In rare cases it is possible for s_flags & MS_RDONLY to be set but
MNT_READONLY to be clear. This starting combination can cause
fs_fully_visible to fail to ensure that the new mount is readonly.
Therefore force MNT_LOCK_READONLY in the new mount if MS_RDONLY
is set on the source filesystem of the mount.
In general both MS_RDONLY and MNT_READONLY are set at the same for
mounts so I don't expect any programs to care. Nor do I expect
MS_RDONLY to be set on proc or sysfs in the initial user namespace,
which further decreases the likelyhood of problems.
Which means this change should only affect system configurations by
paranoid sysadmins who should welcome the additional protection
as it keeps people from wriggling out of their policies.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 8c6cf9cc82 ("mnt: Modify fs_fully_visible to deal with locked ro nodev and atime")
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
MNT_LOCKED implies on a child mount implies the child is locked to the
parent. So while looping through the children the children should be
tested (not their parent).
Typically an unshare of a mount namespace locks all mounts together
making both the parent and the slave as locked but there are a few
corner cases where other things work.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: ceeb0e5d39 ("vfs: Ignore unlocked mounts in fs_fully_visible")
Reported-by: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Add this trivial missing error handling.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 1b852bceb0 ("mnt: Refactor the logic for mounting sysfs and proc in a user namespace")
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
parallel to mutex_{lock,unlock,trylock,is_locked,lock_nested},
inode_foo(inode) being mutex_foo(&inode->i_mutex).
Please, use those for access to ->i_mutex; over the coming cycle
->i_mutex will become rwsem, with ->lookup() done with it held
only shared.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Pull misc vfs updates from Al Viro:
"All kinds of stuff. That probably should've been 5 or 6 separate
branches, but by the time I'd realized how large and mixed that bag
had become it had been too close to -final to play with rebasing.
Some fs/namei.c cleanups there, memdup_user_nul() introduction and
switching open-coded instances, burying long-dead code, whack-a-mole
of various kinds, several new helpers for ->llseek(), assorted
cleanups and fixes from various people, etc.
One piece probably deserves special mention - Neil's
lookup_one_len_unlocked(). Similar to lookup_one_len(), but gets
called without ->i_mutex and tries to avoid ever taking it. That, of
course, means that it's not useful for any directory modifications,
but things like getting inode attributes in nfds readdirplus are fine
with that. I really should've asked for moratorium on lookup-related
changes this cycle, but since I hadn't done that early enough... I
*am* asking for that for the coming cycle, though - I'm going to try
and get conversion of i_mutex to rwsem with ->lookup() done under lock
taken shared.
There will be a patch closer to the end of the window, along the lines
of the one Linus had posted last May - mechanical conversion of
->i_mutex accesses to inode_lock()/inode_unlock()/inode_trylock()/
inode_is_locked()/inode_lock_nested(). To quote Linus back then:
-----
| This is an automated patch using
|
| sed 's/mutex_lock(&\(.*\)->i_mutex)/inode_lock(\1)/'
| sed 's/mutex_unlock(&\(.*\)->i_mutex)/inode_unlock(\1)/'
| sed 's/mutex_lock_nested(&\(.*\)->i_mutex,[ ]*I_MUTEX_\([A-Z0-9_]*\))/inode_lock_nested(\1, I_MUTEX_\2)/'
| sed 's/mutex_is_locked(&\(.*\)->i_mutex)/inode_is_locked(\1)/'
| sed 's/mutex_trylock(&\(.*\)->i_mutex)/inode_trylock(\1)/'
|
| with a very few manual fixups
-----
I'm going to send that once the ->i_mutex-affecting stuff in -next
gets mostly merged (or when Linus says he's about to stop taking
merges)"
* 'work.misc' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: (63 commits)
nfsd: don't hold i_mutex over userspace upcalls
fs:affs:Replace time_t with time64_t
fs/9p: use fscache mutex rather than spinlock
proc: add a reschedule point in proc_readfd_common()
logfs: constify logfs_block_ops structures
fcntl: allow to set O_DIRECT flag on pipe
fs: __generic_file_splice_read retry lookup on AOP_TRUNCATED_PAGE
fs: xattr: Use kvfree()
[s390] page_to_phys() always returns a multiple of PAGE_SIZE
nbd: use ->compat_ioctl()
fs: use block_device name vsprintf helper
lib/vsprintf: add %*pg format specifier
fs: use gendisk->disk_name where possible
poll: plug an unused argument to do_poll
amdkfd: don't open-code memdup_user()
cdrom: don't open-code memdup_user()
rsxx: don't open-code memdup_user()
mtip32xx: don't open-code memdup_user()
[um] mconsole: don't open-code memdup_user_nul()
[um] hostaudio: don't open-code memdup_user()
...
