Commit Graph

968155 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Lijun Pan
3ada288150 ibmvnic: enhance resetting status check during module exit
Based on the discussion with Sukadev Bhattiprolu and Dany Madden,
we believe that checking adapter->resetting bit is preferred
since RESETTING state flag is not as strict as resetting bit.
RESETTING state flag is removed since it is verbose now.

Fixes: 7d7195a026 ("ibmvnic: Do not process device remove during device reset")
Signed-off-by: Lijun Pan <ljp@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
2020-11-24 16:28:34 -08:00
Lijun Pan
0e435befae ibmvnic: fix NULL pointer dereference in ibmvic_reset_crq
crq->msgs could be NULL if the previous reset did not complete after
freeing crq->msgs. Check for NULL before dereferencing them.

Snippet of call trace:
...
ibmvnic 30000003 env3 (unregistering): Releasing sub-CRQ
ibmvnic 30000003 env3 (unregistering): Releasing CRQ
BUG: Kernel NULL pointer dereference on read at 0x00000000
Faulting instruction address: 0xc0000000000c1a30
Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [#1]
LE PAGE_SIZE=64K MMU=Hash SMP NR_CPUS=2048 NUMA pSeries
Modules linked in: ibmvnic(E-) rpadlpar_io rpaphp xt_CHECKSUM xt_MASQUERADE xt_conntrack ipt_REJECT nf_reject_ipv4 nft_compat nft_counter nft_chain_nat nf_nat nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 nf_tables xsk_diag tcp_diag udp_diag tun raw_diag inet_diag unix_diag bridge af_packet_diag netlink_diag stp llc rfkill sunrpc pseries_rng xts vmx_crypto uio_pdrv_genirq uio binfmt_misc ip_tables xfs libcrc32c sd_mod t10_pi sg ibmvscsi ibmveth scsi_transport_srp dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod [last unloaded: ibmvnic]
CPU: 20 PID: 8426 Comm: kworker/20:0 Tainted: G            E     5.10.0-rc1+ #12
Workqueue: events __ibmvnic_reset [ibmvnic]
NIP:  c0000000000c1a30 LR: c008000001b00c18 CTR: 0000000000000400
REGS: c00000000d05b7a0 TRAP: 0380   Tainted: G            E      (5.10.0-rc1+)
MSR:  800000000280b033 <SF,VEC,VSX,EE,FP,ME,IR,DR,RI,LE>  CR: 44002480  XER: 20040000
CFAR: c0000000000c19ec IRQMASK: 0
GPR00: 0000000000000400 c00000000d05ba30 c008000001b17c00 0000000000000000
GPR04: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000000001e2
GPR08: 000000000001f400 ffffffffffffd950 0000000000000000 c008000001b0b280
GPR12: c0000000000c19c8 c00000001ec72e00 c00000000019a778 c00000002647b440
GPR16: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
GPR20: 0000000000000006 0000000000000001 0000000000000003 0000000000000002
GPR24: 0000000000001000 c008000001b0d570 0000000000000005 c00000007ab5d550
GPR28: c00000007ab5c000 c000000032fcf848 c00000007ab5cc00 c000000032fcf800
NIP [c0000000000c1a30] memset+0x68/0x104
LR [c008000001b00c18] ibmvnic_reset_crq+0x70/0x110 [ibmvnic]
Call Trace:
[c00000000d05ba30] [0000000000000800] 0x800 (unreliable)
[c00000000d05bab0] [c008000001b0a930] do_reset.isra.40+0x224/0x634 [ibmvnic]
[c00000000d05bb80] [c008000001b08574] __ibmvnic_reset+0x17c/0x3c0 [ibmvnic]
[c00000000d05bc50] [c00000000018d9ac] process_one_work+0x2cc/0x800
[c00000000d05bd20] [c00000000018df58] worker_thread+0x78/0x520
[c00000000d05bdb0] [c00000000019a934] kthread+0x1c4/0x1d0
[c00000000d05be20] [c00000000000d5d0] ret_from_kernel_thread+0x5c/0x6c

Fixes: 032c5e8284 ("Driver for IBM System i/p VNIC protocol")
Signed-off-by: Lijun Pan <ljp@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
2020-11-24 16:28:34 -08:00
Lijun Pan
a0faaa27c7 ibmvnic: fix NULL pointer dereference in reset_sub_crq_queues
adapter->tx_scrq and adapter->rx_scrq could be NULL if the previous reset
did not complete after freeing sub crqs. Check for NULL before
dereferencing them.

Snippet of call trace:
ibmvnic 30000006 env6: Releasing sub-CRQ
ibmvnic 30000006 env6: Releasing CRQ
...
ibmvnic 30000006 env6: Got Control IP offload Response
ibmvnic 30000006 env6: Re-setting tx_scrq[0]
BUG: Kernel NULL pointer dereference on read at 0x00000000
Faulting instruction address: 0xc008000003dea7cc
Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [#1]
LE PAGE_SIZE=64K MMU=Hash SMP NR_CPUS=2048 NUMA pSeries
Modules linked in: rpadlpar_io rpaphp xt_CHECKSUM xt_MASQUERADE xt_conntrack ipt_REJECT nf_reject_ipv4 nft_compat nft_counter nft_chain_nat nf_nat nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 nf_tables xsk_diag tcp_diag udp_diag raw_diag inet_diag unix_diag af_packet_diag netlink_diag tun bridge stp llc rfkill sunrpc pseries_rng xts vmx_crypto uio_pdrv_genirq uio binfmt_misc ip_tables xfs libcrc32c sd_mod t10_pi sg ibmvscsi ibmvnic ibmveth scsi_transport_srp dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod
CPU: 80 PID: 1856 Comm: kworker/80:2 Tainted: G        W         5.8.0+ #4
Workqueue: events __ibmvnic_reset [ibmvnic]
NIP:  c008000003dea7cc LR: c008000003dea7bc CTR: 0000000000000000
REGS: c0000007ef7db860 TRAP: 0380   Tainted: G        W          (5.8.0+)
MSR:  800000000280b033 <SF,VEC,VSX,EE,FP,ME,IR,DR,RI,LE>  CR: 28002422  XER: 0000000d
CFAR: c000000000bd9520 IRQMASK: 0
GPR00: c008000003dea7bc c0000007ef7dbaf0 c008000003df7400 c0000007fa26ec00
GPR04: c0000007fcd0d008 c0000007fcd96350 0000000000000027 c0000007fcd0d010
GPR08: 0000000000000023 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
GPR12: 0000000000002000 c00000001ec18e00 c0000000001982f8 c0000007bad6e840
GPR16: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
GPR20: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 fffffffffffffef7
GPR24: 0000000000000402 c0000007fa26f3a8 0000000000000003 c00000016f8ec048
GPR28: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 c0000007fa26ec00
NIP [c008000003dea7cc] ibmvnic_reset_init+0x15c/0x258 [ibmvnic]
LR [c008000003dea7bc] ibmvnic_reset_init+0x14c/0x258 [ibmvnic]
Call Trace:
[c0000007ef7dbaf0] [c008000003dea7bc] ibmvnic_reset_init+0x14c/0x258 [ibmvnic] (unreliable)
[c0000007ef7dbb80] [c008000003de8860] __ibmvnic_reset+0x408/0x970 [ibmvnic]
[c0000007ef7dbc50] [c00000000018b7cc] process_one_work+0x2cc/0x800
[c0000007ef7dbd20] [c00000000018bd78] worker_thread+0x78/0x520
[c0000007ef7dbdb0] [c0000000001984c4] kthread+0x1d4/0x1e0
[c0000007ef7dbe20] [c00000000000cea8] ret_from_kernel_thread+0x5c/0x74

Fixes: 57a49436f4 ("ibmvnic: Reset sub-crqs during driver reset")
Signed-off-by: Lijun Pan <ljp@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
2020-11-24 16:28:34 -08:00
Jakub Kicinski
5fc145f155 Merge branch 'fixes-for-ena-driver'
Shay Agroskin says:

====================
Fixes for ENA driver

- fix wrong data offset on machines that support rx offset
- work-around Intel iommu issue
- fix out of bound access when request id is wrong
====================

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201123190859.21298-1-shayagr@amazon.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
2020-11-24 16:07:17 -08:00
Shay Agroskin
1396d3148b net: ena: fix packet's addresses for rx_offset feature
This patch fixes two lines in which the rx_offset received by the device
wasn't taken into account:

- prefetch function:
	In our driver the copied data would reside in
	rx_info->page + rx_headroom + rx_offset

	so the prefetch function is changed accordingly.

- setting page_offset to zero for descriptors > 1:
	for every descriptor but the first, the rx_offset is zero. Hence
	the page_offset value should be set to rx_headroom.

	The previous implementation changed the value of rx_info after
	the descriptor was added to the SKB (essentially providing wrong
	page offset).

Fixes: 68f236df93 ("net: ena: add support for the rx offset feature")
Signed-off-by: Shay Agroskin <shayagr@amazon.com>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
2020-11-24 16:07:13 -08:00
Shay Agroskin
09323b3bca net: ena: set initial DMA width to avoid intel iommu issue
The ENA driver uses the readless mechanism, which uses DMA, to find
out what the DMA mask is supposed to be.

