Fix a few omissions in passing TFM instead of CTX to algorithms.
Signed-off-by: Michal Ludvig <michal@logix.cz>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Up until now algorithms have been happy to get a context pointer since
they know everything that's in the tfm already (e.g., alignment, block
size).
However, once we have parameterised algorithms, such information will
be specific to each tfm. So the algorithm API needs to be changed to
pass the tfm structure instead of the context pointer.
This patch is basically a text substitution. The only tricky bit is
the assembly routines that need to get the context pointer offset
through asm-offsets.h.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Various digest algorithms operate one block at a time and therefore
keep a temporary buffer of partial blocks. This buffer does not need
to be initialised since there is a counter which indicates what is and
isn't valid in it.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Some hash modules load/store data words directly. The digest layer
should pass properly aligned buffer to update()/final() method. This
patch also add cra_alignmask to some hash modules.
Signed-off-by: Atsushi Nemoto <anemo@mba.ocn.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
On 64-bit platform, reading 64-bit keys (which is supposed to be
32-bit aligned) at a time will result in unaligned access.
Signed-off-by: Atsushi Nemoto <anemo@mba.ocn.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
The AES setkey routine writes 64 bytes to the E_KEY area even though
there are only 60 bytes there. It is in fact safe since E_KEY is
immediately follwed by D_KEY which is initialised afterwards. However,
doing this may trigger undefined behaviour and makes Coverity unhappy.
So by combining E_KEY and D_KEY into one array we sidestep this issue
altogether.
This problem was reported by Adrian Bunk.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Force 32-bit alignment on keys in tcrypt test vectors. Also rearrange the
structure to prevent unnecessary padding.
Signed-off-by: Atsushi Nemoto <anemo@mba.ocn.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
The "des3_ede" and "serpent" lack cra_alignmask.
Signed-off-by: Atsushi Nemoto <anemo@mba.ocn.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
this patch converts crypto/ to kzalloc usage.
Compile tested with allyesconfig.
Signed-off-by: Eric Sesterhenn <snakebyte@gmx.de>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Since tfm contexts can contain arbitrary types we should provide at least
natural alignment (__attribute__ ((__aligned__))) for them. In particular,
this is needed on the Xscale which is a 32-bit architecture with a u64 type
that requires 64-bit alignment. This problem was reported by Ronen Shitrit.
The crypto_tfm structure's size was 44 bytes on 32-bit architectures and
80 bytes on 64-bit architectures. So adding this requirement only means
that we have to add an extra 4 bytes on 32-bit architectures.
On i386 the natural alignment is 16 bytes which also benefits the VIA
Padlock as it no longer has to manually align its context structure to
128 bits.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
A bunch of asm/bug.h includes are both not needed (since it will get
pulled anyway) and bogus (since they are done too early). Removed.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Many cipher implementations use 4-byte/8-byte loads/stores which require
alignment on some architectures. This patch explicitly sets the alignment
requirements for them.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
The cipher code path may allocate up to two blocks of data on the stack.
Therefore we need to place limits on the maximum block size.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Since the temporary buffer is used as an argument to cia_decrypt, it must be
aligned by cra_alignmask. This bug was found by linux@horizon.com.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
This patch avoids shifting the count left and right needlessly for each
call to sha1_update(). It instead can be done only once at the end in
sha1_final().
Keeping the previous test example (sha1_update() successively called with
len=64), a 1.3% performance increase can be observed on i386, or 0.2% on
ARM. The generated code is also smaller on ARM.
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Pitre <nico@cam.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
This patch gives more descriptive names to the variables i and j.
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Pitre <nico@cam.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
The current code unconditionally copy the first block for every call to
sha1_update(). This can be avoided if there is no pending partial block.
This is always the case on the first call to sha1_update() (if the length
is >= 64 of course.
Furthermore, temp does need to be called if sha_transform is never invoked.
Also consolidate the sha_transform calls into one to reduce code size.
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Pitre <nico@cam.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
As the Crypto API now allows multiple implementations to be registered
for the same algorithm, we no longer have to play tricks with Kconfig
to select the right AES implementation.
