QEMU running in a stubdom needs to be able to set INTX_DISABLE, and the
MSI(-X) enable flags in the PCI config space. This adds an attribute
'allow_interrupt_control' which when set for a PCI device allows writes
to this flag(s). The toolstack will need to set this for stubdoms.
When enabled, guest (stubdomain) will be allowed to set relevant enable
flags, but only one at a time - i.e. it refuses to enable more than one
of INTx, MSI, MSI-X at a time.
This functionality is needed only for config space access done by device
model (stubdomain) serving a HVM with the actual PCI device. It is not
necessary and unsafe to enable direct access to those bits for PV domain
with the device attached. For PV domains, there are separate protocol
messages (XEN_PCI_OP_{enable,disable}_{msi,msix}) for this purpose.
Those ops in addition to setting enable bits, also configure MSI(-X) in
dom0 kernel - which is undesirable for PCI passthrough to HVM guests.
This should not introduce any new security issues since a malicious
guest (or stubdom) can already generate MSIs through other ways, see
[1] page 8. Additionally, when qemu runs in dom0, it already have direct
access to those bits.
This is the second iteration of this feature. First was proposed as a
direct Xen interface through a new hypercall, but ultimately it was
rejected by the maintainer, because of mixing pciback and hypercalls for
PCI config space access isn't a good design. Full discussion at [2].
[1]: https://invisiblethingslab.com/resources/2011/Software%20Attacks%20on%20Intel%20VT-d.pdf
[2]: https://xen.markmail.org/thread/smpgpws4umdzizze
[part of the commit message and sysfs handling]
Signed-off-by: Simon Gaiser <simon@invisiblethingslab.com>
[the rest]
Signed-off-by: Marek Marczykowski-Górecki <marmarek@invisiblethingslab.com>
Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
[boris: A few small changes suggested by Roger, some formatting changes]
Signed-off-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Fixes gcc '-Wunused-but-set-variable' warning:
drivers/xen/xen-pciback/conf_space_capability.c: In function pm_ctrl_write:
drivers/xen/xen-pciback/conf_space_capability.c:119:25: warning:
variable old_state set but not used [-Wunused-but-set-variable]
It is never used so can be removed.
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: YueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
There is no need for this at all. Worst it means that if
the guest tries to write to BARs it could lead (on certain
platforms) to PCI SERR errors.
Please note that with af6fc858a3
"xen-pciback: limit guest control of command register"
a guest is still allowed to enable those control bits (safely), but
is not allowed to disable them and that therefore a well behaved
frontend which enables things before using them will still
function correctly.
This is done via an write to the configuration register 0x4 which
triggers on the backend side:
command_write
\- pci_enable_device
\- pci_enable_device_flags
\- do_pci_enable_device
\- pcibios_enable_device
\-pci_enable_resourcess
[which enables the PCI_COMMAND_MEMORY|PCI_COMMAND_IO]
However guests (and drivers) which don't do this could cause
problems, including the security issues which XSA-120 sought
to address.
Reported-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Prarit Bhargava <prarit@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
In preparation to enabling -Wimplicit-fallthrough, mark switch
cases where we are expecting to fall through.
This patch fixes the following warning:
drivers/xen/xen-pciback/xenbus.c: In function ‘xen_pcibk_frontend_changed’:
drivers/xen/xen-pciback/xenbus.c:545:6: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=]
if (xenbus_dev_is_online(xdev))
^
drivers/xen/xen-pciback/xenbus.c:548:2: note: here
case XenbusStateUnknown:
^~~~
Warning level 3 was used: -Wimplicit-fallthrough=3
Notice that, in this particular case, the code comment is modified
in accordance with what GCC is expecting to find.
This patch is part of the ongoing efforts to enable
-Wimplicit-fallthrough.
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com>
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
If pcistub_init_device fails, the release function will be called with
dev_data set to NULL. Check it before using it to avoid a NULL pointer
dereference.
Signed-off-by: Ross Lagerwall <ross.lagerwall@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
pcistub_reg_add() is never called in atomic context.
pcistub_reg_add() is only called by pcistub_quirk_add, which is
only set in DRIVER_ATTR().
Despite never getting called from atomic context,
pcistub_reg_add() calls kzalloc() with GFP_ATOMIC,
which does not sleep for allocation.
GFP_ATOMIC is not necessary and can be replaced with GFP_KERNEL,
which can sleep and improve the possibility of sucessful allocation.
This is found by a static analysis tool named DCNS written by myself.
And I also manually check it.