This patch makes path_is_under return bool to improve
readability due to this particular function only using either
one or zero as its return value.
No functional change.
Signed-off-by: Yaowei Bai <baiyaowei@cmss.chinamobile.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Since no one uses mandatory locking and files with mandatory locks can
cause problems don't allow them in user namespaces.
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jeff.layton@primarydata.com>
Mandatory locking appears to be almost unused and buggy and there
appears no real interest in doing anything with it. Since effectively
no one uses the code and since the code is buggy let's allow it to be
disabled at compile time. I would just suggest removing the code but
undoubtedly that will break some piece of userspace code somewhere.
For the distributions that don't care about this piece of code
this gives a nice starting point to make mandatory locking go away.
Cc: Benjamin Coddington <bcodding@redhat.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Jeff Layton <jeff.layton@primarydata.com>
Cc: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@fieldses.org>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jeff.layton@primarydata.com>
Pull user namespace updates from Eric Biederman:
"This finishes up the changes to ensure proc and sysfs do not start
implementing executable files, as the there are application today that
are only secure because such files do not exist.
It akso fixes a long standing misfeature of /proc/<pid>/mountinfo that
did not show the proper source for files bind mounted from
/proc/<pid>/ns/*.
It also straightens out the handling of clone flags related to user
namespaces, fixing an unnecessary failure of unshare(CLONE_NEWUSER)
when files such as /proc/<pid>/environ are read while <pid> is calling
unshare. This winds up fixing a minor bug in unshare flag handling
that dates back to the first version of unshare in the kernel.
Finally, this fixes a minor regression caused by the introduction of
sysfs_create_mount_point, which broke someone's in house application,
by restoring the size of /sys/fs/cgroup to 0 bytes. Apparently that
application uses the directory size to determine if a tmpfs is mounted
on /sys/fs/cgroup.
The bind mount escape fixes are present in Al Viros for-next branch.
and I expect them to come from there. The bind mount escape is the
last of the user namespace related security bugs that I am aware of"
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace:
fs: Set the size of empty dirs to 0.
userns,pidns: Force thread group sharing, not signal handler sharing.
unshare: Unsharing a thread does not require unsharing a vm
nsfs: Add a show_path method to fix mountinfo
mnt: fs_fully_visible enforce noexec and nosuid if !SB_I_NOEXEC
vfs: Commit to never having exectuables on proc and sysfs.
The handling of in detach_mounts of unmounted but connected mounts is
buggy and can lead to an infinite loop.
Correct the handling of unmounted mounts in detach_mount. When the
mountpoint of an unmounted but connected mount is connected to a
dentry, and that dentry is deleted we need to disconnect that mount
from the parent mount and the deleted dentry.
Nothing changes for the unmounted and connected children. They can be
safely ignored.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: ce07d891a0 mnt: Honor MNT_LOCKED when detaching mounts
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
rmdir mntpoint will result in an infinite loop when there is
a mount locked on the mountpoint in another mount namespace.
This is because the logic to test to see if a mount should
be disconnected in umount_tree is buggy.
