We switched from "struct task_struct"->security to "struct cred"->security
in Linux 2.6.29. But not all LSM modules were happy with that change.
TOMOYO LSM module is an example which want to use per "struct task_struct"
security blob, for TOMOYO's security context is defined based on "struct
task_struct" rather than "struct cred". AppArmor LSM module is another
example which want to use it, for AppArmor is currently abusing the cred
a little bit to store the change_hat and setexeccon info. Although
security_task_free() hook was revived in Linux 3.4 because Yama LSM module
wanted to release per "struct task_struct" security blob,
security_task_alloc() hook and "struct task_struct"->security field were
not revived. Nowadays, we are getting proposals of lightweight LSM modules
which want to use per "struct task_struct" security blob.
We are already allowing multiple concurrent LSM modules (up to one fully
armored module which uses "struct cred"->security field or exclusive hooks
like security_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(), plus unlimited number of
lightweight modules which do not use "struct cred"->security nor exclusive
hooks) as long as they are built into the kernel. But this patch does not
implement variable length "struct task_struct"->security field which will
become needed when multiple LSM modules want to use "struct task_struct"->
security field. Although it won't be difficult to implement variable length
"struct task_struct"->security field, let's think about it after we merged
this patch.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Tested-by: Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@gmail.com>
Acked-by: José Bollo <jobol@nonadev.net>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Cc: José Bollo <jobol@nonadev.net>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
"struct security_hook_heads" is an array of "struct list_head"
where elements can be initialized just before registration.
There is no need to waste 350+ lines for initialization. Let's
initialize "struct security_hook_heads" just before registration.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
The local variable "rt" will be set to an appropriate pointer a bit later.
Thus omit the explicit initialisation at the beginning which became
unnecessary with a previous update step.
Signed-off-by: Markus Elfring <elfring@users.sourceforge.net>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Return directly after a call of the function "next_entry" failed
at the beginning.
Signed-off-by: Markus Elfring <elfring@users.sourceforge.net>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
The local variable "ft" was set to a null pointer despite of an
immediate reassignment.
Thus remove this statement from the beginning of a loop.
Signed-off-by: Markus Elfring <elfring@users.sourceforge.net>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Call the function "kfree" at the end only after it was determined
that the local variable "newgenfs" contained a non-null pointer.
Signed-off-by: Markus Elfring <elfring@users.sourceforge.net>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Return directly after a call of the function "next_entry" failed
at the beginning.
Signed-off-by: Markus Elfring <elfring@users.sourceforge.net>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
The script "checkpatch.pl" pointed information out like the following.
WARNING: void function return statements are not generally useful
Thus remove such a statement in the affected function.
Signed-off-by: Markus Elfring <elfring@users.sourceforge.net>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Multiplications for the size determination of memory allocations
indicated that array data structures should be processed.
Thus use the corresponding function "kcalloc".
This issue was detected by using the Coccinelle software.
Signed-off-by: Markus Elfring <elfring@users.sourceforge.net>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
The script "checkpatch.pl" pointed information out like the following.
Comparison to NULL could be written !…
Thus fix affected source code places.
Signed-off-by: Markus Elfring <elfring@users.sourceforge.net>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
A multiplication for the size determination of a memory allocation
indicated that an array data structure should be processed.
Thus use the corresponding function "kmalloc_array".
This issue was detected by using the Coccinelle software.
Signed-off-by: Markus Elfring <elfring@users.sourceforge.net>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Replace the specification of data structures by pointer dereferences
as the parameter for the operator "sizeof" to make the corresponding size
determination a bit safer.
Signed-off-by: Markus Elfring <elfring@users.sourceforge.net>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
The script "checkpatch.pl" pointed information out like the following.
WARNING: void function return statements are not generally useful
Thus remove such a statement in the affected function.
Signed-off-by: Markus Elfring <elfring@users.sourceforge.net>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
* A multiplication for the size determination of a memory allocation
indicated that an array data structure should be processed.
Thus use the corresponding function "kmalloc_array".
This issue was detected by using the Coccinelle software.
* Replace the specification of a data type by a pointer dereference
to make the corresponding size determination a bit safer according to
the Linux coding style convention.
Signed-off-by: Markus Elfring <elfring@users.sourceforge.net>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
For now we have only "=" operator for fowner/uid/euid rules. This
patch provide two more operators - ">" and "<" in order to make
fowner/uid/euid rules more flexible.
Examples of usage.
Appraise all files owned by special and system users (SYS_UID_MAX 999):
appraise fowner<1000
Don't appraise files owned by normal users (UID_MIN 1000):
dont_appraise fowner>999
Appraise all files owned by users with UID 1000-1010:
dont_appraise fowner>1010
appraise fowner>999
Changelog v3:
- Removed code duplication in ima_parse_rule().
- Fix ima_policy_show() - (Mimi)
Changelog v2:
- Fixed default policy rules.
Signed-off-by: Mikhail Kurinnoi <viewizard@viewizard.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 115 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------
1 file changed, 87 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-)
KMSAN (KernelMemorySanitizer, a new error detection tool) reports use of
uninitialized memory in selinux_socket_bind():
==================================================================
BUG: KMSAN: use of unitialized memory
inter: 0
CPU: 3 PID: 1074 Comm: packet2 Tainted: G B 4.8.0-rc6+ #1916
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
0000000000000000 ffff8800882ffb08 ffffffff825759c8 ffff8800882ffa48
ffffffff818bf551 ffffffff85bab870 0000000000000092 ffffffff85bab550
0000000000000000 0000000000000092 00000000bb0009bb 0000000000000002
Call Trace:
[< inline >] __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:15
[<ffffffff825759c8>] dump_stack+0x238/0x290 lib/dump_stack.c:51
[<ffffffff818bdee6>] kmsan_report+0x276/0x2e0 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:1008
[<ffffffff818bf0fb>] __msan_warning+0x5b/0xb0 mm/kmsan/kmsan_instr.c:424
[<ffffffff822dae71>] selinux_socket_bind+0xf41/0x1080 security/selinux/hooks.c:4288
[<ffffffff8229357c>] security_socket_bind+0x1ec/0x240 security/security.c:1240
[<ffffffff84265d98>] SYSC_bind+0x358/0x5f0 net/socket.c:1366
[<ffffffff84265a22>] SyS_bind+0x82/0xa0 net/socket.c:1356
[<ffffffff81005678>] do_syscall_64+0x58/0x70 arch/x86/entry/common.c:292
[<ffffffff8518217c>] entry_SYSCALL64_slow_path+0x25/0x25 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.o:?
chained origin: 00000000ba6009bb
[<ffffffff810bb7a7>] save_stack_trace+0x27/0x50 arch/x86/kernel/stacktrace.c:67
[< inline >] kmsan_save_stack_with_flags mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:322
[< inline >] kmsan_save_stack mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:337
[<ffffffff818bd2b8>] kmsan_internal_chain_origin+0x118/0x1e0 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:530
[<ffffffff818bf033>] __msan_set_alloca_origin4+0xc3/0x130 mm/kmsan/kmsan_instr.c:380
[<ffffffff84265b69>] SYSC_bind+0x129/0x5f0 net/socket.c:1356
[<ffffffff84265a22>] SyS_bind+0x82/0xa0 net/socket.c:1356
[<ffffffff81005678>] do_syscall_64+0x58/0x70 arch/x86/entry/common.c:292
[<ffffffff8518217c>] return_from_SYSCALL_64+0x0/0x6a arch/x86/entry/entry_64.o:?
origin description: ----address@SYSC_bind (origin=00000000b8c00900)
==================================================================
(the line numbers are relative to 4.8-rc6, but the bug persists upstream)
, when I run the following program as root:
=======================================================
#include <string.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <netinet/in.h>
int main(int argc, char *argv[]) {
struct sockaddr addr;
int size = 0;
if (argc > 1) {
size = atoi(argv[1]);
}
memset(&addr, 0, sizeof(addr));
int fd = socket(PF_INET6, SOCK_DGRAM, IPPROTO_IP);
bind(fd, &addr, size);
return 0;
}
=======================================================
(for different values of |size| other error reports are printed).
This happens because bind() unconditionally copies |size| bytes of
|addr| to the kernel, leaving the rest uninitialized. Then
security_socket_bind() reads the IP address bytes, including the
uninitialized ones, to determine the port, or e.g. pass them further to
sel_netnode_find(), which uses them to calculate a hash.
Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
[PM: fixed some whitespace damage]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Modifying the attributes of a file makes ima_inode_post_setattr reset
the IMA cache flags. So if the file, which has just been created,
is opened a second time before the first file descriptor is closed,
verification fails since the security.ima xattr has not been written
yet. We therefore have to look at the IMA_NEW_FILE even if the file
already existed.
With this patch there should no longer be an error when cat tries to
open testfile:
$ rm -f testfile
$ ( echo test >&3 ; touch testfile ; cat testfile ) 3>testfile
A file being new is no reason to accept that it is missing a digital
signature demanded by the policy.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Glöckner <dg@emlix.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
The default IMA rules are loaded during init and then do not
change, so mark them as __ro_after_init.
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Constify nlmsg permission tables, which are initialized once
and then do not change.
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Mark all of the registration hooks as __ro_after_init (via the
__lsm_ro_after_init macro).
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Subsequent patches will add RO hardening to LSM hooks, however, SELinux
still needs to be able to perform runtime disablement after init to handle
architectures where init-time disablement via boot parameters is not feasible.
Introduce a new kernel configuration parameter CONFIG_SECURITY_WRITABLE_HOOKS,
and a helper macro __lsm_ro_after_init, to handle this case.
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
commit 79bcf325e6b32b3c ("prlimit,security,selinux: add a security hook
for prlimit") introduced a security hook for prlimit() and implemented it
for SELinux. However, if prlimit() is called with NULL arguments for both
the new limit and the old limit, then the hook is called with 0 for the
read/write flags, since the prlimit() will neither read nor write the
process' limits. This would in turn lead to calling avc_has_perm() with 0
for the requested permissions, which triggers a BUG_ON() in
avc_has_perm_noaudit() since the kernel should never be invoking
avc_has_perm() with no permissions. Fix this in the SELinux hook by
returning immediately if the flags are 0. Arguably prlimit64() itself
ought to return immediately if both old_rlim and new_rlim are NULL since
it is effectively a no-op in that case.
Reported by the lkp-robot based on trinity testing.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
When SELinux was first added to the kernel, a process could only get
and set its own resource limits via getrlimit(2) and setrlimit(2), so no
MAC checks were required for those operations, and thus no security hooks
were defined for them. Later, SELinux introduced a hook for setlimit(2)
with a check if the hard limit was being changed in order to be able to
rely on the hard limit value as a safe reset point upon context
transitions.
Later on, when prlimit(2) was added to the kernel with the ability to get
or set resource limits (hard or soft) of another process, LSM/SELinux was
not updated other than to pass the target process to the setrlimit hook.
This resulted in incomplete control over both getting and setting the
resource limits of another process.
Add a new security_task_prlimit() hook to the check_prlimit_permission()
function to provide complete mediation. The hook is only called when
acting on another task, and only if the existing DAC/capability checks
would allow access. Pass flags down to the hook to indicate whether the
prlimit(2) call will read, write, or both read and write the resource
limits of the target process.
The existing security_task_setrlimit() hook is left alone; it continues
to serve a purpose in supporting the ability to make decisions based on
the old and/or new resource limit values when setting limits. This
is consistent with the DAC/capability logic, where
check_prlimit_permission() performs generic DAC/capability checks for
acting on another task, while do_prlimit() performs a capability check
based on a comparison of the old and new resource limits. Fix the
inline documentation for the hook to match the code.
Implement the new hook for SELinux. For setting resource limits, we
reuse the existing setrlimit permission. Note that this does overload
the setrlimit permission to mean the ability to set the resource limit
(soft or hard) of another process or the ability to change one's own
hard limit. For getting resource limits, a new getrlimit permission
is defined. This was not originally defined since getrlimit(2) could
only be used to obtain a process' own limits.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Pull sched.h split-up from Ingo Molnar:
"The point of these changes is to significantly reduce the
<linux/sched.h> header footprint, to speed up the kernel build and to
have a cleaner header structure.
After these changes the new <linux/sched.h>'s typical preprocessed
size goes down from a previous ~0.68 MB (~22K lines) to ~0.45 MB (~15K
lines), which is around 40% faster to build on typical configs.
Not much changed from the last version (-v2) posted three weeks ago: I
eliminated quirks, backmerged fixes plus I rebased it to an upstream
SHA1 from yesterday that includes most changes queued up in -next plus
all sched.h changes that were pending from Andrew.
I've re-tested the series both on x86 and on cross-arch defconfigs,
and did a bisectability test at a number of random points.
I tried to test as many build configurations as possible, but some
build breakage is probably still left - but it should be mostly
limited to architectures that have no cross-compiler binaries
available on kernel.org, and non-default configurations"
* 'WIP.sched-core-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (146 commits)
sched/headers: Clean up <linux/sched.h>
sched/headers: Remove #ifdefs from <linux/sched.h>
sched/headers: Remove the <linux/topology.h> include from <linux/sched.h>
sched/headers, hrtimer: Remove the <linux/wait.h> include from <linux/hrtimer.h>
sched/headers, x86/apic: Remove the <linux/pm.h> header inclusion from <asm/apic.h>
sched/headers, timers: Remove the <linux/sysctl.h> include from <linux/timer.h>
sched/headers: Remove <linux/magic.h> from <linux/sched/task_stack.h>
sched/headers: Remove <linux/sched.h> from <linux/sched/init.h>
sched/core: Remove unused prefetch_stack()
sched/headers: Remove <linux/rculist.h> from <linux/sched.h>
sched/headers: Remove the 'init_pid_ns' prototype from <linux/sched.h>
sched/headers: Remove <linux/signal.h> from <linux/sched.h>
sched/headers: Remove <linux/rwsem.h> from <linux/sched.h>
sched/headers: Remove the runqueue_is_locked() prototype
sched/headers: Remove <linux/sched.h> from <linux/sched/hotplug.h>
sched/headers: Remove <linux/sched.h> from <linux/sched/debug.h>
sched/headers: Remove <linux/sched.h> from <linux/sched/nohz.h>
sched/headers: Remove <linux/sched.h> from <linux/sched/stat.h>
sched/headers: Remove the <linux/gfp.h> include from <linux/sched.h>
sched/headers: Remove <linux/rtmutex.h> from <linux/sched.h>
...
Update files that depend on the magic.h inclusion.
Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
We don't actually need the full rculist.h header in sched.h anymore,
we will be able to include the smaller rcupdate.h header instead.
But first update code that relied on the implicit header inclusion.
Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
We are going to split <linux/sched/task.h> out of <linux/sched.h>, which
will have to be picked up from other headers and a couple of .c files.
Create a trivial placeholder <linux/sched/task.h> file that just
maps to <linux/sched.h> to make this patch obviously correct and
bisectable.
