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76d56d4ab4
2346 Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Chao Yu
|
76d56d4ab4 |
f2fs: fix to do sanity check with extra_attr feature
If FI_EXTRA_ATTR is set in inode by fuzzing, inode.i_addr[0] will be parsed as inode.i_extra_isize, then in __recover_inline_status, inline data address will beyond boundary of page, result in accessing invalid memory. So in this condition, during reading inode page, let's do sanity check with EXTRA_ATTR feature of fs and extra_attr bit of inode, if they're inconsistent, deny to load this inode. - Overview Out-of-bound access in f2fs_iget() when mounting a corrupted f2fs image - Reproduce The following message will be got in KASAN build of 4.18 upstream kernel. [ 819.392227] ================================================================== [ 819.393901] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in f2fs_iget+0x736/0x1530 [ 819.395329] Read of size 4 at addr ffff8801f099c968 by task mount/1292 [ 819.397079] CPU: 1 PID: 1292 Comm: mount Not tainted 4.18.0-rc1+ #4 [ 819.397082] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Ubuntu-1.8.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014 [ 819.397088] Call Trace: [ 819.397124] dump_stack+0x7b/0xb5 [ 819.397154] print_address_description+0x70/0x290 [ 819.397159] kasan_report+0x291/0x390 [ 819.397163] ? f2fs_iget+0x736/0x1530 [ 819.397176] check_memory_region+0x139/0x190 [ 819.397182] __asan_loadN+0xf/0x20 [ 819.397185] f2fs_iget+0x736/0x1530 [ 819.397197] f2fs_fill_super+0x1b4f/0x2b40 [ 819.397202] ? f2fs_fill_super+0x1b4f/0x2b40 [ 819.397208] ? f2fs_commit_super+0x1b0/0x1b0 [ 819.397227] ? set_blocksize+0x90/0x140 [ 819.397241] mount_bdev+0x1c5/0x210 [ 819.397245] ? f2fs_commit_super+0x1b0/0x1b0 [ 819.397252] f2fs_mount+0x15/0x20 [ 819.397256] mount_fs+0x60/0x1a0 [ 819.397267] ? alloc_vfsmnt+0x309/0x360 [ 819.397272] vfs_kern_mount+0x6b/0x1a0 [ 819.397282] do_mount+0x34a/0x18c0 [ 819.397300] ? lockref_put_or_lock+0xcf/0x160 [ 819.397306] ? copy_mount_string+0x20/0x20 [ 819.397318] ? memcg_kmem_put_cache+0x1b/0xa0 [ 819.397324] ? kasan_check_write+0x14/0x20 [ 819.397334] ? _copy_from_user+0x6a/0x90 [ 819.397353] ? memdup_user+0x42/0x60 [ 819.397359] ksys_mount+0x83/0xd0 [ 819.397365] __x64_sys_mount+0x67/0x80 [ 819.397388] do_syscall_64+0x78/0x170 [ 819.397403] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 [ 819.397422] RIP: 0033:0x7f54c667cb9a [ 819.397424] Code: 48 8b 0d 01 c3 2b 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 49 89 ca b8 a5 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d ce c2 2b 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 [ 819.397483] RSP: 002b:00007ffd8f46cd08 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a5 [ 819.397496] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000dfa030 RCX: 00007f54c667cb9a [ 819.397498] RDX: 0000000000dfa210 RSI: 0000000000dfbf30 RDI: 0000000000e02ec0 [ 819.397501] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000013 [ 819.397503] R10: 00000000c0ed0000 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 0000000000e02ec0 [ 819.397505] R13: 0000000000dfa210 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000003 [ 819.397866] Allocated by task 139: [ 819.398702] save_stack+0x46/0xd0 [ 819.398705] kasan_kmalloc+0xad/0xe0 [ 819.398709] kasan_slab_alloc+0x11/0x20 [ 819.398713] kmem_cache_alloc+0xd1/0x1e0 [ 819.398717] dup_fd+0x50/0x4c0 [ 819.398740] copy_process.part.37+0xbed/0x32e0 [ 819.398744] _do_fork+0x16e/0x590 [ 819.398748] __x64_sys_clone+0x69/0x80 [ 819.398752] do_syscall_64+0x78/0x170 [ 819.398756] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 [ 819.399097] Freed by task 159: [ 819.399743] save_stack+0x46/0xd0 [ 819.399747] __kasan_slab_free+0x13c/0x1a0 [ 819.399750] kasan_slab_free+0xe/0x10 [ 819.399754] kmem_cache_free+0x89/0x1e0 [ 819.399757] put_files_struct+0x132/0x150 [ 819.399761] exit_files+0x62/0x70 [ 819.399766] do_exit+0x47b/0x1390 [ 819.399770] do_group_exit+0x86/0x130 [ 819.399774] __x64_sys_exit_group+0x2c/0x30 [ 819.399778] do_syscall_64+0x78/0x170 [ 819.399782] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 [ 819.400115] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff8801f099c680 which belongs to the cache files_cache of size 704 [ 819.403234] The buggy address is located 40 bytes to the right of 704-byte region [ffff8801f099c680, ffff8801f099c940) [ 819.405689] The buggy address belongs to the page: [ 819.406709] page:ffffea0007c26700 count:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffff8801f69a3340 index:0xffff8801f099d380 compound_mapcount: 0 [ 819.408984] flags: 0x2ffff0000008100(slab|head) [ 819.409932] raw: 