If DMA is used without setting the dma_mask first, it causes the
Intel IOMMU driver to think that ENA is a 32-bit device and therefore
disables IOMMU passthrough permanently.

This patch sets the dma_mask to be ENA_MAX_PHYS_ADDR_SIZE_BITS=48
before readless initialization in
ena_device_init()->ena_com_mmio_reg_read_request_init(),
which is large enough to workaround the intel_iommu issue.

DMA mask is set again to the correct value after it's received from the
device after readless is initialized.

The patch also changes the driver to use dma_set_mask_and_coherent()
function instead of the two pci_set_dma_mask() and
pci_set_consistent_dma_mask() ones. Both methods achieve the same
effect.

Fixes: 1738cd3ed3 ("net: ena: Add a driver for Amazon Elastic Network Adapters (ENA)")
Signed-off-by: Mike Cui <mikecui@amazon.com>
Signed-off-by: Arthur Kiyanovski <akiyano@amazon.com>
Signed-off-by: Shay Agroskin <shayagr@amazon.com>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
2020-11-24 16:07:13 -08:00
Shay Agroskin
5b7022cf1d net: ena: handle bad request id in ena_netdev
After request id is checked in validate_rx_req_id() its value is still
used in the line
	rx_ring->free_ids[next_to_clean] =
					rx_ring->ena_bufs[i].req_id;
even if it was found to be out-of-bound for the array free_ids.

The patch moves the request id to an earlier stage in the napi routine and
makes sure its value isn't used if it's found out-of-bounds.

Fixes: 30623e1ed1 ("net: ena: avoid memory access violation by validating req_id properly")
Signed-off-by: Ido Segev <idose@amazon.com>
Signed-off-by: Shay Agroskin <shayagr@amazon.com>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
2020-11-24 16:07:13 -08:00
Linus Torvalds
127c501a03 Four smb3 fixes for stable
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Merge tag '5.10-rc5-smb3-fixes' of git://git.samba.org/sfrench/cifs-2.6

Pull cifs fixes from Steve French:
 "Four smb3 fixes for stable: one fixes a memleak, the other three
  address a problem found with decryption offload that can cause a use
  after free"

* tag '5.10-rc5-smb3-fixes' of git://git.samba.org/sfrench/cifs-2.6:
  smb3: Handle error case during offload read path
  smb3: Avoid Mid pending list corruption
  smb3: Call cifs reconnect from demultiplex thread
  cifs: fix a memleak with modefromsid
2020-11-24 15:33:18 -08:00
Hugh Dickins
073861ed77 mm: fix VM_BUG_ON(PageTail) and BUG_ON(PageWriteback)
Twice now, when exercising ext4 looped on shmem huge pages, I have crashed
on the PF_ONLY_HEAD check inside PageWaiters(): ext4_finish_bio() calling
end_page_writeback() calling wake_up_page() on tail of a shmem huge page,
no longer an ext4 page at all.

The problem is that PageWriteback is not accompanied by a page reference
(as the NOTE at the end of test_clear_page_writeback() acknowledges): as
soon as TestClearPageWriteback has been done, that page could be removed
from page cache, freed, and reused for something else by the time that
wake_up_page() is reached.

https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/20200827122019.GC14765@casper.infradead.org/
Matthew Wilcox suggested avoiding or weakening the PageWaiters() tail
check; but I'm paranoid about even looking at an unreferenced struct page,
lest its memory might itself have already been reused or hotremoved (and
wake_up_page_bit() may modify that memory with its ClearPageWaiters()).

Then on crashing a second time, realized there's a stronger reason against
that approach.  If my testing just occasionally crashes on that check,
when the page is reused for part of a compound page, wouldn't it be much
more common for the page to get reused as an order-0 page before reaching
wake_up_page()?  And on rare occasions, might that reused page already be
marked PageWriteback by its new user, and already be waited upon?  What
would that look like?

It would look like BUG_ON(PageWriteback) after wait_on_page_writeback()
in write_cache_pages() (though I have never seen that crash myself).

Matthew Wilcox explaining this to himself:
 "page is allocated, added to page cache, dirtied, writeback starts,

  --- thread A ---
  filesystem calls end_page_writeback()
        test_clear_page_writeback()
  --- context switch to thread B ---
  truncate_inode_pages_range() finds the page, it doesn't have writeback set,
  we delete it from the page cache.  Page gets reallocated, dirtied, writeback
  starts again.  Then we call write_cache_pages(), see
  PageWriteback() set, call wait_on_page_writeback()
  --- context switch back to thread A ---
  wake_up_page(page, PG_writeback);
  ... thread B is woken, but because the wakeup was for the old use of
  the page, PageWriteback is still set.

  Devious"

And prior to 2a9127fcf2 ("mm: rewrite wait_on_page_bit_common() logic")
this would have been much less likely: before that, wake_page_function()'s
non-exclusive case would stop walking and not wake if it found Writeback
already set again; whereas now the non-exclusive case proceeds to wake.

I have not thought of a fix that does not add a little overhead: the
simplest fix is for end_page_writeback() to get_page() before calling
test_clear_page_writeback(), then put_page() after wake_up_page().

Was there a chance of missed wakeups before, since a page freed before
reaching wake_up_page() would have PageWaiters cleared?  I think not,
because each waiter does hold a reference on the page.  This bug comes
when the old use of the page, the one we do TestClearPageWriteback on,
had *no* waiters, so no additional page reference beyond the page cache
(and whoever racily freed it).  The reuse of the page has a waiter
holding a reference, and its own PageWriteback set; but the belated
wake_up_page() has woken the reuse to hit that BUG_ON(PageWriteback).

Reported-by: syzbot+3622cea378100f45d59f@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: Qian Cai <cai@lca.pw>
Fixes: 2a9127fcf2 ("mm: rewrite wait_on_page_bit_common() logic")
Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.8+
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-11-24 15:23:19 -08:00
Krzysztof Kozlowski
d8f0a86795 nfc: s3fwrn5: use signed integer for parsing GPIO numbers
GPIOs - as returned by of_get_named_gpio() and used by the gpiolib - are
signed integers, where negative number indicates error.  The return
value of of_get_named_gpio() should not be assigned to an unsigned int
because in case of !CONFIG_GPIOLIB such number would be a valid GPIO.

Fixes: c04c674fad ("nfc: s3fwrn5: Add driver for Samsung S3FWRN5 NFC Chip")
Signed-off-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzk@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201123162351.209100-1-krzk@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
2020-11-24 15:00:53 -08:00
Ezequiel Garcia
078eb55cdf dpaa2-eth: Fix compile error due to missing devlink support
The dpaa2 driver depends on devlink, so it should select
NET_DEVLINK in order to fix compile errors, such as:

drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/dpaa2/dpaa2-eth.o: in function `dpaa2_eth_rx_err':
dpaa2-eth.c:(.text+0x3cec): undefined reference to `devlink_trap_report'
drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/dpaa2/dpaa2-eth-devlink.o: in function `dpaa2_eth_dl_info_get':
dpaa2-eth-devlink.c:(.text+0x160): undefined reference to `devlink_info_driver_name_put'

Fixes: ceeb03ad8e ("dpaa2-eth: add basic devlink support")
Signed-off-by: Ezequiel Garcia <ezequiel@collabora.com>
Signed-off-by: Ioana Ciornei <ioana.ciornei@nxp.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201123163553.1666476-1-ciorneiioana@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
2020-11-24 14:57:55 -08:00
Jesper Dangaard Brouer
bc40a3691f MAINTAINERS: Update page pool entry
Add some file F: matches that is related to page_pool.

Acked-by: Ilias Apalodimas <ilias.apalodimas@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Jesper Dangaard Brouer <brouer@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/160613894639.2826716.14635284017814375894.stgit@firesoul
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
2020-11-24 14:45:21 -08:00
Zhen Lei
68878a5c5b bpftool: Fix error return value in build_btf_type_table
An appropriate return value should be set on the failed path.

Fixes: 4d374ba0bf ("tools: bpftool: implement "bpftool btf show|list"")
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Zhen Lei <thunder.leizhen@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20201124104100.491-1-thunder.leizhen@huawei.com
2020-11-24 23:19:18 +01:00
Alexander Duyck
407c85c7dd tcp: Set ECT0 bit in tos/tclass for synack when BPF needs ECN
When a BPF program is used to select between a type of TCP congestion
control algorithm that uses either ECN or not there is a case where the
synack for the frame was coming up without the ECT0 bit set. A bit of
research found that this was due to the final socket being configured to
dctcp while the listener socket was staying in cubic.

To reproduce it all that is needed is to monitor TCP traffic while running
the sample bpf program "samples/bpf/tcp_cong_kern.c". What is observed,
assuming tcp_dctcp module is loaded or compiled in and the traffic matches
the rules in the sample file, is that for all frames with the exception of
the synack the ECT0 bit is set.

To address that it is necessary to make one additional call to
tcp_bpf_ca_needs_ecn using the request socket and then use the output of
that to set the ECT0 bit for the tos/tclass of the packet.