Include the new header in the files that are going to need it.
Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Add #include <linux/cred.h> dependencies to all .c files rely on sched.h
doing that for them.
Note that even if the count where we need to add extra headers seems high,
it's still a net win, because <linux/sched.h> is included in over
2,200 files ...
Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
We are going to split <linux/sched/user.h> out of <linux/sched.h>, which
will have to be picked up from other headers and a couple of .c files.
Create a trivial placeholder <linux/sched/user.h> file that just
maps to <linux/sched.h> to make this patch obviously correct and
bisectable.
Include the new header in the files that are going to need it.
Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
We are going to split <linux/sched/signal.h> out of <linux/sched.h>, which
will have to be picked up from other headers and a couple of .c files.
Create a trivial placeholder <linux/sched/signal.h> file that just
maps to <linux/sched.h> to make this patch obviously correct and
bisectable.
Include the new header in the files that are going to need it.
Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
commit 1ea0ce4069 ("selinux: allow
changing labels for cgroupfs") broke the Android init program,
which looks up security contexts whenever creating directories
and attempts to assign them via setfscreatecon().
When creating subdirectories in cgroup mounts, this would previously
be ignored since cgroup did not support userspace setting of security
contexts. However, after the commit, SELinux would attempt to honor
the requested context on cgroup directories and fail due to permission
denial. Avoid breaking existing userspace/policy by wrapping this change
with a conditional on a new cgroup_seclabel policy capability. This
preserves existing behavior until/unless a new policy explicitly enables
this capability.
Reported-by: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
rcu_dereference_key() and user_key_payload() are currently being used in
two different, incompatible ways:
(1) As a wrapper to rcu_dereference() - when only the RCU read lock used
to protect the key.
(2) As a wrapper to rcu_dereference_protected() - when the key semaphor is
used to protect the key and the may be being modified.
Fix this by splitting both of the key wrappers to produce:
(1) RCU accessors for keys when caller has the key semaphore locked:
dereference_key_locked()
user_key_payload_locked()
(2) RCU accessors for keys when caller holds the RCU read lock:
dereference_key_rcu()
user_key_payload_rcu()
This should fix following warning in the NFS idmapper
===============================
[ INFO: suspicious RCU usage. ]
4.10.0 #1 Tainted: G W
-------------------------------
./include/keys/user-type.h:53 suspicious rcu_dereference_protected() usage!
other info that might help us debug this:
rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 0
1 lock held by mount.nfs/5987:
#0: (rcu_read_lock){......}, at: [<d000000002527abc>] nfs_idmap_get_key+0x15c/0x420 [nfsv4]
stack backtrace:
CPU: 1 PID: 5987 Comm: mount.nfs Tainted: G W 4.10.0 #1
Call Trace:
dump_stack+0xe8/0x154 (unreliable)
lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0x140/0x190
nfs_idmap_get_key+0x380/0x420 [nfsv4]
nfs_map_name_to_uid+0x2a0/0x3b0 [nfsv4]
decode_getfattr_attrs+0xfac/0x16b0 [nfsv4]
decode_getfattr_generic.constprop.106+0xbc/0x150 [nfsv4]
nfs4_xdr_dec_lookup_root+0xac/0xb0 [nfsv4]
rpcauth_unwrap_resp+0xe8/0x140 [sunrpc]
call_decode+0x29c/0x910 [sunrpc]
__rpc_execute+0x140/0x8f0 [sunrpc]
rpc_run_task+0x170/0x200 [sunrpc]
nfs4_call_sync_sequence+0x68/0xa0 [nfsv4]
_nfs4_lookup_root.isra.44+0xd0/0xf0 [nfsv4]
nfs4_lookup_root+0xe0/0x350 [nfsv4]
nfs4_lookup_root_sec+0x70/0xa0 [nfsv4]
nfs4_find_root_sec+0xc4/0x100 [nfsv4]
nfs4_proc_get_rootfh+0x5c/0xf0 [nfsv4]
nfs4_get_rootfh+0x6c/0x190 [nfsv4]
nfs4_server_common_setup+0xc4/0x260 [nfsv4]
nfs4_create_server+0x278/0x3c0 [nfsv4]
nfs4_remote_mount+0x50/0xb0 [nfsv4]
mount_fs+0x74/0x210
vfs_kern_mount+0x78/0x220
nfs_do_root_mount+0xb0/0x140 [nfsv4]
nfs4_try_mount+0x60/0x100 [nfsv4]
nfs_fs_mount+0x5ec/0xda0 [nfs]
mount_fs+0x74/0x210
vfs_kern_mount+0x78/0x220
do_mount+0x254/0xf70
SyS_mount+0x94/0x100
system_call+0x38/0xe0
Reported-by: Jan Stancek <jstancek@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Jan Stancek <jstancek@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Now that %z is standartised in C99 there is no reason to support %Z.
Unlike %L it doesn't even make format strings smaller.
Use BUILD_BUG_ON in a couple ATM drivers.
In case anyone didn't notice lib/vsprintf.o is about half of SLUB which
is in my opinion is quite an achievement. Hopefully this patch inspires
someone else to trim vsprintf.c more.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170103230126.GA30170@avx2
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: Andy Shevchenko <andy.shevchenko@gmail.com>
Cc: Rasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
->fault(), ->page_mkwrite(), and ->pfn_mkwrite() calls do not need to
take a vma and vmf parameter when the vma already resides in vmf.
Remove the vma parameter to simplify things.
[arnd@arndb.de: fix ARM build]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170125223558.1451224-1-arnd@arndb.de
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/148521301778.19116.10840599906674778980.stgit@djiang5-desk3.ch.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Reviewed-by: Ross Zwisler <ross.zwisler@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <mawilcox@microsoft.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.com>
Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Pull namespace updates from Eric Biederman:
"There is a lot here. A lot of these changes result in subtle user
visible differences in kernel behavior. I don't expect anything will
care but I will revert/fix things immediately if any regressions show
up.
From Seth Forshee there is a continuation of the work to make the vfs
ready for unpriviled mounts. We had thought the previous changes
prevented the creation of files outside of s_user_ns of a filesystem,
but it turns we missed the O_CREAT path. Ooops.
Pavel Tikhomirov and Oleg Nesterov worked together to fix a long
standing bug in the implemenation of PR_SET_CHILD_SUBREAPER where only
children that are forked after the prctl are considered and not
children forked before the prctl. The only known user of this prctl
systemd forks all children after the prctl. So no userspace
regressions will occur. Holding earlier forked children to the same
rules as later forked children creates a semantic that is sane enough
to allow checkpoing of processes that use this feature.
There is a long delayed change by Nikolay Borisov to limit inotify
instances inside a user namespace.
Michael Kerrisk extends the API for files used to maniuplate
namespaces with two new trivial ioctls to allow discovery of the
hierachy and properties of namespaces.
Konstantin Khlebnikov with the help of Al Viro adds code that when a
network namespace exits purges it's sysctl entries from the dcache. As
in some circumstances this could use a lot of memory.
Vivek Goyal fixed a bug with stacked filesystems where the permissions
on the wrong inode were being checked.
I continue previous work on ptracing across exec. Allowing a file to
be setuid across exec while being ptraced if the tracer has enough
credentials in the user namespace, and if the process has CAP_SETUID
in it's own namespace. Proc files for setuid or otherwise undumpable
executables are now owned by the root in the user namespace of their
mm. Allowing debugging of setuid applications in containers to work
better.
A bug I introduced with permission checking and automount is now
fixed. The big change is to mark the mounts that the kernel initiates
as a result of an automount. This allows the permission checks in sget
to be safely suppressed for this kind of mount. As the permission
check happened when the original filesystem was mounted.
Finally a special case in the mount namespace is removed preventing
unbounded chains in the mount hash table, and making the semantics
simpler which benefits CRIU.
The vfs fix along with related work in ima and evm I believe makes us
ready to finish developing and merge fully unprivileged mounts of the
fuse filesystem. The cleanups of the mount namespace makes discussing
how to fix the worst case complexity of umount. The stacked filesystem
fixes pave the way for adding multiple mappings for the filesystem
uids so that efficient and safer containers can be implemented"
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace:
proc/sysctl: Don't grab i_lock under sysctl_lock.
vfs: Use upper filesystem inode in bprm_fill_uid()
proc/sysctl: prune stale dentries during unregistering
mnt: Tuck mounts under others instead of creating shadow/side mounts.
prctl: propagate has_child_subreaper flag to every descendant
introduce the walk_process_tree() helper
nsfs: Add an ioctl() to return owner UID of a userns
fs: Better permission checking for submounts
exit: fix the setns() && PR_SET_CHILD_SUBREAPER interaction
vfs: open() with O_CREAT should not create inodes with unknown ids
nsfs: Add an ioctl() to return the namespace type
proc: Better ownership of files for non-dumpable tasks in user namespaces
exec: Remove LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP
exec: Test the ptracer's saved cred to see if the tracee can gain caps
exec: Don't reset euid and egid when the tracee has CAP_SETUID
inotify: Convert to using per-namespace limits
Here is the "small" driver core patches for 4.11-rc1.
Not much here, some firmware documentation and self-test updates, a
debugfs code formatting issue, and a new feature for call_usermodehelper
to make it more robust on systems that want to lock it down in a more
secure way.
All of these have been linux-next for a while now with no reported
issues.
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Merge tag 'driver-core-4.11-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/driver-core
Pull driver core updates from Greg KH:
"Here is the "small" driver core patches for 4.11-rc1.
Not much here, some firmware documentation and self-test updates, a
debugfs code formatting issue, and a new feature for call_usermodehelper
to make it more robust on systems that want to lock it down in a more
secure way.
All of these have been linux-next for a while now with no reported
issues"
* tag 'driver-core-4.11-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/driver-core:
kernfs: handle null pointers while printing node name and path
Introduce STATIC_USERMODEHELPER to mediate call_usermodehelper()
Make static usermode helper binaries constant
kmod: make usermodehelper path a const string
firmware: revamp firmware documentation
selftests: firmware: send expected errors to /dev/null
selftests: firmware: only modprobe if driver is missing
platform: Print the resource range if device failed to claim
kref: prefer atomic_inc_not_zero to atomic_add_unless
debugfs: improve formatting of debugfs_real_fops()
Pull networking updates from David Miller:
"Highlights:
1) Support TX_RING in AF_PACKET TPACKET_V3 mode, from Sowmini
Varadhan.
2) Simplify classifier state on sk_buff in order to shrink it a bit.
From Willem de Bruijn.
3) Introduce SIPHASH and it's usage for secure sequence numbers and
syncookies. From Jason A. Donenfeld.
4) Reduce CPU usage for ICMP replies we are going to limit or
suppress, from Jesper Dangaard Brouer.
5) Introduce Shared Memory Communications socket layer, from Ursula
Braun.
6) Add RACK loss detection and allow it to actually trigger fast
recovery instead of just assisting after other algorithms have
triggered it. From Yuchung Cheng.
7) Add xmit_more and BQL support to mvneta driver, from Simon Guinot.
8) skb_cow_data avoidance in esp4 and esp6, from Steffen Klassert.
9) Export MPLS packet stats via netlink, from Robert Shearman.
10) Significantly improve inet port bind conflict handling, especially
when an application is restarted and changes it's setting of
reuseport. From Josef Bacik.
11) Implement TX batching in vhost_net, from Jason Wang.
12) Extend the dummy device so that VF (virtual function) features,
such as configuration, can be more easily tested. From Phil
Sutter.
13) Avoid two atomic ops per page on x86 in bnx2x driver, from Eric
Dumazet.
14) Add new bpf MAP, implementing a longest prefix match trie. From
Daniel Mack.
15) Packet sample offloading support in mlxsw driver, from Yotam Gigi.
16) Add new aquantia driver, from David VomLehn.
17) Add bpf tracepoints, from Daniel Borkmann.
18) Add support for port mirroring to b53 and bcm_sf2 drivers, from
Florian Fainelli.
19) Remove custom busy polling in many drivers, it is done in the core
networking since 4.5 times. From Eric Dumazet.
20) Support XDP adjust_head in virtio_net, from John Fastabend.
21) Fix several major holes in neighbour entry confirmation, from
Julian Anastasov.
22) Add XDP support to bnxt_en driver, from Michael Chan.
23) VXLAN offloads for enic driver, from Govindarajulu Varadarajan.
24) Add IPVTAP driver (IP-VLAN based tap driver) from Sainath Grandhi.
25) Support GRO in IPSEC protocols, from Steffen Klassert"
* git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net-next: (1764 commits)
Revert "ath10k: Search SMBIOS for OEM board file extension"
net: socket: fix recvmmsg not returning error from sock_error
bnxt_en: use eth_hw_addr_random()
bpf: fix unlocking of jited image when module ronx not set
arch: add ARCH_HAS_SET_MEMORY config
net: napi_watchdog() can use napi_schedule_irqoff()
tcp: Revert "tcp: tcp_probe: use spin_lock_bh()"
net/hsr: use eth_hw_addr_random()
net: mvpp2: enable building on 64-bit platforms
net: mvpp2: switch to build_skb() in the RX path
net: mvpp2: simplify MVPP2_PRS_RI_* definitions
net: mvpp2: fix indentation of MVPP2_EXT_GLOBAL_CTRL_DEFAULT
net: mvpp2: remove unused register definitions
net: mvpp2: simplify mvpp2_bm_bufs_add()
net: mvpp2: drop useless fields in mvpp2_bm_pool and related code
net: mvpp2: remove unused 'tx_skb' field of 'struct mvpp2_tx_queue'
net: mvpp2: release reference to txq_cpu[] entry after unmapping
net: mvpp2: handle too large value in mvpp2_rx_time_coal_set()
net: mvpp2: handle too large value handling in mvpp2_rx_pkts_coal_set()
net: mvpp2: remove useless arguments in mvpp2_rx_{pkts, time}_coal_set
...
Pull security layer updates from James Morris:
"Highlights:
- major AppArmor update: policy namespaces & lots of fixes
- add /sys/kernel/security/lsm node for easy detection of loaded LSMs
- SELinux cgroupfs labeling support
- SELinux context mounts on tmpfs, ramfs, devpts within user
namespaces
- improved TPM 2.0 support"
* 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (117 commits)
tpm: declare tpm2_get_pcr_allocation() as static
tpm: Fix expected number of response bytes of TPM1.2 PCR Extend
tpm xen: drop unneeded chip variable
tpm: fix misspelled "facilitate" in module parameter description
tpm_tis: fix the error handling of init_tis()
KEYS: Use memzero_explicit() for secret data
KEYS: Fix an error code in request_master_key()
sign-file: fix build error in sign-file.c with libressl
selinux: allow changing labels for cgroupfs
selinux: fix off-by-one in setprocattr
tpm: silence an array overflow warning
tpm: fix the type of owned field in cap_t
tpm: add securityfs support for TPM 2.0 firmware event log
tpm: enhance read_log_of() to support Physical TPM event log
tpm: enhance TPM 2.0 PCR extend to support multiple banks
tpm: implement TPM 2.0 capability to get active PCR banks
tpm: fix RC value check in tpm2_seal_trusted
tpm_tis: fix iTPM probe via probe_itpm() function
tpm: Begin the process to deprecate user_read_timer
tpm: remove tpm_read_index and tpm_write_index from tpm.h
...