02ffff0000008100 ffffea00077fb600 0000000200000002 ffff8801f69a3340 [ 819.411514] raw: ffff8801f099d380 0000000080130000 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 [ 819.413073] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected [ 819.414539] Memory state around the buggy address: [ 819.415521] ffff8801f099c800: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb [ 819.416981] ffff8801f099c880: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb [ 819.418454] >ffff8801f099c900: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc [ 819.419921] ^ [ 819.421265] ffff8801f099c980: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb [ 819.422745] ffff8801f099ca00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb [ 819.424206] ================================================================== [ 819.425668] Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint [ 819.457463] F2FS-fs (loop0): Mounted with checkpoint version = 3 The kernel still mounts the image. If you run the following program on the mounted folder mnt, (poc.c) static void activity(char *mpoint) { char *foo_bar_baz; int err; static int buf[8192]; memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf)); err = asprintf(&foo_bar_baz, "%s/foo/bar/baz", mpoint); int fd = open(foo_bar_baz, O_RDONLY, 0); if (fd >= 0) { read(fd, (char *)buf, 11); close(fd); } } int main(int argc, char *argv[]) { activity(argv[1]); return 0; } You can get kernel crash: [ 819.457463] F2FS-fs (loop0): Mounted with checkpoint version = 3 [ 918.028501] BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at ffffed0048000d82 [ 918.044020] PGD 23ffee067 P4D 23ffee067 PUD 23fbef067 PMD 0 [ 918.045207] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI [ 918.046048] CPU: 0 PID: 1309 Comm: poc Tainted: G B 4.18.0-rc1+ #4 [ 918.047573] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Ubuntu-1.8.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014 [ 918.049552] RIP: 0010:check_memory_region+0x5e/0x190 [ 918.050565] Code: f8 49 c1 e8 03 49 89 db 49 c1 eb 03 4d 01 cb 4d 01 c1 4d 8d 63 01 4c 89 c8 4d 89 e2 4d 29 ca 49 83 fa 10 7f 3d 4d 85 d2 74 32 <41> 80 39 00 75 23 48 b8 01 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 4d 01 d1 49 01 c0 [ 918.054322] RSP: 0018:ffff8801e3a1f258 EFLAGS: 00010202 [ 918.055400] RAX: ffffed0048000d82 RBX: ffff880240006c11 RCX: ffffffffb8867d14 [ 918.056832] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000002 RDI: ffff880240006c10 [ 918.058253] RBP: ffff8801e3a1f268 R08: 1ffff10048000d82 R09: ffffed0048000d82 [ 918.059717] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffed0048000d82 R12: ffffed0048000d83 [ 918.061159] R13: ffff8801e3a1f390 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff880240006c08 [ 918.062614] FS: 00007fac9732c700(0000) GS:ffff8801f6e00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 918.064246] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 918.065412] CR2: ffffed0048000d82 CR3: 00000001df77a000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 [ 918.066882] Call Trace: [ 918.067410] __asan_loadN+0xf/0x20 [ 918.068149] f2fs_find_target_dentry+0xf4/0x270 [ 918.069083] ? __get_node_page+0x331/0x5b0 [ 918.069925] f2fs_find_in_inline_dir+0x24b/0x310 [ 918.070881] ? f2fs_recover_inline_data+0x4c0/0x4c0 [ 918.071905] ? unwind_next_frame.part.5+0x34f/0x490 [ 918.072901] ? unwind_dump+0x290/0x290 [ 918.073695] ? is_bpf_text_address+0xe/0x20 [ 918.074566] __f2fs_find_entry+0x599/0x670 [ 918.075408] ? kasan_unpoison_shadow+0x36/0x50 [ 918.076315] ? kasan_kmalloc+0xad/0xe0 [ 918.077100] ? memcg_kmem_put_cache+0x55/0xa0 [ 918.077998] ? f2fs_find_target_dentry+0x270/0x270 [ 918.079006] ? d_set_d_op+0x30/0x100 [ 918.079749] ? __d_lookup_rcu+0x69/0x2e0 [ 918.080556] ? __d_alloc+0x275/0x450 [ 918.081297] ? kasan_check_write+0x14/0x20 [ 918.082135] ? memset+0x31/0x40 [ 918.082820] ? fscrypt_setup_filename+0x1ec/0x4c0 [ 918.083782] ? d_alloc_parallel+0x5bb/0x8c0 [ 918.084640] f2fs_find_entry+0xe9/0x110 [ 918.085432] ? __f2fs_find_entry+0x670/0x670 [ 918.086308] ? kasan_check_write+0x14/0x20 [ 918.087163] f2fs_lookup+0x297/0x590 [ 918.087902] ? f2fs_link+0x2b0/0x2b0 [ 918.088646] ? legitimize_path.isra.29+0x61/0xa0 [ 918.089589] __lookup_slow+0x12e/0x240 [ 918.090371] ? may_delete+0x2b0/0x2b0 [ 918.091123] ? __nd_alloc_stack+0xa0/0xa0 [ 918.091944] lookup_slow+0x44/0x60 [ 918.092642] walk_component+0x3ee/0xa40 [ 918.093428] ? is_bpf_text_address+0xe/0x20 [ 918.094283] ? pick_link+0x3e0/0x3e0 [ 918.095047] ? in_group_p+0xa5/0xe0 [ 918.095771] ? generic_permission+0x53/0x1e0 [ 918.096666] ? security_inode_permission+0x1d/0x70 [ 918.097646] ? inode_permission+0x7a/0x1f0 [ 