Open access to monitoring for CAP_PERFMON privileged process. Providing
the access under CAP_PERFMON capability singly, without the rest of
CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials, excludes chances to misuse the credentials
and makes operation more secure.
CAP_PERFMON implements the principle of least privilege for performance
monitoring and observability operations (POSIX IEEE 1003.1e 2.2.2.39
principle of least privilege: A security design principle that states
that a process or program be granted only those privileges (e.g.,
capabilities) necessary to accomplish its legitimate function, and only
for the time that such privileges are actually required)
For backward compatibility reasons access to the monitoring remains open
for CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged processes but CAP_SYS_ADMIN usage for
secure monitoring is discouraged with respect to CAP_PERFMON capability.
Signed-off-by: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Igor Lubashev <ilubashe@akamai.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-man@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Cc: selinux@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lore.kernel.org/lkml/691f1096-b15f-9b12-50a0-c2b93918149e@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Fix up affected files that include this signal functionality via sched.h.
Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
This was entirely automated, using the script by Al:
PATT='^[[:blank:]]*#[[:blank:]]*include[[:blank:]]*<asm/uaccess.h>'
sed -i -e "s!$PATT!#include <linux/uaccess.h>!" \
$(git grep -l "$PATT"|grep -v ^include/linux/uaccess.h)
to do the replacement at the end of the merge window.
Requested-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
The oprofilefs_lock can be taken in atomic context (in profiling
interrupts) and therefore cannot cannot be preempted on -rt -
annotate it.
In mainline this change documents the low level nature of
the lock - otherwise there's no functional difference. Lockdep
and Sparse checking will work as usual.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
The event buffer cannot deal with seeks, so
we should forbid that outright.
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Robert Richter <robert.richter@amd.com>
Cc: oprofile-list@lists.sf.net
Signed-off-by: Robert Richter <robert.richter@amd.com>
A race shouldn't happen since all workqueues or handlers are canceled
or flushed before the event buffer is freed. A warning is triggered
now if the buffer is freed too early.
Also, this patch adds some comments about event buffer protection,
reworks some code and adds code to clear buffer_pos during alloc and
free of the event buffer.
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Robert Richter <robert.richter@amd.com>
Looking at the 2.6.31-rc9 code, it appears there is a race condition
in the event_buffer cleanup code path (shutdown). This could lead to
kernel panic as some CPUs may be operating on the event buffer AFTER
it has been freed. The attached patch solves the problem and makes
sure CPUs check if the buffer is not NULL before they access it as
some may have been spinning on the mutex while the buffer was being
freed.
The race may happen if the buffer is freed during pending reads. But
it is not clear why there are races in add_event_entry() since all
workqueues or handlers are canceled or flushed before the event buffer
is freed.
Signed-off-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Robert Richter <robert.richter@amd.com>
This patch renames kernel-wide identifiers to something more oprofile
specific names.
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Robert Richter <robert.richter@amd.com>
Regular bitops don't work as locks on all architectures.
Also: can use non-atomic unlock as no concurrent stores to the word.
Signed-off-by: Nick Piggin <npiggin@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Robert Richter <robert.richter@amd.com>
If an error occurs on opcontrol start, the event and per cpu buffers
are released. If later opcontrol shutdown is called then the free
function will be called again to free buffers that no longer
exist. This results in a kernel oops. The following changes
prevent the call to delete buffers that don't exist.
Signed-off-by: Carl Love <carll@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Acked-by: Robert Richter <robert.richter@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
nmi_cpu_setup() is called from hardirq context and acquires oprofilefs_lock.
alloc_event_buffer() and oprofilefs_ulong_from_user() acquire this lock
without disabling irqs, which could deadlock.
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Many struct file_operations in the kernel can be "const". Marking them const
moves these to the .rodata section, which avoids false sharing with potential
dirty data. In addition it'll catch accidental writes at compile time to
these shared resources.
Signed-off-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Markus Armbruster <armbru@redhat.com>
Cc: Philippe Elie <phil.el@wanadoo.fr>
Cc: John Levon <levon@movementarian.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
- Move capable() from sched.h to capability.h;
- Use <linux/capability.h> where capable() is used
(in include/, block/, ipc/, kernel/, a few drivers/,
mm/, security/, & sound/;
many more drivers/ to go)
Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@xenotime.net>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Initial git repository build. I'm not bothering with the full history,
even though we have it. We can create a separate "historical" git
archive of that later if we want to, and in the meantime it's about
3.2GB when imported into git - space that would just make the early
git days unnecessarily complicated, when we don't have a lot of good
infrastructure for it.
Let it rip!