Pull locking updates from Ingo Molnar:
"The main changes in this cycle were:
- Implement wraparound-safe refcount_t and kref_t types based on
generic atomic primitives (Peter Zijlstra)
- Improve and fix the ww_mutex code (Nicolai Hähnle)
- Add self-tests to the ww_mutex code (Chris Wilson)
- Optimize percpu-rwsems with the 'rcuwait' mechanism (Davidlohr
Bueso)
- Micro-optimize the current-task logic all around the core kernel
(Davidlohr Bueso)
- Tidy up after recent optimizations: remove stale code and APIs,
clean up the code (Waiman Long)
- ... plus misc fixes, updates and cleanups"
* 'locking-core-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (50 commits)
fork: Fix task_struct alignment
locking/spinlock/debug: Remove spinlock lockup detection code
lockdep: Fix incorrect condition to print bug msgs for MAX_LOCKDEP_CHAIN_HLOCKS
lkdtm: Convert to refcount_t testing
kref: Implement 'struct kref' using refcount_t
refcount_t: Introduce a special purpose refcount type
sched/wake_q: Clarify queue reinit comment
sched/wait, rcuwait: Fix typo in comment
locking/mutex: Fix lockdep_assert_held() fail
locking/rtmutex: Flip unlikely() branch to likely() in __rt_mutex_slowlock()
locking/rwsem: Reinit wake_q after use
locking/rwsem: Remove unnecessary atomic_long_t casts
jump_labels: Move header guard #endif down where it belongs
locking/atomic, kref: Implement kref_put_lock()
locking/ww_mutex: Turn off __must_check for now
locking/atomic, kref: Avoid more abuse
locking/atomic, kref: Use kref_get_unless_zero() more
locking/atomic, kref: Kill kref_sub()
locking/atomic, kref: Add kref_read()
locking/atomic, kref: Add KREF_INIT()
...
I don't think GCC has figured out how to optimize the memset() away, but
they might eventually so let's future proof this code a bit.
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
This function has two callers and neither are able to handle a NULL
return. Really, -EINVAL is the correct thing return here anyway. This
fixes some static checker warnings like:
security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c:709 encrypted_key_decrypt()
error: uninitialized symbol 'master_key'.
Fixes: 7e70cb4978 ("keys: add new key-type encrypted")
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
SELinux tries to support setting/clearing of /proc/pid/attr attributes
from the shell by ignoring terminating newlines and treating an
attribute value that begins with a NUL or newline as an attempt to
clear the attribute. However, the test for clearing attributes has
always been wrong; it has an off-by-one error, and this could further
lead to reading past the end of the allocated buffer since commit
bb646cdb12 ("proc_pid_attr_write():
switch to memdup_user()"). Fix the off-by-one error.
Even with this fix, setting and clearing /proc/pid/attr attributes
from the shell is not straightforward since the interface does not
support multiple write() calls (so shells that write the value and
newline separately will set and then immediately clear the attribute,
requiring use of echo -n to set the attribute), whereas trying to use
echo -n "" to clear the attribute causes the shell to skip the
write() call altogether since POSIX says that a zero-length write
causes no side effects. Thus, one must use echo -n to set and echo
without -n to clear, as in the following example:
$ echo -n unconfined_u:object_r:user_home_t:s0 > /proc/$$/attr/fscreate
$ cat /proc/$$/attr/fscreate
unconfined_u:object_r:user_home_t:s0
$ echo "" > /proc/$$/attr/fscreate
$ cat /proc/$$/attr/fscreate
Note the use of /proc/$$ rather than /proc/self, as otherwise
the cat command will read its own attribute value, not that of the shell.
There are no users of this facility to my knowledge; possibly we
should just get rid of it.
UPDATE: Upon further investigation it appears that a local process
with the process:setfscreate permission can cause a kernel panic as a
result of this bug. This patch fixes CVE-2017-2618.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
[PM: added the update about CVE-2017-2618 to the commit description]
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.5: d6ea83ec68
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
This patch allows changing labels for cgroup mounts. Previously, running
chcon on cgroupfs would throw an "Operation not supported". This patch
specifically whitelist cgroupfs.
The patch could also allow containers to write only to the systemd cgroup
for instance, while the other cgroups are kept with cgroup_t label.
Signed-off-by: Antonio Murdaca <runcom@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
SELinux tries to support setting/clearing of /proc/pid/attr attributes
from the shell by ignoring terminating newlines and treating an
attribute value that begins with a NUL or newline as an attempt to
clear the attribute. However, the test for clearing attributes has
always been wrong; it has an off-by-one error, and this could further
lead to reading past the end of the allocated buffer since commit
bb646cdb12 ("proc_pid_attr_write():
switch to memdup_user()"). Fix the off-by-one error.
Even with this fix, setting and clearing /proc/pid/attr attributes
from the shell is not straightforward since the interface does not
support multiple write() calls (so shells that write the value and
newline separately will set and then immediately clear the attribute,
requiring use of echo -n to set the attribute), whereas trying to use
echo -n "" to clear the attribute causes the shell to skip the
write() call altogether since POSIX says that a zero-length write
causes no side effects. Thus, one must use echo -n to set and echo
without -n to clear, as in the following example:
$ echo -n unconfined_u:object_r:user_home_t:s0 > /proc/$$/attr/fscreate
$ cat /proc/$$/attr/fscreate
unconfined_u:object_r:user_home_t:s0
$ echo "" > /proc/$$/attr/fscreate
$ cat /proc/$$/attr/fscreate
Note the use of /proc/$$ rather than /proc/self, as otherwise
the cat command will read its own attribute value, not that of the shell.
There are no users of this facility to my knowledge; possibly we
should just get rid of it.
UPDATE: Upon further investigation it appears that a local process
with the process:setfscreate permission can cause a kernel panic as a
result of this bug. This patch fixes CVE-2017-2618.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
[PM: added the update about CVE-2017-2618 to the commit description]
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.5: d6ea83ec68
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Otherwise some mask and inmask tokens with MAY_APPEND flag may not work
as expected.
Signed-off-by: Lans Zhang <jia.zhang@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
On failure to return a pathname from ima_d_path(), a pointer to
dname is returned, which is subsequently used in the IMA measurement
list, the IMA audit records, and other audit logging. Saving the
pointer to dname for later use has the potential to race with rename.
Intead of returning a pointer to dname on failure, this patch returns
a pointer to a copy of the filename.
Reported-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Add net.ipv4.ip_unprivileged_port_start, which is a per namespace sysctl
that denotes the first unprivileged inet port in the namespace. To
disable all privileged ports set this to zero. It also checks for
overlap with the local port range. The privileged and local range may
not overlap.
The use case for this change is to allow containerized processes to bind
to priviliged ports, but prevent them from ever being allowed to modify
their container's network configuration. The latter is accomplished by
ensuring that the network namespace is not a child of the user
namespace. This modification was needed to allow the container manager
to disable a namespace's priviliged port restrictions without exposing
control of the network namespace to processes in the user namespace.
Signed-off-by: Krister Johansen <kjlx@templeofstupid.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
With previous changes every location that tests for
LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP also tests for LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE making the
LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP redundant, so remove it.
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Now that we have user namespaces and non-global capabilities verify
the tracer has capabilities in the relevant user namespace instead
of in the current_user_ns().
As the test for setting LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP is currently
ptracer_capable(p, current_user_ns()) and the new task credentials are
in current_user_ns() this change does not have any user visible change
and simply moves the test to where it is used, making the code easier
to read.
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Don't reset euid and egid when the tracee has CAP_SETUID in
it's user namespace. I punted on relaxing this permission check
long ago but now that I have read this code closely it is clear
it is safe to test against CAP_SETUID in the user namespace.
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Some usermode helper applications are defined at kernel build time, while
others can be changed at runtime. To provide a sane way to filter these, add a
new kernel option "STATIC_USERMODEHELPER". This option routes all
call_usermodehelper() calls through this binary, no matter what the caller
wishes to have called.
The new binary (by default set to /sbin/usermode-helper, but can be changed
through the STATIC_USERMODEHELPER_PATH option) can properly filter the
requested programs to be run by the kernel by looking at the first argument
that is passed to it. All other options should then be passed onto the proper
program if so desired.
To disable all call_usermodehelper() calls by the kernel, set
STATIC_USERMODEHELPER_PATH to an empty string.
Thanks to Neil Brown for the idea of this feature.
Cc: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
There are a number of usermode helper binaries that are "hard coded" in
the kernel today, so mark them as "const" to make it harder for someone
to change where the variables point to.
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Thomas Sailer <t.sailer@alumni.ethz.ch>
Cc: "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
Cc: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>
Cc: Alex Elder <elder@kernel.org>
Cc: "J. Bruce Fields" <bfields@fieldses.org>
Cc: Jeff Layton <jlayton@poochiereds.net>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
I am still tired of having to find indirect ways to determine
what security modules are active on a system. I have added
/sys/kernel/security/lsm, which contains a comma separated
list of the active security modules. No more groping around
in /proc/filesystems or other clever hacks.
Unchanged from previous versions except for being updated
to the latest security next branch.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
The kernel build bot turned up a bad config combination when
CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR is y and CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_HASH is n,
resulting in the build error
security/built-in.o: In function `aa_unpack':
(.text+0x841e2): undefined reference to `aa_g_hash_policy'
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
If this sysctl is set to non-zero and a process with CAP_MAC_ADMIN in
the root namespace has created an AppArmor policy namespace,
unprivileged processes will be able to change to a profile in the
newly created AppArmor policy namespace and, if the profile allows
CAP_MAC_ADMIN and appropriate file permissions, will be able to load
policy in the respective policy namespace.
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Allow a profile to carry extra data that can be queried via userspace.
This provides a means to store extra data in a profile that a trusted
helper can extract and use from live policy.
Signed-off-by: William Hua <william.hua@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
apparmor should be checking the SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT constant. Also
in complain mode make it so apparmor can elect to log a message,
informing of the check.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Allow turning off the computation of the policy hashes via the
apparmor.hash_policy kernel parameter.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Moving the use of fqname to later allows learning profiles to be based
on the fqname request instead of just the hname. It also allows cleaning
up some of the name parsing and lookup by allowing the use of
the fqlookupn_profile() lib fn.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
The aad macro can replace aad strings when it is not intended to. Switch
to a fn macro so it is only applied when intended.
Also at the same time cleanup audit_data initialization by putting
common boiler plate behind a macro, and dropping the gfp_t parameter
which will become useless.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Having ops be an integer that is an index into an op name table is
awkward and brittle. Every op change requires an edit for both the
op constant and a string in the table. Instead switch to using const
strings directly, eliminating the need for the table that needs to
be kept in sync.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Trying to update the task cred while the task current cred is not the
real cred will result in an error at the cred layer. Avoid this by
failing early and delaying the update.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Verify that profiles in a load set specify the same policy ns and
audit the name of the policy ns that policy is being loaded for.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Store loaded policy and allow introspecting it through apparmorfs. This
has several uses from debugging, policy validation, and policy checkpoint
and restore for containers.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Policy management will be expanded beyond traditional unconfined root.
This will require knowning the profile of the task doing the management
and the ns view.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Prepare for a tighter pairing of user namespaces and apparmor policy
namespaces, by making the ns to be viewed available.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Prepare for a tighter pairing of user namespaces and apparmor policy
namespaces, by making the ns to be viewed available and checking
that the user namespace level is the same as the policy ns level.
This strict pairing will be relaxed once true support of user namespaces
lands.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Borrow the special null device file from selinux to "close" fds that
don't have sufficient permissions at exec time.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Commit 9f834ec18d ("binfmt_elf: switch to new creds when switching to new mm")
changed when the creds are installed by the binfmt_elf handler. This
affects which creds are used to mmap the executable into the address
space. Which can have an affect on apparmor policy.
Add a flag to apparmor at
/sys/kernel/security/apparmor/features/domain/fix_binfmt_elf_mmap
to make it possible to detect this semantic change so that the userspace
tools and the regression test suite can correctly deal with the change.
BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1630069
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Instead of testing whether a given dfa exists in every code path, have
a default null dfa that is used when loaded policy doesn't provide a
dfa.
This will let us get rid of special casing and avoid dereference bugs
when special casing is missed.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Newer policy will combine the file and policydb dfas, allowing for
better optimizations. However to support older policy we need to
keep the ability to address the "file" dfa separately. So dup
the policydb as if it is the file dfa and set the appropriate start
state.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
The dfa is currently setup to be shared (has the basis of refcounting)
but currently can't be because the count can't be increased.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Newer policy encodes more than just version in the version tag,
so add masking to make sure the comparison remains correct.
Note: this is fully compatible with older policy as it will never set
the bits being masked out.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
When possible its better to name a learning profile after the missing
profile in question. This allows for both more informative names and
for profile reuse.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
prepare_ns() will need to be called from alternate views, and namespaces
will need to be created via different interfaces. So refactor and
allow specifying the view ns.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Rename to indicate the test is only about whether path mediation is used,
not whether other types of mediation might be used.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Policy namespaces will be diverging from profile management and
expanding so put it in its own file.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Prepare to mark sensitive kernel structures for randomization by making
sure they're using designated initializers. These were identified during
allyesconfig builds of x86, arm, and arm64, with most initializer fixes
extracted from grsecurity.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Calling kmalloc(GFP_NOIO) with order == PAGE_ALLOC_COSTLY_ORDER is not
recommended because it might fall into infinite retry loop without
invoking the OOM killer.
Since aa_dfa_unpack() is the only caller of kvzalloc() and
aa_dfa_unpack() which is calling kvzalloc() via unpack_table() is
doing kzalloc(GFP_KERNEL), it is safe to use GFP_KERNEL from
__aa_kvmalloc().
Since aa_simple_write_to_buffer() is the only caller of kvmalloc()
and aa_simple_write_to_buffer() is calling copy_from_user() which
is GFP_KERNEL context (see memdup_user_nul()), it is safe to use
GFP_KERNEL from __aa_kvmalloc().
Therefore, replace GFP_NOIO with GFP_KERNEL. Also, since we have
vmalloc() fallback, add __GFP_NORETRY so that we don't invoke the OOM
killer by kmalloc(GFP_KERNEL) with order == PAGE_ALLOC_COSTLY_ORDER.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
For some obscure reason apparmor thinks its needs to locally implement
kref primitives that already exist. Stop doing this.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
As reported by yangshukui, a permission denial from security_task_wait()
can lead to a soft lockup in zap_pid_ns_processes() since it only expects
sys_wait4() to return 0 or -ECHILD. Further, security_task_wait() can
in general lead to zombies; in the absence of some way to automatically
reparent a child process upon a denial, the hook is not useful. Remove
the security hook and its implementations in SELinux and Smack. Smack
already removed its check from its hook.
