This adjusts structleak to also work with non-struct types when they
are passed by reference, since those variables may leak just like
anything else. This is exposed via an improved set of Kconfig options.
(This does mean structleak is slightly misnamed now.)
Building with CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK_BYREF_ALL should give the
kernel complete initialization coverage of all stack variables passed
by reference, including padding (see lib/test_stackinit.c).
Using CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK_VERBOSE to count added initializations
under defconfig:
..._BYREF: 5945 added initializations
..._BYREF_ALL: 16606 added initializations
There is virtually no change to text+data size (both have less than 0.05%
growth):
text data bss dec hex filename
19502103 5051456 1917000 26470559 193e89f vmlinux.stock
19513412 5051456 1908808 26473676 193f4cc vmlinux.byref
19516974 5047360 1900616 26464950 193d2b6 vmlinux.byref_all
The measured performance difference is in the noise for hackbench and
kernel build benchmarks:
Stock:
5x hackbench -g 20 -l 1000
Mean: 10.649s
Std Dev: 0.339
5x kernel build (4-way parallel)
Mean: 261.98s
Std Dev: 1.53
CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK_BYREF:
5x hackbench -g 20 -l 1000
Mean: 10.540s
Std Dev: 0.233
5x kernel build (4-way parallel)
Mean: 260.52s
Std Dev: 1.31
CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK_BYREF_ALL:
5x hackbench -g 20 -l 1000
Mean: 10.320
Std Dev: 0.413
5x kernel build (4-way parallel)
Mean: 260.10
Std Dev: 0.86
This does not yet solve missing padding initialization for structures
on the stack that are never passed by reference (which should be a tiny
minority). Hopefully this will be more easily addressed by upstream
compiler fixes after clarifying the C11 padding initialization
specification.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
On ARM, we currently only change the value of the stack canary when
switching tasks if the kernel was built for UP. On SMP kernels, this
is impossible since the stack canary value is obtained via a global
symbol reference, which means
a) all running tasks on all CPUs must use the same value
b) we can only modify the value when no kernel stack frames are live
on any CPU, which is effectively never.
So instead, use a GCC plugin to add a RTL pass that replaces each
reference to the address of the __stack_chk_guard symbol with an
expression that produces the address of the 'stack_canary' field
that is added to struct thread_info. This way, each task will use
its own randomized value.
Cc: Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Emese Revfy <re.emese@gmail.com>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>
Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Acked-by: Nicolas Pitre <nico@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Introduce CONFIG_STACKLEAK_RUNTIME_DISABLE option, which provides
'stack_erasing' sysctl. It can be used in runtime to control kernel
stack erasing for kernels built with CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK.
Suggested-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexander Popov <alex.popov@linux.com>
Tested-by: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Introduce CONFIG_STACKLEAK_METRICS providing STACKLEAK information about
tasks via the /proc file system. In particular, /proc/<pid>/stack_depth
shows the maximum kernel stack consumption for the current and previous
syscalls. Although this information is not precise, it can be useful for
estimating the STACKLEAK performance impact for your workloads.
Suggested-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexander Popov <alex.popov@linux.com>
Tested-by: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
The STACKLEAK feature erases the kernel stack before returning from
syscalls. That reduces the information which kernel stack leak bugs can
reveal and blocks some uninitialized stack variable attacks.
This commit introduces the STACKLEAK gcc plugin. It is needed for
tracking the lowest border of the kernel stack, which is important
for the code erasing the used part of the kernel stack at the end
of syscalls (comes in a separate commit).
The STACKLEAK feature is ported from grsecurity/PaX. More information at:
https://grsecurity.net/https://pax.grsecurity.net/
This code is modified from Brad Spengler/PaX Team's code in the last
public patch of grsecurity/PaX based on our understanding of the code.
Changes or omissions from the original code are ours and don't reflect
the original grsecurity/PaX code.
Signed-off-by: Alexander Popov <alex.popov@linux.com>
Tested-by: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
The STACKLEAK feature (initially developed by PaX Team) has the following
benefits:
1. Reduces the information that can be revealed through kernel stack leak
bugs. The idea of erasing the thread stack at the end of syscalls is
similar to CONFIG_PAGE_POISONING and memzero_explicit() in kernel
crypto, which all comply with FDP_RIP.2 (Full Residual Information
Protection) of the Common Criteria standard.
2. Blocks some uninitialized stack variable attacks (e.g. CVE-2017-17712,
CVE-2010-2963). That kind of bugs should be killed by improving C
compilers in future, which might take a long time.
This commit introduces the code filling the used part of the kernel
stack with a poison value before returning to userspace. Full
STACKLEAK feature also contains the gcc plugin which comes in a
separate commit.
The STACKLEAK feature is ported from grsecurity/PaX. More information at:
https://grsecurity.net/https://pax.grsecurity.net/
This code is modified from Brad Spengler/PaX Team's code in the last
public patch of grsecurity/PaX based on our understanding of the code.
Changes or omissions from the original code are ours and don't reflect
the original grsecurity/PaX code.
Performance impact:
Hardware: Intel Core i7-4770, 16 GB RAM
Test #1: building the Linux kernel on a single core
0.91% slowdown
Test #2: hackbench -s 4096 -l 2000 -g 15 -f 25 -P
4.2% slowdown
So the STACKLEAK description in Kconfig includes: "The tradeoff is the
performance impact: on a single CPU system kernel compilation sees a 1%
slowdown, other systems and workloads may vary and you are advised to
test this feature on your expected workload before deploying it".
Signed-off-by: Alexander Popov <alex.popov@linux.com>
Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Prior to doing compiler feature detection in Kconfig, attempts to build
GCC plugins with Clang would fail the build, much in the same way missing
GCC plugin headers would fail the build. However, now that this logic
has been lifted into Kconfig, add an explicit test for GCC (instead of
duplicating it in the feature-test script).
Reported-by: Stefan Agner <stefan@agner.ch>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