Move the logic to decide if a mount should remain connected to
it's mountpoint into it's own function disconnect_mount so that
clarity of expression instead of terseness of expression becomes
a virtue.
When the conditions where it is invalid to leave a mount connected
are first ruled out, the logic for deciding if a mount should
be disconnected becomes much clearer and simpler.
Fixes: e0c9c0afd2 mnt: Update detach_mounts to leave mounts connected
Fixes: ce07d891a0 mnt: Honor MNT_LOCKED when detaching mounts
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
The filesystems proc and sysfs do not have executable files do not
have exectuable files today and portions of userspace break if we do
enforce nosuid and noexec consistency of nosuid and noexec flags
between previous mounts and new mounts of proc and sysfs.
Add the code to enforce consistency of the nosuid and noexec flags,
and use the presence of SB_I_NOEXEC to signal that there is no need to
bother.
This results in a completely userspace invisible change that makes it
clear fs_fully_visible can only skip the enforcement of noexec and
nosuid because it is known the filesystems in question do not support
executables.
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Pull user namespace updates from Eric Biederman:
"Long ago and far away when user namespaces where young it was realized
that allowing fresh mounts of proc and sysfs with only user namespace
permissions could violate the basic rule that only root gets to decide
if proc or sysfs should be mounted at all.
Some hacks were put in place to reduce the worst of the damage could
be done, and the common sense rule was adopted that fresh mounts of
proc and sysfs should allow no more than bind mounts of proc and
sysfs. Unfortunately that rule has not been fully enforced.
There are two kinds of gaps in that enforcement. Only filesystems
mounted on empty directories of proc and sysfs should be ignored but
the test for empty directories was insufficient. So in my tree
directories on proc, sysctl and sysfs that will always be empty are
created specially. Every other technique is imperfect as an ordinary
directory can have entries added even after a readdir returns and
shows that the directory is empty. Special creation of directories
for mount points makes the code in the kernel a smidge clearer about
it's purpose. I asked container developers from the various container
projects to help test this and no holes were found in the set of mount
points on proc and sysfs that are created specially.
This set of changes also starts enforcing the mount flags of fresh
mounts of proc and sysfs are consistent with the existing mount of
proc and sysfs. I expected this to be the boring part of the work but
unfortunately unprivileged userspace winds up mounting fresh copies of
proc and sysfs with noexec and nosuid clear when root set those flags
on the previous mount of proc and sysfs. So for now only the atime,
read-only and nodev attributes which userspace happens to keep
consistent are enforced. Dealing with the noexec and nosuid
attributes remains for another time.
This set of changes also addresses an issue with how open file
descriptors from /proc/<pid>/ns/* are displayed. Recently readlink of
/proc/<pid>/fd has been triggering a WARN_ON that has not been
meaningful since it was added (as all of the code in the kernel was
converted) and is not now actively wrong.
There is also a short list of issues that have not been fixed yet that
I will mention briefly.
It is possible to rename a directory from below to above a bind mount.
At which point any directory pointers below the renamed directory can
be walked up to the root directory of the filesystem. With user
namespaces enabled a bind mount of the bind mount can be created
allowing the user to pick a directory whose children they can rename
to outside of the bind mount. This is challenging to fix and doubly
so because all obvious solutions must touch code that is in the
performance part of pathname resolution.