Fixes: 91b5b21c7c ("bpf: Add support for changing congestion control")
Signed-off-by: Alexander Duyck <alexanderduyck@fb.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/160593039663.2604.1374502006916871573.stgit@localhost.localdomain
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
2020-11-24 14:12:55 -08:00
Björn Töpel
36ccdf8582 net, xsk: Avoid taking multiple skbuff references
Commit 642e450b6b ("xsk: Do not discard packet when NETDEV_TX_BUSY")
addressed the problem that packets were discarded from the Tx AF_XDP
ring, when the driver returned NETDEV_TX_BUSY. Part of the fix was
bumping the skbuff reference count, so that the buffer would not be
freed by dev_direct_xmit(). A reference count larger than one means
that the skbuff is "shared", which is not the case.

If the "shared" skbuff is sent to the generic XDP receive path,
netif_receive_generic_xdp(), and pskb_expand_head() is entered the
BUG_ON(skb_shared(skb)) will trigger.

This patch adds a variant to dev_direct_xmit(), __dev_direct_xmit(),
where a user can select the skbuff free policy. This allows AF_XDP to
avoid bumping the reference count, but still keep the NETDEV_TX_BUSY
behavior.

Fixes: 642e450b6b ("xsk: Do not discard packet when NETDEV_TX_BUSY")
Reported-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Björn Töpel <bjorn.topel@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20201123175600.146255-1-bjorn.topel@gmail.com
2020-11-24 22:39:56 +01:00
Moshe Shemesh
5204bb683c devlink: Fix reload stats structure
Fix reload stats structure exposed to the user. Change stats structure
hierarchy to have the reload action as a parent of the stat entry and
then stat entry includes value per limit. This will also help to avoid
string concatenation on iproute2 output.

Reload stats structure before this fix:
"stats": {
    "reload": {
        "driver_reinit": 2,
        "fw_activate": 1,
        "fw_activate_no_reset": 0
     }
}

After this fix:
"stats": {
    "reload": {
        "driver_reinit": {
            "unspecified": 2
        },
        "fw_activate": {
            "unspecified": 1,
            "no_reset": 0
        }
}

Fixes: a254c26426 ("devlink: Add reload stats")
Signed-off-by: Moshe Shemesh <moshe@mellanox.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri@nvidia.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1606109785-25197-1-git-send-email-moshe@mellanox.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
2020-11-24 13:04:04 -08:00
Linus Torvalds
80145ac2f7 - disable interrupts when restoring fpu and vector registers,
otherwise KVM guests might see corrupted register contents
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Merge tag 's390-5.10-5' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/s390/linux

Pull s390 fix from Heiko Carstens:
 "Disable interrupts when restoring fpu and vector registers, otherwise
  KVM guests might see corrupted register contents"

* tag 's390-5.10-5' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/s390/linux:
  s390: fix fpu restore in entry.S
2020-11-24 12:15:44 -08:00
Linus Torvalds
b148942204 ARC fixes for 5.10-rc6
- More stack unwinding updates
 
  - Miscll minor fixes
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Merge tag 'arc-5.10-rc6' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/vgupta/arc

Pull ARC fixes from Vineet Gupta:
 "A couple more stack unwinder related fixes:

   - More stack unwinding updates

   - Misc minor fixes"

* tag 'arc-5.10-rc6' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/vgupta/arc:
  ARC: stack unwinding: reorganize how initial register state setup
  ARC: stack unwinding: don't assume non-current task is sleeping
  ARC: mm: fix spelling mistakes
  ARC: bitops: Remove unecessary operation and value
2020-11-24 12:12:55 -08:00
Lincoln Ramsay
9bd2702d29 aquantia: Remove the build_skb path
When performing IPv6 forwarding, there is an expectation that SKBs
will have some headroom. When forwarding a packet from the aquantia
driver, this does not always happen, triggering a kernel warning.

aq_ring.c has this code (edited slightly for brevity):

if (buff->is_eop && buff->len <= AQ_CFG_RX_FRAME_MAX - AQ_SKB_ALIGN) {
    skb = build_skb(aq_buf_vaddr(&buff->rxdata), AQ_CFG_RX_FRAME_MAX);
} else {
    skb = napi_alloc_skb(napi, AQ_CFG_RX_HDR_SIZE);

There is a significant difference between the SKB produced by these
2 code paths. When napi_alloc_skb creates an SKB, there is a certain
amount of headroom reserved. However, this is not done in the
build_skb codepath.

As the hardware buffer that build_skb is built around does not
handle the presence of the SKB header, this code path is being
removed and the napi_alloc_skb path will always be used. This code
path does have to copy the packet header into the SKB, but it adds
the packet data as a frag.

Fixes: 018423e90b ("net: ethernet: aquantia: Add ring support code")
Signed-off-by: Lincoln Ramsay <lincoln.ramsay@opengear.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/MWHPR1001MB23184F3EAFA413E0D1910EC9E8FC0@MWHPR1001MB2318.namprd10.prod.outlook.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
2020-11-24 10:59:17 -08:00
Likun Gao
60734bd546 drm/amdgpu: update golden setting for sienna_cichlid
Update golden setting for sienna_cichlid.

Signed-off-by: Likun Gao <Likun.Gao@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Hawking Zhang <Hawking.Zhang@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.9.x
2020-11-24 12:33:07 -05:00
Rodrigo Siqueira
d661155bfc drm/amd/display: Avoid HDCP initialization in devices without output
The HDCP feature requires at least one connector attached to the device;
however, some GPUs do not have a physical output, making the HDCP
initialization irrelevant. This patch disables HDCP initialization when
the graphic card does not have output.

Acked-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Rodrigo Siqueira <Rodrigo.Siqueira@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
2020-11-24 12:32:06 -05:00
Chris Wilson
280ffdb6dd drm/i915/gt: Free stale request on destroying the virtual engine
Since preempt-to-busy, we may unsubmit a request while it is still on
the HW and completes asynchronously. That means it may be retired and in
the process destroy the virtual engine (as the user has closed their
context), but that engine may still be holding onto the unsubmitted
compelted request. Therefore we need to potentially cleanup the old
request on destroying the virtual engine. We also have to keep the
virtual_engine alive until after the sibling's execlists_dequeue() have
finished peeking into the virtual engines, for which we serialise with
RCU.

v2: Be paranoid and flush the tasklet as well.
v3: And flush the tasklet before the engines, as the tasklet may
re-attach an rb_node after our removal from the siblings.

Fixes: 6d06779e86 ("drm/i915: Load balancing across a virtual engine")
Signed-off-by: Chris Wilson <chris@chris-wilson.co.uk>
Cc: Tvrtko Ursulin <tvrtko.ursulin@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Tvrtko Ursulin <tvrtko.ursulin@intel.com>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20201123113717.20500-4-chris@chris-wilson.co.uk
(cherry picked from commit 46eecfccb4c2b0f258adbafb2e53ca3b822cd663)
Signed-off-by: Rodrigo Vivi <rodrigo.vivi@intel.com>
2020-11-24 09:30:57 -08:00
Chris Wilson
2e6ce8313a drm/i915/gt: Don't cancel the interrupt shadow too early
We currently want to keep the interrupt enabled until the interrupt after
which we have no more work to do. This heuristic was broken by us
kicking the irq-work on adding a completed request without attaching a
signaler -- hence it appearing to the irq-worker that an interrupt had
fired when we were idle.

Fixes: 2854d86632 ("drm/i915/gt: Replace intel_engine_transfer_stale_breadcrumbs")
Signed-off-by: Chris Wilson <chris@chris-wilson.co.uk>
Reviewed-by: Tvrtko Ursulin <tvrtko.ursulin@intel.com>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20201123113717.20500-3-chris@chris-wilson.co.uk
(cherry picked from commit 3aef910d26ef48b8a79d48b006dc04383b86dd31)
Signed-off-by: Rodrigo Vivi <rodrigo.vivi@intel.com>
2020-11-24 09:30:56 -08:00
Chris Wilson
eb0104ee49 drm/i915/gt: Track signaled breadcrumbs outside of the breadcrumb spinlock
Make b->signaled_requests a lockless-list so that we can manipulate it
outside of the b->irq_lock.

Signed-off-by: Chris Wilson <chris@chris-wilson.co.uk>
Reviewed-by: Tvrtko Ursulin <tvrtko.ursulin@intel.com>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20201123113717.20500-2-chris@chris-wilson.co.uk
(cherry picked from commit 6cfe66eb71b638968350b5f0fff051fd25eb75fb)
Signed-off-by: Rodrigo Vivi <rodrigo.vivi@intel.com>
2020-11-24 09:30:56 -08:00
Sonny Jiang
dbbf2728d5 drm/amdgpu: fix a page fault
The UVD firmware is copied to cpu addr in uvd_resume, so it
should be used after that. This is to fix a bug introduced by
patch drm/amdgpu: fix SI UVD firmware validate resume fail.

Signed-off-by: Sonny Jiang <sonny.jiang@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Leo Liu <leo.liu@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
2020-11-24 12:30:37 -05:00
Sonny Jiang
4d6a953661 drm/amdgpu: fix SI UVD firmware validate resume fail
The SI UVD firmware validate key is stored at the end of firmware,
which is changed during resume while playing video. So get the key
at sw_init and store it for fw validate using.

