectre V4.
To fix this, update the MSR value independent of the TIF_SSBD difference
and dependent on the SSBD mitigation method available. This ensures that
a subsequent STIPB initiated MSR write has the correct state of SSBD.
[ tglx: Handle X86_FEATURE_VIRT_SSBD & X86_FEATURE_VIRT_SSBD correctly
and massaged changelog ]
Fixes: 5bfbe3ad58 ("x86/speculation: Prepare for per task indirect branch speculation control")
Signed-off-by: Anthony Steinhauser <asteinhauser@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
When STIBP is unavailable or enhanced IBRS is available, Linux
force-disables the IBPB mitigation of Spectre-BTB even when simultaneous
multithreading is disabled. While attempts to enable IBPB using
prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_SPEC_INDIRECT_BRANCH, ...) fail with
EPERM, the seccomp syscall (or its prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, ...) equivalent)
which are used e.g. by Chromium or OpenSSH succeed with no errors but the
application remains silently vulnerable to cross-process Spectre v2 attacks
(classical BTB poisoning). At the same time the SYSFS reporting
(/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spectre_v2) displays that IBPB is
conditionally enabled when in fact it is unconditionally disabled.
STIBP is useful only when SMT is enabled. When SMT is disabled and STIBP is
unavailable, it makes no sense to force-disable also IBPB, because IBPB
protects against cross-process Spectre-BTB attacks regardless of the SMT
state. At the same time since missing STIBP was only observed on AMD CPUs,
AMD does not recommend using STIBP, but recommends using IBPB, so disabling
IBPB because of missing STIBP goes directly against AMD's advice:
https://developer.amd.com/wp-content/resources/Architecture_Guidelines_Update_Indirect_Branch_Control.pdf
Similarly, enhanced IBRS is designed to protect cross-core BTB poisoning
and BTB-poisoning attacks from user space against kernel (and
BTB-poisoning attacks from guest against hypervisor), it is not designed
to prevent cross-process (or cross-VM) BTB poisoning between processes (or
VMs) running on the same core. Therefore, even with enhanced IBRS it is
necessary to flush the BTB during context-switches, so there is no reason
to force disable IBPB when enhanced IBRS is available.
Enable the prctl control of IBPB even when STIBP is unavailable or enhanced
IBRS is available.
Fixes: 7cc765a67d ("x86/speculation: Enable prctl mode for spectre_v2_user")
Signed-off-by: Anthony Steinhauser <asteinhauser@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
KVM sets HCR_EL2.TACR via HCR_GUEST_FLAGS. This means ACTLR* accesses
from the guest are always trapped, and always return the value in the
sys_regs array.
The guest can't change the value of these registers, so we are
save restoring the reset value, which came from the host.
Stop save/restoring this register. Keep the storage for this register
in sys_regs[] as this is how the value is exposed to user-space,
removing it would break migration.
Signed-off-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200529150656.7339-4-james.morse@arm.com
ACTLR_EL1 is a 64bit register while the 32bit ACTLR is obviously 32bit.
For 32bit software, the extra bits are accessible via ACTLR2... which
KVM doesn't emulate.
Suggested-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200529150656.7339-3-james.morse@arm.com
aarch32 has pairs of registers to access the high and low parts of 64bit
registers. KVM has a union of 64bit sys_regs[] and 32bit copro[]. The
32bit accessors read the high or low part of the 64bit sys_reg[] value
through the union.
Both sys_reg_descs[] and cp15_regs[] list access_csselr() as the accessor
for CSSELR{,_EL1}. access_csselr() is only aware of the 64bit sys_regs[],
and expects r->reg to be 'CSSELR_EL1' in the enum, index 2 of the 64bit
array.
cp15_regs[] uses the 32bit copro[] alias of sys_regs[]. Here CSSELR is
c0_CSSELR which is the same location in sys_reg[]. r->reg is 'c0_CSSELR',
index 4 in the 32bit array.
access_csselr() uses the 32bit r->reg value to access the 64bit array,
so reads and write the wrong value. sys_regs[4], is ACTLR_EL1, which
is subsequently save/restored when we enter the guest.
ACTLR_EL1 is supposed to be read-only for the guest. This register
only affects execution at EL1, and the host's value is restored before
we return to host EL1.
Convert the 32bit register index back to the 64bit version.
Suggested-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200529150656.7339-2-james.morse@arm.com
This code calls brelse(bh) and then dereferences "bh" on the next line
resulting in a possible use after free. The brelse() should just be
moved down a line.
Fixes: b676fdbcf4c8 ("exfat: standardize checksum calculation")
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Namjae Jeon <namjae.jeon@samsung.com>