As mentioned above there is also a question of how to ensure that
developers by accident or with purpose do not introduce exectuable
files on sysfs and proc and in doing so introduce security regressions
in the current userspace that will not be immediately obvious and as
such are likely to require breaking userspace in painful ways once
they are recognized"
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace:
vfs: Remove incorrect debugging WARN in prepend_path
mnt: Update fs_fully_visible to test for permanently empty directories
sysfs: Create mountpoints with sysfs_create_mount_point
sysfs: Add support for permanently empty directories to serve as mount points.
kernfs: Add support for always empty directories.
proc: Allow creating permanently empty directories that serve as mount points
sysctl: Allow creating permanently empty directories that serve as mountpoints.
fs: Add helper functions for permanently empty directories.
vfs: Ignore unlocked mounts in fs_fully_visible
mnt: Modify fs_fully_visible to deal with locked ro nodev and atime
mnt: Refactor the logic for mounting sysfs and proc in a user namespace
fs_fully_visible attempts to make fresh mounts of proc and sysfs give
the mounter no more access to proc and sysfs than if they could have
by creating a bind mount. One aspect of proc and sysfs that makes
this particularly tricky is that there are other filesystems that
typically mount on top of proc and sysfs. As those filesystems are
mounted on empty directories in practice it is safe to ignore them.
However testing to ensure filesystems are mounted on empty directories
has not been something the in kernel data structures have supported so
the current test for an empty directory which checks to see
if nlink <= 2 is a bit lacking.
proc and sysfs have recently been modified to use the new empty_dir
infrastructure to create all of their dedicated mount points. Instead
of testing for S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode) && i_nlink <= 2 to see if a
directory is empty, test for is_empty_dir_inode(inode). That small
change guaranteess mounts found on proc and sysfs really are safe to
ignore, because the directories are not only empty but nothing can
ever be added to them. This guarantees there is nothing to worry
about when mounting proc and sysfs.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Limit the mounts fs_fully_visible considers to locked mounts.
Unlocked can always be unmounted so considering them adds hassle
but no security benefit.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
A patchset to remove support for passing pre-allocated struct seq_file to
seq_open(). Such feature is undocumented and prone to error.
In particular, if seq_release() is used in release handler, it will
kfree() a pointer which was not allocated by seq_open().
So this patchset drops support for pre-allocated struct seq_file: it's
only of use in proc_namespace.c and can be easily replaced by using
seq_open_private()/seq_release_private().
Additionally, it documents the use of file->private_data to hold pointer
to struct seq_file by seq_open().
This patch (of 3):
Since patch described below, from v2.6.15-rc1, seq_open() could use a
struct seq_file already allocated by the caller if the pointer to the
structure is stored in file->private_data before calling the function.
Commit 1abe77b0fc
Author: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Date: Mon Nov 7 17:15:34 2005 -0500
[PATCH] allow callers of seq_open do allocation themselves
Allow caller of seq_open() to kmalloc() seq_file + whatever else they
want and set ->private_data to it. seq_open() will then abstain from
doing allocation itself.
Such behavior is only used by mounts_open_common().
In order to drop support for such uncommon feature, proc_mounts is
converted to use seq_open_private(), which take care of allocating the
proc_mounts structure, making it available through ->private in struct
seq_file.
Conversely, proc_mounts is converted to use seq_release_private(), in
order to release the private structure allocated by seq_open_private().
Then, ->private is used directly instead of proc_mounts() macro to access
to the proc_mounts structure.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/cover.1433193673.git.ydroneaud@opteya.com
Signed-off-by: Yann Droneaud <ydroneaud@opteya.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Ignore an existing mount if the locked readonly, nodev or atime
attributes are less permissive than the desired attributes
of the new mount.
On success ensure the new mount locks all of the same readonly, nodev and
atime attributes as the old mount.
The nosuid and noexec attributes are not checked here as this change
is destined for stable and enforcing those attributes causes a
regression in lxc and libvirt-lxc where those applications will not
start and there are no known executables on sysfs or proc and no known
way to create exectuables without code modifications
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: e51db73532 ("userns: Better restrictions on when proc and sysfs can be mounted")
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Fresh mounts of proc and sysfs are a very special case that works very
much like a bind mount. Unfortunately the current structure can not
preserve the MNT_LOCK... mount flags. Therefore refactor the logic
into a form that can be modified to preserve those lock bits.