Signed-off-by: Sonny Jiang <sonny.jiang@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Leo Liu <leo.liu@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
2020-11-24 12:29:35 -05:00
Kenneth Feng
7acc79eb5f drm/amd/amdgpu: fix null pointer in runtime pm
fix the null pointer issue when runtime pm is triggered.

Signed-off-by: Kenneth Feng <kenneth.feng@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
2020-11-24 12:27:01 -05:00
Chris Wilson
08b49e14ec drm/i915/gt: Defer enabling the breadcrumb interrupt to after submission
Move the register slow register write and readback from out of the
critical path for execlists submission and delay it until the following
worker, shaving off around 200us. Note that the same signal_irq_work() is
allowed to run concurrently on each CPU (but it will only be queued once,
once running though it can be requeued and reexecuted) so we have to
remember to lock the global interactions as we cannot rely on the
signal_irq_work() itself providing the serialisation (in constrast to a
tasklet).

By pushing the arm/disarm into the central signaling worker we can close
the race for disarming the interrupt (and dropping its associated
GT wakeref) on parking the engine. If we loose the race, that GT wakeref
may be held indefinitely, preventing the machine from sleeping while
the GPU is ostensibly idle.

v2: Move the self-arming parking of the signal_irq_work to a flush of
the irq-work from intel_breadcrumbs_park().

Closes: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/drm/intel/-/issues/2271
Fixes: e23005604b ("drm/i915/gt: Hold context/request reference while breadcrumbs are active")
Signed-off-by: Chris Wilson <chris@chris-wilson.co.uk>
Reviewed-by: Tvrtko Ursulin <tvrtko.ursulin@intel.com>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20201123113717.20500-1-chris@chris-wilson.co.uk
(cherry picked from commit 9d5612ca165a58aacc160465532e7998b9aab270)
Signed-off-by: Rodrigo Vivi <rodrigo.vivi@intel.com>
2020-11-24 09:17:41 -08:00
Yan Zhao
b5e420f459 drm/i915/gvt: correct a false comment of flag F_UNALIGN
Correct falsely removed comment of flag F_UNALIGN.

Fixes: a6c5817a38 ("drm/i915/gvt: remove flag F_CMD_ACCESSED")
Reviewed-by: Zhenyu Wang <zhenyuw@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Yan Zhao <yan.y.zhao@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Zhenyu Wang <zhenyuw@linux.intel.com>
Link: http://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20200910035405.20273-1-yan.y.zhao@intel.com
(cherry picked from commit 6594094f819e0020e926e137e47e2edb97ba500b)
Signed-off-by: Rodrigo Vivi <rodrigo.vivi@intel.com>
2020-11-24 09:17:41 -08:00
Lionel Landwerlin
0305613dbc drm/i915/perf: workaround register corruption in OATAILPTR
After having written the entire OA buffer with reports, the HW will
write again at the beginning of the OA buffer. It'll indicate it by
setting the WRAP bits in the OASTATUS register.

When a wrap happens and that at the end of the read vfunc we write the
OASTATUS register back to clear the REPORT_LOST bit, we sometimes see
that the OATAILPTR register is reset to a previous position on Gen8/9
(apparently not the case on Gen11+). This leads the next call to the
read vfunc to process reports we've already read. Because we've marked
those as read by clearing the reason & timestamp dwords, they're
discarded and a "Skipping spurious, invalid OA report" message is
emitted.

The workaround to avoid this OATAILPTR value reset seems to be to set
the wrap bits when writing back OASTATUS.

This change has no impact on userspace, it only avoids a bunch of
DRM_NOTE("Skipping spurious, invalid OA report\n") messages.

Signed-off-by: Lionel Landwerlin <lionel.g.landwerlin@intel.com>
Fixes: 19f81df285 ("drm/i915/perf: Add OA unit support for Gen 8+")
Reviewed-by: Umesh Nerlige Ramappa <umesh.nerlige.ramappa@intel.com>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20201117130124.829979-1-lionel.g.landwerlin@intel.com
(cherry picked from commit 059a0beb486344a577ff476acce75e69eab704be)
Signed-off-by: Rodrigo Vivi <rodrigo.vivi@intel.com>
2020-11-24 09:17:41 -08:00
Pavel Begunkov
9c3a205c5f io_uring: fix ITER_BVEC check
iov_iter::type is a bitmask that also keeps direction etc., so it
shouldn't be directly compared against ITER_*. Use proper helper.

Fixes: ff6165b2d7 ("io_uring: retain iov_iter state over io_read/io_write calls")
Reported-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Pavel Begunkov <asml.silence@gmail.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 5.9
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
2020-11-24 07:54:30 -07:00
Joseph Qi
eb2667b343 io_uring: fix shift-out-of-bounds when round up cq size
Abaci Fuzz reported a shift-out-of-bounds BUG in io_uring_create():

[ 59.598207] UBSAN: shift-out-of-bounds in ./include/linux/log2.h:57:13
[ 59.599665] shift exponent 64 is too large for 64-bit type 'long unsigned int'
[ 59.601230] CPU: 0 PID: 963 Comm: a.out Not tainted 5.10.0-rc4+ #3
[ 59.602502] Hardware name: Red Hat KVM, BIOS 0.5.1 01/01/2011
[ 59.603673] Call Trace:
[ 59.604286] dump_stack+0x107/0x163
[ 59.605237] ubsan_epilogue+0xb/0x5a
[ 59.606094] __ubsan_handle_shift_out_of_bounds.cold+0xb2/0x20e
[ 59.607335] ? lock_downgrade+0x6c0/0x6c0
[ 59.608182] ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0xaf/0xe0
[ 59.609166] io_uring_create.cold+0x99/0x149
[ 59.610114] io_uring_setup+0xd6/0x140
[ 59.610975] ? io_uring_create+0x2510/0x2510
[ 59.611945] ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x286/0x400
[ 59.613007] ? syscall_enter_from_user_mode+0x27/0x80
[ 59.614038] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0x5b/0x180
[ 59.615056] do_syscall_64+0x2d/0x40
[ 59.615940] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
[ 59.617007] RIP: 0033:0x7f2bb8a0b239

This is caused by roundup_pow_of_two() if the input entries larger
enough, e.g. 2^32-1. For sq_entries, it will check first and we allow
at most IORING_MAX_ENTRIES, so it is okay. But for cq_entries, we do
round up first, that may overflow and truncate it to 0, which is not
the expected behavior. So check the cq size first and then do round up.

Fixes: 88ec3211e4 ("io_uring: round-up cq size before comparing with rounded sq size")
Reported-by: Abaci Fuzz <abaci@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefano Garzarella <sgarzare@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
2020-11-24 07:54:30 -07:00
Clark Wang
7cd7120296
spi: imx: fix the unbalanced spi runtime pm management
If set active without increase the usage count of pm, the dont use
autosuspend function will call the suspend callback to close the two
clocks of spi because the usage count is reduced to -1.
This will cause the warning dump below when the defer-probe occurs.

[  129.379701] ecspi2_root_clk already disabled
[  129.384005] WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 33 at drivers/clk/clk.c:952 clk_core_disable+0xa4/0xb0

So add the get noresume function before set active.

Fixes: 43b6bf406c spi: imx: fix runtime pm support for !CONFIG_PM
Signed-off-by: Clark Wang <xiaoning.wang@nxp.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201124085247.18025-1-xiaoning.wang@nxp.com
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
2020-11-24 14:14:02 +00:00
Amit Sunil Dhamne
acfdd18591 firmware: xilinx: Use hash-table for api feature check
Currently array of fix length PM_API_MAX is used to cache
the pm_api version (valid or invalid). However ATF based
PM APIs values are much higher then PM_API_MAX.
So to include ATF based PM APIs also, use hash-table to
store the pm_api version status.

Signed-off-by: Amit Sunil Dhamne <amit.sunil.dhamne@xilinx.com>
Reported-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: Ravi Patel <ravi.patel@xilinx.com>
Signed-off-by: Rajan Vaja <rajan.vaja@xilinx.com>
Reviewed-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Tested-by: Michal Simek <michal.simek@xilinx.com>
Fixes: f3217d6f2f ("firmware: xilinx: fix out-of-bounds access")
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1606197161-25976-1-git-send-email-rajan.vaja@xilinx.com
Signed-off-by: Michal Simek <michal.simek@xilinx.com>
2020-11-24 15:13:54 +01:00
Manish Narani
f4426311f9 firmware: xilinx: Fix SD DLL node reset issue
Fix the SD DLL node reset issue where incorrect node is being referenced
instead of SD DLL node.

Fixes: 426c8d85df ("firmware: xilinx: Use APIs instead of IOCTLs")

Signed-off-by: Manish Narani <manish.narani@xilinx.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1605534744-15649-1-git-send-email-manish.narani@xilinx.com
Signed-off-by: Michal Simek <michal.simek@xilinx.com>
2020-11-24 15:09:08 +01:00
Eyal Birger
d549699048 net/packet: fix packet receive on L3 devices without visible hard header
In the patchset merged by commit b9fcf0a0d8
("Merge branch 'support-AF_PACKET-for-layer-3-devices'") L3 devices which
did not have header_ops were given one for the purpose of protocol parsing
on af_packet transmit path.