Reported-by: yangshukui <yangshukui@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Several of the extended socket classes introduced by
commit da69a5306a ("selinux: support distinctions
among all network address families") are never used because
sockets can never be created with the associated address family.
Remove these unused socket security classes. The removed classes
are bridge_socket for PF_BRIDGE, ib_socket for PF_IB, and mpls_socket
for PF_MPLS.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
The access to fd from anon_inode is always failed because there is
no set xattr operations. So this patch fixes to ignore private
inode including anon_inode for file functions.
It was only ignored for smack_file_receive() to share dma-buf fd,
but dma-buf has other functions like ioctl and mmap.
Reference: https://lkml.org/lkml/2015/4/17/16
Signed-off-by: Seung-Woo Kim <sw0312.kim@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Since 4b936885a (v2.6.32) all inodes on sockfs and pipefs are disconnected.
It caused filesystem specific code in smack_d_instantiate to be skipped,
because all inodes on those pseudo filesystems were treated as root inodes.
As a result all sockfs inodes had the Smack label set to floor.
In most cases access checks for sockets use socket_smack data so the inode
label is not important. But there are special cases that were broken.
One example would be calling fcntl with F_SETOWN command on a socket fd.
Now smack_d_instantiate expects all pipefs and sockfs inodes to be
disconnected and has the logic in appropriate place.
Signed-off-by: Rafal Krypa <r.krypa@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
smack_file_open() is first checking the capability of calling subject,
this check will skip the SMACK logging for success case. Use smk_tskacc()
for proper logging and SMACK access check.
Signed-off-by: Himanshu Shukla <himanshu.sh@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
In smack_from_secattr function,"smack_known_list" is being traversed
using list_for_each_entry macro, although it is a rcu protected
structure. So it should be traversed using "list_for_each_entry_rcu"
macro to fetch the rcu protected entry.
Signed-off-by: Vishal Goel <vishal.goel@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Himanshu Shukla <himanshu.sh@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
There is race condition issue while freeing the i_security blob in SMACK
module. There is existing condition where i_security can be freed while
inode_permission is called from path lookup on second CPU. There has been
observed the page fault with such condition. VFS code and Selinux module
takes care of this condition by freeing the inode and i_security field
using RCU via call_rcu(). But in SMACK directly the i_secuirty blob is
being freed. Use call_rcu() to fix this race condition issue.
Signed-off-by: Himanshu Shukla <himanshu.sh@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Vishal Goel <vishal.goel@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
smk_copy_rules() and smk_copy_relabel() are initializing list_head though
they have been initialized already in new_task_smack() function. Delete
repeated initialization.
Signed-off-by: Himanshu Shukla <himanshu.sh@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
"smk_set_access()" function adds a new rule entry in subject label specific
list(rule_list) and in global rule list(smack_rule_list) both. Mutex lock
(rule_lock) is used to avoid simultaneous updates. But this lock is subject
label specific lock. If 2 processes tries to add different rules(i.e with
different subject labels) simultaneously, then both the processes can take
the "rule_lock" respectively. So it will cause a problem while adding
entries in master rule list.
Now a new mutex lock(smack_master_list_lock) has been taken to add entry in
smack_rule_list to avoid simultaneous updates of different rules.
Signed-off-by: Vishal Goel <vishal.goel@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Himanshu Shukla <himanshu.sh@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Fix the issue of wrong SMACK label (SMACK64IPIN) update when a second bind
call is made to same IP address & port, but with different SMACK label
(SMACK64IPIN) by second instance of server. In this case server returns
with "Bind:Address already in use" error but before returning, SMACK label
is updated in SMACK port-label mapping list inside smack_socket_bind() hook
To fix this issue a new check has been added in smk_ipv6_port_label()
function before updating the existing port entry. It checks whether the
socket for matching port entry is closed or not. If it is closed then it
means port is not bound and it is safe to update the existing port entry
else return if port is still getting used. For checking whether socket is
closed or not, one more field "smk_can_reuse" has been added in the
"smk_port_label" structure. This field will be set to '1' in
"smack_sk_free_security()" function which is called to free the socket
security blob when the socket is being closed. In this function, port entry
is searched in the SMACK port-label mapping list for the closing socket.
If entry is found then "smk_can_reuse" field is set to '1'.Initially
"smk_can_reuse" field is set to '0' in smk_ipv6_port_label() function after
creating a new entry in the list which indicates that socket is in use.
Signed-off-by: Vishal Goel <vishal.goel@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Himanshu Shukla <himanshu.sh@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Permission denied error comes when 2 IPv6 servers are running and client
tries to connect one of them. Scenario is that both servers are using same
IP and port but different protocols(Udp and tcp). They are using different
SMACK64IPIN labels.Tcp server is using "test" and udp server is using
"test-in". When we try to run tcp client with SMACK64IPOUT label as "test",
then connection denied error comes. It should not happen since both tcp
server and client labels are same.This happens because there is no check
for protocol in smk_ipv6_port_label() function while searching for the
earlier port entry. It checks whether there is an existing port entry on
the basis of port only. So it updates the earlier port entry in the list.
Due to which smack label gets changed for earlier entry in the
"smk_ipv6_port_list" list and permission denied error comes.
Now a check is added for socket type also.Now if 2 processes use same
port but different protocols (tcp or udp), then 2 different port entries
will be added in the list. Similarly while checking smack access in
smk_ipv6_port_check() function, port entry is searched on the basis of
both port and protocol.
Signed-off-by: Vishal Goel <vishal.goel@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Himanshu Shukla <Himanshu.sh@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Add the rcu synchronization mechanism for accessing smk_ipv6_port_list
in smack IPv6 hooks. Access to the port list is vulnerable to a race
condition issue,it does not apply proper synchronization methods while
working on critical section. It is possible that when one thread is
reading the list, at the same time another thread is modifying the
same port list, which can cause the major problems.
To ensure proper synchronization between two threads, rcu mechanism
has been applied while accessing and modifying the port list. RCU will
also not affect the performance, as there are more accesses than
modification where RCU is most effective synchronization mechanism.
Signed-off-by: Vishal Goel <vishal.goel@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Himanshu Shukla <himanshu.sh@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Use SECINITSID_SECURITY as the default SID for booleans which don't have
a matching SID returned from security_genfs_sid(), also update the
error message to a warning which matches this.
This prevents the policy failing to load (and consequently the system
failing to boot) when there is no default genfscon statement matched for
the selinuxfs in the new policy.
Signed-off-by: Gary Tierney <gary.tierney@gmx.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Adds error logging to the code paths which can fail when loading a new
policy in sel_write_load(). If the policy fails to be loaded from
userspace then a warning message is printed, whereas if a failure occurs
after loading policy from userspace an error message will be printed
with details on where policy loading failed (recreating one of /classes/,
/policy_capabilities/, /booleans/ in the SELinux fs).
Also, if sel_make_bools() fails to obtain an SID for an entry in
/booleans/* an error will be printed indicating the path of the
boolean.
Signed-off-by: Gary Tierney <gary.tierney@gmx.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Processes can only alter their own security attributes via
/proc/pid/attr nodes. This is presently enforced by each individual
security module and is also imposed by the Linux credentials
implementation, which only allows a task to alter its own credentials.
Move the check enforcing this restriction from the individual
security modules to proc_pid_attr_write() before calling the security hook,
and drop the unnecessary task argument to the security hook since it can
only ever be the current task.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
SELinux was sometimes using the task "objective" credentials when
it could/should use the "subjective" credentials. This was sometimes
hidden by the fact that we were unnecessarily passing around pointers
to the current task, making it appear as if the task could be something
other than current, so eliminate all such passing of current. Inline
various permission checking helper functions that can be reduced to a
single avc_has_perm() call.
Since the credentials infrastructure only allows a task to alter
its own credentials, we can always assume that current must be the same
as the target task in selinux_setprocattr after the check. We likely
should move this check from selinux_setprocattr() to proc_pid_attr_write()
and drop the task argument to the security hook altogether; it can only
serve to confuse things.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
commit aad82892af ("selinux: Add support for
unprivileged mounts from user namespaces") prohibited any use of context
mount options within non-init user namespaces. However, this breaks
use of context mount options for tmpfs mounts within user namespaces,
which are being used by Docker/runc. There is no reason to block such
usage for tmpfs, ramfs or devpts. Exempt these filesystem types
from this restriction.
Before:
sh$ userns_child_exec -p -m -U -M '0 1000 1' -G '0 1000 1' bash
sh# mount -t tmpfs -o context=system_u:object_r:user_tmp_t:s0:c13 none /tmp
mount: tmpfs is write-protected, mounting read-only
mount: cannot mount tmpfs read-only
After:
sh$ userns_child_exec -p -m -U -M '0 1000 1' -G '0 1000 1' bash
sh# mount -t tmpfs -o context=system_u:object_r:user_tmp_t:s0:c13 none /tmp
sh# ls -Zd /tmp
unconfined_u:object_r:user_tmp_t:s0:c13 /tmp
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
commit 79c8b348f215 ("selinux: support distinctions among all network
address families") mapped datagram ICMP sockets to the new icmp_socket
security class, but left ICMPv6 sockets unchanged. This change fixes
that oversight to handle both kinds of sockets consistently.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Since kernel 4.1 ftrace is supported as a new separate filesystem. It
gets automatically mounted by the kernel under the old path
/sys/kernel/debug/tracing. Because it lives now on a separate filesystem
SELinux needs to be updated to also support setting SELinux labels
on tracefs inodes. This is required for compatibility in Android
when moving to Linux 4.1 or newer.
Signed-off-by: Yongqin Liu <yongqin.liu@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: William Roberts <william.c.roberts@intel.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Extend SELinux to support distinctions among all network address families
implemented by the kernel by defining new socket security classes
and mapping to them. Otherwise, many sockets are mapped to the generic
socket class and are indistinguishable in policy. This has come up
previously with regard to selectively allowing access to bluetooth sockets,
and more recently with regard to selectively allowing access to AF_ALG
sockets. Guido Trentalancia submitted a patch that took a similar approach
to add only support for distinguishing AF_ALG sockets, but this generalizes
his approach to handle all address families implemented by the kernel.
Socket security classes are also added for ICMP and SCTP sockets.
Socket security classes were not defined for AF_* values that are reserved
but unimplemented in the kernel, e.g. AF_NETBEUI, AF_SECURITY, AF_ASH,
AF_ECONET, AF_SNA, AF_WANPIPE.
Backward compatibility is provided by only enabling the finer-grained
socket classes if a new policy capability is set in the policy; older
policies will behave as before. The legacy redhat1 policy capability
that was only ever used in testing within Fedora for ptrace_child
is reclaimed for this purpose; as far as I can tell, this policy
capability is not enabled in any supported distro policy.
Add a pair of conditional compilation guards to detect when new AF_* values
are added so that we can update SELinux accordingly rather than having to
belatedly update it long after new address families are introduced.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
This was entirely automated, using the script by Al:
PATT='^[[:blank:]]*#[[:blank:]]*include[[:blank:]]*<asm/uaccess.h>'
sed -i -e "s!$PATT!#include <linux/uaccess.h>!" \
$(git grep -l "$PATT"|grep -v ^include/linux/uaccess.h)
to do the replacement at the end of the merge window.
Requested-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Pull SElinux fix from James Morris:
"From Paul:
'A small SELinux patch to fix some clang/llvm compiler warnings and
ensure the tools under scripts work well in the face of kernel
changes'"
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security:
selinux: use the kernel headers when building scripts/selinux
Commit 3322d0d64f ("selinux: keep SELinux in sync with new capability
definitions") added a check on the defined capabilities without
explicitly including the capability header file which caused problems
when building genheaders for users of clang/llvm. Resolve this by
using the kernel headers when building genheaders, which is arguably
the right thing to do regardless, and explicitly including the
kernel's capability.h header file in classmap.h. We also update the
mdp build, even though it wasn't causing an error we really should
be using the headers from the kernel we are building.
Reported-by: Nicolas Iooss <nicolas.iooss@m4x.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
For remote attestion it is important for the ima measurement values to
be platform-independent. Therefore integer fields to be hashed must be
converted to canonical format.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1480554346-29071-11-git-send-email-zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Andreas Steffen <andreas.steffen@strongswan.org>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com>
Cc: Josh Sklar <sklar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Stewart Smith <stewart@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
The IMA binary_runtime_measurements list is currently in platform native
format.
To allow restoring a measurement list carried across kexec with a
different endianness than the targeted kernel, this patch defines
little-endian as the canonical format. For big endian systems wanting
to save/restore the measurement list from a system with a different
endianness, a new boot command line parameter named "ima_canonical_fmt"
is defined.
Considerations: use of the "ima_canonical_fmt" boot command line option
will break existing userspace applications on big endian systems
expecting the binary_runtime_measurements list to be in platform native
format.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1480554346-29071-10-git-send-email-zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com>
Cc: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Andreas Steffen <andreas.steffen@strongswan.org>
Cc: Josh Sklar <sklar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Stewart Smith <stewart@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
The configured IMA measurement list template format can be replaced at
runtime on the boot command line, including a custom template format.
This patch adds support for restoring a measuremement list containing
multiple builtin/custom template formats.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1480554346-29071-9-git-send-email-zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com>
Cc: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Andreas Steffen <andreas.steffen@strongswan.org>
Cc: Josh Sklar <sklar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Stewart Smith <stewart@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
The builtin and single custom templates are currently stored in an
array. In preparation for being able to restore a measurement list
containing multiple builtin/custom templates, this patch stores the
builtin and custom templates as a linked list. This will permit
defining more than one custom template per boot.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1480554346-29071-8-git-send-email-zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com>
Cc: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Andreas Steffen <andreas.steffen@strongswan.org>
Cc: Josh Sklar <sklar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Stewart Smith <stewart@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
The TPM PCRs are only reset on a hard reboot. In order to validate a
TPM's quote after a soft reboot (eg. kexec -e), the IMA measurement
list of the running kernel must be saved and restored on boot.
This patch uses the kexec buffer passing mechanism to pass the
serialized IMA binary_runtime_measurements to the next kernel.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1480554346-29071-7-git-send-email-zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Acked-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com>
Cc: Andreas Steffen <andreas.steffen@strongswan.org>
Cc: Josh Sklar <sklar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Stewart Smith <stewart@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
In preparation for serializing the binary_runtime_measurements, this
patch maintains the amount of memory required.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1480554346-29071-5-git-send-email-zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com>
Cc: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Andreas Steffen <andreas.steffen@strongswan.org>
Cc: Josh Sklar <sklar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Stewart Smith <stewart@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Measurements carried across kexec need to be added to the IMA
measurement list, but should not prevent measurements of the newly
booted kernel from being added to the measurement list. This patch adds
support for allowing duplicate measurements.
