The following modify sequence (loosely based on ipoib) will lose a pkey
modifcation:
- Modify (pkey index, port)
- Modify (new pkey index, NO port)
After the first modify, the qp_pps list will have saved the pkey and the
unit on the main list.
During the second modify, get_new_pps() will fetch the port from qp_pps
and read the new pkey index from qp_attr->pkey_index. The state will
still be zero, or IB_PORT_PKEY_NOT_VALID. Because of the invalid state,
the new values will never replace the one in the qp pps list, losing the
new pkey.
This happens because the following if statements will never correct the
state because the first term will be false. If the code had been executed,
it would incorrectly overwrite valid values.
if ((qp_attr_mask & IB_QP_PKEY_INDEX) && (qp_attr_mask & IB_QP_PORT))
new_pps->main.state = IB_PORT_PKEY_VALID;
if (!(qp_attr_mask & (IB_QP_PKEY_INDEX | IB_QP_PORT)) && qp_pps) {
new_pps->main.port_num = qp_pps->main.port_num;
new_pps->main.pkey_index = qp_pps->main.pkey_index;
if (qp_pps->main.state != IB_PORT_PKEY_NOT_VALID)
new_pps->main.state = IB_PORT_PKEY_VALID;
}
Fix by joining the two if statements with an or test to see if qp_pps is
non-NULL and in the correct state.
Fixes: 1dd017882e ("RDMA/core: Fix protection fault in get_pkey_idx_qp_list")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200313124704.14982.55907.stgit@awfm-01.aw.intel.com
Reviewed-by: Kaike Wan <kaike.wan@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Marciniszyn <mike.marciniszyn@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
Clang warns:
../drivers/infiniband/core/security.c:351:41: warning: converting the
enum constant to a boolean [-Wint-in-bool-context]
if (!(qp_attr_mask & (IB_QP_PKEY_INDEX || IB_QP_PORT)) && qp_pps) {
^
1 warning generated.
A bitwise OR should have been used instead.
Fixes: 1dd017882e ("RDMA/core: Fix protection fault in get_pkey_idx_qp_list")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200217204318.13609-1-natechancellor@gmail.com
Link: https://github.com/ClangBuiltLinux/linux/issues/889
Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Nathan Chancellor <natechancellor@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
rdma_for_each_port is already incrementing the iterator's value it
receives therefore, after the first iteration the iterator is increased by
2 which eventually causing wrong queries and possible traces.
Fix the above by removing the old redundant incrementation that was used
before rdma_for_each_port() macro.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Fixes: ea1075edcb ("RDMA: Add and use rdma_for_each_port")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191002122127.17571-1-leon@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mohamad Heib <mohamadh@mellanox.com>
Reviewed-by: Erez Alfasi <ereza@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@mellanox.com>
Reviewed-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
There is no reason to have three allocations of per-port data. Combine
them together and make the lifetime for all the per-port data match the
struct ib_device.
Following patches will require more port-specific data, now there is a
good place to put it.
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
We have many loops iterating over all of the end port numbers on a struct
ib_device, simplify them with a for_each helper.
Reviewed-by: Parav Pandit <parav@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
Since this only frees memory it should be done during the release
callback. Otherwise there are possible error flows where it might not get
called if registration aborts.
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
When creating many MAD agents in a short period of time, receive packet
processing can be delayed long enough to cause timeouts while new agents
are being added to the atomic notifier chain with IRQs disabled. Notifier
chain registration and unregstration is an O(n) operation. With large
numbers of MAD agents being created and destroyed simultaneously the CPUs
spend too much time with interrupts disabled.
Instead of each MAD agent registering for it's own LSM notification,
maintain a list of agents internally and register once, this registration
already existed for handling the PKeys. This list is write mostly, so a
normal spin lock is used vs a read/write lock. All MAD agents must be
checked, so a single list is used instead of breaking them down per
device.
Notifier calls are done under rcu_read_lock, so there isn't a risk of
similar packet timeouts while checking the MAD agents security settings
when notified.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Jurgens <danielj@mellanox.com>
Reviewed-by: Parav Pandit <parav@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@mellanox.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
If the MAD agents isn't allowed to manage the subnet, or fails to register
for the LSM notifier, the security context is leaked. Free the context in
these cases.