Signed-off-by: Jia-Ju Bai <baijiaju1990@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
xen_pcibk_config_quirks_init() is never called in atomic context.
The call chains ending up at xen_pcibk_config_quirks_init() are:
[1] xen_pcibk_config_quirks_init() <- xen_pcibk_config_init_dev() <-
pcistub_init_device() <- pcistub_seize() <- pcistub_probe()
[2] xen_pcibk_config_quirks_init() <- xen_pcibk_config_init_dev() <-
pcistub_init_device() <- pcistub_init_devices_late() <-
xen_pcibk_init()
pcistub_probe() is only set as ".probe" in struct pci_driver.
xen_pcibk_init() is is only set as a parameter of module_init().
These functions are not called in atomic context.
Despite never getting called from atomic context,
xen_pcibk_config_quirks_init() calls kzalloc() with GFP_ATOMIC,
which does not sleep for allocation.
GFP_ATOMIC is not necessary and can be replaced with GFP_KERNEL,
which can sleep and improve the possibility of sucessful allocation.
Signed-off-by: Jia-Ju Bai <baijiaju1990@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
pcistub_device_alloc() is never called in atomic context.
The call chain ending up at pcistub_device_alloc() is:
[1] pcistub_device_alloc() <- pcistub_seize() <- pcistub_probe()
pcistub_probe() is only set as ".probe" in struct pci_driver.
This function is not called in atomic context.
Despite never getting called from atomic context,
pcistub_device_alloc() calls kzalloc() with GFP_ATOMIC,
which does not sleep for allocation.
GFP_ATOMIC is not necessary and can be replaced with GFP_KERNEL,
which can sleep and improve the possibility of sucessful allocation.
Signed-off-by: Jia-Ju Bai <baijiaju1990@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
pcistub_init_device() is never called in atomic context.
The call chain ending up at pcistub_init_device() is:
[1] pcistub_init_device() <- pcistub_seize() <- pcistub_probe()
[2] pcistub_init_device() <- pcistub_init_devices_late() <-
xen_pcibk_init()
pcistub_probe() is only set as ".probe" in struct pci_driver.
xen_pcibk_init() is is only set as a parameter of module_init().
These functions are not called in atomic context.
Despite never getting called from atomic context,
pcistub_init_device() calls kzalloc() with GFP_ATOMIC,
which does not sleep for allocation.
GFP_ATOMIC is not necessary and can be replaced with GFP_KERNEL,
which can sleep and improve the possibility of sucessful allocation.
This is found by a static analysis tool named DCNS written by myself.
And I also manually check it.
Signed-off-by: Jia-Ju Bai <baijiaju1990@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
pcistub_probe() is never called in atomic context.
This function is only set as ".probe" in struct pci_driver.
Despite never getting called from atomic context,
pcistub_probe() calls kmalloc() with GFP_ATOMIC,
which does not sleep for allocation.
GFP_ATOMIC is not necessary and can be replaced with GFP_KERNEL,
which can sleep and improve the possibility of sucessful allocation.
This is found by a static analysis tool named DCNS written by myself.
And I also manually check it.
Signed-off-by: Jia-Ju Bai <baijiaju1990@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which
makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license.
By default all files without license information are under the default
license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2.
Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0'
SPDX license identifier. The SPDX identifier is a legally binding
shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text.
This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and
Philippe Ombredanne.
How this work was done:
Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of
the use cases:
- file had no licensing information it it.
- file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it,
- file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information,
Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases
where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license
had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords.
The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to
a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the
output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX
tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne. Philippe prepared the
base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files.
The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files
assessed. Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner
results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s)
to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not
immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was:
- Files considered eligible had to be source code files.
- Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5
lines of source
- File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5
lines).
All documentation files were explicitly excluded.
The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license
identifiers to apply.
- when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was
considered to have no license information in it, and the top level
COPYING file license applied.
For non */uapi/* files that summary was:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|-------
GPL-2.0 11139
and resulted in the first patch in this series.
If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH
Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0". Results of that was:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|-------
GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 930
and resulted in the second patch in this series.
- if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one
of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if
any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in
it (per prior point). Results summary:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|------
GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 270
GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 169
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause) 21
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 17
LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 15
GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 14
((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 5
LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 4
LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note 3
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT) 3
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT) 1
and that resulted in the third patch in this series.
- when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became
the concluded license(s).
- when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a
license but the other didn't, or they both detected different
licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred.
- In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file
resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and
which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics).
- When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was
confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
- If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier,
the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later
in time.