This patch sets the driver name and priority for all the AES
implementations and removes the Kconfig conditions on the C implementation
for AES.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
This is the first step on the road towards asynchronous support in
the Crypto API. It adds support for having multiple crypto_alg objects
for the same algorithm registered in the system.
For example, each device driver would register a crypto_alg object
for each algorithm that it supports. While at the same time the
user may load software implementations of those same algorithms.
Users of the Crypto API may then select a specific implementation
by name, or choose any implementation for a given algorithm with
the highest priority.
The priority field is a 32-bit signed integer. In future it will be
possible to modify it from user-space.
This also provides a solution to the problem of selecting amongst
various AES implementations, that is, aes vs. aes-i586 vs. aes-padlock.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
A lot of crypto code needs to read/write a 32-bit/64-bit words in a
specific gender. Many of them open code them by reading/writing one
byte at a time. This patch converts all the applicable usages over
to use the standard byte order macros.
This is based on a previous patch by Denis Vlasenko.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Sanitize some s390 Kconfig options. We have ARCH_S390, ARCH_S390X,
ARCH_S390_31, 64BIT, S390_SUPPORT and COMPAT. Replace these 6 options by
S390, 64BIT and COMPAT.
Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Add new test vectors to the AES test suite for AES CBC and AES with plaintext
larger than AES blocksize.
Signed-off-by: Jan Glauber <jan.glauber@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Add support for the hardware accelerated AES crypto algorithm.
Signed-off-by: Jan Glauber <jan.glauber@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Add support for the hardware accelerated sha256 crypto algorithm.
Signed-off-by: Jan Glauber <jan.glauber@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Replace all references to z990 by s390 in the in-kernel crypto files in
arch/s390/crypto. The code is not specific to a particular machine (z990) but
to the s390 platform. Big diff, does nothing..
Signed-off-by: Jan Glauber <jan.glauber@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
The cipher code relies on the fact that the block size is a multiple
of the required alignment. So we should check this at the time of
algorith registration. We also ensure that the block size is bounded
by the page size.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
This patch rewrites various occurences of &sg[0] where sg is an array
of length one to simply sg.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
This patch uses sg_set_buf/sg_init_one in some places where it was
duplicated.
Signed-off-by: David Hardeman <david@2gen.com>
Cc: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@steeleye.com>
Cc: Greg KH <greg@kroah.com>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Jeff Garzik <jgarzik@pobox.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
The boundary check in the standard multi-block cipher processors are
broken when nbytes is not a multiple of bsize. In those cases it will
always process an extra block.
This patch corrects the check so that it processes at most nbytes of
data.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
The crypto layer currently uses in_atomic() to determine whether it is
allowed to sleep. This is incorrect since spin locks don't always cause
in_atomic() to return true.
Instead of that, this patch returns to an earlier idea of a per-tfm flag
which determines whether sleeping is allowed. Unlike the earlier version,
the default is to not allow sleeping. This ensures that no existing code
can break.
As usual, this flag may either be set through crypto_alloc_tfm(), or
just before a specific crypto operation.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
The XTEA implementation was incorrect due to a misinterpretation of
operator precedence. Because of the wide-spread nature of this
error, the erroneous implementation will be kept, albeit under the
new name of XETA.
Signed-off-by: Aaron Grothe <ajgrothe@yahoo.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
`gcc -W' likes to complain if the static keyword is not at the beginning of
the declaration. This patch fixes all remaining occurrences of "inline
static" up with "static inline" in the entire kernel tree (140 occurrences in
47 files).
While making this change I came across a few lines with trailing whitespace
that I also fixed up, I have also added or removed a blank line or two here
and there, but there are no functional changes in the patch.
Signed-off-by: Jesper Juhl <juhl-lkml@dif.dk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
I've made a new implementation of DES to replace the old one in the kernel.
It provides faster encryption on all tested processors apart from the original
Pentium, and key setup is many times faster.