Fixes: 47a2b338fe ("IB/core: Enforce security on management datagrams")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Jurgens <danielj@mellanox.com>
Reviewed-by: Parav Pandit <parav@mellanox.com>
Reported-by: Parav Pandit <parav@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
If the notifier runs after the security context is freed an access of
freed memory can occur.
Fixes: 47a2b338fe ("IB/core: Enforce security on management datagrams")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Jurgens <danielj@mellanox.com>
Reviewed-by: Parav Pandit <parav@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
Make all the required change to start use the ib_device_ops structure.
Signed-off-by: Kamal Heib <kamalheib1@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
These return the same thing but dev_name is a more conventional use of the
kernel API.
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
Reviewed-by: Steve Wise <swise@opengridcomputing.com>
Reviewed-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@mellanox.com>
Reviewed-by: Dennis Dalessandro <dennis.dalessandro@intel.com>
Patches for 4.16 that are dependent on patches sent to 4.15-rc.
These are small clean ups for the vmw_pvrdma and i40iw drivers.
* 'from-rc' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rdma/rdma.git:
RDMA/vmw_pvrdma: Remove usage of BIT() from UAPI header
RDMA/vmw_pvrdma: Use refcount_t instead of atomic_t
RDMA/vmw_pvrdma: Use more specific sizeof in kcalloc
RDMA/vmw_pvrdma: Clarify QP and CQ is_kernel logic
RDMA/vmw_pvrdma: Add UAR SRQ macros in ABI header file
i40iw: Change accelerated flag to bool
The XRC target QP create flow sets up qp_sec only if there is an IB link with
LSM security enabled. However, several other related uAPI entry points blindly
follow the qp_sec NULL pointer, resulting in a possible oops.
Check for NULL before using qp_sec.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.12
Fixes: d291f1a652 ("IB/core: Enforce PKey security on QPs")
Reviewed-by: Daniel Jurgens <danielj@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Moni Shoua <monis@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leon@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
ib_security_modify_qp and ib_security_pkey_access are core internal
function. So avoid exporting them.
ib_security_pkey_access is used only when secuirty hooks are enabled so
avoid defining it otherwise.
Signed-off-by: Parav Pandit <parav@mellanox.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Jurgens <danielj@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leon@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
Per the infiniband spec an SMI MAD can have any PKey. Checking the pkey
on SMI MADs is not necessary, and it seems that some older adapters
using the mthca driver don't follow the convention of using the default
PKey, resulting in false denials, or errors querying the PKey cache.
SMI MAD security is still enforced, only agents allowed to manage the
subnet are able to receive or send SMI MADs.
Reported-by: Chris Blake <chrisrblake93@gmail.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.12
Fixes: 47a2b338fe ("IB/core: Enforce security on management datagrams")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Jurgens <danielj@mellanox.com>
Reviewed-by: Parav Pandit <parav@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leon@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
For now the only LSM security enforcement mechanism available is
specific to InfiniBand. Bypass enforcement for non-IB link types.
This fixes a regression where modify_qp fails for iWARP because
querying the PKEY returns -EINVAL.
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Cc: Don Dutile <ddutile@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Potnuri Bharat Teja <bharat@chelsio.com>
Fixes: d291f1a65232("IB/core: Enforce PKey security on QPs")
Fixes: 47a2b338fe63("IB/core: Enforce security on management datagrams")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Jurgens <danielj@mellanox.com>
Reviewed-by: Parav Pandit <parav@mellanox.com>
Tested-by: Potnuri Bharat Teja <bharat@chelsio.com>
Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leon@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
When modify QP is called on a shared QP update the security context for
the real QP. When security is subsequently enforced the shared QP
handles will be checked as well.
Without this change shared QP handles get added to the port/pkey lists,
which is a bug, because not all shared QP handles will be checked for
access. Also the shared QP security context wouldn't get removed from
the port/pkey lists causing access to free memory and list corruption
when they are destroyed.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: d291f1a652 ("IB/core: Enforce PKey security on QPs")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Jurgens <danielj@mellanox.com>
Reviewed-by: Parav Pandit <parav@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leon@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
Since there is nothing done with non zero return value, such check is
avoided.
