Add IMA policy support for measuring/appraising the kexec image and
initramfs. Two new IMA policy identifiers KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK and
KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK are defined.
Example policy rules:
measure func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK
appraise func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK appraise_type=imasig
measure func=KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK
appraise func=KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK appraise_type=imasig
Moving the enumeration to the vfs layer simplified the patches, allowing
the IMA changes, for the most part, to be separated from the other
changes. Unfortunately, passing either a kernel_read_file_id or a
ima_hooks enumeration within IMA is messy.
Option 1: duplicate kernel_read_file enumeration in ima_hooks
enum kernel_read_file_id {
...
READING_KEXEC_IMAGE,
READING_KEXEC_INITRAMFS,
READING_MAX_ID
enum ima_hooks {
...
KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK
KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK
Option 2: define ima_hooks as extension of kernel_read_file
eg: enum ima_hooks {
FILE_CHECK = READING_MAX_ID,
MMAP_CHECK,
In order to pass both kernel_read_file_id and ima_hooks values, we
would need to specify a struct containing a union.
struct caller_id {
union {
enum ima_hooks func_id;
enum kernel_read_file_id read_id;
};
};
Option 3: incorportate the ima_hooks enumeration into kernel_read_file_id,
perhaps changing the enumeration name.
For now, duplicate the new READING_KEXEC_IMAGE/INITRAMFS in the ima_hooks.
Changelog v4:
- replaced switch statement with a kernel_read_file_id to an ima_hooks
id mapping array - Dmitry
- renamed ima_hook tokens KEXEC_CHECK and INITRAMFS_CHECK to
KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK and KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK respectively - Dave Young
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Petko Manolov <petkan@mip-labs.com>
Acked-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@huawei.com>
Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Each time a file is read by the kernel, the file should be re-measured and
the file signature re-appraised, based on policy. As there is no need to
preserve the status information, this patch replaces the firmware and
module specific cache status with a generic one named read_file.
This change simplifies adding support for other files read by the kernel.
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Petko Manolov <petkan@mip-labs.com>
Acked-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@huawei.com>
Replace copy_module_from_fd() with kernel_read_file_from_fd().
Although none of the upstreamed LSMs define a kernel_module_from_file
hook, IMA is called, based on policy, to prevent unsigned kernel modules
from being loaded by the original kernel module syscall and to
measure/appraise signed kernel modules.
The security function security_kernel_module_from_file() was called prior
to reading a kernel module. Preventing unsigned kernel modules from being
loaded by the original kernel module syscall remains on the pre-read
kernel_read_file() security hook. Instead of reading the kernel module
twice, once for measuring/appraising and again for loading the kernel
module, the signature validation is moved to the kernel_post_read_file()
security hook.
This patch removes the security_kernel_module_from_file() hook and security
call.
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Luis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@kernel.org>
Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
The kernel_read_file security hook is called prior to reading the file
into memory.
Changelog v4+:
- export security_kernel_read_file()
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Luis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Replace the fw_read_file_contents with kernel_file_read_from_path().
Although none of the upstreamed LSMs define a kernel_fw_from_file hook,
IMA is called by the security function to prevent unsigned firmware from
being loaded and to measure/appraise signed firmware, based on policy.
Instead of reading the firmware twice, once for measuring/appraising the
firmware and again for reading the firmware contents into memory, the
kernel_post_read_file() security hook calculates the file hash based on
the in memory file buffer. The firmware is read once.
This patch removes the LSM kernel_fw_from_file() hook and security call.
Changelog v4+:
- revert dropped buf->size assignment - reported by Sergey Senozhatsky
v3:
- remove kernel_fw_from_file hook
- use kernel_file_read_from_path() - requested by Luis
v2:
- reordered and squashed firmware patches
- fix MAX firmware size (Kees Cook)
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Luis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@kernel.org>
This patch defines a new IMA hook ima_post_read_file() for measuring
and appraising files read by the kernel. The caller loads the file into
memory before calling this function, which calculates the hash followed by
the normal IMA policy based processing.
Changelog v5:
- fail ima_post_read_file() if either file or buf is NULL
v3:
- rename ima_hash_and_process_file() to ima_post_read_file()
v1:
- split patch
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@huawei.com>
The inode_getsecid hook is called from contexts in which sleeping is not
allowed, so we cannot revalidate inode security labels from there. Use
the non-validating version of inode_security() instead.
Reported-by: Benjamin Coddington <bcodding@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Setting up ahash has some overhead. Only use ahash to calculate the
hash of a buffer, if the buffer is larger than ima_ahash_minsize.
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@huawei.com>
To differentiate between the kernel_read_file() callers, this patch
defines a new enumeration named kernel_read_file_id and includes the
caller identifier as an argument.
Subsequent patches define READING_KEXEC_IMAGE, READING_KEXEC_INITRAMFS,
READING_FIRMWARE, READING_MODULE, and READING_POLICY.
Changelog v3:
- Replace the IMA specific enumeration with a generic one.
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Luis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@kernel.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
For a while it was looked down upon to directly read files from Linux.
These days there exists a few mechanisms in the kernel that do just
this though to load a file into a local buffer. There are minor but
important checks differences on each. This patch set is the first
attempt at resolving some of these differences.
This patch introduces a common function for reading files from the kernel
with the corresponding security post-read hook and function.
Changelog v4+:
- export security_kernel_post_read_file() - Fengguang Wu
v3:
- additional bounds checking - Luis
v2:
- To simplify patch review, re-ordered patches
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Luis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@suse.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cleanup the function arguments by using "ima_hooks" enumerator as needed.
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Petko Manolov <petkan@mip-labs.com>
Acked-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@huawei.com>
Define and call a function to display the "ima_hooks" rules.
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Petko Manolov <petkan@mip-labs.com>
Acked-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@huawei.com>
Instead of passing pointers to pointers to ima_collect_measurent() to
read and return the 'security.ima' xattr value, this patch moves the
functionality to the calling process_measurement() to directly read
the xattr and pass only the hash algo to the ima_collect_measurement().
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
The Kconfig currently controlling compilation of this code is:
config BIG_KEYS
bool "Large payload keys"
...meaning that it currently is not being built as a module by anyone.
Lets remove the modular code that is essentially orphaned, so that
when reading the driver there is no doubt it is builtin-only.
Since module_init translates to device_initcall in the non-modular
case, the init ordering remains unchanged with this commit.
We also delete the MODULE_LICENSE tag since all that information
is already contained at the top of the file in the comments.
Cc: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Convert asymmetric_verify to akcipher api.
Signed-off-by: Tadeusz Struk <tadeusz.struk@intel.com>
Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Before this commit, removing the access property of
a file, aka, the extended attribute security.SMACK64
was not effictive until the cache had been cleaned.
This patch fixes that problem.
Signed-off-by: José Bollo <jobol@nonadev.net>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
For protection keys, we need to understand whether protections
should be enforced in software or not. In general, we enforce
protections when working on our own task, but not when on others.
We call these "current" and "remote" operations.
This patch introduces a new get_user_pages() variant:
get_user_pages_remote()
Which is a replacement for when get_user_pages() is called on
non-current tsk/mm.
We also introduce a new gup flag: FOLL_REMOTE which can be used
for the "__" gup variants to get this new behavior.
The uprobes is_trap_at_addr() location holds mmap_sem and
calls get_user_pages(current->mm) on an instruction address. This
makes it a pretty unique gup caller. Being an instruction access
and also really originating from the kernel (vs. the app), I opted
to consider this a 'remote' access where protection keys will not
be enforced.
Without protection keys, this patch should not change any behavior.
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave@sr71.net>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Naoya Horiguchi <n-horiguchi@ah.jp.nec.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Srikar Dronamraju <srikar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: jack@suse.cz
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20160212210154.3F0E51EA@viggo.jf.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
This patch fixes vulnerability CVE-2016-2085. The problem exists
because the vm_verify_hmac() function includes a use of memcmp().
Unfortunately, this allows timing side channel attacks; specifically
a MAC forgery complexity drop from 2^128 to 2^12. This patch changes
the memcmp() to the cryptographically safe crypto_memneq().
Reported-by: Xiaofei Rex Guo <xiaofei.rex.guo@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Ryan Ware <ware@linux.intel.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Prior to the 4.2 kernel there no no harm in providing
a security module hook that does nothing, as the default
hook would get called if the module did not supply one.
With the list based infrastructure an empty hook adds
overhead. This patch removes the three Smack hooks that
don't actually do anything.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
CONFIG_KEYS_DEBUG_PROC_KEYS is no longer an option as /proc/keys is now
mandatory if the keyrings facility is enabled (it's used by libkeyutils in
userspace).
The defconfig references were removed with:
perl -p -i -e 's/CONFIG_KEYS_DEBUG_PROC_KEYS=y\n//' \
`git grep -l CONFIG_KEYS_DEBUG_PROC_KEYS=y`
and the integrity Kconfig fixed by hand.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Andreas Ziegler <andreas.ziegler@fau.de>
cc: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@huawei.com>
In my original patch sealing with policy was done with dynamically
allocated buffer that I changed later into an array so the checks in
tpm2-cmd.c became invalid. This patch fixes the issue.
Fixes: 5beb0c435b ("keys, trusted: seal with a TPM2 authorization policy")
Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Peter Huewe <peterhuewe@gmx.de>
Add KEY_ALLOC_BUILT_IN to convey that a key should have KEY_FLAG_BUILTIN
set rather than setting it after the fact.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Without this, using SOCK_DESTROY in enforcing mode results in:
SELinux: unrecognized netlink message type=21 for sclass=32
Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Colitti <lorenzo@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
ima_check_policy() has no parameters, so use the normal void
parameter convention to make it match the prototype in the header file
security/integrity/ima/ima.h
Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Convert asymmetric_verify to akcipher api.
Signed-off-by: Tadeusz Struk <tadeusz.struk@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Compiler warns us a lot that it can't find include folder because it's
provided in relative form.
CC security/selinux/netlabel.o
cc1: warning: security/selinux/include: No such file or directory
cc1: warning: security/selinux/include: No such file or directory
cc1: warning: security/selinux/include: No such file or directory
cc1: warning: security/selinux/include: No such file or directory
Add $(srctree) prefix to the path.
Signed-off-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>
[PM: minor description edits to fit under 80char width]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
KEY_FLAG_KEEP should only be applied to a key if the keyring it is being
linked into has KEY_FLAG_KEEP set.
To this end, partially revert the following patch:
commit 1d6d167c2e
Author: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Date: Thu Jan 7 07:46:36 2016 -0500
KEYS: refcount bug fix
to undo the change that made it unconditional (Mimi got it right the first
time).
Without undoing this change, it becomes impossible to delete, revoke or
invalidate keys added to keyrings through __key_instantiate_and_link()
where the keyring has itself been linked to. To test this, run the
following command sequence:
keyctl newring foo @s
keyctl add user a a %:foo
keyctl unlink %user:a %:foo
keyctl clear %:foo
With the commit mentioned above the third and fourth commands fail with
EPERM when they should succeed.
Reported-by: Stephen Gallager <sgallagh@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org
cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Access to tty->tty_files list is always per-tty, never for all ttys
simultaneously. Replace global tty_files_lock spinlock with per-tty
->files_lock. Initialize when the ->tty_files list is inited, in
alloc_tty_struct().
Signed-off-by: Peter Hurley <peter@hurleysoftware.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
parallel to mutex_{lock,unlock,trylock,is_locked,lock_nested},
inode_foo(inode) being mutex_foo(&inode->i_mutex).
Please, use those for access to ->i_mutex; over the coming cycle
->i_mutex will become rwsem, with ->lookup() done with it held
only shared.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
By checking the effective credentials instead of the real UID / permitted
capabilities, ensure that the calling process actually intended to use its
credentials.
To ensure that all ptrace checks use the correct caller credentials (e.g.
in case out-of-tree code or newly added code omits the PTRACE_MODE_*CREDS
flag), use two new flags and require one of them to be set.
The problem was that when a privileged task had temporarily dropped its
privileges, e.g. by calling setreuid(0, user_uid), with the intent to
perform following syscalls with the credentials of a user, it still passed
ptrace access checks that the user would not be able to pass.
While an attacker should not be able to convince the privileged task to
perform a ptrace() syscall, this is a problem because the ptrace access
check is reused for things in procfs.
In particular, the following somewhat interesting procfs entries only rely
on ptrace access checks:
/proc/$pid/stat - uses the check for determining whether pointers
should be visible, useful for bypassing ASLR
/proc/$pid/maps - also useful for bypassing ASLR
/proc/$pid/cwd - useful for gaining access to restricted
directories that contain files with lax permissions, e.g. in
this scenario:
lrwxrwxrwx root root /proc/13020/cwd -> /root/foobar
drwx------ root root /root
drwxr-xr-x root root /root/foobar
-rw-r--r-- root root /root/foobar/secret
Therefore, on a system where a root-owned mode 6755 binary changes its
effective credentials as described and then dumps a user-specified file,
this could be used by an attacker to reveal the memory layout of root's
processes or reveal the contents of files he is not allowed to access
(through /proc/$pid/cwd).