Add a new filesystem flag FS_USERNS_VISIBLE that requires some mount
of the filesystem be fully visible in the current mount namespace,
before the filesystem may be mounted.
Move the logic for calling fs_fully_visible from proc and sysfs into
fs/namespace.c where it has greater access to mount namespace state.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
same as legitimize_mnt(), except that it does *not* drop and regain
rcu_read_lock; return values are
0 => grabbed a reference, we are fine
1 => failed, just go away
-1 => failed, go away and mntput(bastard) when outside of rcu_read_lock
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
This fixes a dumb bug in fs_fully_visible that allows proc or sys to
be mounted if there is a bind mount of part of /proc/ or /sys/ visible.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Eric Windisch <ewindisch@docker.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Now that it is possible to lazily unmount an entire mount tree and
leave the individual mounts connected to each other add a new flag
UMOUNT_CONNECTED to umount_tree to force this behavior and use
this flag in detach_mounts.
This closes a bug where the deletion of a file or directory could
trigger an unmount and reveal data under a mount point.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
lookup_mountpoint can return either NULL or an error value.
Update the test in __detach_mounts to test for an error value
to avoid pathological cases causing a NULL pointer dereferences.
The callers of __detach_mounts should prevent it from ever being
called on an unlinked dentry but don't take any chances.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Modify umount(MNT_DETACH) to keep mounts in the hash table that are
locked to their parent mounts, when the parent is lazily unmounted.
In mntput_no_expire detach the children from the hash table, depending
on mnt_pin_kill in cleanup_mnt to decrement the mnt_count of the children.
In __detach_mounts if there are any mounts that have been unmounted
but still are on the list of mounts of a mountpoint, remove their
children from the mount hash table and those children to the unmounted
list so they won't linger potentially indefinitely waiting for their
final mntput, now that the mounts serve no purpose.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
For future use factor out a function umount_mnt from umount_tree.
This function unhashes a mount and remembers where the mount
was mounted so that eventually when the code makes it to a
sleeping context the mountpoint can be dput.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Create a function unhash_mnt that contains the common code between
detach_mnt and umount_tree, and use unhash_mnt in place of the common
code. This add a unncessary list_del_init(mnt->mnt_child) into
umount_tree but given that mnt_child is already empty this extra
line is a noop.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
The only users of collect_mounts are in audit_tree.c
In audit_trim_trees and audit_add_tree_rule the path passed into
collect_mounts is generated from kern_path passed an audit_tree
pathname which is guaranteed to be an absolute path. In those cases
collect_mounts is obviously intended to work on mounted paths and
if a race results in paths that are unmounted when collect_mounts
it is reasonable to fail early.
The paths passed into audit_tag_tree don't have the absolute path
check. But are used to play with fsnotify and otherwise interact with
the audit_trees, so again operating only on mounted paths appears
reasonable.
Avoid having to worry about what happens when we try and audit
unmounted filesystems by restricting collect_mounts to mounts
that appear in the mount tree.
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
A prerequisite of calling umount_tree is that the point where the tree
is mounted at is valid to unmount.
If we are propagating the effect of the unmount clear MNT_LOCKED in
every instance where the same filesystem is mounted on the same
mountpoint in the mount tree, as we know (by virtue of the fact
that umount_tree was called) that it is safe to reveal what
is at that mountpoint.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
- Modify __lookup_mnt_hash_last to ignore mounts that have MNT_UMOUNTED set.
- Don't remove mounts from the mount hash table in propogate_umount
- Don't remove mounts from the mount hash table in umount_tree before
the entire list of mounts to be umounted is selected.
- Remove mounts from the mount hash table as the last thing that
happens in the case where a mount has a parent in umount_tree.
Mounts without parents are not hashed (by definition).
This paves the way for delaying removal from the mount hash table even
farther and fixing the MNT_LOCKED vs MNT_DETACH issue.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
In some instances it is necessary to know if the the unmounting
process has begun on a mount. Add MNT_UMOUNT to make that reliably
testable.