918.098497] link_path_walk+0x2a2/0x7b0 [ 918.099298] ? apparmor_capget+0x3d0/0x3d0 [ 918.100140] ? walk_component+0xa40/0xa40 [ 918.100958] ? path_init+0x2e6/0x580 [ 918.101695] path_openat+0x1bb/0x2160 [ 918.102471] ? __save_stack_trace+0x92/0x100 [ 918.103352] ? save_stack+0xb5/0xd0 [ 918.104070] ? vfs_unlink+0x250/0x250 [ 918.104822] ? save_stack+0x46/0xd0 [ 918.105538] ? kasan_slab_alloc+0x11/0x20 [ 918.106370] ? kmem_cache_alloc+0xd1/0x1e0 [ 918.107213] ? getname_flags+0x76/0x2c0 [ 918.107997] ? getname+0x12/0x20 [ 918.108677] ? do_sys_open+0x14b/0x2c0 [ 918.109450] ? __x64_sys_open+0x4c/0x60 [ 918.110255] ? do_syscall_64+0x78/0x170 [ 918.111083] ? entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 [ 918.112148] ? entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 [ 918.113204] ? f2fs_empty_inline_dir+0x1e0/0x1e0 [ 918.114150] ? timespec64_trunc+0x5c/0x90 [ 918.114993] ? wb_io_lists_depopulated+0x1a/0xc0 [ 918.115937] ? inode_io_list_move_locked+0x102/0x110 [ 918.116949] do_filp_open+0x12b/0x1d0 [ 918.117709] ? may_open_dev+0x50/0x50 [ 918.118475] ? kasan_kmalloc+0xad/0xe0 [ 918.119246] do_sys_open+0x17c/0x2c0 [ 918.119983] ? do_sys_open+0x17c/0x2c0 [ 918.120751] ? filp_open+0x60/0x60 [ 918.121463] ? task_work_run+0x4d/0xf0 [ 918.122237] __x64_sys_open+0x4c/0x60 [ 918.123001] do_syscall_64+0x78/0x170 [ 918.123759] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 [ 918.124802] RIP: 0033:0x7fac96e3e040 [ 918.125537] Code: 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 83 3d 09 27 2d 00 00 75 10 b8 02 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 31 c3 48 83 ec 08 e8 7e e0 01 00 48 89 04 24 [ 918.129341] RSP: 002b:00007fff1b37f848 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000002 [ 918.130870] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007fac96e3e040 [ 918.132295] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 000000000122d080 [ 918.133748] RBP: 00007fff1b37f9b0 R08: 00007fac9710bbd8 R09: 0000000000000001 [ 918.135209] R10: 000000000000069d R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000400c20 [ 918.136650] R13: 00007fff1b37fab0 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 [ 918.138093] Modules linked in: snd_hda_codec_generic snd_hda_intel snd_hda_codec snd_hwdep snd_hda_core snd_pcm snd_timer snd mac_hid i2c_piix4 soundcore ib_iser rdma_cm iw_cm ib_cm ib_core iscsi_tcp libiscsi_tcp libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi raid10 raid456 async_raid6_recov async_memcpy async_pq async_xor async_tx raid1 raid0 multipath linear 8139too crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul qxl drm_kms_helper syscopyarea aesni_intel sysfillrect sysimgblt fb_sys_fops ttm drm aes_x86_64 crypto_simd cryptd 8139cp glue_helper mii pata_acpi floppy [ 918.147924] CR2: ffffed0048000d82 [ 918.148619] ---[ end trace 4ce02f25ff7d3df5 ]--- [ 918.149563] RIP: 0010:check_memory_region+0x5e/0x190 [ 918.150576] Code: f8 49 c1 e8 03 49 89 db 49 c1 eb 03 4d 01 cb 4d 01 c1 4d 8d 63 01 4c 89 c8 4d 89 e2 4d 29 ca 49 83 fa 10 7f 3d 4d 85 d2 74 32 <41> 80 39 00 75 23 48 b8 01 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 4d 01 d1 49 01 c0 [ 918.154360] RSP: 0018:ffff8801e3a1f258 EFLAGS: 00010202 [ 918.155411] RAX: ffffed0048000d82 RBX: ffff880240006c11 RCX: ffffffffb8867d14 [ 918.156833] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000002 RDI: ffff880240006c10 [ 918.158257] RBP: ffff8801e3a1f268 R08: 1ffff10048000d82 R09: ffffed0048000d82 [ 918.159722] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffed0048000d82 R12: ffffed0048000d83 [ 918.161149] R13: ffff8801e3a1f390 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff880240006c08 [ 918.162587] FS: 00007fac9732c700(0000) GS:ffff8801f6e00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 918.164203] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 918.165356] CR2: ffffed0048000d82 CR3: 00000001df77a000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 Reported-by: Wen Xu <wen.xu@gatech.edu> Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org> |
||
|
Chao Yu
|
01f9cf6db7 |
f2fs: fix to correct return value of f2fs_trim_fs
We should account trimmed block number from __wait_all_discard_cmd in __issue_discard_cmd_range, otherwise trimmed blocks returned by f2fs_trim_fs will be wrong, this patch fixes it. Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org> |
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|
Chao Yu
|
c77ec61ca0 |
f2fs: fix to do sanity check with {sit,nat}_ver_bitmap_bytesize
This patch adds to do sanity check with {sit,nat}_ver_bitmap_bytesize
during mount, in order to avoid accessing across cache boundary with
this abnormal bitmap size.