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix warning]
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Cc: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
It looks like smack and yama weren't aware that the ptrace mode
can have flags ORed into it - PTRACE_MODE_NOAUDIT until now, but
only for /proc/$pid/stat, and with the PTRACE_MODE_*CREDS patch,
all modes have flags ORed into them.
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Cc: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
This fixes CVE-2016-0728.
If a thread is asked to join as a session keyring the keyring that's already
set as its session, we leak a keyring reference.
This can be tested with the following program:
#include <stddef.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <keyutils.h>
int main(int argc, const char *argv[])
{
int i = 0;
key_serial_t serial;
serial = keyctl(KEYCTL_JOIN_SESSION_KEYRING,
"leaked-keyring");
if (serial < 0) {
perror("keyctl");
return -1;
}
if (keyctl(KEYCTL_SETPERM, serial,
KEY_POS_ALL | KEY_USR_ALL) < 0) {
perror("keyctl");
return -1;
}
for (i = 0; i < 100; i++) {
serial = keyctl(KEYCTL_JOIN_SESSION_KEYRING,
"leaked-keyring");
if (serial < 0) {
perror("keyctl");
return -1;
}
}
return 0;
}
If, after the program has run, there something like the following line in
/proc/keys:
3f3d898f I--Q--- 100 perm 3f3f0000 0 0 keyring leaked-keyring: empty
with a usage count of 100 * the number of times the program has been run,
then the kernel is malfunctioning. If leaked-keyring has zero usages or
has been garbage collected, then the problem is fixed.
Reported-by: Yevgeny Pats <yevgeny@perception-point.io>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Prarit Bhargava <prarit@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Jarod Wilson <jarod@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris:
- EVM gains support for loading an x509 cert from the kernel
(EVM_LOAD_X509), into the EVM trusted kernel keyring.
- Smack implements 'file receive' process-based permission checking for
sockets, rather than just depending on inode checks.
- Misc enhancments for TPM & TPM2.
- Cleanups and bugfixes for SELinux, Keys, and IMA.
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (41 commits)
selinux: Inode label revalidation performance fix
KEYS: refcount bug fix
ima: ima_write_policy() limit locking
IMA: policy can be updated zero times
selinux: rate-limit netlink message warnings in selinux_nlmsg_perm()
selinux: export validatetrans decisions
gfs2: Invalid security labels of inodes when they go invalid
selinux: Revalidate invalid inode security labels
security: Add hook to invalidate inode security labels
selinux: Add accessor functions for inode->i_security
security: Make inode argument of inode_getsecid non-const
security: Make inode argument of inode_getsecurity non-const
selinux: Remove unused variable in selinux_inode_init_security
keys, trusted: seal with a TPM2 authorization policy
keys, trusted: select hash algorithm for TPM2 chips
keys, trusted: fix: *do not* allow duplicate key options
tpm_ibmvtpm: properly handle interrupted packet receptions
tpm_tis: Tighten IRQ auto-probing
tpm_tis: Refactor the interrupt setup
tpm_tis: Get rid of the duplicate IRQ probing code
...
Pull misc vfs updates from Al Viro:
"All kinds of stuff. That probably should've been 5 or 6 separate
branches, but by the time I'd realized how large and mixed that bag
had become it had been too close to -final to play with rebasing.
Some fs/namei.c cleanups there, memdup_user_nul() introduction and
switching open-coded instances, burying long-dead code, whack-a-mole
of various kinds, several new helpers for ->llseek(), assorted
cleanups and fixes from various people, etc.
One piece probably deserves special mention - Neil's
lookup_one_len_unlocked(). Similar to lookup_one_len(), but gets
called without ->i_mutex and tries to avoid ever taking it. That, of
course, means that it's not useful for any directory modifications,
but things like getting inode attributes in nfds readdirplus are fine
with that. I really should've asked for moratorium on lookup-related
changes this cycle, but since I hadn't done that early enough... I
*am* asking for that for the coming cycle, though - I'm going to try
and get conversion of i_mutex to rwsem with ->lookup() done under lock
taken shared.
There will be a patch closer to the end of the window, along the lines
of the one Linus had posted last May - mechanical conversion of
->i_mutex accesses to inode_lock()/inode_unlock()/inode_trylock()/
inode_is_locked()/inode_lock_nested(). To quote Linus back then:
-----
| This is an automated patch using
|
| sed 's/mutex_lock(&\(.*\)->i_mutex)/inode_lock(\1)/'
| sed 's/mutex_unlock(&\(.*\)->i_mutex)/inode_unlock(\1)/'
| sed 's/mutex_lock_nested(&\(.*\)->i_mutex,[ ]*I_MUTEX_\([A-Z0-9_]*\))/inode_lock_nested(\1, I_MUTEX_\2)/'
| sed 's/mutex_is_locked(&\(.*\)->i_mutex)/inode_is_locked(\1)/'
| sed 's/mutex_trylock(&\(.*\)->i_mutex)/inode_trylock(\1)/'
|
| with a very few manual fixups
-----
I'm going to send that once the ->i_mutex-affecting stuff in -next
gets mostly merged (or when Linus says he's about to stop taking
merges)"
* 'work.misc' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: (63 commits)
nfsd: don't hold i_mutex over userspace upcalls
fs:affs:Replace time_t with time64_t
fs/9p: use fscache mutex rather than spinlock
proc: add a reschedule point in proc_readfd_common()
logfs: constify logfs_block_ops structures
fcntl: allow to set O_DIRECT flag on pipe
fs: __generic_file_splice_read retry lookup on AOP_TRUNCATED_PAGE
fs: xattr: Use kvfree()
[s390] page_to_phys() always returns a multiple of PAGE_SIZE
nbd: use ->compat_ioctl()
fs: use block_device name vsprintf helper
lib/vsprintf: add %*pg format specifier
fs: use gendisk->disk_name where possible
poll: plug an unused argument to do_poll
amdkfd: don't open-code memdup_user()
cdrom: don't open-code memdup_user()
rsxx: don't open-code memdup_user()
mtip32xx: don't open-code memdup_user()
[um] mconsole: don't open-code memdup_user_nul()
[um] hostaudio: don't open-code memdup_user()
...
Pull vfs xattr updates from Al Viro:
"Andreas' xattr cleanup series.
It's a followup to his xattr work that went in last cycle; -0.5KLoC"
* 'work.xattr' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs:
xattr handlers: Simplify list operation
ocfs2: Replace list xattr handler operations
nfs: Move call to security_inode_listsecurity into nfs_listxattr
xfs: Change how listxattr generates synthetic attributes
tmpfs: listxattr should include POSIX ACL xattrs
tmpfs: Use xattr handler infrastructure
btrfs: Use xattr handler infrastructure
vfs: Distinguish between full xattr names and proper prefixes
posix acls: Remove duplicate xattr name definitions
gfs2: Remove gfs2_xattr_acl_chmod
vfs: Remove vfs_xattr_cmp
Commit 5d226df4 has introduced a performance regression of about
10% in the UnixBench pipe benchmark. It turns out that the call
to inode_security in selinux_file_permission can be moved below
the zero-mask test and that inode_security_revalidate can be
removed entirely, which brings us back to roughly the original
performance.
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
This patch fixes the key_ref leak, removes the unnecessary KEY_FLAG_KEEP
test before setting the flag, and cleans up the if/then brackets style
introduced in commit:
d3600bc KEYS: prevent keys from being removed from specified keyrings
Reported-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Nothing in there gives a damn about the buffer alignment - it
just parses its contents. So the use of get_zeroed_page()
doesn't buy us anything - might as well had been kmalloc(),
which makes that code equivalent to open-coded memdup_user_nul()
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
A _lot_ of ->write() instances were open-coding it; some are
converted to memdup_user_nul(), a lot more remain...
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
There is no need to hold the ima_write_mutex for so long. We only need it
around ima_parse_add_rule().
Changelog:
- The return path now takes into account failed kmalloc() call.
Reported-by: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Petko Manolov <petkan@mip-labs.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Commit "IMA: policy can now be updated multiple times" assumed that the
policy would be updated at least once.
If there are zero updates, the temporary list head object will get added
to the policy list, and later dereferenced as an IMA policy object, which
means that invalid memory will be accessed.
Changelog:
- Move list_empty() test to ima_release_policy(), before audit msg - Mimi
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Any process is able to send netlink messages with invalid types.
Make the warning rate-limited to prevent too much log spam.
The warning is supposed to help to find misbehaving programs, so
print the triggering command name and pid.
Reported-by: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Vladis Dronov <vdronov@redhat.com>
[PM: subject line tweak to make checkpatch.pl happy]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Make validatetrans decisions available through selinuxfs.
"/validatetrans" is added to selinuxfs for this purpose.
This functionality is needed by file system servers
implemented in userspace or kernelspace without the VFS
layer.
Writing "$oldcontext $newcontext $tclass $taskcontext"
to /validatetrans is expected to return 0 if the transition
is allowed and -EPERM otherwise.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Perepechko <anserper@ya.ru>
CC: andrew.perepechko@seagate.com
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
When fetching an inode's security label, check if it is still valid, and
try reloading it if it is not. Reloading will fail when we are in RCU
context which doesn't allow sleeping, or when we can't find a dentry for
the inode. (Reloading happens via iop->getxattr which takes a dentry
parameter.) When reloading fails, continue using the old, invalid
label.
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Add a hook to invalidate an inode's security label when the cached
information becomes invalid.
Add the new hook in selinux: set a flag when a security label becomes
invalid.
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Add functions dentry_security and inode_security for accessing
inode->i_security. These functions initially don't do much, but they
will later be used to revalidate the security labels when necessary.
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Make the inode argument of the inode_getsecid hook non-const so that we
can use it to revalidate invalid security labels.
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Make the inode argument of the inode_getsecurity hook non-const so that
we can use it to revalidate invalid security labels.
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
TPM2 supports authorization policies, which are essentially
combinational logic statements repsenting the conditions where the data
can be unsealed based on the TPM state. This patch enables to use
authorization policies to seal trusted keys.
Two following new options have been added for trusted keys:
* 'policydigest=': provide an auth policy digest for sealing.
* 'policyhandle=': provide a policy session handle for unsealing.
If 'hash=' option is supplied after 'policydigest=' option, this
will result an error because the state of the option would become
mixed.
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Tested-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Peter Huewe <peterhuewe@gmx.de>
Added 'hash=' option for selecting the hash algorithm for add_key()
syscall and documentation for it.
Added entry for sm3-256 to the following tables in order to support
TPM_ALG_SM3_256:
* hash_algo_name
* hash_digest_size
Includes support for the following hash algorithms:
* sha1
* sha256
* sha384
* sha512
* sm3-256
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Tested-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Peter Huewe <peterhuewe@gmx.de>
The trusted keys option parsing allows specifying the same option
multiple times. The last option value specified is used.
This is problematic because:
* No gain.
* This makes complicated to specify options that are dependent on other
options.
This patch changes the behavior in a way that option can be specified
only once.
Reported-by: James Morris James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Peter Huewe <peterhuewe@gmx.de>
This fixes CVE-2015-7550.
There's a race between keyctl_read() and keyctl_revoke(). If the revoke
happens between keyctl_read() checking the validity of a key and the key's
semaphore being taken, then the key type read method will see a revoked key.
This causes a problem for the user-defined key type because it assumes in
its read method that there will always be a payload in a non-revoked key
and doesn't check for a NULL pointer.
Fix this by making keyctl_read() check the validity of a key after taking
semaphore instead of before.
I think the bug was introduced with the original keyrings code.
This was discovered by a multithreaded test program generated by syzkaller
(http://github.com/google/syzkaller). Here's a cleaned up version:
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <keyutils.h>
#include <pthread.h>
void *thr0(void *arg)
{
key_serial_t key = (unsigned long)arg;
keyctl_revoke(key);
return 0;
}
void *thr1(void *arg)
{
key_serial_t key = (unsigned long)arg;
char buffer[16];
keyctl_read(key, buffer, 16);
return 0;
}
int main()
{
key_serial_t key = add_key("user", "%", "foo", 3, KEY_SPEC_USER_KEYRING);
pthread_t th[5];
pthread_create(&th[0], 0, thr0, (void *)(unsigned long)key);
pthread_create(&th[1], 0, thr1, (void *)(unsigned long)key);
pthread_create(&th[2], 0, thr0, (void *)(unsigned long)key);
pthread_create(&th[3], 0, thr1, (void *)(unsigned long)key);
pthread_join(th[0], 0);
pthread_join(th[1], 0);
pthread_join(th[2], 0);
pthread_join(th[3], 0);
return 0;
}
Build as:
cc -o keyctl-race keyctl-race.c -lkeyutils -lpthread
Run as:
while keyctl-race; do :; done
as it may need several iterations to crash the kernel. The crash can be
summarised as:
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000010
IP: [<ffffffff81279b08>] user_read+0x56/0xa3
...
