This is mainly a patch for clarification, and to let us remove
the time_t definition from the kernel to prevent new users from
creeping in that might not be y2038-safe.
All remaining uses of 'time_t' or '__kernel_time_t' are part of
the user API that cannot be changed by that either have a
replacement or that do not suffer from the y2038 overflow.
Acked-by: Deepa Dinamani <deepa.kernel@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Patch series "sysvipc: introduce STAT_ANY commands", v2.
The following patches adds the discussed (see [1]) new command for shm
as well as for sems and msq as they are subject to the same
discrepancies for ipc object permission checks between the syscall and
via procfs. These new commands are justified in that (1) we are stuck
with this semantics as changing syscall and procfs can break userland;
and (2) some users can benefit from performance (for large amounts of
shm segments, for example) from not having to parse the procfs
interface.
Once merged, I will submit the necesary manpage updates. But I'm thinking
something like:
: diff --git a/man2/shmctl.2 b/man2/shmctl.2
: index 7bb503999941..bb00bbe21a57 100644
: --- a/man2/shmctl.2
: +++ b/man2/shmctl.2
: @@ -41,6 +41,7 @@
: .\" 2005-04-25, mtk -- noted aberrant Linux behavior w.r.t. new
: .\" attaches to a segment that has already been marked for deletion.
: .\" 2005-08-02, mtk: Added IPC_INFO, SHM_INFO, SHM_STAT descriptions.
: +.\" 2018-02-13, dbueso: Added SHM_STAT_ANY description.
: .\"
: .TH SHMCTL 2 2017-09-15 "Linux" "Linux Programmer's Manual"
: .SH NAME
: @@ -242,6 +243,18 @@ However, the
: argument is not a segment identifier, but instead an index into
: the kernel's internal array that maintains information about
: all shared memory segments on the system.
: +.TP
: +.BR SHM_STAT_ANY " (Linux-specific)"
: +Return a
: +.I shmid_ds
: +structure as for
: +.BR SHM_STAT .
: +However, the
: +.I shm_perm.mode
: +is not checked for read access for
: +.IR shmid ,
: +resembing the behaviour of
: +/proc/sysvipc/shm.
: .PP
: The caller can prevent or allow swapping of a shared
: memory segment with the following \fIcmd\fP values:
: @@ -287,7 +300,7 @@ operation returns the index of the highest used entry in the
: kernel's internal array recording information about all
: shared memory segments.
: (This information can be used with repeated
: -.B SHM_STAT
: +.B SHM_STAT/SHM_STAT_ANY
: operations to obtain information about all shared memory segments
: on the system.)
: A successful
: @@ -328,7 +341,7 @@ isn't accessible.
: \fIshmid\fP is not a valid identifier, or \fIcmd\fP
: is not a valid command.
: Or: for a
: -.B SHM_STAT
: +.B SHM_STAT/SHM_STAT_ANY
: operation, the index value specified in
: .I shmid
: referred to an array slot that is currently unused.
This patch (of 3):
There is a permission discrepancy when consulting shm ipc object metadata
between /proc/sysvipc/shm (0444) and the SHM_STAT shmctl command. The
later does permission checks for the object vs S_IRUGO. As such there can
be cases where EACCESS is returned via syscall but the info is displayed
anyways in the procfs files.
While this might have security implications via info leaking (albeit no
writing to the shm metadata), this behavior goes way back and showing all
the objects regardless of the permissions was most likely an overlook - so
we are stuck with it. Furthermore, modifying either the syscall or the
procfs file can cause userspace programs to break (ie ipcs). Some
applications require getting the procfs info (without root privileges) and
can be rather slow in comparison with a syscall -- up to 500x in some
reported cases.
This patch introduces a new SHM_STAT_ANY command such that the shm ipc
object permissions are ignored, and only audited instead. In addition,
I've left the lsm security hook checks in place, as if some policy can
block the call, then the user has no other choice than just parsing the
procfs file.