This fix gets used in fixing locked mounts in MNT_DETACH
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
umount_tree builds a list of mounts that need to be unmounted.
Utilize mnt_list for this purpose instead of mnt_hash. This begins to
allow keeping a mount on the mnt_hash after it is unmounted, which is
necessary for a properly functioning MNT_LOCKED implementation.
The fact that mnt_list is an ordinary list makding available list_move
is nice bonus.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Invoking mount propagation from __detach_mounts is inefficient and
wrong.
It is inefficient because __detach_mounts already walks the list of
mounts that where something needs to be done, and mount propagation
walks some subset of those mounts again.
It is actively wrong because if the dentry that is passed to
__detach_mounts is not part of the path to a mount that mount should
not be affected.
change_mnt_propagation(p,MS_PRIVATE) modifies the mount propagation
tree of a master mount so it's slaves are connected to another master
if possible. Which means even removing a mount from the middle of a
mount tree with __detach_mounts will not deprive any mount propagated
mount events.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
- Remove the unneeded declaration from pnode.h
- Mark umount_tree static as it has no callers outside of namespace.c
- Define an enumeration of umount_tree's flags.
- Pass umount_tree's flags in by name
This removes the magic numbers 0, 1 and 2 making the code a little
clearer and makes it possible for there to be lazy unmounts that don't
propagate. Which is what __detach_mounts actually wants for example.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Convert the following where appropriate:
(1) S_ISLNK(dentry->d_inode) to d_is_symlink(dentry).
(2) S_ISREG(dentry->d_inode) to d_is_reg(dentry).
(3) S_ISDIR(dentry->d_inode) to d_is_dir(dentry). This is actually more
complicated than it appears as some calls should be converted to
d_can_lookup() instead. The difference is whether the directory in
question is a real dir with a ->lookup op or whether it's a fake dir with
a ->d_automount op.
In some circumstances, we can subsume checks for dentry->d_inode not being
NULL into this, provided we the code isn't in a filesystem that expects
d_inode to be NULL if the dirent really *is* negative (ie. if we're going to
use d_inode() rather than d_backing_inode() to get the inode pointer).
Note that the dentry type field may be set to something other than
DCACHE_MISS_TYPE when d_inode is NULL in the case of unionmount, where the VFS
manages the fall-through from a negative dentry to a lower layer. In such a
case, the dentry type of the negative union dentry is set to the same as the
type of the lower dentry.
However, if you know d_inode is not NULL at the call site, then you can use
the d_is_xxx() functions even in a filesystem.
There is one further complication: a 0,0 chardev dentry may be labelled
DCACHE_WHITEOUT_TYPE rather than DCACHE_SPECIAL_TYPE. Strictly, this was
intended for special directory entry types that don't have attached inodes.
The following perl+coccinelle script was used:
use strict;
my @callers;
open($fd, 'git grep -l \'S_IS[A-Z].*->d_inode\' |') ||
die "Can't grep for S_ISDIR and co. callers";
@callers = <$fd>;
close($fd);
unless (@callers) {
print "No matches\n";
exit(0);
}
my @cocci = (
'@@',
'expression E;',
'@@',
'',
'- S_ISLNK(E->d_inode->i_mode)',
'+ d_is_symlink(E)',
'',
'@@',
'expression E;',
'@@',
'',
'- S_ISDIR(E->d_inode->i_mode)',
'+ d_is_dir(E)',
'',
'@@',
'expression E;',
'@@',
'',
'- S_ISREG(E->d_inode->i_mode)',
'+ d_is_reg(E)' );
my $coccifile = "tmp.sp.cocci";
open($fd, ">$coccifile") || die $coccifile;
print($fd "$_\n") || die $coccifile foreach (@cocci);
close($fd);
foreach my $file (@callers) {
chomp $file;
print "Processing ", $file, "\n";
system("spatch", "--sp-file", $coccifile, $file, "--in-place", "--no-show-diff") == 0 ||
die "spatch failed";
}
[AV: overlayfs parts skipped]
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Pull misc VFS updates from Al Viro:
"This cycle a lot of stuff sits on topical branches, so I'll be sending
more or less one pull request per branch.