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff81276aa9>] keyctl_read_key+0xb6/0xd7
[<ffffffff81277815>] SyS_keyctl+0x83/0xe0
[<ffffffff815dbb97>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x6f
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Smack security handler for sendmsg() syscall
is vulnerable to type confusion issue what
can allow to privilege escalation into root
or cause denial of service.
A malicious attacker can create socket of one
type for example AF_UNIX and pass is into
sendmsg() function ensuring that this is
AF_INET socket.
Remedy
Do not trust user supplied data.
Proposed fix below.
Signed-off-by: Roman Kubiak <r.kubiak@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mateusz Fruba <m.fruba@samsung.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
The Kconfig currently controlling compilation of this code is:
ima/Kconfig:config IMA_MOK_KEYRING
ima/Kconfig: bool "Create IMA machine owner keys (MOK) and blacklist keyrings"
...meaning that it currently is not being built as a module by anyone.
Lets remove the couple of traces of modularity so that when reading the
driver there is no doubt it really is builtin-only.
Since module_init translates to device_initcall in the non-modular
case, the init ordering remains unchanged with this commit.
Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com>
Cc: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: linux-ima-devel@lists.sourceforge.net
Cc: linux-ima-user@lists.sourceforge.net
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
While creating a temporary list of new rules, the ima_appraise flag is
updated, but not reverted on failure to append the new rules to the
existing policy. This patch defines temp_ima_appraise flag. Only when
the new rules are appended to the policy is the flag updated.
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Petko Manolov <petkan@mip-labs.com>
Set the KEY_FLAGS_KEEP on the .ima_blacklist to prevent userspace
from removing keys from the keyring.
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Userspace should not be allowed to remove keys from certain keyrings
(eg. blacklist), though the keys themselves can expire.
This patch defines a new key flag named KEY_FLAG_KEEP to prevent
userspace from being able to unlink, revoke, invalidate or timed
out a key on a keyring. When this flag is set on the keyring, all
keys subsequently added are flagged.
In addition, when this flag is set, the keyring itself can not be
cleared.
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
It is often useful to be able to read back the IMA policy. It is
even more important after introducing CONFIG_IMA_WRITE_POLICY.
This option allows the root user to see the current policy rules.
Signed-off-by: Zbigniew Jasinski <z.jasinski@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Petko Manolov <petkan@mip-labs.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
This option creates IMA MOK and blacklist keyrings. IMA MOK is an
intermediate keyring that sits between .system and .ima keyrings,
effectively forming a simple CA hierarchy. To successfully import a key
into .ima_mok it must be signed by a key which CA is in .system keyring.
On turn any key that needs to go in .ima keyring must be signed by CA in
either .system or .ima_mok keyrings. IMA MOK is empty at kernel boot.
IMA blacklist keyring contains all revoked IMA keys. It is consulted
before any other keyring. If the search is successful the requested
operation is rejected and error is returned to the caller.
Signed-off-by: Petko Manolov <petkan@mip-labs.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
The new rules get appended to the original policy, forming a queue.
The new rules are first added to a temporary list, which on error
get released without disturbing the normal IMA operations. On
success both lists (the current policy and the new rules) are spliced.
IMA policy reads are many orders of magnitude more numerous compared to
writes, the match code is RCU protected. The updater side also does
list splice in RCU manner.
Signed-off-by: Petko Manolov <petkan@mip-labs.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
The newly added EVM_LOAD_X509 code can be configured even if
CONFIG_EVM is disabled, but that causes a link error:
security/built-in.o: In function `integrity_load_keys':
digsig_asymmetric.c:(.init.text+0x400): undefined reference to `evm_load_x509'
This adds a Kconfig dependency to ensure it is only enabled when
CONFIG_EVM is set as well.
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Fixes: 2ce523eb89 ("evm: load x509 certificate from the kernel")
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
The EVM verification status is cached in iint->evm_status and if it
was successful, never re-verified again when IMA passes the 'iint' to
evm_verifyxattr().
When file attributes or extended attributes change, we may wish to
re-verify EVM integrity as well. For example, after setting a digital
signature we may need to re-verify the signature and update the
iint->flags that there is an EVM signature.
This patch enables that by resetting evm_status to INTEGRITY_UKNOWN
state.
Changes in v2:
* Flag setting moved to EVM layer
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
A crypto HW kernel module can possibly initialize the EVM key from the
kernel __init code to enable EVM before calling the 'init' process.
This patch provides a function evm_set_key() to set the EVM key
directly without using the KEY subsystem.
Changes in v4:
* kernel-doc style for evm_set_key
Changes in v3:
* error reporting moved to evm_set_key
* EVM_INIT_HMAC moved to evm_set_key
* added bitop to prevent key setting race
Changes in v2:
* use size_t for key size instead of signed int
* provide EVM_MAX_KEY_SIZE macro in <linux/evm.h>
* provide EVM_MIN_KEY_SIZE macro in <linux/evm.h>
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
In order to enable EVM before starting the 'init' process,
evm_initialized needs to be non-zero. Previously non-zero indicated
that the HMAC key was loaded. When EVM loads the X509 before calling
'init', with this patch it is now possible to enable EVM to start
signature based verification.
This patch defines bits to enable EVM if a key of any type is loaded.
Changes in v3:
* print error message if key is not set
Changes in v2:
* EVM_STATE_KEY_SET replaced by EVM_INIT_HMAC
* EVM_STATE_X509_SET replaced by EVM_INIT_X509
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
This patch defines a configuration option and the evm_load_x509() hook
to load an X509 certificate onto the EVM trusted kernel keyring.
Changes in v4:
* Patch description updated
Changes in v3:
* Removed EVM_X509_PATH definition. CONFIG_EVM_X509_PATH is used
directly.
Changes in v2:
* default key patch changed to /etc/keys
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Add a nfs_listxattr operation. Move the call to security_inode_listsecurity
from list operation of the "security.*" xattr handler to nfs_listxattr.
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
Cc: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>
Cc: Anna Schumaker <anna.schumaker@netapp.com>
Cc: linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
The existing file receive hook checks for access on
the file inode even for UDS. This is not right, as
the inode is not used by Smack to make access checks
for sockets. This change checks for an appropriate
access relationship between the receiving (current)
process and the socket. If the process can't write
to the socket's send label or the socket's receive
label can't write to the process fail.
This will allow the legitimate cases, where the
socket sender and socket receiver can freely communicate.
Only strangly set socket labels should cause a problem.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
If a user key gets negatively instantiated, an error code is cached in the
payload area. A negatively instantiated key may be then be positively
instantiated by updating it with valid data. However, the ->update key
type method must be aware that the error code may be there.
The following may be used to trigger the bug in the user key type:
keyctl request2 user user "" @u
keyctl add user user "a" @u
which manifests itself as:
BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at 00000000ffffff8a
IP: [<ffffffff810a376f>] __call_rcu.constprop.76+0x1f/0x280 kernel/rcu/tree.c:3046
PGD 7cc30067 PUD 0
Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP
Modules linked in:
CPU: 3 PID: 2644 Comm: a.out Not tainted 4.3.0+ #49
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
task: ffff88003ddea700 ti: ffff88003dd88000 task.ti: ffff88003dd88000
RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff810a376f>] [<ffffffff810a376f>] __call_rcu.constprop.76+0x1f/0x280
[<ffffffff810a376f>] __call_rcu.constprop.76+0x1f/0x280 kernel/rcu/tree.c:3046
RSP: 0018:ffff88003dd8bdb0 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 00000000ffffff82 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000001
RDX: ffffffff81e3fe40 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 00000000ffffff82
RBP: ffff88003dd8bde0 R08: ffff88007d2d2da0 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffff88003e8073c0 R12: 00000000ffffff82
R13: ffff88003dd8be68 R14: ffff88007d027600 R15: ffff88003ddea700
FS: 0000000000b92880(0063) GS:ffff88007fd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b
CR2: 00000000ffffff8a CR3: 000000007cc5f000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
Stack:
ffff88003dd8bdf0 ffffffff81160a8a 0000000000000000 00000000ffffff82
ffff88003dd8be68 ffff88007d027600 ffff88003dd8bdf0 ffffffff810a39e5
ffff88003dd8be20 ffffffff812a31ab ffff88007d027600 ffff88007d027620
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff810a39e5>] kfree_call_rcu+0x15/0x20 kernel/rcu/tree.c:3136
[<ffffffff812a31ab>] user_update+0x8b/0xb0 security/keys/user_defined.c:129
[< inline >] __key_update security/keys/key.c:730
[<ffffffff8129e5c1>] key_create_or_update+0x291/0x440 security/keys/key.c:908
[< inline >] SYSC_add_key security/keys/keyctl.c:125
[<ffffffff8129fc21>] SyS_add_key+0x101/0x1e0 security/keys/keyctl.c:60
[<ffffffff8185f617>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x6a arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:185
Note the error code (-ENOKEY) in EDX.
A similar bug can be tripped by:
keyctl request2 trusted user "" @u
keyctl add trusted user "a" @u
This should also affect encrypted keys - but that has to be correctly
parameterised or it will fail with EINVAL before getting to the bit that
will crashes.
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
commit fa1aa143ac ("selinux: extended permissions for ioctls")
introduced a bug into the handling of conditional rules, skipping the
processing entirely when the caller does not provide an extended
permissions (xperms) structure. Access checks from userspace using
/sys/fs/selinux/access do not include such a structure since that
interface does not presently expose extended permission information.
As a result, conditional rules were being ignored entirely on userspace
access requests, producing denials when access was allowed by
conditional rules in the policy. Fix the bug by only skipping
computation of extended permissions in this situation, not the entire
conditional rules processing.
Reported-by: Laurent Bigonville <bigon@debian.org>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
[PM: fixed long lines in patch description]
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.3
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Require all keys added to the EVM keyring be signed by an
existing trusted key on the system trusted keyring.
This patch also switches IMA to use integrity_init_keyring().
Changes in v3:
* Added 'init_keyring' config based variable to skip initializing
keyring instead of using __integrity_init_keyring() wrapper.
* Added dependency back to CONFIG_IMA_TRUSTED_KEYRING
Changes in v2:
* Replace CONFIG_EVM_TRUSTED_KEYRING with IMA and EVM common
CONFIG_INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING configuration option
* Deprecate CONFIG_IMA_TRUSTED_KEYRING but keep it for config
file compatibility. (Mimi Zohar)
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Pull networking fixes from David Miller:
1) Fix null deref in xt_TEE netfilter module, from Eric Dumazet.
2) Several spots need to get to the original listner for SYN-ACK
packets, most spots got this ok but some were not. Whilst covering
the remaining cases, create a helper to do this. From Eric Dumazet.
3) Missiing check of return value from alloc_netdev() in CAIF SPI code,
from Rasmus Villemoes.
4) Don't sleep while != TASK_RUNNING in macvtap, from Vlad Yasevich.
5) Use after free in mvneta driver, from Justin Maggard.
6) Fix race on dst->flags access in dst_release(), from Eric Dumazet.
7) Add missing ZLIB_INFLATE dependency for new qed driver. From Arnd
Bergmann.
8) Fix multicast getsockopt deadlock, from WANG Cong.
9) Fix deadlock in btusb, from Kuba Pawlak.
10) Some ipv6_add_dev() failure paths were not cleaning up the SNMP6
counter state. From Sabrina Dubroca.
11) Fix packet_bind() race, which can cause lost notifications, from
Francesco Ruggeri.
12) Fix MAC restoration in qlcnic driver during bonding mode changes,
from Jarod Wilson.
13) Revert bridging forward delay change which broke libvirt and other
userspace things, from Vlad Yasevich.
* git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net: (65 commits)
Revert "bridge: Allow forward delay to be cfgd when STP enabled"
bpf_trace: Make dependent on PERF_EVENTS
qed: select ZLIB_INFLATE
net: fix a race in dst_release()
net: mvneta: Fix memory use after free.
net: Documentation: Fix default value tcp_limit_output_bytes
macvtap: Resolve possible __might_sleep warning in macvtap_do_read()
mvneta: add FIXED_PHY dependency
net: caif: check return value of alloc_netdev
net: hisilicon: NET_VENDOR_HISILICON should depend on HAS_DMA
drivers: net: xgene: fix RGMII 10/100Mb mode
netfilter: nft_meta: use skb_to_full_sk() helper
net_sched: em_meta: use skb_to_full_sk() helper
sched: cls_flow: use skb_to_full_sk() helper
netfilter: xt_owner: use skb_to_full_sk() helper
smack: use skb_to_full_sk() helper
net: add skb_to_full_sk() helper and use it in selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid()
bpf: doc: correct arch list for supported eBPF JIT
dwc_eth_qos: Delete an unnecessary check before the function call "of_node_put"
bonding: fix panic on non-ARPHRD_ETHER enslave failure
...
This module wants to access sk->sk_security, which is not
available for request sockets.
Fixes: ca6fb06518 ("tcp: attach SYNACK messages to request sockets instead of listener")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Generalize selinux_skb_sk() added in commit 212cd08953
("selinux: fix random read in selinux_ip_postroute_compat()")
so that we can use it other contexts.