[1] https://lkml.org/lkml/2017/12/19/220
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180215162458.10059-2-dave@stgolabs.net
Signed-off-by: Davidlohr Bueso <dbueso@suse.de>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Cc: Manfred Spraul <manfred@colorfullife.com>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Robert Kettler <robert.kettler@outlook.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Many user space API headers are missing licensing information, which
makes it hard for compliance tools to determine the correct license.
By default are files without license information under the default
license of the kernel, which is GPLV2. Marking them GPLV2 would exclude
them from being included in non GPLV2 code, which is obviously not
intended. The user space API headers fall under the syscall exception
which is in the kernels COPYING file:
NOTE! This copyright does *not* cover user programs that use kernel
services by normal system calls - this is merely considered normal use
of the kernel, and does *not* fall under the heading of "derived work".
otherwise syscall usage would not be possible.
Update the files which contain no license information with an SPDX
license identifier. The chosen identifier is 'GPL-2.0 WITH
Linux-syscall-note' which is the officially assigned identifier for the
Linux syscall exception. SPDX license identifiers are a legally binding
shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text.
This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and
Philippe Ombredanne. See the previous patch in this series for the
methodology of how this patch was researched.
Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Use the common definitions from hugetlb_encode.h header file for
encoding hugetlb size definitions in shmget system call flags.
In addition, move these definitions from the internal (kernel) to user
(uapi) header file.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1501527386-10736-4-git-send-email-mike.kravetz@oracle.com
Signed-off-by: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>
Suggested-by: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: Aneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Anshuman Khandual <khandual@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <dbueso@suse.de>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
This is useful in the future and allows users to better understand the
reasoning behind the changes.
Also use UL as we're dealing with it anyways.
Signed-off-by: Davidlohr Bueso <davidlohr@hp.com>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Cc: Manfred Spraul <manfred@colorfullife.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
System V shared memory
a) can be abused to trigger out-of-memory conditions and the standard
measures against out-of-memory do not work:
- it is not possible to use setrlimit to limit the size of shm segments.
- segments can exist without association with any processes, thus
the oom-killer is unable to free that memory.
b) is typically used for shared information - today often multiple GB.
(e.g. database shared buffers)
The current default is a maximum segment size of 32 MB and a maximum
total size of 8 GB. This is often too much for a) and not enough for
b), which means that lots of users must change the defaults.
This patch increases the default limits (nearly) to the maximum, which
is perfect for case b). The defaults are used after boot and as the
initial value for each new namespace.
Admins/distros that need a protection against a) should reduce the
limits and/or enable shm_rmid_forced.
Unix has historically required setting these limits for shared memory,
and Linux inherited such behavior. The consequence of this is added
complexity for users and administrators. One very common example are
Database setup/installation documents and scripts, where users must
manually calculate the values for these limits. This also requires
(some) knowledge of how the underlying memory management works, thus
causing, in many occasions, the limits to just be flat out wrong.
Disabling these limits sooner could have saved companies a lot of time,
headaches and money for support. But it's never too late, simplify
users life now.
Further notes:
- The patch only changes default, overrides behave as before:
# sysctl kernel.shmall=33554432
would recreate the previous limit for SHMMAX (for the current namespace).
- Disabling sysv shm allocation is possible with:
# sysctl kernel.shmall=0
(not a new feature, also per-namespace)
- The limits are intentionally set to a value slightly less than ULONG_MAX,
to avoid triggering overflows in user space apps.
[not unreasonable, see http://marc.info/?l=linux-mm&m=139638334330127]
Signed-off-by: Manfred Spraul <manfred@colorfullife.com>
Signed-off-by: Davidlohr Bueso <davidlohr@hp.com>
Reported-by: Davidlohr Bueso <davidlohr@hp.com>
Acked-by: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Acked-by: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Both x32 and x86-64 use the same struct shmid64_ds/shminfo64/shm_info for
system calls. But x32 long is 32-bit. This patch replaces unsigned long
with __kernel_ulong_t in struct shmid64_ds/shminfo64/shm_info.
Signed-off-by: H.J. Lu <hjl.tools@gmail.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1388182464-28428-8-git-send-email-hjl.tools@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