This is the first pile; more to follow in a few. In this one are
several misc commits from early in the cycle (before I went for
separate branches), plus the rework of mntput/dput ordering on umount,
switching to use of fs_pin instead of convoluted games in
namespace_unlock()"
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs:
switch the IO-triggering parts of umount to fs_pin
new fs_pin killing logics
allow attaching fs_pin to a group not associated with some superblock
get rid of the second argument of acct_kill()
take count and rcu_head out of fs_pin
dcache: let the dentry count go down to zero without taking d_lock
pull bumping refcount into ->kill()
kill pin_put()
mode_t whack-a-mole: chelsio
file->f_path.dentry is pinned down for as long as the file is open...
get rid of lustre_dump_dentry()
gut proc_register() a bit
kill d_validate()
ncpfs: get rid of d_validate() nonsense
selinuxfs: don't open-code d_genocide()
VFS frequently performs duplication of strings located in read-only memory
section. Replacing kstrdup by kstrdup_const allows to avoid such
operations.
Signed-off-by: Andrzej Hajda <a.hajda@samsung.com>
Cc: Marek Szyprowski <m.szyprowski@samsung.com>
Cc: Kyungmin Park <kyungmin.park@samsung.com>
Cc: Mike Turquette <mturquette@linaro.org>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Greg KH <greg@kroah.com>
Cc: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
While reviewing the code of umount_tree I realized that when we append
to a preexisting unmounted list we do not change pprev of the former
first item in the list.
Which means later in namespace_unlock hlist_del_init(&mnt->mnt_hash) on
the former first item of the list will stomp unmounted.first leaving
it set to some random mount point which we are likely to free soon.
This isn't likely to hit, but if it does I don't know how anyone could
track it down.
[ This happened because we don't have all the same operations for
hlist's as we do for normal doubly-linked lists. In particular,
list_splice() is easy on our standard doubly-linked lists, while
hlist_splice() doesn't exist and needs both start/end entries of the
hlist. And commit 38129a13e6 incorrectly open-coded that missing
hlist_splice().
We should think about making these kinds of "mindless" conversions
easier to get right by adding the missing hlist helpers - Linus ]
Fixes: 38129a13e6 switch mnt_hash to hlist
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Pull user namespace related fixes from Eric Biederman:
"As these are bug fixes almost all of thes changes are marked for
backporting to stable.
The first change (implicitly adding MNT_NODEV on remount) addresses a
regression that was created when security issues with unprivileged
remount were closed. I go on to update the remount test to make it
easy to detect if this issue reoccurs.
Then there are a handful of mount and umount related fixes.
Then half of the changes deal with the a recently discovered design
bug in the permission checks of gid_map. Unix since the beginning has
allowed setting group permissions on files to less than the user and
other permissions (aka ---rwx---rwx). As the unix permission checks
stop as soon as a group matches, and setgroups allows setting groups
that can not later be dropped, results in a situtation where it is
possible to legitimately use a group to assign fewer privileges to a
process. Which means dropping a group can increase a processes
privileges.
The fix I have adopted is that gid_map is now no longer writable
without privilege unless the new file /proc/self/setgroups has been
set to permanently disable setgroups.
The bulk of user namespace using applications even the applications
using applications using user namespaces without privilege remain
unaffected by this change. Unfortunately this ix breaks a couple user
space applications, that were relying on the problematic behavior (one
of which was tools/selftests/mount/unprivileged-remount-test.c).
To hopefully prevent needing a regression fix on top of my security
fix I rounded folks who work with the container implementations mostly
like to be affected and encouraged them to test the changes.