Use it right away in selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid()
Fixes: ca6fb06518 ("tcp: attach SYNACK messages to request sockets instead of listener")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
__GFP_WAIT was used to signal that the caller was in atomic context and
could not sleep. Now it is possible to distinguish between true atomic
context and callers that are not willing to sleep. The latter should
clear __GFP_DIRECT_RECLAIM so kswapd will still wake. As clearing
__GFP_WAIT behaves differently, there is a risk that people will clear the
wrong flags. This patch renames __GFP_WAIT to __GFP_RECLAIM to clearly
indicate what it does -- setting it allows all reclaim activity, clearing
them prevents it.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix build]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes]
Signed-off-by: Mel Gorman <mgorman@techsingularity.net>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Acked-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Vitaly Wool <vitalywool@gmail.com>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Pull security subsystem update from James Morris:
"This is mostly maintenance updates across the subsystem, with a
notable update for TPM 2.0, and addition of Jarkko Sakkinen as a
maintainer of that"
* 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (40 commits)
apparmor: clarify CRYPTO dependency
selinux: Use a kmem_cache for allocation struct file_security_struct
selinux: ioctl_has_perm should be static
selinux: use sprintf return value
selinux: use kstrdup() in security_get_bools()
selinux: use kmemdup in security_sid_to_context_core()
selinux: remove pointless cast in selinux_inode_setsecurity()
selinux: introduce security_context_str_to_sid
selinux: do not check open perm on ftruncate call
selinux: change CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_CHECKREQPROT_VALUE default
KEYS: Merge the type-specific data with the payload data
KEYS: Provide a script to extract a module signature
KEYS: Provide a script to extract the sys cert list from a vmlinux file
keys: Be more consistent in selection of union members used
certs: add .gitignore to stop git nagging about x509_certificate_list
KEYS: use kvfree() in add_key
Smack: limited capability for changing process label
TPM: remove unnecessary little endian conversion
vTPM: support little endian guests
char: Drop owner assignment from i2c_driver
...
In commit e446f9dfe1 ("net: synack packets can be attached to request
sockets"), I missed one remaining case of invalid skb->sk->sk_security
access.
Dmitry Vyukov got a KASan report pointing to it.
Add selinux_skb_sk() helper that is responsible to get back to the
listener if skb is attached to a request socket, instead of
duplicating the logic.
Fixes: ca6fb06518 ("tcp: attach SYNACK messages to request sockets instead of listener")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
The crypto framework can be built as a loadable module, but the
apparmor hash code can only be built-in, which then causes a
link error:
security/built-in.o: In function `aa_calc_profile_hash':
integrity_audit.c:(.text+0x21610): undefined reference to `crypto_shash_update'
security/built-in.o: In function `init_profile_hash':
integrity_audit.c:(.init.text+0xb4c): undefined reference to `crypto_alloc_shash'
This changes Apparmor to use 'select CRYPTO' like a lot of other
subsystems do.
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
The size of struct file_security_struct is 16byte at my setup.
But, the real allocation size for per each file_security_struct
is 64bytes in my setup that kmalloc min size is 64bytes
because ARCH_DMA_MINALIGN is 64.
This allocation is called every times at file allocation(alloc_file()).
So, the total slack memory size(allocated size - request size)
is increased exponentially.
E.g) Min Kmalloc Size : 64bytes, Unit : bytes
Allocated Size | Request Size | Slack Size | Allocation Count
---------------------------------------------------------------
770048 | 192512 | 577536 | 12032
At the result, this change reduce memory usage 42bytes per each
file_security_struct
Signed-off-by: Sangwoo <sangwoo2.park@lge.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
[PM: removed extra subject prefix]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Fixes the following sparse warning:
security/selinux/hooks.c:3242:5: warning: symbol 'ioctl_has_perm' was
not declared. Should it be static?
Signed-off-by: Geliang Tang <geliangtang@163.com>
Acked-by: Jeff Vander Stoep <jeffv@google.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
sprintf returns the number of characters printed (excluding '\0'), so
we can use that and avoid duplicating the length computation.
Signed-off-by: Rasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
This is much simpler.
Signed-off-by: Rasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
security_context_to_sid() expects a const char* argument, so there's
no point in casting away the const qualifier of value.
Signed-off-by: Rasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
There seems to be a little confusion as to whether the scontext_len
parameter of security_context_to_sid() includes the nul-byte or
not. Reading security_context_to_sid_core(), it seems that the
expectation is that it does not (both the string copying and the test
for scontext_len being zero hint at that).
Introduce the helper security_context_str_to_sid() to do the strlen()
call and fix all callers.
Signed-off-by: Rasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Use the ATTR_FILE attribute to distinguish between truncate()
and ftruncate() system calls. The two other cases where
do_truncate is called with a filp (and therefore ATTR_FILE is set)
are for coredump files and for open(O_TRUNC). In both of those cases
the open permission has already been checked during file open and
therefore does not need to be repeated.
Commit 95dbf73931 ("SELinux: check OPEN on truncate calls")
fixed a major issue where domains were allowed to truncate files
without the open permission. However, it introduced a new bug where
a domain with the write permission can no longer ftruncate files
without the open permission, even when they receive an already open
file.
Signed-off-by: Jeff Vander Stoep <jeffv@google.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Change the SELinux checkreqprot default value to 0 so that SELinux
performs access control checking on the actual memory protections
used by the kernel and not those requested by the application.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
key->description and key->index_key.description are same because
they are unioned. But, for readability, using same name for
duplication and validation seems better.
Signed-off-by: Insu Yun <wuninsu@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
There is no need to make a flag to tell that this memory is allocated by
kmalloc or vmalloc. Just use kvfree to free the memory.
Signed-off-by: Geliang Tang <geliangtang@163.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
This feature introduces new kernel interface:
- <smack_fs>/relabel-self - for setting transition labels list
This list is used to control smack label transition mechanism.
List is set by, and per process. Process can transit to new label only if
label is on the list. Only process with CAP_MAC_ADMIN capability can add
labels to this list. With this list, process can change it's label without
CAP_MAC_ADMIN but only once. After label changing, list is unset.
Changes in v2:
* use list_for_each_entry instead of _rcu during label write
* added missing description in security/Smack.txt
Changes in v3:
* squashed into one commit
Changes in v4:
* switch from global list to per-task list
* since the per-task list is accessed only by the task itself
there is no need to use synchronization mechanisms on it
Changes in v5:
* change smackfs interface of relabel-self to the one used for onlycap
multiple labels are accepted, separated by space, which
replace the previous list upon write
Signed-off-by: Zbigniew Jasinski <z.jasinski@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Rafal Krypa <r.krypa@samsung.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
If request_key() is used to find a keyring, only do the search part - don't
do the construction part if the keyring was not found by the search. We
don't really want keyrings in the negative instantiated state since the
rejected/negative instantiation error value in the payload is unioned with
keyring metadata.
Now the kernel gives an error:
request_key("keyring", "#selinux,bdekeyring", "keyring", KEY_SPEC_USER_SESSION_KEYRING) = -1 EPERM (Operation not permitted)
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Call tpm_seal_trusted() and tpm_unseal_trusted() for TPM 2.0 chips.
We require explicit 'keyhandle=' option because there's no a fixed
storage root key inside TPM2 chips.
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Fuchs <andreas.fuchs@sit.fraunhofer.de>
Tested-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> (on TPM 1.2)
Tested-by: Chris J Arges <chris.j.arges@canonical.com>
Tested-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Tested-by: Kevin Strasser <kevin.strasser@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Huewe <peterhuewe@gmx.de>
Moved struct trusted_key_options to trustes-type.h so that the fields
can be accessed from drivers/char/tpm.
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Huewe <peterhuewe@gmx.de>
This merge resolves conflicts with 75aec9df3a ("bridge: Remove
br_nf_push_frag_xmit_sk") as part of Eric Biederman's effort to improve
netns support in the network stack that reached upstream via David's
net-next tree.
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Conflicts:
net/bridge/br_netfilter_hooks.c
since commit 8405a8fff3 ("netfilter: nf_qeueue: Drop queue entries on
nf_unregister_hook") all pending queued entries are discarded.
So we can simply remove all of the owner handling -- when module is
removed it also needs to unregister all its hooks.
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
The following sequence of commands:
i=`keyctl add user a a @s`
keyctl request2 keyring foo bar @t
keyctl unlink $i @s
tries to invoke an upcall to instantiate a keyring if one doesn't already
exist by that name within the user's keyring set. However, if the upcall
fails, the code sets keyring->type_data.reject_error to -ENOKEY or some
other error code. When the key is garbage collected, the key destroy
function is called unconditionally and keyring_destroy() uses list_empty()
on keyring->type_data.link - which is in a union with reject_error.
Subsequently, the kernel tries to unlink the keyring from the keyring names
list - which oopses like this:
BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at 00000000ffffff8a
IP: [<ffffffff8126e051>] keyring_destroy+0x3d/0x88
...
Workqueue: events key_garbage_collector
...
RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff8126e051>] keyring_destroy+0x3d/0x88
RSP: 0018:ffff88003e2f3d30 EFLAGS: 00010203
RAX: 00000000ffffff82 RBX: ffff88003bf1a900 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 000000003bfc6901 RDI: ffffffff81a73a40
RBP: ffff88003e2f3d38 R08: 0000000000000152 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: ffff88003e2f3c18 R11: 000000000000865b R12: ffff88003bf1a900
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff88003bf1a908 R15: ffff88003e2f4000
...
CR2: 00000000ffffff8a CR3: 000000003e3ec000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
...
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff8126c756>] key_gc_unused_keys.constprop.1+0x5d/0x10f
[<ffffffff8126ca71>] key_garbage_collector+0x1fa/0x351
[<ffffffff8105ec9b>] process_one_work+0x28e/0x547
[<ffffffff8105fd17>] worker_thread+0x26e/0x361
[<ffffffff8105faa9>] ? rescuer_thread+0x2a8/0x2a8
[<ffffffff810648ad>] kthread+0xf3/0xfb
[<ffffffff810647ba>] ? kthread_create_on_node+0x1c2/0x1c2
[<ffffffff815f2ccf>] ret_from_fork+0x3f/0x70
[<ffffffff810647ba>] ? kthread_create_on_node+0x1c2/0x1c2
Note the value in RAX. This is a 32-bit representation of -ENOKEY.
The solution is to only call ->destroy() if the key was successfully
instantiated.
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
selinux needs few changes to accommodate fact that SYNACK messages
can be attached to a request socket, lacking sk_security pointer
(Only syncookies are still attached to a TCP_LISTEN socket)
Adds a new sk_listener() helper, and use it in selinux and sch_fq
Fixes: ca6fb06518 ("tcp: attach SYNACK messages to request sockets instead of listener")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported by: kernel test robot <ying.huang@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
This fix writes the task label when
smack_d_instantiate is called, before the
label of the superblock was written on the
pipe's inode.
Signed-off-by: Roman Kubiak <r.kubiak@samsung.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
This change has two goals:
- delay the setting of 'smack_enabled' until
it will be really effective
- ensure that smackfs is valid only if 'smack_enabled'
is set (it is already the case in smack_netfilter.c)
Signed-off-by: José Bollo <jose.bollo@iot.bzh>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Fixes the following sparse warning:
security/smack/smack_lsm.c:55:1: warning: symbol 'smk_ipv6_port_list'
was not declared. Should it be static?
Signed-off-by: Geliang Tang <geliangtang@163.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
'commit e774ad683f ("smack: pass error code through pointers")'
made this function return proper error codes instead of NULL. Reflect that.
This is a fix for a NULL dereference introduced in
'commit 21abb1ec41 ("Smack: IPv6 host labeling")'
echo "$SOME_IPV6_ADDR \"test" > /smack/ipv6host
(this should return EINVAL, it doesn't)
cat /smack/ipv6host
(derefences 0x000a)
Signed-off-by: Lukasz Pawelczyk <l.pawelczyk@samsung.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
If IMA_LOAD_X509 is enabled, either directly or indirectly via
IMA_APPRAISE_SIGNED_INIT, certificates are loaded onto the IMA
trusted keyring by the kernel via key_create_or_update(). When
the KEY_ALLOC_TRUSTED flag is provided, certificates are loaded
without first verifying the certificate is properly signed by a
trusted key on the system keyring. This patch removes the
KEY_ALLOC_TRUSTED flag.
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@huawei.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 3.19+
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Conflicts:
net/ipv4/arp.c
The net/ipv4/arp.c conflict was one commit adding a new
local variable while another commit was deleting one.
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
There appears to be a race between:
(1) key_gc_unused_keys() which frees key->security and then calls
keyring_destroy() to unlink the name from the name list
(2) find_keyring_by_name() which calls key_permission(), thus accessing
key->security, on a key before checking to see whether the key usage is 0
(ie. the key is dead and might be cleaned up).
Fix this by calling ->destroy() before cleaning up the core key data -
including key->security.