- Overview
buffer overrun in build_sit_info() when mounting a crafted f2fs image
- Reproduce
- Kernel message
[ 548.580867] F2FS-fs (loop0): Invalid log blocks per segment (8201)
[ 548.580877] F2FS-fs (loop0): Can't find valid F2FS filesystem in 1th superblock
[ 548.584979] ==================================================================
[ 548.586568] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in kmemdup+0x36/0x50
[ 548.587715] Read of size 64 at addr ffff8801e9c265ff by task mount/1295
[ 548.589428] CPU: 1 PID: 1295 Comm: mount Not tainted 4.18.0-rc1+ #4
[ 548.589432] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Ubuntu-1.8.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
[ 548.589438] Call Trace:
[ 548.589474] dump_stack+0x7b/0xb5
[ 548.589487] print_address_description+0x70/0x290
[ 548.589492] kasan_report+0x291/0x390
[ 548.589496] ? kmemdup+0x36/0x50
[ 548.589509] check_memory_region+0x139/0x190
[ 548.589514] memcpy+0x23/0x50
[ 548.589518] kmemdup+0x36/0x50
[ 548.589545] f2fs_build_segment_manager+0x8fa/0x3410
[ 548.589551] ? __asan_loadN+0xf/0x20
[ 548.589560] ? f2fs_sanity_check_ckpt+0x1be/0x240
[ 548.589566] ? f2fs_flush_sit_entries+0x10c0/0x10c0
[ 548.589587] ? __put_user_ns+0x40/0x40
[ 548.589604] ? find_next_bit+0x57/0x90
[ 548.589610] f2fs_fill_super+0x194b/0x2b40
[ 548.589617] ? f2fs_commit_super+0x1b0/0x1b0
[ 548.589637] ? set_blocksize+0x90/0x140
[ 548.589651] mount_bdev+0x1c5/0x210
[ 548.589655] ? f2fs_commit_super+0x1b0/0x1b0
[ 548.589667] f2fs_mount+0x15/0x20
[ 548.589672] mount_fs+0x60/0x1a0
[ 548.589683] ? alloc_vfsmnt+0x309/0x360
[ 548.589688] vfs_kern_mount+0x6b/0x1a0
[ 548.589699] do_mount+0x34a/0x18c0
[ 548.589710] ? lockref_put_or_lock+0xcf/0x160
[ 548.589716] ? copy_mount_string+0x20/0x20
[ 548.589728] ? memcg_kmem_put_cache+0x1b/0xa0
[ 548.589734] ? kasan_check_write+0x14/0x20
[ 548.589740] ? _copy_from_user+0x6a/0x90
[ 548.589744] ? memdup_user+0x42/0x60
[ 548.589750] ksys_mount+0x83/0xd0
[ 548.589755] __x64_sys_mount+0x67/0x80
[ 548.589781] do_syscall_64+0x78/0x170
[ 548.589797] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
[ 548.589820] RIP: 0033:0x7f76fc331b9a
[ 548.589821] Code: 48 8b 0d 01 c3 2b 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 49 89 ca b8 a5 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d ce c2 2b 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48
[ 548.589880] RSP: 002b:00007ffd4f0a0e48 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a5
[ 548.589890] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000146c030 RCX: 00007f76fc331b9a
[ 548.589892] RDX: 000000000146c210 RSI: 000000000146df30 RDI: 0000000001474ec0
[ 548.589895] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000013
[ 548.589897] R10: 00000000c0ed0000 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 0000000001474ec0
[ 548.589900] R13: 000000000146c210 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000003
[ 548.590242] The buggy address belongs to the page:
[ 548.591243] page:ffffea0007a70980 count:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0
[ 548.592886] flags: 0x2ffff0000000000()
[ 548.593665] raw: 02ffff0000000000 dead000000000100 dead000000000200 0000000000000000
[ 548.595258] raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000
[ 548.603713] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
[ 548.605203] Memory state around the buggy address:
[ 548.606198] ffff8801e9c26480: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff
[ 548.607676] ffff8801e9c26500: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff
[ 548.609157] >ffff8801e9c26580: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff
[ 548.610629] ^
[ 548.612088] ffff8801e9c26600: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff
[ 548.613674] ffff8801e9c26680: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff
[ 548.615141] ==================================================================
[ 548.616613] Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint
[ 548.622871] WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 1295 at mm/page_alloc.c:4065 __alloc_pages_slowpath+0xe4a/0x1420
[ 548.622878] Modules linked in: snd_hda_codec_generic snd_hda_intel snd_hda_codec snd_hwdep snd_hda_core snd_pcm snd_timer snd mac_hid i2c_piix4 soundcore ib_iser rdma_cm iw_cm ib_cm ib_core iscsi_tcp libiscsi_tcp libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi raid10 raid456 async_raid6_recov async_memcpy async_pq async_xor async_tx raid1 raid0 multipath linear 8139too crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul qxl drm_kms_helper syscopyarea aesni_intel sysfillrect sysimgblt fb_sys_fops ttm drm aes_x86_64 crypto_simd cryptd 8139cp glue_helper mii pata_acpi floppy
[ 548.623217] CPU: 1 PID: 1295 Comm: mount Tainted: G B 4.18.0-rc1+ #4