> So far nothing broke on my libvirt-lxc test bed. :-)
> Tested with openSUSE 13.2 and libvirt 1.2.9.
> Tested-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
> Tested on Fedora20 with libvirt 1.2.11, works fine.
> Tested-by: Chen Hanxiao <chenhanxiao@cn.fujitsu.com>
> Ok, thanks - yes, unprivileged lxc is working fine with your kernels.
> Just to be sure I was testing the right thing I also tested using
> my unprivileged nsexec testcases, and they failed on setgroup/setgid
> as now expected, and succeeded there without your patches.
> Tested-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
> I tested this with Sandstorm. It breaks as is and it works if I add
> the setgroups thing.
> Tested-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> # breaks things as designed :("
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace:
userns: Unbreak the unprivileged remount tests
userns; Correct the comment in map_write
userns: Allow setting gid_maps without privilege when setgroups is disabled
userns: Add a knob to disable setgroups on a per user namespace basis
userns: Rename id_map_mutex to userns_state_mutex
userns: Only allow the creator of the userns unprivileged mappings
userns: Check euid no fsuid when establishing an unprivileged uid mapping
userns: Don't allow unprivileged creation of gid mappings
userns: Don't allow setgroups until a gid mapping has been setablished
userns: Document what the invariant required for safe unprivileged mappings.
groups: Consolidate the setgroups permission checks
mnt: Clear mnt_expire during pivot_root
mnt: Carefully set CL_UNPRIVILEGED in clone_mnt
mnt: Move the clear of MNT_LOCKED from copy_tree to it's callers.
umount: Do not allow unmounting rootfs.
umount: Disallow unprivileged mount force
mnt: Update unprivileged remount test
mnt: Implicitly add MNT_NODEV on remount when it was implicitly added by mount
New pseudo-filesystem: nsfs. Targets of /proc/*/ns/* live there now.
It's not mountable (not even registered, so it's not in /proc/filesystems,
etc.). Files on it *are* bindable - we explicitly permit that in do_loopback().
This stuff lives in fs/nsfs.c now; proc_ns_fget() moved there as well.
get_proc_ns() is a macro now (it's simply returning ->i_private; would
have been an inline, if not for header ordering headache).
proc_ns_inode() is an ex-parrot. The interface used in procfs is
ns_get_path(path, task, ops) and ns_get_name(buf, size, task, ops).
Dentries and inodes are never hashed; a non-counting reference to dentry
is stashed in ns_common (removed by ->d_prune()) and reused by ns_get_path()
if present. See ns_get_path()/ns_prune_dentry/nsfs_evict() for details
of that mechanism.
As the result, proc_ns_follow_link() has stopped poking in nd->path.mnt;
it does nd_jump_link() on a consistent <vfsmount,dentry> pair it gets
from ns_get_path().
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
a) make get_proc_ns() return a pointer to struct ns_common
b) mirror ns_ops in dentry->d_fsdata of ns dentries, so that
is_mnt_ns_file() could get away with fewer dereferences.
That way struct proc_ns becomes invisible outside of fs/proc/*.c
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
for now - just move corresponding ->proc_inum instances over there
Acked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
When inspecting the pivot_root and the current mount expiry logic I
realized that pivot_root fails to clear like mount move does.
Add the missing line in case someone does the interesting feat of
moving an expirable submount. This gives a strong guarantee that root
of the filesystem tree will never expire.
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Clear MNT_LOCKED in the callers of copy_tree except copy_mnt_ns, and
collect_mounts. In copy_mnt_ns it is necessary to create an exact
copy of a mount tree, so not clearing MNT_LOCKED is important.
Similarly collect_mounts is used to take a snapshot of the mount tree
for audit logging purposes and auditing using a faithful copy of the
tree is important.
This becomes particularly significant when we start setting MNT_LOCKED
on rootfs to prevent it from being unmounted.
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