In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the
spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the
source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation
by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from
FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners
disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights. The
Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so
they are related.
Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets
for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the
files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks
in about 15000 files.
In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have
copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the
correct identifier.
Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual
inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch
version early this week with:
- a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected
license ids and scores
- reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+
files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct
- reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license
was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied
SPDX license was correct
This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction. This
worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the
different types of files to be modified.
These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg. Thomas wrote a script to
parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the
format that the file expected. This script was further refined by Greg
based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to
distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different
comment types.) Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to
generate the patches.
Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Just like done in d2bd05d88d ("xen-pciback: return proper values during
BAR sizing") for the ROM BAR, ordinary ones also shouldn't compare the
written value directly against ~0, but consider the r/o bits at the
bottom (if any).
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
It's better to be explicit and use the DRIVER_ATTR_RW() and
DRIVER_ATTR_RO() macros when defining a driver's sysfs file.
Bonus is this fixes up a checkpatch.pl warning.
This is part of a series to drop DRIVER_ATTR() from the tree entirely.
Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Today a Xenstore watch event is delivered via a callback function
declared as:
void (*callback)(struct xenbus_watch *,
const char **vec, unsigned int len);
As all watch events only ever come with two parameters (path and token)
changing the prototype to:
void (*callback)(struct xenbus_watch *,
const char *path, const char *token);
is the natural thing to do.
Apply this change and adapt all users.
Cc: konrad.wilk@oracle.com
Cc: roger.pau@citrix.com
Cc: wei.liu2@citrix.com
Cc: paul.durrant@citrix.com
Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Durrant <paul.durrant@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Use xenbus_read_unsigned() instead of xenbus_scanf() when possible.
This requires to change the type of the read from int to unsigned,
but this case has been wrong before: negative values are not allowed
for the modified case.
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Acked-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com>
Support the driver_override scheme introduced with commit 782a985d7a
("PCI: Introduce new device binding path using pci_dev.driver_override")
As pcistub_probe() is called for all devices (it has to check for a
match based on the slot address rather than device type) it has to
check for driver_override set to "pciback" itself.
Up to now for assigning a pci device to pciback you need something like:
echo 0000:07:10.0 > /sys/bus/pci/devices/0000\:07\:10.0/driver/unbind
echo 0000:07:10.0 > /sys/bus/pci/drivers/pciback/new_slot
echo 0000:07:10.0 > /sys/bus/pci/drivers_probe
while with the patch you can use the same mechanism as for similar
drivers like pci-stub and vfio-pci:
echo pciback > /sys/bus/pci/devices/0000\:07\:10.0/driver_override
echo 0000:07:10.0 > /sys/bus/pci/devices/0000\:07\:10.0/driver/unbind
echo 0000:07:10.0 > /sys/bus/pci/drivers_probe
So e.g. libvirt doesn't need special handling for pciback.
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com>
The Xen pciback driver has a list of all pci devices it is ready to
seize. There is no check whether a to be added entry already exists.
While this might be no problem in the common case it might confuse
those which consume the list via sysfs.
Modify the handling of this list by not adding an entry which already
exists. As this will be needed later split out the list handling into
a separate function.
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com>
The Xen pciback driver maintains a list of all its seized devices.
There are two functions searching the list for a specific device with
basically the same semantics just returning different structures in
case of a match.
Split out the search function.
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com>
req_start is simply an alias of the "offset" function parameter, and
req_end is being used just once in each function. (And both variables
were loop invariant anyway, so should at least have got initialized
outside the loop.)
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com>
There's no point calling xen_pcibk_config_read() here - all it'll do is
return whatever conf_space_read() returns for the field which was found
here (and which would be found there again). Also there's no point
clearing tmp_val before the call.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com>
Other than for raw BAR values, flags are properly separated in the
internal representation.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com>
System workqueues have been able to handle high level of concurrency
for a long time now and there's no reason to use dedicated workqueues
just to gain concurrency. Replace dedicated xen_pcibk_wq with the
use of system_wq.
Unlike a dedicated per-cpu workqueue created with create_workqueue(),
system_wq allows multiple work items to overlap executions even on
the same CPU; however, a per-cpu workqueue doesn't have any CPU
locality or global ordering guarantees unless the target CPU is
explicitly specified and thus the increase of local concurrency shouldn't
make any difference.
Since the work items could be pending, flush_work() has been used in
xen_pcibk_disconnect(). xen_pcibk_xenbus_remove() calls free_pdev()
which in turn calls xen_pcibk_disconnect() for every pdev to ensure that
there is no pending task while disconnecting the driver.