Reported-by: Petr Matousek <pmatouse@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Only pass the void *priv parameter out of the nf_hook_ops. That is
all any of the functions are interested now, and by limiting what is
passed it becomes simpler to change implementation details.
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
With two exceptions (drm/qxl and drm/radeon) all vm_operations_struct
structs should be constant.
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris:
"Highlights:
- PKCS#7 support added to support signed kexec, also utilized for
module signing. See comments in 3f1e1bea.
** NOTE: this requires linking against the OpenSSL library, which
must be installed, e.g. the openssl-devel on Fedora **
- Smack
- add IPv6 host labeling; ignore labels on kernel threads
- support smack labeling mounts which use binary mount data
- SELinux:
- add ioctl whitelisting (see
http://kernsec.org/files/lss2015/vanderstoep.pdf)
- fix mprotect PROT_EXEC regression caused by mm change
- Seccomp:
- add ptrace options for suspend/resume"
* 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (57 commits)
PKCS#7: Add OIDs for sha224, sha284 and sha512 hash algos and use them
Documentation/Changes: Now need OpenSSL devel packages for module signing
scripts: add extract-cert and sign-file to .gitignore
modsign: Handle signing key in source tree
modsign: Use if_changed rule for extracting cert from module signing key
Move certificate handling to its own directory
sign-file: Fix warning about BIO_reset() return value
PKCS#7: Add MODULE_LICENSE() to test module
Smack - Fix build error with bringup unconfigured
sign-file: Document dependency on OpenSSL devel libraries
PKCS#7: Appropriately restrict authenticated attributes and content type
KEYS: Add a name for PKEY_ID_PKCS7
PKCS#7: Improve and export the X.509 ASN.1 time object decoder
modsign: Use extract-cert to process CONFIG_SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYS
extract-cert: Cope with multiple X.509 certificates in a single file
sign-file: Generate CMS message as signature instead of PKCS#7
PKCS#7: Support CMS messages also [RFC5652]
X.509: Change recorded SKID & AKID to not include Subject or Issuer
PKCS#7: Check content type and versions
MAINTAINERS: The keyrings mailing list has moved
...
Many file systems that implement the show_options hook fail to correctly
escape their output which could lead to unescaped characters (e.g. new
lines) leaking into /proc/mounts and /proc/[pid]/mountinfo files. This
could lead to confusion, spoofed entries (resulting in things like
systemd issuing false d-bus "mount" notifications), and who knows what
else. This looks like it would only be the root user stepping on
themselves, but it's possible weird things could happen in containers or
in other situations with delegated mount privileges.
Here's an example using overlay with setuid fusermount trusting the
contents of /proc/mounts (via the /etc/mtab symlink). Imagine the use
of "sudo" is something more sneaky:
$ BASE="ovl"
$ MNT="$BASE/mnt"
$ LOW="$BASE/lower"
$ UP="$BASE/upper"
$ WORK="$BASE/work/ 0 0
none /proc fuse.pwn user_id=1000"
$ mkdir -p "$LOW" "$UP" "$WORK"
$ sudo mount -t overlay -o "lowerdir=$LOW,upperdir=$UP,workdir=$WORK" none /mnt
$ cat /proc/mounts
none /root/ovl/mnt overlay rw,relatime,lowerdir=ovl/lower,upperdir=ovl/upper,workdir=ovl/work/ 0 0
none /proc fuse.pwn user_id=1000 0 0
$ fusermount -u /proc
$ cat /proc/mounts
cat: /proc/mounts: No such file or directory
This fixes the problem by adding new seq_show_option and
seq_show_option_n helpers, and updating the vulnerable show_option
handlers to use them as needed. Some, like SELinux, need to be open
coded due to unusual existing escape mechanisms.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: add lost chunk, per Kees]
[keescook@chromium.org: seq_show_option should be using const parameters]
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Cc: J. R. Okajima <hooanon05g@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Per Andrew Morgan's request, add a securebit to allow admins to disable
PR_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE. This securebit will prevent processes from adding
capabilities to their ambient set.
For simplicity, this disables PR_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE entirely rather than
just disabling setting previously cleared bits.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Aaron Jones <aaronmdjones@gmail.com>
Cc: Ted Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Austin S Hemmelgarn <ahferroin7@gmail.com>
Cc: Markku Savela <msa@moth.iki.fi>
Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Cc: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Credit where credit is due: this idea comes from Christoph Lameter with
a lot of valuable input from Serge Hallyn. This patch is heavily based
on Christoph's patch.
===== The status quo =====
On Linux, there are a number of capabilities defined by the kernel. To
perform various privileged tasks, processes can wield capabilities that
they hold.
Each task has four capability masks: effective (pE), permitted (pP),
inheritable (pI), and a bounding set (X). When the kernel checks for a
capability, it checks pE. The other capability masks serve to modify
what capabilities can be in pE.
Any task can remove capabilities from pE, pP, or pI at any time. If a
task has a capability in pP, it can add that capability to pE and/or pI.
If a task has CAP_SETPCAP, then it can add any capability to pI, and it
can remove capabilities from X.
Tasks are not the only things that can have capabilities; files can also
have capabilities. A file can have no capabilty information at all [1].
If a file has capability information, then it has a permitted mask (fP)
and an inheritable mask (fI) as well as a single effective bit (fE) [2].
File capabilities modify the capabilities of tasks that execve(2) them.
A task that successfully calls execve has its capabilities modified for
the file ultimately being excecuted (i.e. the binary itself if that
binary is ELF or for the interpreter if the binary is a script.) [3] In
the capability evolution rules, for each mask Z, pZ represents the old
value and pZ' represents the new value. The rules are:
pP' = (X & fP) | (pI & fI)
pI' = pI
pE' = (fE ? pP' : 0)
X is unchanged
For setuid binaries, fP, fI, and fE are modified by a moderately
complicated set of rules that emulate POSIX behavior. Similarly, if
euid == 0 or ruid == 0, then fP, fI, and fE are modified differently
(primary, fP and fI usually end up being the full set). For nonroot
users executing binaries with neither setuid nor file caps, fI and fP
are empty and fE is false.
As an extra complication, if you execute a process as nonroot and fE is
set, then the "secure exec" rules are in effect: AT_SECURE gets set,
LD_PRELOAD doesn't work, etc.
This is rather messy. We've learned that making any changes is
dangerous, though: if a new kernel version allows an unprivileged
program to change its security state in a way that persists cross
execution of a setuid program or a program with file caps, this
persistent state is surprisingly likely to allow setuid or file-capped
programs to be exploited for privilege escalation.
===== The problem =====
Capability inheritance is basically useless.
If you aren't root and you execute an ordinary binary, fI is zero, so
your capabilities have no effect whatsoever on pP'. This means that you
can't usefully execute a helper process or a shell command with elevated
capabilities if you aren't root.
On current kernels, you can sort of work around this by setting fI to
the full set for most or all non-setuid executable files. This causes
pP' = pI for nonroot, and inheritance works. No one does this because
it's a PITA and it isn't even supported on most filesystems.
If you try this, you'll discover that every nonroot program ends up with
secure exec rules, breaking many things.
This is a problem that has bitten many people who have tried to use
capabilities for anything useful.
===== The proposed change =====
This patch adds a fifth capability mask called the ambient mask (pA).
pA does what most people expect pI to do.
pA obeys the invariant that no bit can ever be set in pA if it is not
set in both pP and pI. Dropping a bit from pP or pI drops that bit from
pA. This ensures that existing programs that try to drop capabilities
still do so, with a complication. Because capability inheritance is so
broken, setting KEEPCAPS, using setresuid to switch to nonroot uids, and
then calling execve effectively drops capabilities. Therefore,
setresuid from root to nonroot conditionally clears pA unless
SECBIT_NO_SETUID_FIXUP is set. Processes that don't like this can
re-add bits to pA afterwards.
The capability evolution rules are changed:
pA' = (file caps or setuid or setgid ? 0 : pA)
pP' = (X & fP) | (pI & fI) | pA'
pI' = pI
pE' = (fE ? pP' : pA')
X is unchanged
If you are nonroot but you have a capability, you can add it to pA. If
you do so, your children get that capability in pA, pP, and pE. For
example, you can set pA = CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE, and your children can
automatically bind low-numbered ports. Hallelujah!
Unprivileged users can create user namespaces, map themselves to a
nonzero uid, and create both privileged (relative to their namespace)
and unprivileged process trees. This is currently more or less
impossible. Hallelujah!
You cannot use pA to try to subvert a setuid, setgid, or file-capped
program: if you execute any such program, pA gets cleared and the
resulting evolution rules are unchanged by this patch.
Users with nonzero pA are unlikely to unintentionally leak that
capability. If they run programs that try to drop privileges, dropping
privileges will still work.
It's worth noting that the degree of paranoia in this patch could
possibly be reduced without causing serious problems. Specifically, if
we allowed pA to persist across executing non-pA-aware setuid binaries
and across setresuid, then, naively, the only capabilities that could
leak as a result would be the capabilities in pA, and any attacker
*already* has those capabilities. This would make me nervous, though --
setuid binaries that tried to privilege-separate might fail to do so,
and putting CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH or CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE into pA could have
unexpected side effects. (Whether these unexpected side effects would
be exploitable is an open question.) I've therefore taken the more
paranoid route. We can revisit this later.
An alternative would be to require PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS before setting
ambient capabilities. I think that this would be annoying and would
make granting otherwise unprivileged users minor ambient capabilities
(CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE or CAP_NET_RAW for example) much less useful than
it is with this patch.
===== Footnotes =====
[1] Files that are missing the "security.capability" xattr or that have
unrecognized values for that xattr end up with has_cap set to false.
The code that does that appears to be complicated for no good reason.
[2] The libcap capability mask parsers and formatters are dangerously
misleading and the documentation is flat-out wrong. fE is *not* a mask;
it's a single bit. This has probably confused every single person who
has tried to use file capabilities.
[3] Linux very confusingly processes both the script and the interpreter
if applicable, for reasons that elude me. The results from thinking
about a script's file capabilities and/or setuid bits are mostly
discarded.
Preliminary userspace code is here, but it needs updating:
https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/luto/util-linux-playground.git/commit/?h=cap_ambient&id=7f5afbd175d2
Here is a test program that can be used to verify the functionality
(from Christoph):
/*
* Test program for the ambient capabilities. This program spawns a shell
* that allows running processes with a defined set of capabilities.
*
* (C) 2015 Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
* Released under: GPL v3 or later.
*
*
* Compile using:
*
* gcc -o ambient_test ambient_test.o -lcap-ng
*
* This program must have the following capabilities to run properly:
* Permissions for CAP_NET_RAW, CAP_NET_ADMIN, CAP_SYS_NICE
*
* A command to equip the binary with the right caps is:
*
* setcap cap_net_raw,cap_net_admin,cap_sys_nice+p ambient_test
*
*
* To get a shell with additional caps that can be inherited by other processes:
*
* ./ambient_test /bin/bash
*
*
* Verifying that it works:
*
* From the bash spawed by ambient_test run
*
* cat /proc/$$/status
*
* and have a look at the capabilities.
*/
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <cap-ng.h>
#include <sys/prctl.h>
#include <linux/capability.h>
/*
* Definitions from the kernel header files. These are going to be removed
* when the /usr/include files have these defined.
*/
#define PR_CAP_AMBIENT 47
#define PR_CAP_AMBIENT_IS_SET 1
#define PR_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE 2
#define PR_CAP_AMBIENT_LOWER 3
#define PR_CAP_AMBIENT_CLEAR_ALL 4
static void set_ambient_cap(int cap)
{
int rc;
capng_get_caps_process();
rc = capng_update(CAPNG_ADD, CAPNG_INHERITABLE, cap);
if (rc) {
printf("Cannot add inheritable cap\n");
exit(2);
}
capng_apply(CAPNG_SELECT_CAPS);
/* Note the two 0s at the end. Kernel checks for these */
if (prctl(PR_CAP_AMBIENT, PR_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE, cap, 0, 0)) {
perror("Cannot set cap");
exit(1);
}
}
int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
int rc;
set_ambient_cap(CAP_NET_RAW);
set_ambient_cap(CAP_NET_ADMIN);
set_ambient_cap(CAP_SYS_NICE);
printf("Ambient_test forking shell\n");
if (execv(argv[1], argv + 1))
perror("Cannot exec");
return 0;
}
Signed-off-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> # Original author
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Aaron Jones <aaronmdjones@gmail.com>
Cc: Ted Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Austin S Hemmelgarn <ahferroin7@gmail.com>
Cc: Markku Savela <msa@moth.iki.fi>
Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Cc: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
f78f5b90c4 ("rcu: Rename rcu_lockdep_assert() to RCU_LOCKDEP_WARN()")
introduced a bug by incorrectly inverting the condition when moving from
rcu_lockdep_assert() to RCU_LOCKDEP_WARN(). This commit therefore fixes
the inversion.