The "boot_aggregate" measurement entry is the delimiter between soft
boots.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1480554346-29071-4-git-send-email-zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com>
Cc: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Andreas Steffen <andreas.steffen@strongswan.org>
Cc: Josh Sklar <sklar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Stewart Smith <stewart@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
The TPM PCRs are only reset on a hard reboot. In order to validate a
TPM's quote after a soft reboot (eg. kexec -e), the IMA measurement
list of the running kernel must be saved and restored on boot. This
patch restores the measurement list.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1480554346-29071-3-git-send-email-zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com>
Cc: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Andreas Steffen <andreas.steffen@strongswan.org>
Cc: Josh Sklar <sklar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Stewart Smith <stewart@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Pull vfs updates from Al Viro:
- more ->d_init() stuff (work.dcache)
- pathname resolution cleanups (work.namei)
- a few missing iov_iter primitives - copy_from_iter_full() and
friends. Either copy the full requested amount, advance the iterator
and return true, or fail, return false and do _not_ advance the
iterator. Quite a few open-coded callers converted (and became more
readable and harder to fuck up that way) (work.iov_iter)
- several assorted patches, the big one being logfs removal
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs:
logfs: remove from tree
vfs: fix put_compat_statfs64() does not handle errors
namei: fold should_follow_link() with the step into not-followed link
namei: pass both WALK_GET and WALK_MORE to should_follow_link()
namei: invert WALK_PUT logics
namei: shift interpretation of LOOKUP_FOLLOW inside should_follow_link()
namei: saner calling conventions for mountpoint_last()
namei.c: get rid of user_path_parent()
switch getfrag callbacks to ..._full() primitives
make skb_add_data,{_nocache}() and skb_copy_to_page_nocache() advance only on success
[iov_iter] new primitives - copy_from_iter_full() and friends
don't open-code file_inode()
ceph: switch to use of ->d_init()
ceph: unify dentry_operations instances
lustre: switch to use of ->d_init()
Merge more updates from Andrew Morton:
- a few misc things
- kexec updates
- DMA-mapping updates to better support networking DMA operations
- IPC updates
- various MM changes to improve DAX fault handling
- lots of radix-tree changes, mainly to the test suite. All leading up
to reimplementing the IDA/IDR code to be a wrapper layer over the
radix-tree. However the final trigger-pulling patch is held off for
4.11.
* emailed patches from Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>: (114 commits)
radix tree test suite: delete unused rcupdate.c
radix tree test suite: add new tag check
radix-tree: ensure counts are initialised
radix tree test suite: cache recently freed objects
radix tree test suite: add some more functionality
idr: reduce the number of bits per level from 8 to 6
rxrpc: abstract away knowledge of IDR internals
tpm: use idr_find(), not idr_find_slowpath()
idr: add ida_is_empty
radix tree test suite: check multiorder iteration
radix-tree: fix replacement for multiorder entries
radix-tree: add radix_tree_split_preload()
radix-tree: add radix_tree_split
radix-tree: add radix_tree_join
radix-tree: delete radix_tree_range_tag_if_tagged()
radix-tree: delete radix_tree_locate_item()
radix-tree: improve multiorder iterators
btrfs: fix race in btrfs_free_dummy_fs_info()
radix-tree: improve dump output
radix-tree: make radix_tree_find_next_bit more useful
...
Patch series "mm: unexport __get_user_pages_unlocked()".
This patch series continues the cleanup of get_user_pages*() functions
taking advantage of the fact we can now pass gup_flags as we please.
It firstly adds an additional 'locked' parameter to
get_user_pages_remote() to allow for its callers to utilise
VM_FAULT_RETRY functionality. This is necessary as the invocation of
__get_user_pages_unlocked() in process_vm_rw_single_vec() makes use of
this and no other existing higher level function would allow it to do
so.
Secondly existing callers of __get_user_pages_unlocked() are replaced
with the appropriate higher-level replacement -
get_user_pages_unlocked() if the current task and memory descriptor are
referenced, or get_user_pages_remote() if other task/memory descriptors
are referenced (having acquiring mmap_sem.)
This patch (of 2):
Add a int *locked parameter to get_user_pages_remote() to allow
VM_FAULT_RETRY faulting behaviour similar to get_user_pages_[un]locked().
Taking into account the previous adjustments to get_user_pages*()
functions allowing for the passing of gup_flags, we are now in a
position where __get_user_pages_unlocked() need only be exported for his
ability to allow VM_FAULT_RETRY behaviour, this adjustment allows us to
subsequently unexport __get_user_pages_unlocked() as well as allowing
for future flexibility in the use of get_user_pages_remote().
[sfr@canb.auug.org.au: merge fix for get_user_pages_remote API change]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20161122210511.024ec341@canb.auug.org.au
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20161027095141.2569-2-lstoakes@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Stoakes <lstoakes@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@techsingularity.net>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Radim Krcmar <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Pull namespace updates from Eric Biederman:
"After a lot of discussion and work we have finally reachanged a basic
understanding of what is necessary to make unprivileged mounts safe in
the presence of EVM and IMA xattrs which the last commit in this
series reflects. While technically it is a revert the comments it adds
are important for people not getting confused in the future. Clearing
up that confusion allows us to seriously work on unprivileged mounts
of fuse in the next development cycle.
The rest of the fixes in this set are in the intersection of user
namespaces, ptrace, and exec. I started with the first fix which
started a feedback cycle of finding additional issues during review
and fixing them. Culiminating in a fix for a bug that has been present
since at least Linux v1.0.
Potentially these fixes were candidates for being merged during the rc
cycle, and are certainly backport candidates but enough little things
turned up during review and testing that I decided they should be
handled as part of the normal development process just to be certain
there were not any great surprises when it came time to backport some
of these fixes"
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace:
Revert "evm: Translate user/group ids relative to s_user_ns when computing HMAC"
exec: Ensure mm->user_ns contains the execed files
ptrace: Don't allow accessing an undumpable mm
ptrace: Capture the ptracer's creds not PT_PTRACE_CAP
mm: Add a user_ns owner to mm_struct and fix ptrace permission checks
Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris:
"Generally pretty quiet for this release. Highlights:
Yama:
- allow ptrace access for original parent after re-parenting
TPM:
- add documentation
- many bugfixes & cleanups
- define a generic open() method for ascii & bios measurements
Integrity:
- Harden against malformed xattrs
SELinux:
- bugfixes & cleanups
Smack:
- Remove unnecessary smack_known_invalid label
- Do not apply star label in smack_setprocattr hook
- parse mnt opts after privileges check (fixes unpriv DoS vuln)"
* 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (56 commits)
Yama: allow access for the current ptrace parent
tpm: adjust return value of tpm_read_log
tpm: vtpm_proxy: conditionally call tpm_chip_unregister
tpm: Fix handling of missing event log
tpm: Check the bios_dir entry for NULL before accessing it
tpm: return -ENODEV if np is not set
tpm: cleanup of printk error messages
tpm: replace of_find_node_by_name() with dev of_node property
tpm: redefine read_log() to handle ACPI/OF at runtime
tpm: fix the missing .owner in tpm_bios_measurements_ops
tpm: have event log use the tpm_chip
tpm: drop tpm1_chip_register(/unregister)
tpm: replace dynamically allocated bios_dir with a static array
tpm: replace symbolic permission with octal for securityfs files
char: tpm: fix kerneldoc tpm2_unseal_trusted name typo
tpm_tis: Allow tpm_tis to be bound using DT
tpm, tpm_vtpm_proxy: add kdoc comments for VTPM_PROXY_IOC_NEW_DEV
tpm: Only call pm_runtime_get_sync if device has a parent
tpm: define a generic open() method for ascii & bios measurements
Documentation: tpm: add the Physical TPM device tree binding documentation
...
Pull timer updates from Thomas Gleixner:
"The time/timekeeping/timer folks deliver with this update:
- Fix a reintroduced signed/unsigned issue and cleanup the whole
signed/unsigned mess in the timekeeping core so this wont happen
accidentaly again.
- Add a new trace clock based on boot time
- Prevent injection of random sleep times when PM tracing abuses the
RTC for storage
- Make posix timers configurable for real tiny systems
- Add tracepoints for the alarm timer subsystem so timer based
suspend wakeups can be instrumented
- The usual pile of fixes and updates to core and drivers"
* 'timers-core-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (23 commits)
timekeeping: Use mul_u64_u32_shr() instead of open coding it
timekeeping: Get rid of pointless typecasts
timekeeping: Make the conversion call chain consistently unsigned
timekeeping_Force_unsigned_clocksource_to_nanoseconds_conversion
alarmtimer: Add tracepoints for alarm timers
trace: Update documentation for mono, mono_raw and boot clock
trace: Add an option for boot clock as trace clock
timekeeping: Add a fast and NMI safe boot clock
timekeeping/clocksource_cyc2ns: Document intended range limitation
timekeeping: Ignore the bogus sleep time if pm_trace is enabled
selftests/timers: Fix spelling mistake "Asyncrhonous" -> "Asynchronous"
clocksource/drivers/bcm2835_timer: Unmap region obtained by of_iomap
clocksource/drivers/arm_arch_timer: Map frame with of_io_request_and_map()
arm64: dts: rockchip: Arch counter doesn't tick in system suspend
clocksource/drivers/arm_arch_timer: Don't assume clock runs in suspend
posix-timers: Make them configurable
posix_cpu_timers: Move the add_device_randomness() call to a proper place
timer: Move sys_alarm from timer.c to itimer.c
ptp_clock: Allow for it to be optional
Kconfig: Regenerate *.c_shipped files after previous changes
...
copy_from_iter_full(), copy_from_iter_full_nocache() and
csum_and_copy_from_iter_full() - counterparts of copy_from_iter()
et.al., advancing iterator only in case of successful full copy
and returning whether it had been successful or not.
Convert some obvious users. *NOTE* - do not blindly assume that
something is a good candidate for those unless you are sure that
not advancing iov_iter in failure case is the right thing in
this case. Anything that does short read/short write kind of
stuff (or is in a loop, etc.) is unlikely to be a good one.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Under ptrace_scope=1, it's possible to have a tracee that is already
ptrace-attached, but is no longer a direct descendant. For instance, a
forking daemon will be re-parented to init, losing its ancestry to the
tracer that launched it.
The tracer can continue using ptrace in that state, but it will be
denied other accesses that check PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH, like process_vm_rw
and various procfs files. There's no reason to prevent such access for
a tracer that already has ptrace control anyway.
This patch adds a case to ptracer_exception_found to allow access for
any task in the same thread group as the current ptrace parent.
Signed-off-by: Josh Stone <jistone@redhat.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
This reverts commit 0b3c9761d1.
Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com> writes:
> All right, I think 0b3c9761d1 should be
> reverted then. EVM is a machine-local integrity mechanism, and so it
> makes sense that the signature would be based on the kernel's notion of
> the uid and not the filesystem's.
I added a commment explaining why the EVM hmac needs to be in the
kernel's notion of uid and gid, not the filesystems to prevent
remounting the filesystem and gaining unwaranted trust in files.
Acked-by: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Convert isec->lock from a mutex into a spinlock. Instead of holding
the lock while sleeping in inode_doinit_with_dentry, set
isec->initialized to LABEL_PENDING and release the lock. Then, when
the sid has been determined, re-acquire the lock. If isec->initialized
is still set to LABEL_PENDING, set isec->sid; otherwise, the sid has
been set by another task (LABEL_INITIALIZED) or invalidated
(LABEL_INVALID) in the meantime.
This fixes a deadlock on gfs2 where
* one task is in inode_doinit_with_dentry -> gfs2_getxattr, holds
isec->lock, and tries to acquire the inode's glock, and
* another task is in do_xmote -> inode_go_inval ->
selinux_inode_invalidate_secctx, holds the inode's glock, and
tries to acquire isec->lock.
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
[PM: minor tweaks to keep checkpatch.pl happy]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
When a new capability is defined, SELinux needs to be updated.
Trigger a build error if a new capability is defined without
corresponding update to security/selinux/include/classmap.h's
COMMON_CAP2_PERMS. This is similar to BUILD_BUG_ON() guards
in the SELinux nlmsgtab code to ensure that SELinux tracks
new netlink message types as needed.
Note that there is already a similar build guard in
security/selinux/hooks.c to detect when more than 64
capabilities are defined, since that will require adding
a third capability class to SELinux.
A nicer way to do this would be to extend scripts/selinux/genheaders
or a similar tool to auto-generate the necessary definitions and code
for SELinux capability checking from include/uapi/linux/capability.h.
AppArmor does something similar in its Makefile, although it only
needs to generate a single table of names. That is left as future
work.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
[PM: reformat the description to keep checkpatch.pl happy]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
After a policy replacement, the task cred may be out of date and need
to be updated. However change_hat is using the stale profiles from
the out of date cred resulting in either: a stale profile being applied
or, incorrect failure when searching for a hat profile as it has been
migrated to the new parent profile.
Fixes: 01e2b670aa (failure to find hat)
Fixes: 898127c34e (stale policy being applied)
Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.suse.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1000287
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
At present, one can write any signed integer value to
/sys/fs/selinux/enforce and it will be stored,
e.g. echo -1 > /sys/fs/selinux/enforce or echo 2 >
/sys/fs/selinux/enforce. This makes no real difference
to the kernel, since it only ever cares if it is zero or non-zero,
but some userspace code compares it with 1 to decide if SELinux
is enforcing, and this could confuse it. Only a process that is
already root and is allowed the setenforce permission in SELinux
policy can write to /sys/fs/selinux/enforce, so this is not considered
to be a security issue, but it should be fixed.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Some embedded systems have no use for them. This removes about
25KB from the kernel binary size when configured out.
Corresponding syscalls are routed to a stub logging the attempt to
use those syscalls which should be enough of a clue if they were
disabled without proper consideration. They are: timer_create,
timer_gettime: timer_getoverrun, timer_settime, timer_delete,
clock_adjtime, setitimer, getitimer, alarm.
The clock_settime, clock_gettime, clock_getres and clock_nanosleep
syscalls are replaced by simple wrappers compatible with CLOCK_REALTIME,
CLOCK_MONOTONIC and CLOCK_BOOTTIME only which should cover the vast
majority of use cases with very little code.
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Pitre <nico@linaro.org>
Acked-by: Richard Cochran <richardcochran@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Josh Triplett <josh@joshtriplett.org>
Cc: Paul Bolle <pebolle@tiscali.nl>
Cc: linux-kbuild@vger.kernel.org
Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.com>
Cc: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1478841010-28605-7-git-send-email-nicolas.pitre@linaro.org
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
The invalid Smack label ("") and the Huh ("?") Smack label
serve the same purpose and having both is unnecessary.