That change made af_packet receive path regard these devices as having a
visible L3 header and therefore aligned incoming skb->data to point to the
skb's mac_header. Some devices, such as ipip, xfrmi, and others, do not
reset their mac_header prior to ingress and therefore their incoming
packets became malformed.

Ideally these devices would reset their mac headers, or af_packet would be
able to rely on dev->hard_header_len being 0 for such cases, but it seems
this is not the case.

Fix by changing af_packet RX ll visibility criteria to include the
existence of a '.create()' header operation, which is used when creating
a device hard header - via dev_hard_header() - by upper layers, and does
not exist in these L3 devices.

As this predicate may be useful in other situations, add it as a common
dev_has_header() helper in netdevice.h.

Fixes: b9fcf0a0d8 ("Merge branch 'support-AF_PACKET-for-layer-3-devices'")
Signed-off-by: Eyal Birger <eyal.birger@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Acked-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201121062817.3178900-1-eyal.birger@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
2020-11-23 17:29:36 -08:00
Hao Si
2663b33885 soc: fsl: dpio: Get the cpumask through cpumask_of(cpu)
The local variable 'cpumask_t mask' is in the stack memory, and its address
is assigned to 'desc->affinity' in 'irq_set_affinity_hint()'.
But the memory area where this variable is located is at risk of being
modified.

During LTP testing, the following error was generated:

Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address ffff000012e9b790
Mem abort info:
  ESR = 0x96000007
  Exception class = DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
  SET = 0, FnV = 0
  EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
Data abort info:
  ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000007
  CM = 0, WnR = 0
swapper pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp = 0000000075ac5e07
[ffff000012e9b790] pgd=00000027dbffe003, pud=00000027dbffd003,
pmd=00000027b6d61003, pte=0000000000000000
Internal error: Oops: 96000007 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
Modules linked in: xt_conntrack
Process read_all (pid: 20171, stack limit = 0x0000000044ea4095)
CPU: 14 PID: 20171 Comm: read_all Tainted: G    B   W
Hardware name: NXP Layerscape LX2160ARDB (DT)
pstate: 80000085 (Nzcv daIf -PAN -UAO)
pc : irq_affinity_hint_proc_show+0x54/0xb0
lr : irq_affinity_hint_proc_show+0x4c/0xb0
sp : ffff00001138bc10
x29: ffff00001138bc10 x28: 0000ffffd131d1e0
x27: 00000000007000c0 x26: ffff8025b9480dc0
x25: ffff8025b9480da8 x24: 00000000000003ff
x23: ffff8027334f8300 x22: ffff80272e97d000
x21: ffff80272e97d0b0 x20: ffff8025b9480d80
x19: ffff000009a49000 x18: 0000000000000000
x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000
x15: 0000000000000000 x14: 0000000000000000
x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000040
x11: 0000000000000000 x10: ffff802735b79b88
x9 : 0000000000000000 x8 : 0000000000000000
x7 : ffff000009a49848 x6 : 0000000000000003
x5 : 0000000000000000 x4 : ffff000008157d6c
x3 : ffff00001138bc10 x2 : ffff000012e9b790
x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : 0000000000000000
Call trace:
 irq_affinity_hint_proc_show+0x54/0xb0
 seq_read+0x1b0/0x440
 proc_reg_read+0x80/0xd8
 __vfs_read+0x60/0x178
 vfs_read+0x94/0x150
 ksys_read+0x74/0xf0
 __arm64_sys_read+0x24/0x30
 el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0xd8/0x1a0
 el0_svc_handler+0x34/0x88
 el0_svc+0x10/0x14
Code: f9001bbf 943e0732 f94066c2 b4000062 (f9400041)
---[ end trace b495bdcb0b3b732b ]---
Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception
SMP: stopping secondary CPUs
SMP: failed to stop secondary CPUs 0,2-4,6,8,11,13-15
Kernel Offset: disabled
CPU features: 0x0,21006008
Memory Limit: none
---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception ]---

Fix it by using 'cpumask_of(cpu)' to get the cpumask.

Signed-off-by: Hao Si <si.hao@zte.com.cn>
Signed-off-by: Lin Chen <chen.lin5@zte.com.cn>
Signed-off-by: Yi Wang <wang.yi59@zte.com.cn>
Signed-off-by: Li Yang <leoyang.li@nxp.com>
2020-11-23 19:27:45 -06:00
Sylwester Dziedziuch
2980cbd4dc i40e: Fix removing driver while bare-metal VFs pass traffic
Prevent VFs from resetting when PF driver is being unloaded:
- introduce new pf state: __I40E_VF_RESETS_DISABLED;
- check if pf state has __I40E_VF_RESETS_DISABLED state set,
  if so, disable any further VFLR event notifications;
- when i40e_remove (rmmod i40e) is called, disable any resets on
  the VFs;

Previously if there were bare-metal VFs passing traffic and PF
driver was removed, there was a possibility of VFs triggering a Tx
timeout right before iavf_remove. This was causing iavf_close to
not be called because there is a check in the beginning of  iavf_remove
that bails out early if adapter->state < IAVF_DOWN_PENDING. This
makes it so some resources do not get cleaned up.

Fixes: 6a9ddb36ee ("i40e: disable IOV before freeing resources")
Signed-off-by: Slawomir Laba <slawomirx.laba@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Brett Creeley <brett.creeley@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sylwester Dziedziuch <sylwesterx.dziedziuch@intel.com>
Tested-by: Konrad Jankowski <konrad0.jankowski@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen <anthony.l.nguyen@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201120180640.3654474-1-anthony.l.nguyen@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
2020-11-23 16:52:59 -08:00
Stefano Garzarella
3fe356d58e vsock/virtio: discard packets only when socket is really closed
Starting from commit 8692cefc43 ("virtio_vsock: Fix race condition
in virtio_transport_recv_pkt"), we discard packets in
virtio_transport_recv_pkt() if the socket has been released.

When the socket is connected, we schedule a delayed work to wait the
RST packet from the other peer, also if SHUTDOWN_MASK is set in
sk->sk_shutdown.
This is done to complete the virtio-vsock shutdown algorithm, releasing
the port assigned to the socket definitively only when the other peer
has consumed all the packets.

If we discard the RST packet received, the socket will be closed only
when the VSOCK_CLOSE_TIMEOUT is reached.

Sergio discovered the issue while running ab(1) HTTP benchmark using
libkrun [1] and observing a latency increase with that commit.

To avoid this issue, we discard packet only if the socket is really
closed (SOCK_DONE flag is set).
We also set SOCK_DONE in virtio_transport_release() when we don't need
to wait any packets from the other peer (we didn't schedule the delayed
work). In this case we remove the socket from the vsock lists, releasing
the port assigned.

[1] https://github.com/containers/libkrun

Fixes: 8692cefc43 ("virtio_vsock: Fix race condition in virtio_transport_recv_pkt")
Cc: justin.he@arm.com
Reported-by: Sergio Lopez <slp@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Sergio Lopez <slp@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefano Garzarella <sgarzare@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Jia He <justin.he@arm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201120104736.73749-1-sgarzare@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
2020-11-23 16:36:29 -08:00
Ricardo Dias
01770a1661 tcp: fix race condition when creating child sockets from syncookies
When the TCP stack is in SYN flood mode, the server child socket is
created from the SYN cookie received in a TCP packet with the ACK flag
set.

The child socket is created when the server receives the first TCP
packet with a valid SYN cookie from the client. Usually, this packet
corresponds to the final step of the TCP 3-way handshake, the ACK
packet. But is also possible to receive a valid SYN cookie from the
first TCP data packet sent by the client, and thus create a child socket
from that SYN cookie.

Since a client socket is ready to send data as soon as it receives the
SYN+ACK packet from the server, the client can send the ACK packet (sent
by the TCP stack code), and the first data packet (sent by the userspace
program) almost at the same time, and thus the server will equally
receive the two TCP packets with valid SYN cookies almost at the same
instant.

When such event happens, the TCP stack code has a race condition that
occurs between the momement a lookup is done to the established
connections hashtable to check for the existence of a connection for the
same client, and the moment that the child socket is added to the
established connections hashtable. As a consequence, this race condition
can lead to a situation where we add two child sockets to the
established connections hashtable and deliver two sockets to the
userspace program to the same client.

This patch fixes the race condition by checking if an existing child
socket exists for the same client when we are adding the second child
socket to the established connections socket. If an existing child
socket exists, we drop the packet and discard the second child socket
to the same client.