Reported-by: Felipe Balbi <balbi@ti.com>
Reported-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Tested-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org>
Pull user namespace updates from Eric Biederman:
"This finishes up the changes to ensure proc and sysfs do not start
implementing executable files, as the there are application today that
are only secure because such files do not exist.
It akso fixes a long standing misfeature of /proc/<pid>/mountinfo that
did not show the proper source for files bind mounted from
/proc/<pid>/ns/*.
It also straightens out the handling of clone flags related to user
namespaces, fixing an unnecessary failure of unshare(CLONE_NEWUSER)
when files such as /proc/<pid>/environ are read while <pid> is calling
unshare. This winds up fixing a minor bug in unshare flag handling
that dates back to the first version of unshare in the kernel.
Finally, this fixes a minor regression caused by the introduction of
sysfs_create_mount_point, which broke someone's in house application,
by restoring the size of /sys/fs/cgroup to 0 bytes. Apparently that
application uses the directory size to determine if a tmpfs is mounted
on /sys/fs/cgroup.
The bind mount escape fixes are present in Al Viros for-next branch.
and I expect them to come from there. The bind mount escape is the
last of the user namespace related security bugs that I am aware of"
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace:
fs: Set the size of empty dirs to 0.
userns,pidns: Force thread group sharing, not signal handler sharing.
unshare: Unsharing a thread does not require unsharing a vm
nsfs: Add a show_path method to fix mountinfo
mnt: fs_fully_visible enforce noexec and nosuid if !SB_I_NOEXEC
vfs: Commit to never having exectuables on proc and sysfs.
Pull RCU updates from Ingo Molnar:
"The main RCU changes in this cycle are:
- the combination of tree geometry-initialization simplifications and
OS-jitter-reduction changes to expedited grace periods. These two
are stacked due to the large number of conflicts that would
otherwise result.
- privatize smp_mb__after_unlock_lock().
This commit moves the definition of smp_mb__after_unlock_lock() to
kernel/rcu/tree.h, in recognition of the fact that RCU is the only
thing using this, that nothing else is likely to use it, and that
it is likely to go away completely.
- documentation updates.
- torture-test updates.
- misc fixes"
* 'core-rcu-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (60 commits)
rcu,locking: Privatize smp_mb__after_unlock_lock()
rcu: Silence lockdep false positive for expedited grace periods
rcu: Don't disable CPU hotplug during OOM notifiers
scripts: Make checkpatch.pl warn on expedited RCU grace periods
rcu: Update MAINTAINERS entry
rcu: Clarify CONFIG_RCU_EQS_DEBUG help text
rcu: Fix backwards RCU_LOCKDEP_WARN() in synchronize_rcu_tasks()
rcu: Rename rcu_lockdep_assert() to RCU_LOCKDEP_WARN()
rcu: Make rcu_is_watching() really notrace
cpu: Wait for RCU grace periods concurrently
rcu: Create a synchronize_rcu_mult()
rcu: Fix obsolete priority-boosting comment
rcu: Use WRITE_ONCE in RCU_INIT_POINTER
rcu: Hide RCU_NOCB_CPU behind RCU_EXPERT
rcu: Add RCU-sched flavors of get-state and cond-sync
rcu: Add fastpath bypassing funnel locking
rcu: Rename RCU_GP_DONE_FQS to RCU_GP_DOING_FQS
rcu: Pull out wait_event*() condition into helper function
documentation: Describe new expedited stall warnings
rcu: Add stall warnings to synchronize_sched_expedited()
...
While in most cases commit b1d9e6b064 ("LSM: Switch to lists of hooks")
retained previous error returns, in three cases it altered them without
any explanation in the commit message. Restore all of them - in the
security_old_inode_init_security() case this led to reiserfs using
uninitialized data, sooner or later crashing the system (the only other
user of this function - ocfs2 - was unaffected afaict, since it passes
pre-initialized structures).
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
The changes for mounting binary filesystems was allied
improperly, with the list of tokens being in an ifdef that
it shouldn't have been. Fix that, and a couple style issues
that were bothering me.
Reported-by: Jim Davis <jim.epost@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Pull RCU changes from Paul E. McKenney:
- The combination of tree geometry-initialization simplifications
and OS-jitter-reduction changes to expedited grace periods.
These two are stacked due to the large number of conflicts
that would otherwise result.
[ With one addition, a temporary commit to silence a lockdep false
positive. Additional changes to the expedited grace-period
primitives (queued for 4.4) remove the cause of this false
positive, and therefore include a revert of this temporary commit. ]
- Documentation updates.
- Torture-test updates.
- Miscellaneous fixes.
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Adds an ignore case for kernel tasks,
so that they can access all resources.
Since kernel worker threads are spawned with
floor label, they are severely restricted by
Smack policy. It is not an issue without onlycap,
as these processes also run with root,
so CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE kicks in. But with onlycap
turned on, there is no way to change the label
for these processes.
Signed-off-by: Roman Kubiak <r.kubiak@samsung.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Without this patch YAMA will not work at all if it is chosen
as the primary LSM instead of being "stacked".
Signed-off-by: Salvatore Mesoraca <s.mesoraca16@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
The kbuild test robot reported a couple of these,
and the third showed up by inspection. Making the
symbols static is proper.
Reported-by: Fengguang Wu <fengguang.wu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
IPv6 appears to be (finally) coming of age with the
influx of autonomous devices. In support of this, add
the ability to associate a Smack label with IPv6 addresses.
This patch also cleans up some of the conditional
compilation associated with the introduction of
secmark processing. It's now more obvious which bit
of code goes with which feature.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Now that minor LSMs can cleanly stack with major LSMs, remove the unneeded
config for Yama to be made to explicitly stack. Just selecting the main
Yama CONFIG will allow it to work, regardless of the major LSM. Since
distros using Yama are already forcing it to stack, this is effectively
a no-op change.
Additionally add MAINTAINERS entry.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
__key_link_end is not freeing the associated array edit structure
and this leads to a 512 byte memory leak each time an identical
existing key is added with add_key().
The reason the add_key() system call returns okay is that
key_create_or_update() calls __key_link_begin() before checking to see
whether it can update a key directly rather than adding/replacing - which
it turns out it can. Thus __key_link() is not called through
__key_instantiate_and_link() and __key_link_end() must cancel the edit.
CVE-2015-1333
Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
This commit renames rcu_lockdep_assert() to RCU_LOCKDEP_WARN() for
consistency with the WARN() series of macros. This also requires
inverting the sense of the conditional, which this commit also does.
Reported-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
security/smack/smackfs.c:2251:1-4: WARNING: end returns can be
simpified and declaration on line 2250 can be dropped
Simplify a trivial if-return sequence. Possibly combine with a
preceding function call.
Generated by: scripts/coccinelle/misc/simple_return.cocci
Signed-off-by: Fengguang Wu <fengguang.wu@intel.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Add support for setting smack mount labels(using smackfsdef, smackfsroot,
smackfshat, smackfsfloor, smackfstransmute) for filesystems with binary
mount data like NFS.
To achieve this, implement sb_parse_opts_str and sb_set_mnt_opts security
operations in smack LSM similar to SELinux.
Signed-off-by: Vivek Trivedi <t.vivek@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Amit Sahrawat <a.sahrawat@samsung.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Create a common helper function to determine the label for a new inode.
This is then used by:
- may_create()
- selinux_dentry_init_security()
- selinux_inode_init_security()
This will change the behaviour of the functions slightly, bringing them
all into line.
Suggested-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Initialize the security class of sock security structures
to the generic socket class. This is similar to what is
already done in inode_alloc_security for files. Generally
the sclass field will later by set by socket_post_create
or sk_clone or sock_graft, but for protocol implementations
that fail to call any of these for newly accepted sockets,
we want some sane default that will yield a legitimate
avc denied message with non-garbage values for class and
permission.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
The inode_free_security() function just took the superblock's isec_lock
before checking and trying to remove the inode security struct from the
linked list. In many cases, the list was empty and so the lock taking
is wasteful as no useful work is done. On multi-socket systems with
a large number of CPUs, there can also be a fair amount of spinlock
contention on the isec_lock if many tasks are exiting at the same time.
This patch changes the code to check the state of the list first before
taking the lock and attempting to dequeue it. The list_del_init()
can be called more than once on the same list with no harm as long
as they are properly serialized. It should not be possible to have
inode_free_security() called concurrently with list_add(). For better
safety, however, we use list_empty_careful() here even though it is
still not completely safe in case that happens.
Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <Waiman.Long@hp.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Add extended permissions logic to selinux. Extended permissions
provides additional permissions in 256 bit increments. Extend the
generic ioctl permission check to use the extended permissions for
per-command filtering. Source/target/class sets including the ioctl
permission may additionally include a set of commands. Example:
allowxperm <source> <target>:<class> ioctl unpriv_app_socket_cmds
auditallowxperm <source> <target>:<class> ioctl priv_gpu_cmds
Where unpriv_app_socket_cmds and priv_gpu_cmds are macros
representing commonly granted sets of ioctl commands.
When ioctl commands are omitted only the permissions are checked.
This feature is intended to provide finer granularity for the ioctl
permission that may be too imprecise. For example, the same driver
may use ioctls to provide important and benign functionality such as
driver version or socket type as well as dangerous capabilities such
as debugging features, read/write/execute to physical memory or
access to sensitive data. Per-command filtering provides a mechanism
to reduce the attack surface of the kernel, and limit applications
to the subset of commands required.
The format of the policy binary has been modified to include ioctl
commands, and the policy version number has been incremented to
POLICYDB_VERSION_XPERMS_IOCTL=30 to account for the format
change.
The extended permissions logic is deliberately generic to allow
components to be reused e.g. netlink filters
Signed-off-by: Jeff Vander Stoep <jeffv@google.com>
Acked-by: Nick Kralevich <nnk@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Add information about ioctl calls to the LSM audit data. Log the
file path and command number.
Signed-off-by: Jeff Vander Stoep <jeffv@google.com>
Acked-by: Nick Kralevich <nnk@google.com>
[PM: subject line tweak]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
commit 66fc130394 ("mm: shmem_zero_setup
skip security check and lockdep conflict with XFS") caused a regression
for SELinux by disabling any SELinux checking of mprotect PROT_EXEC on
shared anonymous mappings. However, even before that regression, the
checking on such mprotect PROT_EXEC calls was inconsistent with the
checking on a mmap PROT_EXEC call for a shared anonymous mapping. On a
mmap, the security hook is passed a NULL file and knows it is dealing
with an anonymous mapping and therefore applies an execmem check and no
file checks. On a mprotect, the security hook is passed a vma with a
non-NULL vm_file (as this was set from the internally-created shmem
file during mmap) and therefore applies the file-based execute check
and no execmem check. Since the aforementioned commit now marks the
shmem zero inode with the S_PRIVATE flag, the file checks are disabled
and we have no checking at all on mprotect PROT_EXEC. Add a test to
the mprotect hook logic for such private inodes, and apply an execmem
check in that case. This makes the mmap and mprotect checking
consistent for shared anonymous mappings, as well as for /dev/zero and
ashmem.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 4.1.x
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Today proc and sysfs do not contain any executable files. Several
applications today mount proc or sysfs without noexec and nosuid and
then depend on there being no exectuables files on proc or sysfs.
Having any executable files show on proc or sysfs would cause
a user space visible regression, and most likely security problems.
Therefore commit to never allowing executables on proc and sysfs by
adding a new flag to mark them as filesystems without executables and
enforce that flag.
Test the flag where MNT_NOEXEC is tested today, so that the only user
visible effect will be that exectuables will be treated as if the
execute bit is cleared.
The filesystems proc and sysfs do not currently incoporate any
executable files so this does not result in any user visible effects.
This makes it unnecessary to vet changes to proc and sysfs tightly for
adding exectuable files or changes to chattr that would modify
existing files, as no matter what the individual file say they will
not be treated as exectuable files by the vfs.
Not having to vet changes to closely is important as without this we
are only one proc_create call (or another goof up in the
implementation of notify_change) from having problematic executables
on proc. Those mistakes are all too easy to make and would create
a situation where there are security issues or the assumptions of
some program having to be broken (and cause userspace regressions).
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
At present we don't create efficient ebitmaps when importing NetLabel
category bitmaps. This can present a problem when comparing ebitmaps
since ebitmap_cmp() is very strict about these things and considers
these wasteful ebitmaps not equal when compared to their more
efficient counterparts, even if their values are the same. This isn't
likely to cause problems on 64-bit systems due to a bit of luck on
how NetLabel/CIPSO works and the default ebitmap size, but it can be
a problem on 32-bit systems.