[ 548.623219] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Ubuntu-1.8.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
[ 548.623226] RIP: 0010:__alloc_pages_slowpath+0xe4a/0x1420
[ 548.623227] Code: ff ff 01 89 85 c8 fe ff ff e9 91 fc ff ff 41 89 c5 e9 5c fc ff ff 0f 0b 89 f8 25 ff ff f7 ff 89 85 8c fe ff ff e9 d5 f2 ff ff <0f> 0b e9 65 f2 ff ff 65 8b 05 38 81 d2 47 f6 c4 01 74 1c 65 48 8b
[ 548.623281] RSP: 0018:ffff8801f28c7678 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 548.623284] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 00000000006040c0 RCX: ffffffffb82f73b7
[ 548.623287] RDX: 1ffff1003e518eeb RSI: 000000000000000c RDI: 0000000000000000
[ 548.623290] RBP: ffff8801f28c7880 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffed0047fff2c5
[ 548.623292] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffed0047fff2c4 R12: ffff8801e88de040
[ 548.623295] R13: 00000000006040c0 R14: 000000000000000c R15: ffff8801f28c7938
[ 548.623299] FS: 00007f76fca51840(0000) GS:ffff8801f6f00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 548.623302] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 548.623304] CR2: 00007f19b9171760 CR3: 00000001ed952000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
[ 548.623317] Call Trace:
[ 548.623325] ? kasan_check_read+0x11/0x20
[ 548.623330] ? __zone_watermark_ok+0x92/0x240
[ 548.623336] ? get_page_from_freelist+0x1c3/0x1d90
[ 548.623347] ? _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x2a/0x60
[ 548.623353] ? warn_alloc+0x250/0x250
[ 548.623358] ? save_stack+0x46/0xd0
[ 548.623361] ? kasan_kmalloc+0xad/0xe0
[ 548.623366] ? __isolate_free_page+0x2a0/0x2a0
[ 548.623370] ? mount_fs+0x60/0x1a0
[ 548.623374] ? vfs_kern_mount+0x6b/0x1a0
[ 548.623378] ? do_mount+0x34a/0x18c0
[ 548.623383] ? ksys_mount+0x83/0xd0
[ 548.623387] ? __x64_sys_mount+0x67/0x80
[ 548.623391] ? do_syscall_64+0x78/0x170
[ 548.623396] ? entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
[ 548.623401] __alloc_pages_nodemask+0x3c5/0x400
[ 548.623407] ? __alloc_pages_slowpath+0x1420/0x1420
[ 548.623412] ? __mutex_lock_slowpath+0x20/0x20
[ 548.623417] ? kvmalloc_node+0x31/0x80
[ 548.623424] alloc_pages_current+0x75/0x110
[ 548.623436] kmalloc_order+0x24/0x60
[ 548.623442] kmalloc_order_trace+0x24/0xb0
[ 548.623448] __kmalloc_track_caller+0x207/0x220
[ 548.623455] ? f2fs_build_node_manager+0x399/0xbb0
[ 548.623460] kmemdup+0x20/0x50
[ 548.623465] f2fs_build_node_manager+0x399/0xbb0
[ 548.623470] f2fs_fill_super+0x195e/0x2b40
[ 548.623477] ? f2fs_commit_super+0x1b0/0x1b0
[ 548.623481] ? set_blocksize+0x90/0x140
[ 548.623486] mount_bdev+0x1c5/0x210
[ 548.623489] ? f2fs_commit_super+0x1b0/0x1b0
[ 548.623495] f2fs_mount+0x15/0x20
[ 548.623498] mount_fs+0x60/0x1a0
[ 548.623503] ? alloc_vfsmnt+0x309/0x360
[ 548.623508] vfs_kern_mount+0x6b/0x1a0
[ 548.623513] do_mount+0x34a/0x18c0
[ 548.623518] ? lockref_put_or_lock+0xcf/0x160
[ 548.623523] ? copy_mount_string+0x20/0x20
[ 548.623528] ? memcg_kmem_put_cache+0x1b/0xa0
[ 548.623533] ? kasan_check_write+0x14/0x20
[ 548.623537] ? _copy_from_user+0x6a/0x90
[ 548.623542] ? memdup_user+0x42/0x60
[ 548.623547] ksys_mount+0x83/0xd0
[ 548.623552] __x64_sys_mount+0x67/0x80
[ 548.623557] do_syscall_64+0x78/0x170
[ 548.623562] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
[ 548.623566] RIP: 0033:0x7f76fc331b9a
[ 548.623567] Code: 48 8b 0d 01 c3 2b 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 49 89 ca b8 a5 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d ce c2 2b 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48
[ 548.623632] RSP: 002b:00007ffd4f0a0e48 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a5
[ 548.623636] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000146c030 RCX: 00007f76fc331b9a
[ 548.623639] RDX: 000000000146c210 RSI: 000000000146df30 RDI: 0000000001474ec0
[ 548.623641] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000013
[ 548.623643] R10: 00000000c0ed0000 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 0000000001474ec0
[ 548.623646] R13: 000000000146c210 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000003
[ 548.623650] ---[ end trace 4ce02f25ff7d3df5 ]---
[ 548.623656] F2FS-fs (loop0): Failed to initialize F2FS node manager
[ 548.627936] F2FS-fs (loop0): Invalid log blocks per segment (8201)
[ 548.627940] F2FS-fs (loop0): Can't find valid F2FS filesystem in 1th superblock
[ 548.635835] F2FS-fs (loop0): Failed to initialize F2FS node manager
- Location
https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/v4.18-rc1/source/fs/f2fs/segment.c#L3578
sit_i->sit_bitmap = kmemdup(src_bitmap, bitmap_size, GFP_KERNEL);
Buffer overrun happens when doing memcpy. I suspect there is missing (inconsistent) checks on bitmap_size.
Reported by Wen Xu (wen.xu@gatech.edu) from SSLab, Gatech.