Signed-off-by: Ricardo Dias <rdias@singlestore.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201120111133.GA67501@rdias-suse-pc.lan
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
2020-11-23 16:32:33 -08:00
Linus Torvalds
d5beb3140f hyperv-fixes for 5.10-rc6
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Merge tag 'hyperv-fixes-signed' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/hyperv/linux

Pull Hyper-V fix from Wei Liu:
 "One patch from Dexuan to fix VRAM cache type in Hyper-V framebuffer
  driver"

* tag 'hyperv-fixes-signed' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/hyperv/linux:
  video: hyperv_fb: Fix the cache type when mapping the VRAM
2020-11-23 15:29:03 -08:00
Jakub Kicinski
1eae77bfad wireless-drivers fixes for v5.10
First set of fixes for v5.10. One fix for iwlwifi kernel panic, others
 less notable.
 
 rtw88
 
 * fix a bogus test found by clang
 
 iwlwifi
 
 * fix long memory reads causing soft lockup warnings
 
 * fix kernel panic during Channel Switch Announcement (CSA)
 
 * other smaller fixes
 
 MAINTAINERS
 
 * email address updates
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Merge tag 'wireless-drivers-2020-11-23' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kvalo/wireless-drivers

Kalle Valo says:

====================
wireless-drivers fixes for v5.10

First set of fixes for v5.10. One fix for iwlwifi kernel panic, others
less notable.

rtw88

* fix a bogus test found by clang

iwlwifi

* fix long memory reads causing soft lockup warnings

* fix kernel panic during Channel Switch Announcement (CSA)

* other smaller fixes

MAINTAINERS

* email address updates

* tag 'wireless-drivers-2020-11-23' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kvalo/wireless-drivers:
  iwlwifi: mvm: fix kernel panic in case of assert during CSA
  iwlwifi: pcie: set LTR to avoid completion timeout
  iwlwifi: mvm: write queue_sync_state only for sync
  iwlwifi: mvm: properly cancel a session protection for P2P
  iwlwifi: mvm: use the HOT_SPOT_CMD to cancel an AUX ROC
  iwlwifi: sta: set max HE max A-MPDU according to HE capa
  MAINTAINERS: update maintainers list for Cypress
  MAINTAINERS: update Yan-Hsuan's email address
  iwlwifi: pcie: limit memory read spin time
  rtw88: fix fw_fifo_addr check
====================

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201123161037.C11D1C43460@smtp.codeaurora.org
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
2020-11-23 14:59:40 -08:00
Xiongfeng Wang
6830ff853a IB/mthca: fix return value of error branch in mthca_init_cq()
We return 'err' in the error branch, but this variable may be set as zero
by the above code. Fix it by setting 'err' as a negative value before we
goto the error label.

Fixes: 74c2174e7b ("IB uverbs: add mthca user CQ support")
Fixes: 1da177e4c3 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1605837422-42724-1-git-send-email-wangxiongfeng2@huawei.com
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Xiongfeng Wang <wangxiongfeng2@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@nvidia.com>
2020-11-23 16:22:34 -04:00
Filipe Manana
a855fbe692 btrfs: fix lockdep splat when enabling and disabling qgroups
When running test case btrfs/017 from fstests, lockdep reported the
following splat:

  [ 1297.067385] ======================================================
  [ 1297.067708] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
  [ 1297.068022] 5.10.0-rc4-btrfs-next-73 #1 Not tainted
  [ 1297.068322] ------------------------------------------------------
  [ 1297.068629] btrfs/189080 is trying to acquire lock:
  [ 1297.068929] ffff9f2725731690 (sb_internal#2){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: btrfs_quota_enable+0xaf/0xa70 [btrfs]
  [ 1297.069274]
		 but task is already holding lock:
  [ 1297.069868] ffff9f2702b61a08 (&fs_info->qgroup_ioctl_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: btrfs_quota_enable+0x3b/0xa70 [btrfs]
  [ 1297.070219]
		 which lock already depends on the new lock.

  [ 1297.071131]
		 the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
  [ 1297.071721]
		 -> #1 (&fs_info->qgroup_ioctl_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}:
  [ 1297.072375]        lock_acquire+0xd8/0x490
  [ 1297.072710]        __mutex_lock+0xa3/0xb30
  [ 1297.073061]        btrfs_qgroup_inherit+0x59/0x6a0 [btrfs]
  [ 1297.073421]        create_subvol+0x194/0x990 [btrfs]
  [ 1297.073780]        btrfs_mksubvol+0x3fb/0x4a0 [btrfs]
  [ 1297.074133]        __btrfs_ioctl_snap_create+0x119/0x1a0 [btrfs]
  [ 1297.074498]        btrfs_ioctl_snap_create+0x58/0x80 [btrfs]
  [ 1297.074872]        btrfs_ioctl+0x1a90/0x36f0 [btrfs]
  [ 1297.075245]        __x64_sys_ioctl+0x83/0xb0
  [ 1297.075617]        do_syscall_64+0x33/0x80
  [ 1297.075993]        entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
  [ 1297.076380]
		 -> #0 (sb_internal#2){.+.+}-{0:0}:
  [ 1297.077166]        check_prev_add+0x91/0xc60
  [ 1297.077572]        __lock_acquire+0x1740/0x3110
  [ 1297.077984]        lock_acquire+0xd8/0x490
  [ 1297.078411]        start_transaction+0x3c5/0x760 [btrfs]
  [ 1297.078853]        btrfs_quota_enable+0xaf/0xa70 [btrfs]
  [ 1297.079323]        btrfs_ioctl+0x2c60/0x36f0 [btrfs]
  [ 1297.079789]        __x64_sys_ioctl+0x83/0xb0
  [ 1297.080232]        do_syscall_64+0x33/0x80
  [ 1297.080680]        entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
  [ 1297.081139]
		 other info that might help us debug this:

  [ 1297.082536]  Possible unsafe locking scenario:

  [ 1297.083510]        CPU0                    CPU1
  [ 1297.084005]        ----                    ----
  [ 1297.084500]   lock(&fs_info->qgroup_ioctl_lock);
  [ 1297.084994]                                lock(sb_internal#2);
  [ 1297.085485]                                lock(&fs_info->qgroup_ioctl_lock);
  [ 1297.085974]   lock(sb_internal#2);
  [ 1297.086454]
		  *** DEADLOCK ***
  [ 1297.087880] 3 locks held by btrfs/189080:
  [ 1297.088324]  #0: ffff9f2725731470 (sb_writers#14){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: btrfs_ioctl+0xa73/0x36f0 [btrfs]
  [ 1297.088799]  #1: ffff9f2702b60cc0 (&fs_info->subvol_sem){++++}-{3:3}, at: btrfs_ioctl+0x1f4d/0x36f0 [btrfs]
  [ 1297.089284]  #2: ffff9f2702b61a08 (&fs_info->qgroup_ioctl_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: btrfs_quota_enable+0x3b/0xa70 [btrfs]
  [ 1297.089771]
		 stack backtrace:
  [ 1297.090662] CPU: 5 PID: 189080 Comm: btrfs Not tainted 5.10.0-rc4-btrfs-next-73 #1
  [ 1297.091132] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
  [ 1297.092123] Call Trace:
  [ 1297.092629]  dump_stack+0x8d/0xb5
  [ 1297.093115]  check_noncircular+0xff/0x110
  [ 1297.093596]  check_prev_add+0x91/0xc60
  [ 1297.094076]  ? kvm_clock_read+0x14/0x30
  [ 1297.094553]  ? kvm_sched_clock_read+0x5/0x10
  [ 1297.095029]  __lock_acquire+0x1740/0x3110
  [ 1297.095510]  lock_acquire+0xd8/0x490
  [ 1297.095993]  ? btrfs_quota_enable+0xaf/0xa70 [btrfs]
  [ 1297.096476]  start_transaction+0x3c5/0x760 [btrfs]
  [ 1297.096962]  ? btrfs_quota_enable+0xaf/0xa70 [btrfs]
  [ 1297.097451]  btrfs_quota_enable+0xaf/0xa70 [btrfs]
  [ 1297.097941]  ? btrfs_ioctl+0x1f4d/0x36f0 [btrfs]
  [ 1297.098429]  btrfs_ioctl+0x2c60/0x36f0 [btrfs]
  [ 1297.098904]  ? do_user_addr_fault+0x20c/0x430
  [ 1297.099382]  ? kvm_clock_read+0x14/0x30
  [ 1297.099854]  ? kvm_sched_clock_read+0x5/0x10
  [ 1297.100328]  ? sched_clock+0x5/0x10
  [ 1297.100801]  ? sched_clock_cpu+0x12/0x180
  [ 1297.101272]  ? __x64_sys_ioctl+0x83/0xb0
  [ 1297.101739]  __x64_sys_ioctl+0x83/0xb0
  [ 1297.102207]  do_syscall_64+0x33/0x80
  [ 1297.102673]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
  [ 1297.103148] RIP: 0033:0x7f773ff65d87

This is because during the quota enable ioctl we lock first the mutex
qgroup_ioctl_lock and then start a transaction, and starting a transaction
acquires a fs freeze semaphore (at the VFS level). However, every other
code path, except for the quota disable ioctl path, we do the opposite:
we start a transaction and then lock the mutex.

So fix this by making the quota enable and disable paths to start the
transaction without having the mutex locked, and then, after starting the
transaction, lock the mutex and check if some other task already enabled
or disabled the quotas, bailing with success if that was the case.

Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
2020-11-23 21:16:43 +01:00
Filipe Manana
7aa6d35984 btrfs: do nofs allocations when adding and removing qgroup relations
When adding or removing a qgroup relation we are doing a GFP_KERNEL
allocation which is not safe because we are holding a transaction
handle open and that can make us deadlock if the allocator needs to
recurse into the filesystem. So just surround those calls with a
nofs context.

Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
2020-11-23 21:16:40 +01:00
Filipe Manana
3d05cad3c3 btrfs: fix lockdep splat when reading qgroup config on mount
Lockdep reported the following splat when running test btrfs/190 from
fstests:

  [ 9482.126098] ======================================================
  [ 9482.126184] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
  [ 9482.126281] 5.10.0-rc4-btrfs-next-73 #1 Not tainted
  [ 9482.126365] ------------------------------------------------------
  [ 9482.126456] mount/24187 is trying to acquire lock:
  [ 9482.126534] ffffa0c869a7dac0 (&fs_info->qgroup_rescan_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: qgroup_rescan_init+0x43/0xf0 [btrfs]
  [ 9482.126647]
		 but task is already holding lock:
  [ 9482.126777] ffffa0c892ebd3a0 (btrfs-quota-00){++++}-{3:3}, at: __btrfs_tree_read_lock+0x27/0x120 [btrfs]
  [ 9482.126886]
		 which lock already depends on the new lock.

  [ 9482.127078]
		 the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
  [ 9482.127213]
		 -> #1 (btrfs-quota-00){++++}-{3:3}:
  [ 9482.127366]        lock_acquire+0xd8/0x490
  [ 9482.127436]        down_read_nested+0x45/0x220
  [ 9482.127528]        __btrfs_tree_read_lock+0x27/0x120 [btrfs]
  [ 9482.127613]        btrfs_read_lock_root_node+0x41/0x130 [btrfs]
  [ 9482.127702]        btrfs_search_slot+0x514/0xc30 [btrfs]
  [ 9482.127788]        update_qgroup_status_item+0x72/0x140 [btrfs]
  [ 9482.127877]        btrfs_qgroup_rescan_worker+0xde/0x680 [btrfs]
  [ 9482.127964]        btrfs_work_helper+0xf1/0x600 [btrfs]
  [ 9482.128039]        process_one_work+0x24e/0x5e0
  [ 9482.128110]        worker_thread+0x50/0x3b0
  [ 9482.128181]        kthread+0x153/0x170
  [ 9482.128256]        ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30
  [ 9482.128327]
		 -> #0 (&fs_info->qgroup_rescan_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}:
  [ 9482.128464]        check_prev_add+0x91/0xc60
  [ 9482.128551]        __lock_acquire+0x1740/0x3110
  [ 9482.128623]        lock_acquire+0xd8/0x490
  [ 9482.130029]        __mutex_lock+0xa3/0xb30
  [ 9482.130590]        qgroup_rescan_init+0x43/0xf0 [btrfs]
  [ 9482.131577]        btrfs_read_qgroup_config+0x43a/0x550 [btrfs]
  [ 9482.132175]        open_ctree+0x1228/0x18a0 [btrfs]
  [ 9482.132756]        btrfs_mount_root.cold+0x13/0xed [btrfs]
  [ 9482.133325]        legacy_get_tree+0x30/0x60
  [ 9482.133866]        vfs_get_tree+0x28/0xe0
  [ 9482.134392]        fc_mount+0xe/0x40
  [ 9482.134908]        vfs_kern_mount.part.0+0x71/0x90
  [ 9482.135428]        btrfs_mount+0x13b/0x3e0 [btrfs]
  [ 9482.135942]        legacy_get_tree+0x30/0x60
  [ 9482.136444]        vfs_get_tree+0x28/0xe0
  [ 9482.136949]        path_mount+0x2d7/0xa70
  [ 9482.137438]        do_mount+0x75/0x90
  [ 9482.137923]        __x64_sys_mount+0x8e/0xd0
  [ 9482.138400]        do_syscall_64+0x33/0x80
  [ 9482.138873]        entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
  [ 9482.139346]
		 other info that might help us debug this:

  [ 9482.140735]  Possible unsafe locking scenario:

  [ 9482.141594]        CPU0                    CPU1
  [ 9482.142011]        ----                    ----
  [ 9482.142411]   lock(btrfs-quota-00);
  [ 9482.142806]                                lock(&fs_info->qgroup_rescan_lock);
  [ 9482.143216]                                lock(btrfs-quota-00);
  [ 9482.143629]   lock(&fs_info->qgroup_rescan_lock);
  [ 9482.144056]
		  *** DEADLOCK ***

  [ 9482.145242] 2 locks held by mount/24187:
  [ 9482.145637]  #0: ffffa0c8411c40e8 (&type->s_umount_key#44/1){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: alloc_super+0xb9/0x400
  [ 9482.146061]  #1: ffffa0c892ebd3a0 (btrfs-quota-00){++++}-{3:3}, at: __btrfs_tree_read_lock+0x27/0x120 [btrfs]
  [ 9482.146509]
		 stack backtrace:
  [ 9482.147350] CPU: 1 PID: 24187 Comm: mount Not tainted 5.10.0-rc4-btrfs-next-73 #1
  [ 9482.147788] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
  [ 9482.148709] Call Trace:
  [ 9482.149169]  dump_stack+0x8d/0xb5
  [ 9482.149628]  check_noncircular+0xff/0x110
  [ 9482.150090]  check_prev_add+0x91/0xc60
  [ 9482.150561]  ? kvm_clock_read+0x14/0x30
  [ 9482.151017]  ? kvm_sched_clock_read+0x5/0x10
  [ 9482.151470]  __lock_acquire+0x1740/0x3110
  [ 9482.151941]  ? __btrfs_tree_read_lock+0x27/0x120 [btrfs]
  [ 9482.152402]  lock_acquire+0xd8/0x490
  [ 9482.152887]  ? qgroup_rescan_init+0x43/0xf0 [btrfs]
  [ 9482.153354]  __mutex_lock+0xa3/0xb30
  [ 9482.153826]  ? qgroup_rescan_init+0x43/0xf0 [btrfs]
  [ 9482.154301]  ? qgroup_rescan_init+0x43/0xf0 [btrfs]
  [ 9482.154768]  ? qgroup_rescan_init+0x43/0xf0 [btrfs]
  [ 9482.155226]  qgroup_rescan_init+0x43/0xf0 [btrfs]
  [ 9482.155690]  btrfs_read_qgroup_config+0x43a/0x550 [btrfs]
  [ 9482.156160]  open_ctree+0x1228/0x18a0 [btrfs]
  [ 9482.156643]  btrfs_mount_root.cold+0x13/0xed [btrfs]
  [ 9482.157108]  ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x5d/0x90
  [ 9482.157567]  ? kfree+0x31f/0x3e0
  [ 9482.158030]  legacy_get_tree+0x30/0x60
  [ 9482.158489]  vfs_get_tree+0x28/0xe0
  [ 9482.158947]  fc_mount+0xe/0x40
  [ 9482.159403]  vfs_kern_mount.part.0+0x71/0x90
  [ 9482.159875]  btrfs_mount+0x13b/0x3e0 [btrfs]
  [ 9482.160335]  ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x5d/0x90
  [ 9482.160805]  ? kfree+0x31f/0x3e0
  [ 9482.161260]  ? legacy_get_tree+0x30/0x60
  [ 9482.161714]  legacy_get_tree+0x30/0x60
  [ 9482.162166]  vfs_get_tree+0x28/0xe0
  [ 9482.162616]  path_mount+0x2d7/0xa70
  [ 9482.163070]  do_mount+0x75/0x90
  [ 9482.163525]  __x64_sys_mount+0x8e/0xd0
  [ 9482.163986]  do_syscall_64+0x33/0x80
  [ 9482.164437]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
  [ 9482.164902] RIP: 0033:0x7f51e907caaa

This happens because at btrfs_read_qgroup_config() we can call
qgroup_rescan_init() while holding a read lock on a quota btree leaf,
acquired by the previous call to btrfs_search_slot_for_read(), and
qgroup_rescan_init() acquires the mutex qgroup_rescan_lock.

A qgroup rescan worker does the opposite: it acquires the mutex
qgroup_rescan_lock, at btrfs_qgroup_rescan_worker(), and then tries to
update the qgroup status item in the quota btree through the call to
update_qgroup_status_item(). This inversion of locking order
between the qgroup_rescan_lock mutex and quota btree locks causes the
splat.

Fix this simply by releasing and freeing the path before calling
qgroup_rescan_init() at btrfs_read_qgroup_config().

CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
2020-11-23 21:16:30 +01:00
David Sterba
6d06b0ad94 btrfs: tree-checker: add missing returns after data_ref alignment checks
There are sectorsize alignment checks that are reported but then
check_extent_data_ref continues. This was not intended, wrong alignment
is not a minor problem and we should return with error.

CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.4+
Fixes: 0785a9aacf ("btrfs: tree-checker: Add EXTENT_DATA_REF check")
Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
2020-11-23 21:16:21 +01:00
Johannes Thumshirn
0697d9a610 btrfs: don't access possibly stale fs_info data for printing duplicate device
Syzbot reported a possible use-after-free when printing a duplicate device
warning device_list_add().

At this point it can happen that a btrfs_device::fs_info is not correctly
setup yet, so we're accessing stale data, when printing the warning
message using the btrfs_printk() wrappers.