Signed-off-by: Bhaktipriya Shridhar <bhaktipriya96@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com>
Reads following writes with all address bits set to 1 should return all
changeable address bits as one, not the BAR size (nor, as was the case
for the upper half of 64-bit BARs, the high half of the region's end
address). Presumably this didn't cause any problems so far because
consumers use the value to calculate the size (usually via val & -val),
and do nothing else with it.
But also consider the exception here: Unimplemented BARs should always
return all zeroes.
And finally, the check for whether to return the sizing address on read
for the ROM BAR should ignore all non-address bits, not just the ROM
Enable one.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com>
Current overlap check is evaluating to false a case where a filter
field is fully contained (proper subset) of a r/w request. This
change applies classical overlap check instead to include all the
scenarios.
More specifically, for (Hilscher GmbH CIFX 50E-DP(M/S)) device driver
the logic is such that the entire confspace is read and written in 4
byte chunks. In this case as an example, CACHE_LINE_SIZE,
LATENCY_TIMER and PCI_BIST are arriving together in one call to
xen_pcibk_config_write() with offset == 0xc and size == 4. With the
exsisting overlap check the LATENCY_TIMER field (offset == 0xd, length
== 1) is fully contained in the write request and hence is excluded
from write, which is incorrect.
Signed-off-by: Andrey Grodzovsky <andrey2805@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com>
- Make earlyprintk=xen work for HVM guests.
- Remove module support for things never built as modules.
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Merge tag 'for-linus-4.6-rc0-tag' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/xen/tip
Pull xen updates from David Vrabel:
"Features and fixes for 4.6:
- Make earlyprintk=xen work for HVM guests
- Remove module support for things never built as modules"
* tag 'for-linus-4.6-rc0-tag' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/xen/tip:
drivers/xen: make platform-pci.c explicitly non-modular
drivers/xen: make sys-hypervisor.c explicitly non-modular
drivers/xen: make xenbus_dev_[front/back]end explicitly non-modular
drivers/xen: make [xen-]ballon explicitly non-modular
xen: audit usages of module.h ; remove unnecessary instances
xen/x86: Drop mode-selecting ifdefs in startup_xen()
xen/x86: Zero out .bss for PV guests
hvc_xen: make early_printk work with HVM guests
hvc_xen: fix xenboot for DomUs
hvc_xen: add earlycon support
Code that uses no modular facilities whatsoever should not be
sourcing module.h at all, since that header drags in a bunch
of other headers with it.
Similarly, code that is not explicitly using modular facilities
like module_init() but only is declaring module_param setup
variables should be using moduleparam.h and not the larger
module.h file for that.
In making this change, we also uncover an implicit use of BUG()
in inline fcns within arch/arm/include/asm/xen/hypercall.h so
we explicitly source <linux/bug.h> for that file now.
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com>
Commit 8135cf8b09 (xen/pciback: Save
xen_pci_op commands before processing it) broke enabling MSI-X because
it would never copy the resulting vectors into the response. The
number of vectors requested was being overwritten by the return value
(typically zero for success).
Save the number of vectors before processing the op, so the correct
number of vectors are copied afterwards.
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com>
Commit 408fb0e5aa (xen/pciback: Don't
allow MSI-X ops if PCI_COMMAND_MEMORY is not set) prevented enabling
MSI-X on passed-through virtual functions, because it checked the VF
for PCI_COMMAND_MEMORY but this is not a valid bit for VFs.
Instead, check the physical function for PCI_COMMAND_MEMORY.
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com>
When allocating a pciback device fails, clear the private
field. This could lead to an use-after free, however
the 'really_probe' takes care of setting
dev_set_drvdata(dev, NULL) in its failure path (which we would
exercise if the ->probe function failed), so we we
are OK. However lets be defensive as the code can change.
Going forward we should clean up the pci_set_drvdata(dev, NULL)
in the various code-base. That will be for another day.
Reviewed-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Reported-by: Jonathan Creekmore <jonathan.creekmore@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Doug Goldstein <cardoe@cardoe.com>
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
commit f598282f51 ("PCI: Fix the NIU MSI-X problem in a better way")
teaches us that dealing with MSI-X can be troublesome.
Further checks in the MSI-X architecture shows that if the
PCI_COMMAND_MEMORY bit is turned of in the PCI_COMMAND we
may not be able to access the BAR (since they are memory regions).