Signed-off-by: Parav Pandit <parav@mellanox.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Jurgens <danielj@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leon@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
When security_ib_alloc_security fails, qp->qp_sec memory is freed.
However ib_destroy_qp still tries to access this memory which result
in kernel crash. So its initialized to NULL to avoid such access.
Fixes: d291f1a652 ("IB/core: Enforce PKey security on QPs")
Signed-off-by: Parav Pandit <parav@mellanox.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Jurgens <danielj@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leon@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
Check the return value from get_pkey_and_subnet_prefix to prevent using
uninitialized variables.
Fixes: d291f1a652 ("IB/core: Enforce PKey security on QPs")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Jurgens <danielj@mellanox.com>
Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Allocate and free a security context when creating and destroying a MAD
agent. This context is used for controlling access to PKeys and sending
and receiving SMPs.
When sending or receiving a MAD check that the agent has permission to
access the PKey for the Subnet Prefix of the port.
During MAD and snoop agent registration for SMI QPs check that the
calling process has permission to access the manage the subnet and
register a callback with the LSM to be notified of policy changes. When
notificaiton of a policy change occurs recheck permission and set a flag
indicating sending and receiving SMPs is allowed.
When sending and receiving MADs check that the agent has access to the
SMI if it's on an SMI QP. Because security policy can change it's
possible permission was allowed when creating the agent, but no longer
is.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Jurgens <danielj@mellanox.com>
Acked-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
[PM: remove the LSM hook init code]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Add new LSM hooks to allocate and free security contexts and check for
permission to access a PKey.
Allocate and free a security context when creating and destroying a QP.
This context is used for controlling access to PKeys.
When a request is made to modify a QP that changes the port, PKey index,
or alternate path, check that the QP has permission for the PKey in the
PKey table index on the subnet prefix of the port. If the QP is shared
make sure all handles to the QP also have access.
Store which port and PKey index a QP is using. After the reset to init
transition the user can modify the port, PKey index and alternate path
independently. So port and PKey settings changes can be a merge of the
previous settings and the new ones.
In order to maintain access control if there are PKey table or subnet
prefix change keep a list of all QPs are using each PKey index on
each port. If a change occurs all QPs using that device and port must
have access enforced for the new cache settings.
These changes add a transaction to the QP modify process. Association
with the old port and PKey index must be maintained if the modify fails,
and must be removed if it succeeds. Association with the new port and
PKey index must be established prior to the modify and removed if the
modify fails.
1. When a QP is modified to a particular Port, PKey index or alternate
path insert that QP into the appropriate lists.
2. Check permission to access the new settings.
3. If step 2 grants access attempt to modify the QP.
4a. If steps 2 and 3 succeed remove any prior associations.
4b. If ether fails remove the new setting associations.
If a PKey table or subnet prefix changes walk the list of QPs and
check that they have permission. If not send the QP to the error state
and raise a fatal error event. If it's a shared QP make sure all the
QPs that share the real_qp have permission as well. If the QP that
owns a security structure is denied access the security structure is
marked as such and the QP is added to an error_list. Once the moving
the QP to error is complete the security structure mark is cleared.
Maintaining the lists correctly turns QP destroy into a transaction.
The hardware driver for the device frees the ib_qp structure, so while
the destroy is in progress the ib_qp pointer in the ib_qp_security
struct is undefined. When the destroy process begins the ib_qp_security
structure is marked as destroying. This prevents any action from being
taken on the QP pointer. After the QP is destroyed successfully it
could still listed on an error_list wait for it to be processed by that
flow before cleaning up the structure.
If the destroy fails the QPs port and PKey settings are reinserted into
the appropriate lists, the destroying flag is cleared, and access control
is enforced, in case there were any cache changes during the destroy
flow.
To keep the security changes isolated a new file is used to hold security
related functionality.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Jurgens <danielj@mellanox.com>
Acked-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
[PM: merge fixup in ib_verbs.h and uverbs_cmd.c]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