Reported-by: Wen Xu <wen.xu@gatech.edu>
Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
|
||
|
Chao Yu
|
42bf546c1f |
f2fs: fix to do sanity check with secs_per_zone
As Wen Xu reported in below link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=200183 - Overview Divide zero in reset_curseg() when mounting a crafted f2fs image - Reproduce - Kernel message [ 588.281510] divide error: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI [ 588.282701] CPU: 0 PID: 1293 Comm: mount Not tainted 4.18.0-rc1+ #4 [ 588.284000] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Ubuntu-1.8.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014 [ 588.286178] RIP: 0010:reset_curseg+0x94/0x1a0 [ 588.298166] RSP: 0018:ffff8801e88d7940 EFLAGS: 00010246 [ 588.299360] RAX: 0000000000000014 RBX: ffff8801e1d46d00 RCX: ffffffffb88bf60b [ 588.300809] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: dffffc0000000000 RDI: ffff8801e1d46d64 [ 588.305272] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000014 R15: 0000000000000000 [ 588.306822] FS: 00007fad85008840(0000) GS:ffff8801f6e00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 588.308456] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 588.309623] CR2: 0000000001705078 CR3: 00000001f30f8000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 [ 588.311085] Call Trace: [ 588.311637] f2fs_build_segment_manager+0x103f/0x3410 [ 588.316136] ? f2fs_commit_super+0x1b0/0x1b0 [ 588.317031] ? set_blocksize+0x90/0x140 [ 588.319473] f2fs_mount+0x15/0x20 [ 588.320166] mount_fs+0x60/0x1a0 [ 588.320847] ? alloc_vfsmnt+0x309/0x360 [ 588.321647] vfs_kern_mount+0x6b/0x1a0 [ 588.322432] do_mount+0x34a/0x18c0 [ 588.323175] ? strndup_user+0x46/0x70 [ 588.323937] ? copy_mount_string+0x20/0x20 [ 588.324793] ? memcg_kmem_put_cache+0x1b/0xa0 [ 588.325702] ? kasan_check_write+0x14/0x20 [ 588.326562] ? _copy_from_user+0x6a/0x90 [ 588.327375] ? memdup_user+0x42/0x60 [ 588.328118] ksys_mount+0x83/0xd0 [ 588.328808] __x64_sys_mount+0x67/0x80 [ 588.329607] do_syscall_64+0x78/0x170 [ 588.330400] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 [ 588.331461] RIP: 0033:0x7fad848e8b9a [ 588.336022] RSP: 002b:00007ffd7c5b6be8 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a5 [ 588.337547] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00000000016f8030 RCX: 00007fad848e8b9a [ 588.338999] RDX: 00000000016f8210 RSI: 00000000016f9f30 RDI: 0000000001700ec0 [ 588.340442] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000013 [ 588.341887] R10: 00000000c0ed0000 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 0000000001700ec0 [ 588.343341] R13: 00000000016f8210 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000003 [ 588.354891] ---[ end trace 4ce02f25ff7d3df5 ]--- [ 588.355862] RIP: 0010:reset_curseg+0x94/0x1a0 [ 588.360742] RSP: 0018:ffff8801e88d7940 EFLAGS: 00010246 [ 588.361812] RAX: 0000000000000014 RBX: ffff8801e1d46d00 RCX: ffffffffb88bf60b [ 588.363485] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: dffffc0000000000 RDI: ffff8801e1d46d64 [ 588.365213] RBP: ffff8801e88d7968 R08: ffffed003c32266f R09: ffffed003c32266f [ 588.366661] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffed003c32266e R12: ffff8801f0337700 [ 588.368110] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000014 R15: 0000000000000000 [ 588.370057] FS: 00007fad85008840(0000) GS:ffff8801f6e00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 588.372099] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 588.373291] CR2: 0000000001705078 CR3: 00000001f30f8000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 - Location https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/latest/source/fs/f2fs/segment.c#L2147 curseg->zone = GET_ZONE_FROM_SEG(sbi, curseg->segno); If secs_per_zone is corrupted due to fuzzing test, it will cause divide zero operation when using GET_ZONE_FROM_SEG macro, so we should do more sanity check with secs_per_zone during mount to avoid this issue. Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org> |
||
|
Chao Yu
|
67fce70ba3 |
f2fs: disable f2fs_check_rb_tree_consistence
If there is millions of discard entries cached in rb tree, each sanity check of it can cause very long latency as held cmd_lock blocking other lock grabbers. In other aspect, we have enabled the check very long time, as we see, there is no such inconsistent condition caused by bugs. But still we do not choose to kill it directly, instead, adding an flag to disable the check now, if there is related code change, we can reuse it to detect bugs. Signed-off-by: Yunlei He <heyunlei@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org> |
||
|
Chao Yu
|
e1da7872f6 |
f2fs: introduce and spread verify_blkaddr
This patch introduces verify_blkaddr to check meta/data block address with valid range to detect bug earlier. In addition, once we encounter an invalid blkaddr, notice user to run fsck to fix, and let the kernel panic. Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org> |
||
|
Arnd Bergmann
|
24b81dfcb7 |
f2fs: use timespec64 for inode timestamps
The on-disk representation and the vfs both use 64-bit tv_sec values, so let's change the last missing piece in the middle. Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Reviewed-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org> |
||
|
Chao Yu
|
6aead1617b |
f2fs: fix to wait on page writeback before updating page
In error path of f2fs_move_rehashed_dirents, inode page could be writeback state, so we should wait on inode page writeback before updating it. Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org> |
||
|
Jaegeuk Kim
|
e2e59414aa |
f2fs: assign REQ_RAHEAD to bio for ->readpages
As Jens reported, we'd better assign REQ_RAHEAD to bio by the fact that ->readpages is called only from read-ahead. In Documentation/filesystems/vfs.txt, readpages: called by the VM to read pages associated with the address_space object. This is essentially just a vector version of readpage. Instead of just one page, several pages are requested. readpages is only used for read-ahead, so read errors are ignored. If anything goes wrong, feel free to give up. Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> Reviewed-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org> |
||
|
Yunlei He
|
2a63531a61 |
f2fs: fix a hungtask problem caused by congestion_wait
This patch fix hungtask problem which can be reproduced as follow:
Thread 0~3:
while true
do
touch /xxx/test/file_xxx
done
Thread 4 write a new checkpoint every three seconds.
In the meantime, fio start 16 threads for randwrite.
With my debug info, cycles num will exceed 1000 in function
f2fs_sync_dirty_inodes, and most of cycle will be dropped
into congestion_wait() and sleep more than 20ms. Cycles num
reduced to 3 with this patch.
Signed-off-by: Yunlei He <heyunlei@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
|
||
|
Dan Carpenter
|
2a96d8ad94 |
f2fs: Fix uninitialized return in f2fs_ioc_shutdown()
"ret" can be uninitialized on the success path when "in ==
F2FS_GOING_DOWN_FULLSYNC".