This patch fixes this problem by being a bit more intelligent when
importing NetLabel category bitmaps by skipping over empty sections
which should result in a nice, efficient ebitmap.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.17
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Pull more vfs updates from Al Viro:
"Assorted VFS fixes and related cleanups (IMO the most interesting in
that part are f_path-related things and Eric's descriptor-related
stuff). UFS regression fixes (it got broken last cycle). 9P fixes.
fs-cache series, DAX patches, Jan's file_remove_suid() work"
[ I'd say this is much more than "fixes and related cleanups". The
file_table locking rule change by Eric Dumazet is a rather big and
fundamental update even if the patch isn't huge. - Linus ]
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: (49 commits)
9p: cope with bogus responses from server in p9_client_{read,write}
p9_client_write(): avoid double p9_free_req()
9p: forgetting to cancel request on interrupted zero-copy RPC
dax: bdev_direct_access() may sleep
block: Add support for DAX reads/writes to block devices
dax: Use copy_from_iter_nocache
dax: Add block size note to documentation
fs/file.c: __fget() and dup2() atomicity rules
fs/file.c: don't acquire files->file_lock in fd_install()
fs:super:get_anon_bdev: fix race condition could cause dev exceed its upper limitation
vfs: avoid creation of inode number 0 in get_next_ino
namei: make set_root_rcu() return void
make simple_positive() public
ufs: use dir_pages instead of ufs_dir_pages()
pagemap.h: move dir_pages() over there
remove the pointless include of lglock.h
fs: cleanup slight list_entry abuse
xfs: Correctly lock inode when removing suid and file capabilities
fs: Call security_ops->inode_killpriv on truncate
fs: Provide function telling whether file_remove_privs() will do anything
...
Pull user namespace updates from Eric Biederman:
"Long ago and far away when user namespaces where young it was realized
that allowing fresh mounts of proc and sysfs with only user namespace
permissions could violate the basic rule that only root gets to decide
if proc or sysfs should be mounted at all.
Some hacks were put in place to reduce the worst of the damage could
be done, and the common sense rule was adopted that fresh mounts of
proc and sysfs should allow no more than bind mounts of proc and
sysfs. Unfortunately that rule has not been fully enforced.
There are two kinds of gaps in that enforcement. Only filesystems
mounted on empty directories of proc and sysfs should be ignored but
the test for empty directories was insufficient. So in my tree
directories on proc, sysctl and sysfs that will always be empty are
created specially. Every other technique is imperfect as an ordinary
directory can have entries added even after a readdir returns and
shows that the directory is empty. Special creation of directories
for mount points makes the code in the kernel a smidge clearer about
it's purpose. I asked container developers from the various container
projects to help test this and no holes were found in the set of mount
points on proc and sysfs that are created specially.
This set of changes also starts enforcing the mount flags of fresh
mounts of proc and sysfs are consistent with the existing mount of
proc and sysfs. I expected this to be the boring part of the work but
unfortunately unprivileged userspace winds up mounting fresh copies of
proc and sysfs with noexec and nosuid clear when root set those flags
on the previous mount of proc and sysfs. So for now only the atime,
read-only and nodev attributes which userspace happens to keep
consistent are enforced. Dealing with the noexec and nosuid
attributes remains for another time.
This set of changes also addresses an issue with how open file
descriptors from /proc/<pid>/ns/* are displayed. Recently readlink of
/proc/<pid>/fd has been triggering a WARN_ON that has not been
meaningful since it was added (as all of the code in the kernel was
converted) and is not now actively wrong.
There is also a short list of issues that have not been fixed yet that
I will mention briefly.
It is possible to rename a directory from below to above a bind mount.
At which point any directory pointers below the renamed directory can
be walked up to the root directory of the filesystem. With user
namespaces enabled a bind mount of the bind mount can be created
allowing the user to pick a directory whose children they can rename
to outside of the bind mount. This is challenging to fix and doubly
so because all obvious solutions must touch code that is in the
performance part of pathname resolution.
As mentioned above there is also a question of how to ensure that
developers by accident or with purpose do not introduce exectuable
files on sysfs and proc and in doing so introduce security regressions
in the current userspace that will not be immediately obvious and as
such are likely to require breaking userspace in painful ways once
they are recognized"
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace:
vfs: Remove incorrect debugging WARN in prepend_path
mnt: Update fs_fully_visible to test for permanently empty directories
sysfs: Create mountpoints with sysfs_create_mount_point
sysfs: Add support for permanently empty directories to serve as mount points.
kernfs: Add support for always empty directories.
proc: Allow creating permanently empty directories that serve as mount points
sysctl: Allow creating permanently empty directories that serve as mountpoints.
fs: Add helper functions for permanently empty directories.
vfs: Ignore unlocked mounts in fs_fully_visible
mnt: Modify fs_fully_visible to deal with locked ro nodev and atime
mnt: Refactor the logic for mounting sysfs and proc in a user namespace
Main excitement here is Peter Zijlstra's lockless rbtree optimization to
speed module address lookup. He found some abusers of the module lock
doing that too.
A little bit of parameter work here too; including Dan Streetman's breaking
up the big param mutex so writing a parameter can load another module (yeah,
really). Unfortunately that broke the usual suspects, !CONFIG_MODULES and
!CONFIG_SYSFS, so those fixes were appended too.
Cheers,
Rusty.
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Merge tag 'modules-next-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rusty/linux
Pull module updates from Rusty Russell:
"Main excitement here is Peter Zijlstra's lockless rbtree optimization
to speed module address lookup. He found some abusers of the module
lock doing that too.
A little bit of parameter work here too; including Dan Streetman's
breaking up the big param mutex so writing a parameter can load
another module (yeah, really). Unfortunately that broke the usual
suspects, !CONFIG_MODULES and !CONFIG_SYSFS, so those fixes were
appended too"
* tag 'modules-next-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rusty/linux: (26 commits)
modules: only use mod->param_lock if CONFIG_MODULES
param: fix module param locks when !CONFIG_SYSFS.
rcu: merge fix for Convert ACCESS_ONCE() to READ_ONCE() and WRITE_ONCE()
module: add per-module param_lock
module: make perm const
params: suppress unused variable error, warn once just in case code changes.
modules: clarify CONFIG_MODULE_COMPRESS help, suggest 'N'.
kernel/module.c: avoid ifdefs for sig_enforce declaration
kernel/workqueue.c: remove ifdefs over wq_power_efficient
kernel/params.c: export param_ops_bool_enable_only
kernel/params.c: generalize bool_enable_only
kernel/module.c: use generic module param operaters for sig_enforce
kernel/params: constify struct kernel_param_ops uses
sysfs: tightened sysfs permission checks
module: Rework module_addr_{min,max}
module: Use __module_address() for module_address_lookup()
module: Make the mod_tree stuff conditional on PERF_EVENTS || TRACING
module: Optimize __module_address() using a latched RB-tree
rbtree: Implement generic latch_tree
seqlock: Introduce raw_read_seqcount_latch()
...
This allows for better documentation in the code and
it allows for a simpler and fully correct version of
fs_fully_visible to be written.
The mount points converted and their filesystems are:
/sys/hypervisor/s390/ s390_hypfs
/sys/kernel/config/ configfs
/sys/kernel/debug/ debugfs
/sys/firmware/efi/efivars/ efivarfs
/sys/fs/fuse/connections/ fusectl
/sys/fs/pstore/ pstore
/sys/kernel/tracing/ tracefs
/sys/fs/cgroup/ cgroup
/sys/kernel/security/ securityfs
/sys/fs/selinux/ selinuxfs
/sys/fs/smackfs/ smackfs
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Pull audit updates from Paul Moore:
"Four small audit patches for v4.2, all bug fixes. Only 10 lines of
change this time so very unremarkable, the patch subject lines pretty
much tell the whole story"
* 'upstream' of git://git.infradead.org/users/pcmoore/audit:
audit: Fix check of return value of strnlen_user()
audit: obsolete audit_context check is removed in audit_filter_rules()
audit: fix for typo in comment to function audit_log_link_denied()
lsm: rename duplicate labels in LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK audit message type
Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris:
"The main change in this kernel is Casey's generalized LSM stacking
work, which removes the hard-coding of Capabilities and Yama stacking,
allowing multiple arbitrary "small" LSMs to be stacked with a default
monolithic module (e.g. SELinux, Smack, AppArmor).
See
https://lwn.net/Articles/636056/
This will allow smaller, simpler LSMs to be incorporated into the
mainline kernel and arbitrarily stacked by users. Also, this is a
useful cleanup of the LSM code in its own right"
* 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (38 commits)
tpm, tpm_crb: fix le64_to_cpu conversions in crb_acpi_add()
vTPM: set virtual device before passing to ibmvtpm_reset_crq
tpm_ibmvtpm: remove unneccessary message level.
ima: update builtin policies
ima: extend "mask" policy matching support
ima: add support for new "euid" policy condition
ima: fix ima_show_template_data_ascii()
Smack: freeing an error pointer in smk_write_revoke_subj()
selinux: fix setting of security labels on NFS
selinux: Remove unused permission definitions
selinux: enable genfscon labeling for sysfs and pstore files
selinux: enable per-file labeling for debugfs files.
selinux: update netlink socket classes
signals: don't abuse __flush_signals() in selinux_bprm_committed_creds()
selinux: Print 'sclass' as string when unrecognized netlink message occurs
Smack: allow multiple labels in onlycap
Smack: fix seq operations in smackfs
ima: pass iint to ima_add_violation()
ima: wrap event related data to the new ima_event_data structure
integrity: add validity checks for 'path' parameter
...
Pull networking updates from David Miller:
1) Add TX fast path in mac80211, from Johannes Berg.
2) Add TSO/GRO support to ibmveth, from Thomas Falcon
3) Move away from cached routes in ipv6, just like ipv4, from Martin
KaFai Lau.
4) Lots of new rhashtable tests, from Thomas Graf.
5) Run ingress qdisc lockless, from Alexei Starovoitov.
6) Allow servers to fetch TCP packet headers for SYN packets of new
connections, for fingerprinting. From Eric Dumazet.
7) Add mode parameter to pktgen, for testing receive. From Alexei
Starovoitov.
8) Cache access optimizations via simplifications of build_skb(), from
Alexander Duyck.
9) Move page frag allocator under mm/, also from Alexander.
10) Add xmit_more support to hv_netvsc, from KY Srinivasan.
11) Add a counter guard in case we try to perform endless reclassify
loops in the packet scheduler.
12) Extern flow dissector to be programmable and use it in new "Flower"
classifier. From Jiri Pirko.
13) AF_PACKET fanout rollover fixes, performance improvements, and new
statistics. From Willem de Bruijn.
14) Add netdev driver for GENEVE tunnels, from John W Linville.
15) Add ingress netfilter hooks and filtering, from Pablo Neira Ayuso.
16) Fix handling of epoll edge triggers in TCP, from Eric Dumazet.
17) Add an ECN retry fallback for the initial TCP handshake, from Daniel
Borkmann.
18) Add tail call support to BPF, from Alexei Starovoitov.
19) Add several pktgen helper scripts, from Jesper Dangaard Brouer.
20) Add zerocopy support to AF_UNIX, from Hannes Frederic Sowa.
21) Favor even port numbers for allocation to connect() requests, and
odd port numbers for bind(0), in an effort to help avoid
ip_local_port_range exhaustion. From Eric Dumazet.
22) Add Cavium ThunderX driver, from Sunil Goutham.
23) Allow bpf programs to access skb_iif and dev->ifindex SKB metadata,
from Alexei Starovoitov.
24) Add support for T6 chips in cxgb4vf driver, from Hariprasad Shenai.
25) Double TCP Small Queues default to 256K to accomodate situations
like the XEN driver and wireless aggregation. From Wei Liu.
26) Add more entropy inputs to flow dissector, from Tom Herbert.
27) Add CDG congestion control algorithm to TCP, from Kenneth Klette
Jonassen.
28) Convert ipset over to RCU locking, from Jozsef Kadlecsik.
29) Track and act upon link status of ipv4 route nexthops, from Andy
Gospodarek.
* git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net-next: (1670 commits)
bridge: vlan: flush the dynamically learned entries on port vlan delete
bridge: multicast: add a comment to br_port_state_selection about blocking state
net: inet_diag: export IPV6_V6ONLY sockopt
stmmac: troubleshoot unexpected bits in des0 & des1
net: ipv4 sysctl option to ignore routes when nexthop link is down
net: track link-status of ipv4 nexthops
net: switchdev: ignore unsupported bridge flags
net: Cavium: Fix MAC address setting in shutdown state
drivers: net: xgene: fix for ACPI support without ACPI
ip: report the original address of ICMP messages
net/mlx5e: Prefetch skb data on RX
net/mlx5e: Pop cq outside mlx5e_get_cqe
net/mlx5e: Remove mlx5e_cq.sqrq back-pointer
net/mlx5e: Remove extra spaces
net/mlx5e: Avoid TX CQE generation if more xmit packets expected
net/mlx5e: Avoid redundant dev_kfree_skb() upon NOP completion
net/mlx5e: Remove re-assignment of wq type in mlx5e_enable_rq()
net/mlx5e: Use skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_segs rather than counting them
net/mlx5e: Static mapping of netdev priv resources to/from netdev TX queues
net/mlx4_en: Use HW counters for rx/tx bytes/packets in PF device
...
While testing my netfilter changes I noticed several files where
recompiling unncessarily because they unncessarily included
netfilter.h.