Since the MSI-X tables are located in there.. that can lead
to us causing PCIe errors. Inhibit us performing any
operation on the MSI-X unless the MEMORY bit is set.
Note that Xen hypervisor with:
"x86/MSI-X: access MSI-X table only after having enabled MSI-X"
will return:
xen_pciback: 0000:0a:00.1: error -6 enabling MSI-X for guest 3!
When the generic MSI code tries to setup the PIRQ without
MEMORY bit set. Which means with later versions of Xen
(4.6) this patch is not neccessary.
This is part of XSA-157
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Otherwise just continue on, returning the same values as
previously (return of 0, and op->result has the PIRQ value).
This does not change the behavior of XEN_PCI_OP_disable_msi[|x].
The pci_disable_msi or pci_disable_msix have the checks for
msi_enabled or msix_enabled so they will error out immediately.
However the guest can still call these operations and cause
us to disable the 'ack_intr'. That means the backend IRQ handler
for the legacy interrupt will not respond to interrupts anymore.
This will lead to (if the device is causing an interrupt storm)
for the Linux generic code to disable the interrupt line.
Naturally this will only happen if the device in question
is plugged in on the motherboard on shared level interrupt GSI.
This is part of XSA-157
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Otherwise an guest can subvert the generic MSI code to trigger
an BUG_ON condition during MSI interrupt freeing:
for (i = 0; i < entry->nvec_used; i++)
BUG_ON(irq_has_action(entry->irq + i));
Xen PCI backed installs an IRQ handler (request_irq) for
the dev->irq whenever the guest writes PCI_COMMAND_MEMORY
(or PCI_COMMAND_IO) to the PCI_COMMAND register. This is
done in case the device has legacy interrupts the GSI line
is shared by the backend devices.
To subvert the backend the guest needs to make the backend
to change the dev->irq from the GSI to the MSI interrupt line,
make the backend allocate an interrupt handler, and then command
the backend to free the MSI interrupt and hit the BUG_ON.
Since the backend only calls 'request_irq' when the guest
writes to the PCI_COMMAND register the guest needs to call
XEN_PCI_OP_enable_msi before any other operation. This will
cause the generic MSI code to setup an MSI entry and
populate dev->irq with the new PIRQ value.
Then the guest can write to PCI_COMMAND PCI_COMMAND_MEMORY
and cause the backend to setup an IRQ handler for dev->irq
(which instead of the GSI value has the MSI pirq). See
'xen_pcibk_control_isr'.
Then the guest disables the MSI: XEN_PCI_OP_disable_msi
which ends up triggering the BUG_ON condition in 'free_msi_irqs'
as there is an IRQ handler for the entry->irq (dev->irq).
Note that this cannot be done using MSI-X as the generic
code does not over-write dev->irq with the MSI-X PIRQ values.
The patch inhibits setting up the IRQ handler if MSI or
MSI-X (for symmetry reasons) code had been called successfully.
P.S.
Xen PCIBack when it sets up the device for the guest consumption
ends up writting 0 to the PCI_COMMAND (see xen_pcibk_reset_device).
XSA-120 addendum patch removed that - however when upstreaming said
addendum we found that it caused issues with qemu upstream. That
has now been fixed in qemu upstream.
This is part of XSA-157
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
The guest sequence of:
a) XEN_PCI_OP_enable_msix
b) XEN_PCI_OP_enable_msix
results in hitting an NULL pointer due to using freed pointers.
The device passed in the guest MUST have MSI-X capability.
The a) constructs and SysFS representation of MSI and MSI groups.
The b) adds a second set of them but adding in to SysFS fails (duplicate entry).
'populate_msi_sysfs' frees the newly allocated msi_irq_groups (note that
in a) pdev->msi_irq_groups is still set) and also free's ALL of the
MSI-X entries of the device (the ones allocated in step a) and b)).
The unwind code: 'free_msi_irqs' deletes all the entries and tries to
delete the pdev->msi_irq_groups (which hasn't been set to NULL).
However the pointers in the SysFS are already freed and we hit an
NULL pointer further on when 'strlen' is attempted on a freed pointer.
The patch adds a simple check in the XEN_PCI_OP_enable_msix to guard
against that. The check for msi_enabled is not stricly neccessary.
This is part of XSA-157
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
The guest sequence of:
a) XEN_PCI_OP_enable_msi
b) XEN_PCI_OP_enable_msi
c) XEN_PCI_OP_disable_msi
results in hitting an BUG_ON condition in the msi.c code.
The MSI code uses an dev->msi_list to which it adds MSI entries.