Fixes:
|
||
|
Jaegeuk Kim
|
5a6154920f |
f2fs: don't issue discard commands in online discard is on
Actually, we don't need to issue discard commands, if discard is on, as mentioned in the comment. Reviewed-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org> |
||
|
Chao Yu
|
e2374015f2 |
f2fs: fix to propagate return value of scan_nat_page()
As Anatoly Trosinenko reported in bugzilla:
How to reproduce:
1. Compile the
|
||
|
Weichao Guo
|
54c55c4e4f |
f2fs: support in-memory inode checksum when checking consistency
Enable in-memory inode checksum to protect metadata blocks from in-memory scribbles when checking consistency, which has no performance requirements. Signed-off-by: Weichao Guo <guoweichao@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org> |
||
|
Chao Yu
|
4e423832a6 |
f2fs: fix error path of fill_super
In fill_super, if root inode's attribute is incorrect, we need to call f2fs_destroy_stats to release stats memory. Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org> |
||
|
Chao Yu
|
4cac90d549 |
f2fs: relocate readdir_ra configure initialization
readdir_ra is sysfs configuration instead of mount option, so it should not be initialized in default_options(), otherwise after remount, it can be reset to be enabled which may not as user wish, so let's move it to f2fs_tuning_parameters(). Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org> |
||
|
Chao Yu
|
0aa7e0f8c0 |
f2fs: move s_res{u,g}id initialization to default_options()
Let default_options() initialize s_res{u,g}id with default value like
other options.
Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
|
||
|
Chao Yu
|
76a45e3c45 |
f2fs: don't acquire orphan ino during recovery
During orphan inode recovery, checkpoint should never succeed due to SBI_POR_DOING flag, so we don't need acquire orphan ino which only be used by checkpoint. Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org> |
||
|
Jaegeuk Kim
|
a1933c09ef |
f2fs: avoid potential deadlock in f2fs_sbi_store
[ 155.018460] ====================================================== [ 155.021431] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected [ 155.024339] 4.18.0-rc3+ #5 Tainted: G OE [ 155.026879] ------------------------------------------------------ [ 155.029783] umount/2901 is trying to acquire lock: [ 155.032187] 00000000c4282f1f (kn->count#130){++++}, at: kernfs_remove+0x1f/0x30 [ 155.035439] [ 155.035439] but task is already holding lock: [ 155.038892] 0000000056e4307b (&type->s_umount_key#41){++++}, at: deactivate_super+0x33/0x50 [ 155.042602] [ 155.042602] which lock already depends on the new lock. [ 155.042602] [ 155.047465] [ 155.047465] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: [ 155.051354] [ 155.051354] -> #1 (&type->s_umount_key#41){++++}: [ 155.054768] f2fs_sbi_store+0x61/0x460 [f2fs] [ 155.057083] kernfs_fop_write+0x113/0x1a0 [ 155.059277] __vfs_write+0x36/0x180 [ 155.061250] vfs_write+0xbe/0x1b0 [ 155.063179] ksys_write+0x55/0xc0 [ 155.065068] do_syscall_64+0x60/0x1b0 [ 155.067071] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe [ 155.069529] [ 155.069529] -> #0 (kn->count#130){++++}: [ 155.072421] __kernfs_remove+0x26f/0x2e0 [ 155.074452] kernfs_remove+0x1f/0x30 [ 155.076342] kobject_del.part.5+0xe/0x40 [ 155.078354] f2fs_put_super+0x12d/0x290 [f2fs] [ 155.080500] generic_shutdown_super+0x6c/0x110 [ 155.082655] kill_block_super+0x21/0x50 [ 155.084634] kill_f2fs_super+0x9c/0xc0 [f2fs] [ 155.086726] deactivate_locked_super+0x3f/0x70 [ 155.088826] cleanup_mnt+0x3b/0x70 [ 155.090584] task_work_run+0x93/0xc0 [ 155.092367] exit_to_usermode_loop+0xf0/0x100 [ 155.094466] do_syscall_64+0x162/0x1b0 [ 155.096312] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe [ 155.098603] [ 155.098603] other info that might help us debug this: [ 155.098603] [ 155.102418] Possible unsafe locking scenario: [ 155.102418] [ 155.105134] CPU0 CPU1 [ 155.107037] ---- ---- [ 155.108910] lock(&type->s_umount_key#41); [ 155.110674] lock(kn->count#130); [ 155.113010] lock(&type->s_umount_key#41); [ 155.115608] lock(kn->count#130); Reviewed-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org> |
||
|
Jaegeuk Kim
|
83a3bfdb5a |
f2fs: indicate shutdown f2fs to allow unmount successfully
Once we shutdown f2fs, we have to flush stale pages in order to unmount the system. In order to make stable, we need to stop fault injection as well. Reviewed-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org> |
||
|
Jaegeuk Kim
|
af697c0f5c |
f2fs: keep meta pages in cp_error state
It turns out losing meta pages in shutdown period makes f2fs very unstable so that I could see many unexpected error conditions. Let's keep meta pages for fault injection and sudden power-off tests. Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org> |
||
|
Jaegeuk Kim
|
1cb50f87e1 |
f2fs: do checkpoint in kill_sb
When unmounting f2fs in force mode, we can get it stuck by io_schedule() by some pending IOs in meta_inode. io_schedule+0xd/0x30 wait_on_page_bit_common+0xc6/0x130 __filemap_fdatawait_range+0xbd/0x100 filemap_fdatawait_keep_errors+0x15/0x40 sync_inodes_sb+0x1cf/0x240 sync_filesystem+0x52/0x90 generic_shutdown_super+0x1d/0x110 kill_f2fs_super+0x28/0x80 [f2fs] deactivate_locked_super+0x35/0x60 cleanup_mnt+0x36/0x70 task_work_run+0x79/0xa0 exit_to_usermode_loop+0x62/0x70 do_syscall_64+0xdb/0xf0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 0xffffffffffffffff Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org> |
||
|
Jaegeuk Kim
|
8a56dd9685 |
f2fs: allow wrong configured dio to buffered write
This fixes to support dio having unaligned buffers as buffered writes. xfs_io -f -d -c "pwrite 0 512" $testfile -> okay xfs_io -f -d -c "pwrite 1 512" $testfile -> EINVAL Reviewed-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org> |
||
|
Jaegeuk Kim
|
7f2ecdd837 |
f2fs: flush journal nat entries for nat_bits during unmount
Let's flush journal nat entries for speed up in the next run. Reviewed-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org> |
||
|
Linus Torvalds
|
7a932516f5 |
vfs/y2038: inode timestamps conversion to timespec64
This is a late set of changes from Deepa Dinamani doing an automated
treewide conversion of the inode and iattr structures from 'timespec'
to 'timespec64', to push the conversion from the VFS layer into the
individual file systems.