  ==================================================================
  BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in btrfs_printk+0x3eb/0x435 fs/btrfs/super.c:245
  Read of size 8 at addr ffff8880878e06a8 by task syz-executor225/7068

  CPU: 1 PID: 7068 Comm: syz-executor225 Not tainted 5.9.0-rc5-syzkaller #0
  Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
  Call Trace:
   __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
   dump_stack+0x1d6/0x29e lib/dump_stack.c:118
   print_address_description+0x66/0x620 mm/kasan/report.c:383
   __kasan_report mm/kasan/report.c:513 [inline]
   kasan_report+0x132/0x1d0 mm/kasan/report.c:530
   btrfs_printk+0x3eb/0x435 fs/btrfs/super.c:245
   device_list_add+0x1a88/0x1d60 fs/btrfs/volumes.c:943
   btrfs_scan_one_device+0x196/0x490 fs/btrfs/volumes.c:1359
   btrfs_mount_root+0x48f/0xb60 fs/btrfs/super.c:1634
   legacy_get_tree+0xea/0x180 fs/fs_context.c:592
   vfs_get_tree+0x88/0x270 fs/super.c:1547
   fc_mount fs/namespace.c:978 [inline]
   vfs_kern_mount+0xc9/0x160 fs/namespace.c:1008
   btrfs_mount+0x33c/0xae0 fs/btrfs/super.c:1732
   legacy_get_tree+0xea/0x180 fs/fs_context.c:592
   vfs_get_tree+0x88/0x270 fs/super.c:1547
   do_new_mount fs/namespace.c:2875 [inline]
   path_mount+0x179d/0x29e0 fs/namespace.c:3192
   do_mount fs/namespace.c:3205 [inline]
   __do_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:3413 [inline]
   __se_sys_mount+0x126/0x180 fs/namespace.c:3390
   do_syscall_64+0x31/0x70 arch/x86/entry/common.c:46
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
  RIP: 0033:0x44840a
  RSP: 002b:00007ffedfffd608 EFLAGS: 00000293 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a5
  RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ffedfffd670 RCX: 000000000044840a
  RDX: 0000000020000000 RSI: 0000000020000100 RDI: 00007ffedfffd630
  RBP: 00007ffedfffd630 R08: 00007ffedfffd670 R09: 0000000000000000
  R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000293 R12: 000000000000001a
  R13: 0000000000000004 R14: 0000000000000003 R15: 0000000000000003

  Allocated by task 6945:
   kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:48 [inline]
   kasan_set_track mm/kasan/common.c:56 [inline]
   __kasan_kmalloc+0x100/0x130 mm/kasan/common.c:461
   kmalloc_node include/linux/slab.h:577 [inline]
   kvmalloc_node+0x81/0x110 mm/util.c:574
   kvmalloc include/linux/mm.h:757 [inline]
   kvzalloc include/linux/mm.h:765 [inline]
   btrfs_mount_root+0xd0/0xb60 fs/btrfs/super.c:1613
   legacy_get_tree+0xea/0x180 fs/fs_context.c:592
   vfs_get_tree+0x88/0x270 fs/super.c:1547
   fc_mount fs/namespace.c:978 [inline]
   vfs_kern_mount+0xc9/0x160 fs/namespace.c:1008
   btrfs_mount+0x33c/0xae0 fs/btrfs/super.c:1732
   legacy_get_tree+0xea/0x180 fs/fs_context.c:592
   vfs_get_tree+0x88/0x270 fs/super.c:1547
   do_new_mount fs/namespace.c:2875 [inline]
   path_mount+0x179d/0x29e0 fs/namespace.c:3192
   do_mount fs/namespace.c:3205 [inline]
   __do_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:3413 [inline]
   __se_sys_mount+0x126/0x180 fs/namespace.c:3390
   do_syscall_64+0x31/0x70 arch/x86/entry/common.c:46
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9

  Freed by task 6945:
   kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:48 [inline]
   kasan_set_track+0x3d/0x70 mm/kasan/common.c:56
   kasan_set_free_info+0x17/0x30 mm/kasan/generic.c:355
   __kasan_slab_free+0xdd/0x110 mm/kasan/common.c:422
   __cache_free mm/slab.c:3418 [inline]
   kfree+0x113/0x200 mm/slab.c:3756
   deactivate_locked_super+0xa7/0xf0 fs/super.c:335
   btrfs_mount_root+0x72b/0xb60 fs/btrfs/super.c:1678
   legacy_get_tree+0xea/0x180 fs/fs_context.c:592
   vfs_get_tree+0x88/0x270 fs/super.c:1547
   fc_mount fs/namespace.c:978 [inline]
   vfs_kern_mount+0xc9/0x160 fs/namespace.c:1008
   btrfs_mount+0x33c/0xae0 fs/btrfs/super.c:1732
   legacy_get_tree+0xea/0x180 fs/fs_context.c:592
   vfs_get_tree+0x88/0x270 fs/super.c:1547
   do_new_mount fs/namespace.c:2875 [inline]
   path_mount+0x179d/0x29e0 fs/namespace.c:3192
   do_mount fs/namespace.c:3205 [inline]
   __do_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:3413 [inline]
   __se_sys_mount+0x126/0x180 fs/namespace.c:3390
   do_syscall_64+0x31/0x70 arch/x86/entry/common.c:46
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9

  The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff8880878e0000
   which belongs to the cache kmalloc-16k of size 16384
  The buggy address is located 1704 bytes inside of
   16384-byte region [ffff8880878e0000, ffff8880878e4000)
  The buggy address belongs to the page:
  page:0000000060704f30 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x878e0
  head:0000000060704f30 order:3 compound_mapcount:0 compound_pincount:0
  flags: 0xfffe0000010200(slab|head)
  raw: 00fffe0000010200 ffffea00028e9a08 ffffea00021e3608 ffff8880aa440b00
  raw: 0000000000000000 ffff8880878e0000 0000000100000001 0000000000000000
  page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected

  Memory state around the buggy address:
   ffff8880878e0580: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
   ffff8880878e0600: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
  >ffff8880878e0680: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
				    ^
   ffff8880878e0700: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
   ffff8880878e0780: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
  ==================================================================

The syzkaller reproducer for this use-after-free crafts a filesystem image
and loop mounts it twice in a loop. The mount will fail as the crafted
image has an invalid chunk tree. When this happens btrfs_mount_root() will
call deactivate_locked_super(), which then cleans up fs_info and
fs_info::sb. If a second thread now adds the same block-device to the
filesystem, it will get detected as a duplicate device and
device_list_add() will reject the duplicate and print a warning. But as
the fs_info pointer passed in is non-NULL this will result in a
use-after-free.

Instead of printing possibly uninitialized or already freed memory in
btrfs_printk(), explicitly pass in a NULL fs_info so the printing of the
device name will be skipped altogether.

There was a slightly different approach discussed in
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/20200114060920.4527-1-anand.jain@oracle.com/t/#u

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/000000000000c9e14b05afcc41ba@google.com
Reported-by: syzbot+582e66e5edf36a22c7b0@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.19+
Reviewed-by: Nikolay Borisov <nborisov@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Anand Jain <anand.jain@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Thumshirn <johannes.thumshirn@wdc.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
2020-11-23 21:16:12 +01:00
Maxime Ripard
2820526dd5
drm/vc4: kms: Don't disable the muxing of an active CRTC
The current HVS muxing code will consider the CRTCs in a given state to
setup their muxing in the HVS, and disable the other CRTCs muxes.

However, it's valid to only update a single CRTC with a state, and in this
situation we would mux out a CRTC that was enabled but left untouched by
the new state.

Fix this by setting a flag on the CRTC state when the muxing has been
changed, and only change the muxing configuration when that flag is there.

Fixes: 87ebcd42fb ("drm/vc4: crtc: Assign output to channel automatically")
Signed-off-by: Maxime Ripard <maxime@cerno.tech>
Tested-by: Hoegeun Kwon <hoegeun.kwon@samsung.com>
Reviewed-by: Hoegeun Kwon <hoegeun.kwon@samsung.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Zimmermann <tzimmermann@suse.de>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20201120144245.398711-3-maxime@cerno.tech
2020-11-23 17:59:30 +01:00
Maxime Ripard
f2df84e096
drm/vc4: kms: Store the unassigned channel list in the state
If a CRTC is enabled but not active, and that we're then doing a page
flip on another CRTC, drm_atomic_get_crtc_state will bring the first
CRTC state into the global state, and will make us wait for its vblank
as well, even though that might never occur.

Instead of creating the list of the free channels each time atomic_check
is called, and calling drm_atomic_get_crtc_state to retrieve the
allocated channels, let's create a private state object in the main
atomic state, and use it to store the available channels.

Since vc4 has a semaphore (with a value of 1, so a lock) in its commit
implementation to serialize all the commits, even the nonblocking ones, we
are free from the use-after-free race if two subsequent commits are not ran
in their submission order.

Fixes: 87ebcd42fb ("drm/vc4: crtc: Assign output to channel automatically")
Signed-off-by: Maxime Ripard <maxime@cerno.tech>
Tested-by: Hoegeun Kwon <hoegeun.kwon@samsung.com>
Reviewed-by: Hoegeun Kwon <hoegeun.kwon@samsung.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Zimmermann <tzimmermann@suse.de>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20201120144245.398711-2-maxime@cerno.tech
2020-11-23 17:59:23 +01:00