Under the above conditions an BUG_ON() can be hit. The device
passed in the guest MUST have MSI capability.
The a) adds the entry to the dev->msi_list and sets msi_enabled.
The b) adds a second entry but adding in to SysFS fails (duplicate entry)
and deletes all of the entries from msi_list and returns (with msi_enabled
is still set). c) pci_disable_msi passes the msi_enabled checks and hits:
BUG_ON(list_empty(dev_to_msi_list(&dev->dev)));
and blows up.
The patch adds a simple check in the XEN_PCI_OP_enable_msi to guard
against that. The check for msix_enabled is not stricly neccessary.
This is part of XSA-157.
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Double fetch vulnerabilities that happen when a variable is
fetched twice from shared memory but a security check is only
performed the first time.
The xen_pcibk_do_op function performs a switch statements on the op->cmd
value which is stored in shared memory. Interestingly this can result
in a double fetch vulnerability depending on the performed compiler
optimization.
This patch fixes it by saving the xen_pci_op command before
processing it. We also use 'barrier' to make sure that the
compiler does not perform any optimization.
This is part of XSA155.
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
The variable for the 'permissive' module parameter used to be static
but was recently changed to be extern. This puts it in the kernel
global namespace if the driver is built-in, so its name should begin
with a prefix identifying the driver.
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Fixes: af6fc858a3 ("xen-pciback: limit guest control of command register")
Signed-off-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com>
Originally Xen PV drivers only use single-page ring to pass along
information. This might limit the throughput between frontend and
backend.
The patch extends Xenbus driver to support multi-page ring, which in
general should improve throughput if ring is the bottleneck. Changes to
various frontend / backend to adapt to the new interface are also
included.
Affected Xen drivers:
* blkfront/back
* netfront/back
* pcifront/back
* scsifront/back
* vtpmfront
The interface is documented, as before, in xenbus_client.c.
Signed-off-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Durrant <paul.durrant@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Bob Liu <bob.liu@oracle.com>
Cc: Konrad Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com>
It's not clear to me why only the enabling operation got handled so
far.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com>
We print at the warninig level messages such as:
pciback 0000:90:00.5: MSI-X preparation failed (-38)
which is due to the hypervisor not supporting this sub-hypercall
(which was added in Xen 4.3).
Instead of having scary messages all the time - only have it
when the hypercall is actually supported.
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com>
Otherwise the guest can abuse that control to cause e.g. PCIe
Unsupported Request responses by disabling memory and/or I/O decoding
and subsequently causing (CPU side) accesses to the respective address
ranges, which (depending on system configuration) may be fatal to the
host.
Note that to alter any of the bits collected together as
PCI_COMMAND_GUEST permissive mode is now required to be enabled
globally or on the specific device.
This is CVE-2015-2150 / XSA-120.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com>
When a PF driver unloads, it may find it necessary to leave the VFs
around simply because of pciback having marked them as assigned to a
guest. Utilize a suitable notification to let go of the VFs, thus
allowing the PF to go back into the state it was before its driver
loaded (which in particular allows the driver to be loaded again with
it being able to create the VFs anew, but which also allows to then
pass through the PF instead of the VFs).
Don't do this however for any VFs currently in active use by a guest.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
[v2: Removed the switch statement, moved it about]
[v3: Redid it a bit differently]
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com>
The commit "xen/pciback: Don't deadlock when unbinding." was using
the version of pci_reset_function which would lock the device lock.
That is no good as we can dead-lock. As such we swapped to using
the lock-less version and requiring that the callers
of 'pcistub_put_pci_dev' take the device lock. And as such
this bug got exposed.
Using the lock-less version is OK, except that we tried to
use 'pci_restore_state' after the lock-less version of
__pci_reset_function_locked - which won't work as 'state_saved'
is set to false. Said 'state_saved' is a toggle boolean that
is to be used by the sequence of a) pci_save_state/pci_restore_state
or b) pci_load_and_free_saved_state/pci_restore_state. We don't
want to use a) as the guest might have messed up the PCI
configuration space and we want it to revert to the state
when the PCI device was binded to us. Therefore we pick
b) to restore the configuration space.
We restore from our 'golden' version of PCI configuration space, when an:
- Device is unbinded from pciback
- Device is detached from a guest.
Reported-by: Sander Eikelenboom <linux@eikelenboom.it>
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com>
A little cleanup. No functional difference.
Reviewed-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com>
We had been printing it only if the device was built with
debug enabled. But this information is useful in the field
to troubleshoot.
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com>