Speed relative to old kernel implementation
Processor des_setkey des_encrypt des3_ede_setkey des3_ede_encrypt
Pentium
120Mhz 6.8 0.82 7.2 0.86
Pentium III
1.266Ghz 5.6 1.19 5.8 1.34
Pentium M
1.3Ghz 5.7 1.15 6.0 1.31
Pentium 4
2.266Ghz 5.8 1.24 6.0 1.40
Pentium 4E
3Ghz 5.4 1.27 5.5 1.48
StrongARM 1110
206Mhz 4.3 1.03 4.4 1.14
Athlon XP
2Ghz 7.8 1.44 8.1 1.61
Athlon 64
2Ghz 7.8 1.34 8.3 1.49
Signed-off-by: Dag Arne Osvik <da@osvik.no>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
The iv field in des_ctx/des3_ede_ctx/serpent_ctx has never been used.
This was noticed by Dag Arne Osvik.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Implementation:
===============
The encrypt/decrypt code is based on an x86 implementation I did a while
ago which I never published. This unpublished implementation does
include an assembler based key schedule and precomputed tables. For
simplicity and best acceptance, however, I took Gladman's in-kernel code
for table generation and key schedule for the kernel port of my
assembler code and modified this code to produce the key schedule as
required by my assembler implementation. File locations and Kconfig are
kept similar to the i586 AES assembler implementation.
It may seem a little bit strange to use 32 bit I/O and registers in the
assembler implementation but this gives the best code size. My
implementation takes one instruction more per round compared to
Gladman's x86 assembler but it doesn't require any stack for local
variables or saved registers and it is less serialized than Gladman's
code.
Note that all comparisons to Gladman's code were done after my code was
implemented. I did only use FIPS PUB 197 for the implementation so my
implementation is independent work.
If anybody has a better assembler solution for x86_64 I'll be pleased to
have my code replaced with the better solution.
Testing:
========
The implementation passes the in-kernel crypto testing module and I'm
running it without any problems on my laptop where it is mainly used for
dm-crypt.
Microbenchmark:
===============
The microbenchmark was done in userspace with similar compile flags as
used during kernel compile.
Encrypt/decrypt is about 35% faster than the generic C implementation.
As the generic C as well as my assembler implementation are both table
I don't really expect that there is much room for further
improvements though I'll be glad to be corrected here.
The key schedule is about 5% slower than the generic C implementation.
This is due to the fact that some more work has to be done in the key
schedule routine to fit the schedule to the assembler implementation.
Code Size:
==========
Encrypt and decrypt are together about 2.1 Kbytes smaller than the
generic C implementation which is important with regard to L1 cache
usage. The key schedule routine is about 100 bytes larger than the
generic C implementation.
Data Size:
==========
There's no difference in data size requirements between the assembler
implementation and the generic C implementation.
License:
========
Gladmans's code is dual BSD/GPL whereas my assembler code is GPLv2 only
(I'm not going to change the license for my code). So I had to change
the module license for the x86_64 aes module from 'Dual BSD/GPL' to
'GPL' to reflect the most restrictive license within the module.
Signed-off-by: Andreas Steinmetz <ast@domdv.de>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
As far as I'm aware there's a general concensus that functions that are
responsible for freeing resources should be able to cope with being passed
a NULL pointer. This makes sense as it removes the need for all callers to
check for NULL, thus elliminating the bugs that happen when some forget
(safer to just check centrally in the freeing function) and it also makes
for smaller code all over due to the lack of all those NULL checks.
This patch makes it safe to pass the crypto_free_tfm() function a NULL
pointer. Once this patch is applied we can start removing the NULL checks
from the callers.
Signed-off-by: Jesper Juhl <juhl-lkml@dif.dk>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Even though cit_iv is now always aligned, the user can still supply an
unaligned iv through crypto_cipher_encrypt_iv/crypto_cipher_decrypt_iv.
This patch will check the alignment of the user-supplied iv and copy
it if necessary.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
This patch ensures that cit_iv is aligned according to cra_alignmask
by allocating it as part of the tfm structure. As a side effect the
crypto layer will also guarantee that the tfm ctx area has enough space
to be aligned by cra_alignmask. This allows us to remove the extra
space reservation from the Padlock driver.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
This patch makes a needlessly global function static.
Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
The VIA Padlock device requires the input and output buffers to
be aligned on 16-byte boundaries. This patch adds the alignmask
attribute for low-level cipher implementations to indicate their
alignment requirements.
The mid-level crypt() function will copy the input/output buffers
if they are not aligned correctly before they are passed to the
low-level implementation.
Strictly speaking, some of the software implementations require
the buffers to be aligned on 4-byte boundaries as they do 32-bit
loads. However, it is not clear whether it is better to copy
the buffers or pay the penalty for unaligned loads/stores.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
This patch adds hooks for cipher algorithms to implement multi-block
ECB/CBC operations directly. This is expected to provide significant
performance boots to the VIA Padlock.
It could also be used for improving software implementations such as
AES where operating on multiple blocks at a time may enable certain
optimisations.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
The VIA Padlock device is able to perform much better when multiple
blocks are fed to it at once. As this device offers an exceptional
throughput rate it is worthwhile to optimise the infrastructure
specifically for it.
We shift the existing page-sized fast path down to the CBC/ECB functions.
We can then replace the CBC/ECB functions with functions provided by the
underlying algorithm that performs the multi-block operations.
As a side-effect this improves the performance of large cipher operations
for all existing algorithm implementations. I've measured the gain to be
around 5% for 3DES and 15% for AES.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Checking a pointer for NULL before calling kfree() on it is redundant.
This patch removes such checks from crypto/
Signed-off-by: Jesper Juhl <juhl-lkml@dif.dk>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
After using this facility for a while to test my changes to the
cipher crypt() layer, I realised that I should've listend to Dave
and made this thing use CPU cycle counters :) As it is it's too
jittery for me to feel safe about relying on the results.
So here is a patch to make it use CPU cycles by default but fall
back to jiffies if the user specifies a non-zero sec value.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
The existing keys used in the speed tests do not pass the 3DES quality check.
This patch makes it use the template keys instead.
Other algorithms can supply template keys through the same interface if needed.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
From: Reyk Floeter <reyk@vantronix.net>
I recently had the requirement to do some benchmarking on cryptoapi, and
I found reyk's very useful performance test patch [1].
However, I could not find any discussion on why that extension (or
something providing a similar feature but different implementation) was
not merged into mainline. If there was such a discussion, can someone
please point me to the archive[s]?
I've now merged the old patch into 2.6.12-rc1, the result can be found
attached to this email.
[1] http://lists.logix.cz/pipermail/padlock/2004/000010.html
Signed-off-by: Harald Welte <laforge@gnumonks.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
It seems that bad code tends to get copied (see test_cipher_speed). So let's
kill this idiom before it spreads any further.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
The netlink gfp_any() problem made me double-check the uses of in_softirq()
in crypto/*. It seems to me that we should be checking in_atomic() instead
of in_softirq() in crypto_yield. Otherwise people calling the crypto ops
with spin locks held or preemption disabled will get burnt, right?
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
We want to make possible, for the user, to enable the i586 AES implementation.
This requires a restructure.
- Add a CONFIG_UML_X86 to notify that we are building a UML for i386.
- Rename CONFIG_64_BIT to CONFIG_64BIT as is used for all other archs
- Tell crypto/Kconfig that UML_X86 is as good as X86
- Tell it that it must exclude not X86_64 but 64BIT, which will give the
same results.
- Tell kbuild to descend down into arch/i386/crypto/ to build what's needed.
Signed-off-by: Paolo 'Blaisorblade' Giarrusso <blaisorblade@yahoo.it>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
In the deflate_[compress|uncompress|pcompress] functions we call the
zlib_[in|de]flateReset function at the beginning. This is OK. But when we
unload the deflate module we don't call zlib_[in|de]flateEnd to free all
the zlib internal data. It looks like a bug for me. Please, consider the
attached patch.
Signed-off-by: Artem B. Bityuckiy <dedekind@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Initial git repository build. I'm not bothering with the full history,
even though we have it. We can create a separate "historical" git
archive of that later if we want to, and in the meantime it's about
3.2GB when imported into git - space that would just make the early
git days unnecessarily complicated, when we don't have a lot of good
infrastructure for it.
Let it rip!