While pulling out the invalid label it became clear that
the use of smack_from_secid() was inconsistent, so that
is repaired. The setting of inode labels to the invalid
label could never happen in a functional system, has
never been observed in the wild and is not what you'd
really want for a failure behavior in any case. That is
removed.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Since smack_parse_opts_str() is calling match_strdup() which uses
GFP_KERNEL, it is safe to use GFP_KERNEL from kcalloc() which is
called by smack_parse_opts_str().
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Now that isec->initialized == LABEL_INITIALIZED implies that
isec->sclass is valid, skip such inodes immediately in
inode_doinit_with_dentry.
For the remaining inodes, initialize isec->sclass at the beginning of
inode_doinit_with_dentry to simplify the code.
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Pass the file mode of the proc inode to be created to
proc_pid_make_inode. In proc_pid_make_inode, initialize inode->i_mode
before calling security_task_to_inode. This allows selinux to set
isec->sclass right away without introducing "half-initialized" inode
security structs.
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Fix the comment for function __inode_security_revalidate, which returns
an integer.
Use the LABEL_* constants consistently for isec->initialized.
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Since selinux_parse_opts_str() is calling match_strdup() which uses
GFP_KERNEL, it is safe to use GFP_KERNEL from kcalloc() which is
called by selinux_parse_opts_str().
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
In general the handling of IMA/EVM xattrs is good, but I found
a few locations where either the xattr size or the value of the
type field in the xattr are not checked. Add a few simple checks
to these locations to prevent malformed or malicious xattrs from
causing problems.
Signed-off-by: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Userspace applications have been modified to write security xattrs,
but they are not context aware. In the case of security.ima, the
security xattr can be either a file hash or a file signature.
Permitting writing one, but not the other requires the application to
be context aware.
In addition, userspace applications might write files to a staging
area, which might not be in policy, and then change some file metadata
(eg. owner) making it in policy. As a result, these files are not
labeled properly.
This reverts commit c68ed80c97, which
prevents writing file hashes as security.ima xattrs.
Requested-by: Patrick Ohly <patrick.ohly@intel.com>
Cc: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
When the "policy" securityfs file is opened for read, it is opened as a
sequential file. However, when it is eventually released, there is no
cleanup for the sequential file, therefore some memory is leaked.
This patch adds a call to seq_release() in ima_release_policy() to clean up
the memory when the file is opened for read.
Fixes: 80eae209d6 IMA: allow reading back the current policy
Reported-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Richter <erichte@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Tested-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
The check for a deleted entry in the list of IPv6 host
addresses was being performed in the wrong place, leading
to most peculiar results in some cases. This puts the
check into the right place.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Memory leak in smack_cred_prepare()function.
smack_cred_prepare() hook returns error if there is error in allocating
memory in smk_copy_rules() or smk_copy_relabel() function.
If smack_cred_prepare() function returns error then the calling
function should call smack_cred_free() function for cleanup.
In smack_cred_free() function first credential is extracted and
then all rules are deleted. In smack_cred_prepare() function security
field is assigned in the end when all function return success. But this
function may return before and memory will not be freed.
Signed-off-by: Himanshu Shukla <himanshu.sh@samsung.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Smack prohibits processes from using the star ("*") and web ("@") labels.
Checks have been added in other functions. In smack_setprocattr()
hook, only check for web ("@") label has been added and restricted
from applying web ("@") label.
Check for star ("*") label should also be added in smack_setprocattr()
hook. Return error should be "-EINVAL" not "-EPERM" as permission
is there for setting label but not the label value as star ("*") or
web ("@").
Signed-off-by: Himanshu Shukla <himanshu.sh@samsung.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
In smack_set_mnt_opts()first the SMACK mount options are being
parsed and later it is being checked whether the user calling
mount has CAP_MAC_ADMIN capability.
This sequence of operationis will allow unauthorized user to add
SMACK labels in label list and may cause denial of security attack
by adding many labels by allocating kernel memory by unauthorized user.
Superblock smack flag is also being set as initialized though function
may return with EPERM error.
First check the capability of calling user then set the SMACK attributes
and smk_flags.
Signed-off-by: Himanshu Shukla <himanshu.sh@samsung.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Assign smack_known_web label for kernel thread's socket
Creating struct sock by sk_alloc function in various kernel subsystems
like bluetooth doesn't call smack_socket_post_create(). In such case,
received sock label is the floor('_') label and makes access deny.
Signed-off-by: jooseong lee <jooseong.lee@samsung.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Since BIG_KEYS can't be compiled as module it requires one of the "stdrng"
providers to be compiled into kernel. Otherwise big_key_crypto_init() fails
on crypto_alloc_rng step and next dereference of big_key_skcipher (e.g. in
big_key_preparse()) results in a NULL pointer dereference.
Fixes: 13100a72f4 ('Security: Keys: Big keys stored encrypted')
Signed-off-by: Artem Savkov <asavkov@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
cc: Kirill Marinushkin <k.marinushkin@gmail.com>
cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
big_key has two separate initialisation functions, one that registers the
key type and one that registers the crypto. If the key type fails to
register, there's no problem if the crypto registers successfully because
there's no way to reach the crypto except through the key type.
However, if the key type registers successfully but the crypto does not,
big_key_rng and big_key_blkcipher may end up set to NULL - but the code
neither checks for this nor unregisters the big key key type.
Furthermore, since the key type is registered before the crypto, it is
theoretically possible for the kernel to try adding a big_key before the
crypto is set up, leading to the same effect.
Fix this by merging big_key_crypto_init() and big_key_init() and calling
the resulting function late. If they're going to be encrypted, we
shouldn't be creating big_keys before we have the facilities to do the
encryption available. The key type registration is also moved after the
crypto initialisation.
The fix also includes message printing on failure.
If the big_key type isn't correctly set up, simply doing:
dd if=/dev/zero bs=4096 count=1 | keyctl padd big_key a @s
ought to cause an oops.
Fixes: 13100a72f4 ('Security: Keys: Big keys stored encrypted')
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Peter Hlavaty <zer0mem@yahoo.com>
cc: Kirill Marinushkin <k.marinushkin@gmail.com>
cc: Artem Savkov <asavkov@redhat.com>
cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
This fixes CVE-2016-7042.
Fix a short sprintf buffer in proc_keys_show(). If the gcc stack protector
is turned on, this can cause a panic due to stack corruption.
The problem is that xbuf[] is not big enough to hold a 64-bit timeout
rendered as weeks:
(gdb) p 0xffffffffffffffffULL/(60*60*24*7)
$2 = 30500568904943
That's 14 chars plus NUL, not 11 chars plus NUL.
Expand the buffer to 16 chars.
I think the unpatched code apparently works if the stack-protector is not
enabled because on a 32-bit machine the buffer won't be overflowed and on a
64-bit machine there's a 64-bit aligned pointer at one side and an int that
isn't checked again on the other side.
The panic incurred looks something like:
Kernel panic - not syncing: stack-protector: Kernel stack is corrupted in: ffffffff81352ebe
CPU: 0 PID: 1692 Comm: reproducer Not tainted 4.7.2-201.fc24.x86_64 #1
Hardware name: Red Hat KVM, BIOS 0.5.1 01/01/2011
0000000000000086 00000000fbbd2679 ffff8800a044bc00 ffffffff813d941f
ffffffff81a28d58 ffff8800a044bc98 ffff8800a044bc88 ffffffff811b2cb6
ffff880000000010 ffff8800a044bc98 ffff8800a044bc30 00000000fbbd2679
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff813d941f>] dump_stack+0x63/0x84
[<ffffffff811b2cb6>] panic+0xde/0x22a
[<ffffffff81352ebe>] ? proc_keys_show+0x3ce/0x3d0
[<ffffffff8109f7f9>] __stack_chk_fail+0x19/0x30
[<ffffffff81352ebe>] proc_keys_show+0x3ce/0x3d0
[<ffffffff81350410>] ? key_validate+0x50/0x50
[<ffffffff8134db30>] ? key_default_cmp+0x20/0x20
[<ffffffff8126b31c>] seq_read+0x2cc/0x390
[<ffffffff812b6b12>] proc_reg_read+0x42/0x70
[<ffffffff81244fc7>] __vfs_read+0x37/0x150
[<ffffffff81357020>] ? security_file_permission+0xa0/0xc0
[<ffffffff81246156>] vfs_read+0x96/0x130
[<ffffffff81247635>] SyS_read+0x55/0xc0
[<ffffffff817eb872>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1a/0xa4
Reported-by: Ondrej Kozina <okozina@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Ondrej Kozina <okozina@redhat.com>
cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Pull vmap stack fixes from Ingo Molnar:
"This is fallout from CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_VMAP_STACK=y on x86: stack
accesses that used to be just somewhat questionable are now totally
buggy.
These changes try to do it without breaking the ABI: the fields are
left there, they are just reporting zero, or reporting narrower
information (the maps file change)"
* 'mm-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
mm: Change vm_is_stack_for_task() to vm_is_stack_for_current()
fs/proc: Stop trying to report thread stacks
fs/proc: Stop reporting eip and esp in /proc/PID/stat
mm/numa: Remove duplicated include from mprotect.c
Asking for a non-current task's stack can't be done without races
unless the task is frozen in kernel mode. As far as I know,
vm_is_stack_for_task() never had a safe non-current use case.
The __unused annotation is because some KSTK_ESP implementations
ignore their parameter, which IMO is further justification for this
patch.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Linux API <linux-api@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Tycho Andersen <tycho.andersen@canonical.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/4c3f68f426e6c061ca98b4fc7ef85ffbb0a25b0c.1475257877.git.luto@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
This removes the 'write' and 'force' from get_user_pages_remote() and
replaces them with 'gup_flags' to make the use of FOLL_FORCE explicit in
callers as use of this flag can result in surprising behaviour (and
hence bugs) within the mm subsystem.
Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Stoakes <lstoakes@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Pull more vfs updates from Al Viro:
">rename2() work from Miklos + current_time() from Deepa"
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs:
fs: Replace current_fs_time() with current_time()
fs: Replace CURRENT_TIME_SEC with current_time() for inode timestamps
fs: Replace CURRENT_TIME with current_time() for inode timestamps
fs: proc: Delete inode time initializations in proc_alloc_inode()
vfs: Add current_time() api
vfs: add note about i_op->rename changes to porting
fs: rename "rename2" i_op to "rename"
vfs: remove unused i_op->rename
fs: make remaining filesystems use .rename2
libfs: support RENAME_NOREPLACE in simple_rename()
fs: support RENAME_NOREPLACE for local filesystems
ncpfs: fix unused variable warning
Pull vfs xattr updates from Al Viro:
"xattr stuff from Andreas
This completes the switch to xattr_handler ->get()/->set() from
->getxattr/->setxattr/->removexattr"
* 'work.xattr' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs:
vfs: Remove {get,set,remove}xattr inode operations
xattr: Stop calling {get,set,remove}xattr inode operations
vfs: Check for the IOP_XATTR flag in listxattr
xattr: Add __vfs_{get,set,remove}xattr helpers
libfs: Use IOP_XATTR flag for empty directory handling
vfs: Use IOP_XATTR flag for bad-inode handling
vfs: Add IOP_XATTR inode operations flag
vfs: Move xattr_resolve_name to the front of fs/xattr.c
ecryptfs: Switch to generic xattr handlers
sockfs: Get rid of getxattr iop
sockfs: getxattr: Fail with -EOPNOTSUPP for invalid attribute names
kernfs: Switch to generic xattr handlers
hfs: Switch to generic xattr handlers
jffs2: Remove jffs2_{get,set,remove}xattr macros
xattr: Remove unnecessary NULL attribute name check
Pull misc vfs updates from Al Viro:
"Assorted misc bits and pieces.
There are several single-topic branches left after this (rename2
series from Miklos, current_time series from Deepa Dinamani, xattr
series from Andreas, uaccess stuff from from me) and I'd prefer to
send those separately"
* 'work.misc' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: (39 commits)
proc: switch auxv to use of __mem_open()
hpfs: support FIEMAP
cifs: get rid of unused arguments of CIFSSMBWrite()
posix_acl: uapi header split
posix_acl: xattr representation cleanups
fs/aio.c: eliminate redundant loads in put_aio_ring_file
fs/internal.h: add const to ns_dentry_operations declaration
compat: remove compat_printk()
fs/buffer.c: make __getblk_slow() static
proc: unsigned file descriptors
fs/file: more unsigned file descriptors
fs: compat: remove redundant check of nr_segs
cachefiles: Fix attempt to read i_blocks after deleting file [ver #2]
cifs: don't use memcpy() to copy struct iov_iter
get rid of separate multipage fault-in primitives
fs: Avoid premature clearing of capabilities
fs: Give dentry to inode_change_ok() instead of inode
fuse: Propagate dentry down to inode_change_ok()
ceph: Propagate dentry down to inode_change_ok()
xfs: Propagate dentry down to inode_change_ok()
...
Merge my system logging cleanups, triggered by the broken '\n' patches.
The line continuation handling has been broken basically forever, and
the code to handle the system log records was both confusing and
dubious. And it would do entirely the wrong thing unless you always had
a terminating newline, partly because it couldn't actually see whether a
message was marked KERN_CONT or not (but partly because the LOG_CONT
handling in the recording code was rather confusing too).
This re-introduces a real semantically meaningful KERN_CONT, and fixes
the few places I noticed where it was missing. There are probably more
missing cases, since KERN_CONT hasn't actually had any semantic meaning
for at least four years (other than the checkpatch meaning of "no log
level necessary, this is a continuation line").
This also allows the combination of KERN_CONT and a log level. In that
case the log level will be ignored if the merging with a previous line
is successful, but if a new record is needed, that new record will now
get the right log level.
That also means that you can at least in theory combine KERN_CONT with
the "pr_info()" style helpers, although any use of pr_fmt() prefixing
would make that just result in a mess, of course (the prefix would end
up in the middle of a continuing line).
* printk-cleanups:
printk: make reading the kernel log flush pending lines
printk: re-organize log_output() to be more legible
printk: split out core logging code into helper function
printk: reinstate KERN_CONT for printing continuation lines
Long long ago the kernel log buffer was a buffered stream of bytes, very
much like stdio in user space. It supported log levels by scanning the
stream and noticing the log level markers at the beginning of each line,
but if you wanted to print a partial line in multiple chunks, you just
did multiple printk() calls, and it just automatically worked.
Except when it didn't, and you had very confusing output when different
lines got all mixed up with each other. Then you got fragment lines
mixing with each other, or with non-fragment lines, because it was
traditionally impossible to tell whether a printk() call was a
continuation or not.
To at least help clarify the issue of continuation lines, we added a
KERN_CONT marker back in 2007 to mark continuation lines:
4749252776 ("printk: add KERN_CONT annotation").