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
This patch defines a builtin measurement policy "tcb", similar to the
existing "ima_tcb", but with additional rules to also measure files
based on the effective uid and to measure files opened with the "read"
mode bit set (eg. read, read-write).
Changing the builtin "ima_tcb" policy could potentially break existing
users. Instead of defining a new separate boot command line option each
time the builtin measurement policy is modified, this patch defines a
single generic boot command line option "ima_policy=" to specify the
builtin policy and deprecates the use of the builtin ima_tcb policy.
[The "ima_policy=" boot command line option is based on Roberto Sassu's
"ima: added new policy type exec" patch.]
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Dr. Greg Wettstein <gw@idfusion.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
The current "mask" policy option matches files opened as MAY_READ,
MAY_WRITE, MAY_APPEND or MAY_EXEC. This patch extends the "mask"
option to match files opened containing one of these modes. For
example, "mask=^MAY_READ" would match files opened read-write.
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Dr. Greg Wettstein <gw@idfusion.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
The new "euid" policy condition measures files with the specified
effective uid (euid). In addition, for CAP_SETUID files it measures
files with the specified uid or suid.
Changelog:
- fixed checkpatch.pl warnings
- fixed avc denied {setuid} messages - based on Roberto's feedback
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Dr. Greg Wettstein <gw@idfusion.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
This patch fixes a bug introduced in "4d7aeee ima: define new template
ima-ng and template fields d-ng and n-ng".
Changelog:
- change int to uint32 (Roberto Sassu's suggestion)
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <rsassu@suse.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.13
This code used to rely on the fact that kfree(NULL) was a no-op, but
then we changed smk_parse_smack() to return error pointers on failure
instead of NULL. Calling kfree() on an error pointer will oops.
I have re-arranged things a bit so that we only free things if they
have been allocated.
Fixes: e774ad683f ('smack: pass error code through pointers')
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Before calling into the filesystem, vfs_setxattr calls
security_inode_setxattr, which ends up calling selinux_inode_setxattr in
our case. That returns -EOPNOTSUPP whenever SBLABEL_MNT is not set.
SBLABEL_MNT was supposed to be set by sb_finish_set_opts, which sets it
only if selinux_is_sblabel_mnt returns true.
The selinux_is_sblabel_mnt logic was broken by eadcabc697 "SELinux: do
all flags twiddling in one place", which didn't take into the account
the SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE behavior that had been introduced for nfs
with eb9ae68650 "SELinux: Add new labeling type native labels".
This caused setxattr's of security labels over NFSv4.2 to fail.
Cc: stable@kernel.org # 3.13
Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Cc: David Quigley <dpquigl@davequigley.com>
Reported-by: Richard Chan <rc556677@outlook.com>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
[PM: added the stable dependency]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Remove unused permission definitions from SELinux.
Many of these were only ever used in pre-mainline
versions of SELinux, prior to Linux 2.6.0. Some of them
were used in the legacy network or compat_net=1 checks
that were disabled by default in Linux 2.6.18 and
fully removed in Linux 2.6.30.
Permissions never used in mainline Linux:
file swapon
filesystem transition
tcp_socket { connectto newconn acceptfrom }
node enforce_dest
unix_stream_socket { newconn acceptfrom }
Legacy network checks, removed in 2.6.30:
socket { recv_msg send_msg }
node { tcp_recv tcp_send udp_recv udp_send rawip_recv rawip_send dccp_recv dccp_send }
netif { tcp_recv tcp_send udp_recv udp_send rawip_recv rawip_send dccp_recv dccp_send }
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Support per-file labeling of sysfs and pstore files based on
genfscon policy entries. This is safe because the sysfs
and pstore directory tree cannot be manipulated by userspace,
except to unlink pstore entries.
This provides an alternative method of assigning per-file labeling
to sysfs or pstore files without needing to set the labels from
userspace on each boot. The advantages of this approach are that
the labels are assigned as soon as the dentry is first instantiated
and userspace does not need to walk the sysfs or pstore tree and
set the labels on each boot. The limitations of this approach are
that the labels can only be assigned based on pathname prefix matching.
You can initially assign labels using this mechanism and then change
them at runtime via setxattr if allowed to do so by policy.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Suggested-by: Dominick Grift <dac.override@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Jeff Vander Stoep <jeffv@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Add support for per-file labeling of debugfs files so that
we can distinguish them in policy. This is particularly
important in Android where certain debugfs files have to be writable
by apps and therefore the debugfs directory tree can be read and
searched by all.
Since debugfs is entirely kernel-generated, the directory tree is
immutable by userspace, and the inodes are pinned in memory, we can
simply use the same approach as with proc and label the inodes from
policy based on pathname from the root of the debugfs filesystem.
Generalize the existing labeling support used for proc and reuse it
for debugfs too.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Update the set of SELinux netlink socket class definitions to match
the set of netlink protocols implemented by the kernel. The
ip_queue implementation for the NETLINK_FIREWALL and NETLINK_IP6_FW protocols
was removed in d16cf20e2f, so we can remove
the corresponding class definitions as this is dead code. Add new
classes for NETLINK_ISCSI, NETLINK_FIB_LOOKUP, NETLINK_CONNECTOR,
NETLINK_NETFILTER, NETLINK_GENERIC, NETLINK_SCSITRANSPORT, NETLINK_RDMA,
and NETLINK_CRYPTO so that we can distinguish among sockets created
for each of these protocols. This change does not define the finer-grained
nlsmsg_read/write permissions or map specific nlmsg_type values to those
permissions in the SELinux nlmsgtab; if finer-grained control of these
sockets is desired/required, that can be added as a follow-on change.
We do not define a SELinux class for NETLINK_ECRYPTFS as the implementation
was removed in 624ae52845.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
selinux_bprm_committed_creds()->__flush_signals() is not right, we
shouldn't clear TIF_SIGPENDING unconditionally. There can be other
reasons for signal_pending(): freezing(), JOBCTL_PENDING_MASK, and
potentially more.
Also change this code to check fatal_signal_pending() rather than
SIGNAL_GROUP_EXIT, it looks a bit better.
Now we can kill __flush_signals() before it finds another buggy user.
Note: this code looks racy, we can flush a signal which was sent after
the task SID has been updated.
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
This prints the 'sclass' field as string instead of index in unrecognized netlink message.
The textual representation makes it easier to distinguish the right class.
Signed-off-by: Marek Milkovic <mmilkovi@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
[PM: 80-char width fixes]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Smack onlycap allows limiting of CAP_MAC_ADMIN and CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE to
processes running with the configured label. But having single privileged
label is not enough in some real use cases. On a complex system like Tizen,
there maybe few programs that need to configure Smack policy in run-time
and running them all with a single label is not always practical.
This patch extends onlycap feature for multiple labels. They are configured
in the same smackfs "onlycap" interface, separated by spaces.
Signed-off-by: Rafal Krypa <r.krypa@samsung.com>
Use proper RCU functions and read locking in smackfs seq_operations.
Smack gets away with not using proper RCU functions in smackfs, because
it never removes entries from these lists. But now one list will be
needed (with interface in smackfs) that will have both elements added and
removed to it.
This change will also help any future changes implementing removal of
unneeded entries from other Smack lists.
The patch also fixes handling of pos argument in smk_seq_start and
smk_seq_next. This fixes a bug in case when smackfs is read with a small
buffer:
Kernel panic - not syncing: Kernel mode fault at addr 0xfa0000011b
CPU: 0 PID: 1292 Comm: dd Not tainted 4.1.0-rc1-00012-g98179b8 #13
Stack:
00000003 0000000d 7ff39e48 7f69fd00
7ff39ce0 601ae4b0 7ff39d50 600e587b
00000010 6039f690 7f69fd40 00612003
Call Trace:
[<601ae4b0>] load2_seq_show+0x19/0x1d
[<600e587b>] seq_read+0x168/0x331
[<600c5943>] __vfs_read+0x21/0x101
[<601a595e>] ? security_file_permission+0xf8/0x105
[<600c5ec6>] ? rw_verify_area+0x86/0xe2
[<600c5fc3>] vfs_read+0xa1/0x14c
[<600c68e2>] SyS_read+0x57/0xa0
[<6001da60>] handle_syscall+0x60/0x80
[<6003087d>] userspace+0x442/0x548
[<6001aa77>] ? interrupt_end+0x0/0x80
[<6001daae>] ? copy_chunk_to_user+0x0/0x2b
[<6002cb6b>] ? save_registers+0x1f/0x39
[<60032ef7>] ? arch_prctl+0xf5/0x170
[<6001a92d>] fork_handler+0x85/0x87
Signed-off-by: Rafal Krypa <r.krypa@samsung.com>
The LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK pid= and comm= labels are duplicates of those at the
start of this function with different values. Rename them to their object
counterparts opid= and ocomm= to disambiguate.
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
[PM: minor merging needed due to differences in the tree]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Most code already uses consts for the struct kernel_param_ops,
sweep the kernel for the last offending stragglers. Other than
include/linux/moduleparam.h and kernel/params.c all other changes
were generated with the following Coccinelle SmPL patch. Merge
conflicts between trees can be handled with Coccinelle.
In the future git could get Coccinelle merge support to deal with
patch --> fail --> grammar --> Coccinelle --> new patch conflicts
automatically for us on patches where the grammar is available and
the patch is of high confidence. Consider this a feature request.
Test compiled on x86_64 against:
* allnoconfig
* allmodconfig
* allyesconfig
@ const_found @
identifier ops;
@@
const struct kernel_param_ops ops = {
};
@ const_not_found depends on !const_found @
identifier ops;
@@
-struct kernel_param_ops ops = {
+const struct kernel_param_ops ops = {
};
Generated-by: Coccinelle SmPL
Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Cc: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: cocci@systeme.lip6.fr
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Luis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
This patch adds the iint associated to the current inode as a new
parameter of ima_add_violation(). The passed iint is always not NULL
if a violation is detected. This modification will be used to determine
the inode for which there is a violation.
Since the 'd' and 'd-ng' template field init() functions were detecting
a violation from the value of the iint pointer, they now check the new
field 'violation', added to the 'ima_event_data' structure.
Changelog:
- v1:
- modified an old comment (Roberto Sassu)
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <rsassu@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
All event related data has been wrapped into the new 'ima_event_data'
structure. The main benefit of this patch is that a new information
can be made available to template fields initialization functions
by simply adding a new field to the new structure instead of modifying
the definition of those functions.
Changelog:
- v2:
- f_dentry replaced with f_path.dentry (Roberto Sassu)
- removed declaration of temporary variables in template field functions
when possible (suggested by Dmitry Kasatkin)
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <rsassu@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
This patch adds validity checks for 'path' parameter and
makes it const.
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
EVM needs to be atomically updated when removing xattrs.
Otherwise concurrent EVM verification may fail in between.
This patch fixes by moving i_mutex unlocking after calling
EVM hook. fsnotify_xattr() is also now called while locked
the same way as it is done in __vfs_setxattr_noperm.
Changelog:
- remove unused 'inode' variable.
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
To prevent offline stripping of existing file xattrs and relabeling of
them at runtime, EVM allows only newly created files to be labeled. As
pseudo filesystems are not persistent, stripping of xattrs is not a
concern.
Some LSMs defer file labeling on pseudo filesystems. This patch
permits the labeling of existing files on pseudo files systems.
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
File hashes are automatically set and updated and should not be
manually set. This patch limits file hash setting to fix and log
modes.
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Include don't appraise or measure rules for the NSFS filesystem
in the builtin ima_tcb and ima_appraise_tcb policies.
Changelog:
- Update documentation
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.19
This patch adds a rule in the default measurement policy to skip inodes
in the cgroupfs filesystem. Measurements for this filesystem can be
avoided, as all the digests collected have the same value of the digest of
an empty file.
Furthermore, this patch updates the documentation of IMA policies in
Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy to make it consistent with
the policies set in security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c.
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <rsassu@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
This patch makes the following functions to use ERR_PTR() and related
macros to pass the appropriate error code through returned pointers:
smk_parse_smack()
smk_import_entry()
smk_fetch()
It also makes all the other functions that use them to handle the
error cases properly. This ways correct error codes from places
where they happened can be propagated to the user space if necessary.
Doing this it fixes a bug in onlycap and unconfined files
handling. Previously their content was cleared on any error from
smk_import_entry/smk_parse_smack, be it EINVAL (as originally intended)
or ENOMEM. Right now it only reacts on EINVAL passing other codes
properly to userspace.
Comments have been updated accordingly.
Signed-off-by: Lukasz Pawelczyk <l.pawelczyk@samsung.com>
The dmabuf fd can be shared between processes via unix domain
socket. The file of dmabuf fd is came from anon_inode. The inode
has no set and get xattr operations, so it can not be shared
between processes with smack. This patch fixes just to ignore
private inode including anon_inode for smack_file_receive.
Signed-off-by: Seung-Woo Kim <sw0312.kim@samsung.com>
It's a bit easier to read this if we split it up into two for loops.
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
The stub functions in capability.c are no longer required
with the list based stacking mechanism. Remove the file.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