That continuation marker was initially an empty string, and didn't
actuall make any semantic difference. But it at least made it possible
to annotate the source code, and have check-patch notice that a printk()
didn't need or want a log level marker, because it was a continuation of
a previous line.
To avoid the ambiguity between a continuation line that had that
KERN_CONT marker, and a printk with no level information at all, we then
in 2009 made KERN_CONT be a real log level marker which meant that we
could now reliably tell the difference between the two cases.
5fd29d6ccb ("printk: clean up handling of log-levels and newlines")
and we could take advantage of that to make sure we didn't mix up
continuation lines with lines that just didn't have any loglevel at all.
Then, in 2012, the kernel log buffer was changed to be a "record" based
log, where each line was a record that has a loglevel and a timestamp.
You can see the beginning of that conversion in commits
e11fea92e1 ("kmsg: export printk records to the /dev/kmsg interface")
7ff9554bb5 ("printk: convert byte-buffer to variable-length record buffer")
with a number of follow-up commits to fix some painful fallout from that
conversion. Over all, it took a couple of months to sort out most of
it. But the upside was that you could have concurrent readers (and
writers) of the kernel log and not have lines with mixed output in them.
And one particular pain-point for the record-based kernel logging was
exactly the fragmentary lines that are generated in smaller chunks. In
order to still log them as one recrod, the continuation lines need to be
attached to the previous record properly.
However the explicit continuation record marker that is actually useful
for this exact case was actually removed in aroundm the same time by commit
61e99ab8e3 ("printk: remove the now unnecessary "C" annotation for KERN_CONT")
due to the incorrect belief that KERN_CONT wasn't meaningful. The
ambiguity between "is this a continuation line" or "is this a plain
printk with no log level information" was reintroduced, and in fact
became an even bigger pain point because there was now the whole
record-level merging of kernel messages going on.
This patch reinstates the KERN_CONT as a real non-empty string marker,
so that the ambiguity is fixed once again.
But it's not a plain revert of that original removal: in the four years
since we made KERN_CONT an empty string again, not only has the format
of the log level markers changed, we've also had some usage changes in
this area.
For example, some ACPI code seems to use KERN_CONT _together_ with a log
level, and now uses both the KERN_CONT marker and (for example) a
KERN_INFO marker to show that it's an informational continuation of a
line.
Which is actually not a bad idea - if the continuation line cannot be
attached to its predecessor, without the log level information we don't
know what log level to assign to it (and we traditionally just assigned
it the default loglevel). So having both a log level and the KERN_CONT
marker is not necessarily a bad idea, but it does mean that we need to
actually iterate over potentially multiple markers, rather than just a
single one.
Also, since KERN_CONT was still conceptually needed, and encouraged, but
didn't actually _do_ anything, we've also had the reverse problem:
rather than having too many annotations it has too few, and there is bit
rot with code that no longer marks the continuation lines with the
KERN_CONT marker.
So this patch not only re-instates the non-empty KERN_CONT marker, it
also fixes up the cases of bit-rot I noticed in my own logs.
There are probably other cases where KERN_CONT will be needed to be
added, either because it is new code that never dealt with the need for
KERN_CONT, or old code that has bitrotted without anybody noticing.
That said, we should strive to avoid the need for KERN_CONT. It does
result in real problems for logging, and should generally not be seen as
a good feature. If we some day can get rid of the feature entirely,
because nobody does any fragmented printk calls, that would be lovely.
But until that point, let's at mark the code that relies on the hacky
multi-fragment kernel printk's. Not only does it avoid the ambiguity,
it also annotates code as "maybe this would be good to fix some day".
(That said, particularly during single-threaded bootup, the downsides of
KERN_CONT are very limited. Things get much hairier when you have
multiple threads going on and user level reading and writing logs too).
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Right now, various places in the kernel check for the existence of
getxattr, setxattr, and removexattr inode operations and directly call
those operations. Switch to helper functions and test for the IOP_XATTR
flag instead.
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris:
SELinux/LSM:
- overlayfs support, necessary for container filesystems
LSM:
- finally remove the kernel_module_from_file hook
Smack:
- treat signal delivery as an 'append' operation
TPM:
- lots of bugfixes & updates
Audit:
- new audit data type: LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE
* 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (47 commits)
Revert "tpm/tpm_crb: implement tpm crb idle state"
Revert "tmp/tpm_crb: fix Intel PTT hw bug during idle state"
Revert "tpm/tpm_crb: open code the crb_init into acpi_add"
Revert "tmp/tpm_crb: implement runtime pm for tpm_crb"
lsm,audit,selinux: Introduce a new audit data type LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE
tmp/tpm_crb: implement runtime pm for tpm_crb
tpm/tpm_crb: open code the crb_init into acpi_add
tmp/tpm_crb: fix Intel PTT hw bug during idle state
tpm/tpm_crb: implement tpm crb idle state
tpm: add check for minimum buffer size in tpm_transmit()
tpm: constify TPM 1.x header structures
tpm/tpm_crb: fix the over 80 characters checkpatch warring
tpm/tpm_crb: drop useless cpu_to_le32 when writing to registers
tpm/tpm_crb: cache cmd_size register value.
tmp/tpm_crb: drop include to platform_device
tpm/tpm_tis: remove unused itpm variable
tpm_crb: fix incorrect values of cmdReady and goIdle bits
tpm_crb: refine the naming of constants
tpm_crb: remove wmb()'s
tpm_crb: fix crb_req_canceled behavior
...
Pull audit updates from Paul Moore:
"Another relatively small pull request for v4.9 with just two patches.
The patch from Richard updates the list of features we support and
report back to userspace; this should have been sent earlier with the
rest of the v4.8 patches but it got lost in my inbox.
The second patch fixes a problem reported by our Android friends where
we weren't very consistent in recording PIDs"
* 'stable-4.9' of git://git.infradead.org/users/pcmoore/audit:
audit: add exclude filter extension to feature bitmap
audit: consistently record PIDs with task_tgid_nr()
If there is an error creating a directory with securityfs_create_dir,
the error is propagated via ERR_PTR but the function comment claims that
NULL is returned.
This is a similar commit to 88e6c94cda
("fix long-broken securityfs_create_file comment") that did not fix
securityfs_create_dir comment at the same time.
Signed-off-by: Laurent Georget <laurent.georget@supelec.fr>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
CURRENT_TIME macro is not appropriate for filesystems as it
doesn't use the right granularity for filesystem timestamps.
Use current_time() instead.
CURRENT_TIME is also not y2038 safe.
This is also in preparation for the patch that transitions
vfs timestamps to use 64 bit time and hence make them
y2038 safe. As part of the effort current_time() will be
extended to do range checks. Hence, it is necessary for all
file system timestamps to use current_time(). Also,
current_time() will be transitioned along with vfs to be
y2038 safe.
Note that whenever a single call to current_time() is used
to change timestamps in different inodes, it is because they
share the same time granularity.
Signed-off-by: Deepa Dinamani <deepa.kernel@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Acked-by: Felipe Balbi <balbi@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Steven Whitehouse <swhiteho@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Ryusuke Konishi <konishi.ryusuke@lab.ntt.co.jp>
Acked-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Pull crypto fixes from Herbert Xu:
"This fixes a regression in RSA that was only half-fixed earlier in the
cycle. It also fixes an older regression that breaks the keyring
subsystem"
* 'linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6:
crypto: rsa-pkcs1pad - Handle leading zero for decryption
KEYS: Fix skcipher IV clobbering
The IV must not be modified by the skcipher operation so we need
to duplicate it.
Fixes: c3917fd9df ("KEYS: Use skcipher")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Right now LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH type contains "struct path" in union "u"
of common_audit_data. This information is used to print path of file
at the same time it is also used to get to dentry and inode. And this
inode information is used to get to superblock and device and print
device information.
This does not work well for layered filesystems like overlay where dentry
contained in path is overlay dentry and not the real dentry of underlying
file system. That means inode retrieved from dentry is also overlay
inode and not the real inode.
SELinux helpers like file_path_has_perm() are doing checks on inode
retrieved from file_inode(). This returns the real inode and not the
overlay inode. That means we are doing check on real inode but for audit
purposes we are printing details of overlay inode and that can be
confusing while debugging.
Hence, introduce a new type LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE which carries file
information and inode retrieved is real inode using file_inode(). That
way right avc denied information is given to user.
For example, following is one example avc before the patch.
type=AVC msg=audit(1473360868.399:214): avc: denied { read open } for
pid=1765 comm="cat"
path="/root/.../overlay/container1/merged/readfile"
dev="overlay" ino=21443
scontext=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:test_overlay_client_t:s0:c10,c20
tcontext=unconfined_u:object_r:test_overlay_files_ro_t:s0
tclass=file permissive=0
It looks as follows after the patch.
type=AVC msg=audit(1473360017.388:282): avc: denied { read open } for
pid=2530 comm="cat"
path="/root/.../overlay/container1/merged/readfile"
dev="dm-0" ino=2377915
scontext=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:test_overlay_client_t:s0:c10,c20
tcontext=unconfined_u:object_r:test_overlay_files_ro_t:s0
tclass=file permissive=0
Notice that now dev information points to "dm-0" device instead of
"overlay" device. This makes it clear that check failed on underlying
inode and not on the overlay inode.
Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
[PM: slight tweaks to the description to make checkpatch.pl happy]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Ima tries to call ->setxattr() on overlayfs dentry after having locked
underlying inode, which results in a deadlock.
Reported-by: Krisztian Litkey <kli@iki.fi>
Fixes: 4bacc9c923 ("overlayfs: Make f_path always point to the overlay and f_inode to the underlay")
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.2
Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Fix to return error code -EINVAL from the error handling case instead
of 0 (rc is overwrite to 0 when policyvers >=
POLICYDB_VERSION_ROLETRANS), as done elsewhere in this function.
Signed-off-by: Wei Yongjun <weiyongjun1@huawei.com>
[PM: normalize "selinux" in patch subject, description line wrap]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Under a strict subject/object security policy delivering a
signal or delivering network IPC could be considered either
a write or an append operation. The original choice to make
both write operations leads to an issue where IPC delivery
is desired under policy, but delivery of signals is not.
This patch provides the option of making signal delivery
an append operation, allowing Smack rules that deny signal
delivery while allowing IPC. This was requested for Tizen.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
- move page-spanning check behind a CONFIG since it's triggering false positives
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Merge tag 'usercopy-v4.8-rc6-part2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux
Pull more hardened usercopyfixes from Kees Cook:
- force check_object_size() to be inline too
- move page-spanning check behind a CONFIG since it's triggering false
positives
[ Changed the page-spanning config option to depend on EXPERT in the
merge. That way it still gets build testing, and you can enable it if
you want to, but is never enabled for "normal" configurations ]
* tag 'usercopy-v4.8-rc6-part2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux:
usercopy: remove page-spanning test for now
usercopy: force check_object_size() inline
A custom allocator without __GFP_COMP that copies to userspace has been
found in vmw_execbuf_process[1], so this disables the page-span checker
by placing it behind a CONFIG for future work where such things can be
tracked down later.
[1] https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1373326
Reported-by: Vinson Lee <vlee@freedesktop.org>
Fixes: f5509cc18d ("mm: Hardened usercopy")
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Unfortunately we record PIDs in audit records using a variety of
methods despite the correct way being the use of task_tgid_nr().
This patch converts all of these callers, except for the case of
AUDIT_SET in audit_receive_msg() (see the comment in the code).
Reported-by: Jeff Vander Stoep <jeffv@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Throughout the SELinux LSM, values taken from sepolicy are
used in places where length == 0 or length == <saturated>
matter, find and fix these.
Signed-off-by: William Roberts <william.c.roberts@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
libsepol pointed out an issue where its possible to have
an unitialized jmp and invalid dereference, fix this.
While we're here, zero allocate all the *_val_to_struct
structures.
Signed-off-by: William Roberts <william.c.roberts@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
When count is 0 and the highbit is not zero, the ebitmap is not
valid and the internal node is not allocated. This causes issues
when routines, like mls_context_isvalid() attempt to use the
ebitmap_for_each_bit() and ebitmap_node_get_bit() as they assume
a highbit > 0 will have a node allocated.
Signed-off-by: William Roberts <william.c.roberts@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Reuse existing functionality from memdup_user() instead of keeping
duplicate source code.
This issue was detected by using the Coccinelle software.
Signed-off-by: Markus Elfring <elfring@users.sourceforge.net>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
The kernel test robot reported a usercopy failure in the new hardened
sanity checks, due to a page-crossing copy of the FPU state into the
task structure.
This happened because the kernel test robot was testing with SLOB, which
doesn't actually do the required book-keeping for slab allocations, and
as a result the hardening code didn't realize that the task struct
allocation was one single allocation - and the sanity checks fail.
Since SLOB doesn't even claim to support hardening (and you really
shouldn't use it), the straightforward solution is to just make the
usercopy hardening code depend on the allocator supporting it.
Reported-by: kernel test robot <xiaolong.ye@intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Remove the SECURITY_SELINUX_POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX Kconfig option
Per: https://github.com/SELinuxProject/selinux/wiki/Kernel-Todo
This was only needed on Fedora 3 and 4 and just causes issues now,
so drop it.
The MAX and MIN should just be whatever the kernel can support.
Signed-off-by: William Roberts <william.c.roberts@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Calculate what would be the label of newly created file and set that
secid in the passed creds.
Context of the task which is actually creating file is retrieved from
set of creds passed in. (old->security).
Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
During a new file creation we need to make sure new file is created with the
right label. New file is created in upper/ so effectively file should get
label as if task had created file in upper/.
We switched to mounter's creds for actual file creation. Also if there is a
whiteout present, then file will be created in work/ dir first and then
renamed in upper. In none of the cases file will be labeled as we want it to
be.
This patch introduces a new hook dentry_create_files_as(), which determines
the label/context dentry will get if it had been created by task in upper
and modify passed set of creds appropriately. Caller makes use of these new
creds for file creation.
Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
[PM: fix whitespace issues found with checkpatch.pl]
[PM: changes to use stat->mode in ovl_create_or_link()]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Right now selinux_determine_inode_label() works on security pointer of
current task. Soon I need this to work on a security pointer retrieved
from a set of creds. So start passing in a pointer and caller can
decide where to fetch security pointer from.
Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
When a file is copied up in overlay, we have already created file on
upper/ with right label and there is no need to copy up selinux
label/xattr from lower file to upper file. In fact in case of context
mount, we don't want to copy up label as newly created file got its label
from context= option.
Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Provide a security hook which is called when xattrs of a file are being
copied up. This hook is called once for each xattr and LSM can return
0 if the security module wants the xattr to be copied up, 1 if the
security module wants the xattr to be discarded on the copy, -EOPNOTSUPP
if the security module does not handle/manage the xattr, or a -errno
upon an error.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
[PM: whitespace cleanup for checkpatch.pl]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
A file is being copied up for overlay file system. Prepare a new set of
creds and set create_sid appropriately so that new file is created with
appropriate label.
Overlay inode has right label for both context and non-context mount
cases. In case of non-context mount, overlay inode will have the label
of lower file and in case of context mount, overlay inode will have
the label from context= mount option.
Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Provide a security hook to label new file correctly when a file is copied
up from lower layer to upper layer of a overlay/union mount.
This hook can prepare a new set of creds which are suitable for new file
creation during copy up. Caller will use new creds to create file and then
revert back to old creds and release new creds.
Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
[PM: whitespace cleanup to appease checkpatch.pl]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
ioctlcmd is currently printing hex numbers, but their is no leading
0x. Thus things like ioctlcmd=1234 are misleading, as the base is
not evident.
Correct this by adding 0x as a prefix, so ioctlcmd=1234 becomes
ioctlcmd=0x1234.
Signed-off-by: William Roberts <william.c.roberts@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
The IS_ENABLED() macro checks if a Kconfig symbol has been enabled
either built-in or as a module, use that macro instead of open coding
the same.
Signed-off-by: Javier Martinez Canillas <javier@osg.samsung.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Pull qstr constification updates from Al Viro:
"Fairly self-contained bunch - surprising lot of places passes struct
qstr * as an argument when const struct qstr * would suffice; it
complicates analysis for no good reason.
I'd prefer to feed that separately from the assorted fixes (those are
in #for-linus and with somewhat trickier topology)"
* 'work.const-qstr' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs:
qstr: constify instances in adfs
qstr: constify instances in lustre
qstr: constify instances in f2fs
qstr: constify instances in ext2
qstr: constify instances in vfat
qstr: constify instances in procfs
qstr: constify instances in fuse
qstr constify instances in fs/dcache.c
qstr: constify instances in nfs
qstr: constify instances in ocfs2
qstr: constify instances in autofs4
qstr: constify instances in hfs
qstr: constify instances in hfsplus
qstr: constify instances in logfs
qstr: constify dentry_init_security
Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris:
"Highlights:
- TPM core and driver updates/fixes
- IPv6 security labeling (CALIPSO)
- Lots of Apparmor fixes
- Seccomp: remove 2-phase API, close hole where ptrace can change
syscall #"
* 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (156 commits)
apparmor: fix SECURITY_APPARMOR_HASH_DEFAULT parameter handling
tpm: Add TPM 2.0 support to the Nuvoton i2c driver (NPCT6xx family)
tpm: Factor out common startup code
tpm: use devm_add_action_or_reset
tpm2_i2c_nuvoton: add irq validity check
tpm: read burstcount from TPM_STS in one 32-bit transaction
tpm: fix byte-order for the value read by tpm2_get_tpm_pt
tpm_tis_core: convert max timeouts from msec to jiffies
apparmor: fix arg_size computation for when setprocattr is null terminated
apparmor: fix oops, validate buffer size in apparmor_setprocattr()
apparmor: do not expose kernel stack
apparmor: fix module parameters can be changed after policy is locked
apparmor: fix oops in profile_unpack() when policy_db is not present
apparmor: don't check for vmalloc_addr if kvzalloc() failed
apparmor: add missing id bounds check on dfa verification
apparmor: allow SYS_CAP_RESOURCE to be sufficient to prlimit another task
apparmor: use list_next_entry instead of list_entry_next
apparmor: fix refcount race when finding a child profile
apparmor: fix ref count leak when profile sha1 hash is read
apparmor: check that xindex is in trans_table bounds
...
Pull userns vfs updates from Eric Biederman:
"This tree contains some very long awaited work on generalizing the
user namespace support for mounting filesystems to include filesystems
with a backing store. The real world target is fuse but the goal is
to update the vfs to allow any filesystem to be supported. This
patchset is based on a lot of code review and testing to approach that
goal.
While looking at what is needed to support the fuse filesystem it
became clear that there were things like xattrs for security modules
that needed special treatment. That the resolution of those concerns
would not be fuse specific. That sorting out these general issues
made most sense at the generic level, where the right people could be
drawn into the conversation, and the issues could be solved for
everyone.
At a high level what this patchset does a couple of simple things:
- Add a user namespace owner (s_user_ns) to struct super_block.
- Teach the vfs to handle filesystem uids and gids not mapping into
to kuids and kgids and being reported as INVALID_UID and
INVALID_GID in vfs data structures.
By assigning a user namespace owner filesystems that are mounted with
only user namespace privilege can be detected. This allows security
modules and the like to know which mounts may not be trusted. This
also allows the set of uids and gids that are communicated to the
filesystem to be capped at the set of kuids and kgids that are in the
owning user namespace of the filesystem.
One of the crazier corner casees this handles is the case of inodes
whose i_uid or i_gid are not mapped into the vfs. Most of the code
simply doesn't care but it is easy to confuse the inode writeback path
so no operation that could cause an inode write-back is permitted for
such inodes (aka only reads are allowed).
This set of changes starts out by cleaning up the code paths involved
in user namespace permirted mounts. Then when things are clean enough
adds code that cleanly sets s_user_ns. Then additional restrictions
are added that are possible now that the filesystem superblock
contains owner information.
These changes should not affect anyone in practice, but there are some
parts of these restrictions that are changes in behavior.
- Andy's restriction on suid executables that does not honor the
suid bit when the path is from another mount namespace (think
/proc/[pid]/fd/) or when the filesystem was mounted by a less
privileged user.
- The replacement of the user namespace implicit setting of MNT_NODEV
with implicitly setting SB_I_NODEV on the filesystem superblock
instead.
Using SB_I_NODEV is a stronger form that happens to make this state
user invisible. The user visibility can be managed but it caused
problems when it was introduced from applications reasonably
expecting mount flags to be what they were set to.
There is a little bit of work remaining before it is safe to support
mounting filesystems with backing store in user namespaces, beyond
what is in this set of changes.
- Verifying the mounter has permission to read/write the block device
during mount.
- Teaching the integrity modules IMA and EVM to handle filesystems
mounted with only user namespace root and to reduce trust in their
security xattrs accordingly.
- Capturing the mounters credentials and using that for permission
checks in d_automount and the like. (Given that overlayfs already
does this, and we need the work in d_automount it make sense to
generalize this case).
Furthermore there are a few changes that are on the wishlist:
- Get all filesystems supporting posix acls using the generic posix
acls so that posix_acl_fix_xattr_from_user and
posix_acl_fix_xattr_to_user may be removed. [Maintainability]
- Reducing the permission checks in places such as remount to allow
the superblock owner to perform them.
- Allowing the superblock owner to chown files with unmapped uids and
gids to something that is mapped so the files may be treated
normally.
I am not considering even obvious relaxations of permission checks
until it is clear there are no more corner cases that need to be
locked down and handled generically.
Many thanks to Seth Forshee who kept this code alive, and putting up
with me rewriting substantial portions of what he did to handle more
corner cases, and for his diligent testing and reviewing of my
changes"
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace: (30 commits)
fs: Call d_automount with the filesystems creds
fs: Update i_[ug]id_(read|write) to translate relative to s_user_ns
evm: Translate user/group ids relative to s_user_ns when computing HMAC
dquot: For now explicitly don't support filesystems outside of init_user_ns
quota: Handle quota data stored in s_user_ns in quota_setxquota
quota: Ensure qids map to the filesystem
vfs: Don't create inodes with a uid or gid unknown to the vfs
vfs: Don't modify inodes with a uid or gid unknown to the vfs
cred: Reject inodes with invalid ids in set_create_file_as()
fs: Check for invalid i_uid in may_follow_link()
vfs: Verify acls are valid within superblock's s_user_ns.
userns: Handle -1 in k[ug]id_has_mapping when !CONFIG_USER_NS
fs: Refuse uid/gid changes which don't map into s_user_ns
selinux: Add support for unprivileged mounts from user namespaces
Smack: Handle labels consistently in untrusted mounts
Smack: Add support for unprivileged mounts from user namespaces
fs: Treat foreign mounts as nosuid
fs: Limit file caps to the user namespace of the super block
userns: Remove the now unnecessary FS_USERNS_DEV_MOUNT flag
userns: Remove implicit MNT_NODEV fragility.
...
Pull vfs updates from Al Viro:
"Assorted cleanups and fixes.
Probably the most interesting part long-term is ->d_init() - that will
have a bunch of followups in (at least) ceph and lustre, but we'll
need to sort the barrier-related rules before it can get used for
really non-trivial stuff.
Another fun thing is the merge of ->d_iput() callers (dentry_iput()
and dentry_unlink_inode()) and a bunch of ->d_compare() ones (all
except the one in __d_lookup_lru())"
* 'work.misc' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: (26 commits)
fs/dcache.c: avoid soft-lockup in dput()
vfs: new d_init method
vfs: Update lookup_dcache() comment
bdev: get rid of ->bd_inodes
Remove last traces of ->sync_page
new helper: d_same_name()
dentry_cmp(): use lockless_dereference() instead of smp_read_barrier_depends()
vfs: clean up documentation
vfs: document ->d_real()
vfs: merge .d_select_inode() into .d_real()
unify dentry_iput() and dentry_unlink_inode()
binfmt_misc: ->s_root is not going anywhere
drop redundant ->owner initializations
ufs: get rid of redundant checks
orangefs: constify inode_operations
missed comment updates from ->direct_IO() prototype change
file_inode(f)->i_mapping is f->f_mapping
trim fsnotify hooks a bit
9p: new helper - v9fs_parent_fid()
debugfs: ->d_parent is never NULL or negative
...
This changes the vfs dentry hashing to mix in the parent pointer at the
_beginning_ of the hash, rather than at the end.
That actually improves both the hash and the code generation, because we
can move more of the computation to the "static" part of the dcache
setup, and do less at lookup runtime.
It turns out that a lot of other hash users also really wanted to mix in
a base pointer as a 'salt' for the hash, and so the slightly extended
interface ends up working well for other cases too.
Users that want a string hash that is purely about the string pass in a
'salt' pointer of NULL.
* merge branch 'salted-string-hash':
fs/dcache.c: Save one 32-bit multiply in dcache lookup
vfs: make the string hashes salt the hash
The newly added Kconfig option could never work and just causes a build error
when disabled:
security/apparmor/lsm.c:675:25: error: 'CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_HASH_DEFAULT' undeclared here (not in a function)
bool aa_g_hash_policy = CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_HASH_DEFAULT;
The problem is that the macro undefined in this case, and we need to use the IS_ENABLED()
helper to turn it into a boolean constant.
Another minor problem with the original patch is that the option is even offered
in sysfs when SECURITY_APPARMOR_HASH is not enabled, so this also hides the option
in that case.
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Fixes: 6059f71f1e ("apparmor: add parameter to control whether policy hashing is used")
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
This is the start of porting PAX_USERCOPY into the mainline kernel. This
is the first set of features, controlled by CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY. The
work is based on code by PaX Team and Brad Spengler, and an earlier port
from Casey Schaufler. Additional non-slab page tests are from Rik van Riel.
This patch contains the logic for validating several conditions when
performing copy_to_user() and copy_from_user() on the kernel object
being copied to/from:
- address range doesn't wrap around
- address range isn't NULL or zero-allocated (with a non-zero copy size)
- if on the slab allocator:
- object size must be less than or equal to copy size (when check is
implemented in the allocator, which appear in subsequent patches)
- otherwise, object must not span page allocations (excepting Reserved
and CMA ranges)
- if on the stack
- object must not extend before/after the current process stack
- object must be contained by a valid stack frame (when there is
arch/build support for identifying stack frames)
- object must not overlap with kernel text
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Tested-by: Valdis Kletnieks <valdis.kletnieks@vt.edu>
Tested-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Pull crypto updates from Herbert Xu:
"Here is the crypto update for 4.8:
API:
- first part of skcipher low-level conversions
- add KPP (Key-agreement Protocol Primitives) interface.
Algorithms:
- fix IPsec/cryptd reordering issues that affects aesni
- RSA no longer does explicit leading zero removal
- add SHA3
- add DH
- add ECDH
- improve DRBG performance by not doing CTR by hand
Drivers:
- add x86 AVX2 multibuffer SHA256/512
- add POWER8 optimised crc32c
- add xts support to vmx
- add DH support to qat
- add RSA support to caam
- add Layerscape support to caam
- add SEC1 AEAD support to talitos
- improve performance by chaining requests in marvell/cesa
- add support for Araneus Alea I USB RNG
- add support for Broadcom BCM5301 RNG
- add support for Amlogic Meson RNG
- add support Broadcom NSP SoC RNG"
* 'linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6: (180 commits)
crypto: vmx - Fix aes_p8_xts_decrypt build failure
crypto: vmx - Ignore generated files
crypto: vmx - Adding support for XTS
crypto: vmx - Adding asm subroutines for XTS
crypto: skcipher - add comment for skcipher_alg->base
crypto: testmgr - Print akcipher algorithm name
crypto: marvell - Fix wrong flag used for GFP in mv_cesa_dma_add_iv_op
crypto: nx - off by one bug in nx_of_update_msc()
crypto: rsa-pkcs1pad - fix rsa-pkcs1pad request struct
crypto: scatterwalk - Inline start/map/done
crypto: scatterwalk - Remove unnecessary BUG in scatterwalk_start
crypto: scatterwalk - Remove unnecessary advance in scatterwalk_pagedone
crypto: scatterwalk - Fix test in scatterwalk_done
crypto: api - Optimise away crypto_yield when hard preemption is on
crypto: scatterwalk - add no-copy support to copychunks
crypto: scatterwalk - Remove scatterwalk_bytes_sglen
crypto: omap - Stop using crypto scatterwalk_bytes_sglen
crypto: skcipher - Remove top-level givcipher interface
crypto: user - Remove crypto_lookup_skcipher call
crypto: cts - Convert to skcipher
...
When proc_pid_attr_write() was changed to use memdup_user apparmor's
(interface violating) assumption that the setprocattr buffer was always
a single page was violated.
The size test is not strictly speaking needed as proc_pid_attr_write()
will reject anything larger, but for the sake of robustness we can keep
it in.
SMACK and SELinux look safe to me, but somebody else should probably
have a look just in case.
Based on original patch from Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
modified for the case that apparmor provides null termination.
Fixes: bb646cdb12
Reported-by: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Do not copy uninitalized fields th.td_hilen, th.td_data.
Signed-off-by: Heinrich Schuchardt <xypron.glpk@gmx.de>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
the policy_lock parameter is a one way switch that prevents policy
from being further modified. Unfortunately some of the module parameters
can effectively modify policy by turning off enforcement.
split policy_admin_capable into a view check and a full admin check,
and update the admin check to test the policy_lock parameter.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1592547
If unpack_dfa() returns NULL due to the dfa not being present,
profile_unpack() is not checking if the dfa is not present (NULL).
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