There were no conflicts between this and the contents of linux-next
until just before the merge window, when we saw multiple problems:
- A minor conflict with my own y2038 fixes, which I could address
by adding another patch on top here.
- One semantic conflict with late changes to the NFS tree. I addressed
this by merging Deepa's original branch on top of the changes that
now got merged into mainline and making sure the merge commit includes
the necessary changes as produced by coccinelle.
- A trivial conflict against the removal of staging/lustre.
- Multiple conflicts against the VFS changes in the overlayfs tree.
These are still part of linux-next, but apparently this is no longer
intended for 4.18 [1], so I am ignoring that part.
As Deepa writes:
The series aims to switch vfs timestamps to use struct timespec64.
Currently vfs uses struct timespec, which is not y2038 safe.
The series involves the following:
1. Add vfs helper functions for supporting struct timepec64 timestamps.
2. Cast prints of vfs timestamps to avoid warnings after the switch.
3. Simplify code using vfs timestamps so that the actual
replacement becomes easy.
4. Convert vfs timestamps to use struct timespec64 using a script.
This is a flag day patch.
Next steps:
1. Convert APIs that can handle timespec64, instead of converting
timestamps at the boundaries.
2. Update internal data structures to avoid timestamp conversions.
Thomas Gleixner adds:
I think there is no point to drag that out for the next merge window.
The whole thing needs to be done in one go for the core changes which
means that you're going to play that catchup game forever. Let's get
over with it towards the end of the merge window.
[1] https://www.spinics.net/lists/linux-fsdevel/msg128294.html
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Merge tag 'vfs-timespec64' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/arnd/playground
Pull inode timestamps conversion to timespec64 from Arnd Bergmann:
"This is a late set of changes from Deepa Dinamani doing an automated
treewide conversion of the inode and iattr structures from 'timespec'
to 'timespec64', to push the conversion from the VFS layer into the
individual file systems.
As Deepa writes:
'The series aims to switch vfs timestamps to use struct timespec64.
Currently vfs uses struct timespec, which is not y2038 safe.
The series involves the following:
1. Add vfs helper functions for supporting struct timepec64
timestamps.
2. Cast prints of vfs timestamps to avoid warnings after the switch.
3. Simplify code using vfs timestamps so that the actual replacement
becomes easy.
4. Convert vfs timestamps to use struct timespec64 using a script.
This is a flag day patch.
Next steps:
1. Convert APIs that can handle timespec64, instead of converting
timestamps at the boundaries.
2. Update internal data structures to avoid timestamp conversions'
Thomas Gleixner adds:
'I think there is no point to drag that out for the next merge
window. The whole thing needs to be done in one go for the core
changes which means that you're going to play that catchup game
forever. Let's get over with it towards the end of the merge window'"
* tag 'vfs-timespec64' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/arnd/playground:
pstore: Remove bogus format string definition
vfs: change inode times to use struct timespec64
pstore: Convert internal records to timespec64
udf: Simplify calls to udf_disk_stamp_to_time
fs: nfs: get rid of memcpys for inode times
ceph: make inode time prints to be long long
lustre: Use long long type to print inode time
fs: add timespec64_truncate()
|
||
|
Arnd Bergmann
|
15eefe2a99 |
Merge branch 'vfs_timespec64' of https://github.com/deepa-hub/vfs into vfs-timespec64
Pull the timespec64 conversion from Deepa Dinamani:
"The series aims to switch vfs timestamps to use
struct timespec64. Currently vfs uses struct timespec,
which is not y2038 safe.
The flag patch applies cleanly. I've not seen the timestamps
update logic change often. The series applies cleanly on 4.17-rc6
and linux-next tip (top commit: next-20180517).
I'm not sure how to merge this kind of a series with a flag patch.
We are targeting 4.18 for this.
Let me know if you have other suggestions.
The series involves the following:
1. Add vfs helper functions for supporting struct timepec64 timestamps.
2. Cast prints of vfs timestamps to avoid warnings after the switch.
3. Simplify code using vfs timestamps so that the actual
replacement becomes easy.
4. Convert vfs timestamps to use struct timespec64 using a script.
This is a flag day patch.
I've tried to keep the conversions with the script simple, to
aid in the reviews. I've kept all the internal filesystem data
structures and function signatures the same.
Next steps:
1. Convert APIs that can handle timespec64, instead of converting
timestamps at the boundaries.
2. Update internal data structures to avoid timestamp conversions."
I've pulled it into a branch based on top of the NFS changes that
are now in mainline, so I could resolve the non-obvious conflict
between the two while merging.
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
|
||
|
Kees Cook
|
9d2a789c1d |
treewide: Use array_size in f2fs_kvzalloc()
The f2fs_kvzalloc() function has no 2-factor argument form, so
multiplication factors need to be wrapped in array_size(). This patch
replaces cases of:
f2fs_kvzalloc(handle, a * b, gfp)
with:
f2fs_kvzalloc(handle, array_size(a, b), gfp)
as well as handling cases of:
f2fs_kvzalloc(handle, a * b * c, gfp)
with:
f2fs_kvzalloc(handle, array3_size(a, b, c), gfp)
This does, however, attempt to ignore constant size factors like:
f2fs_kvzalloc(handle, 4 * 1024, gfp)
though any constants defined via macros get caught up in the conversion.
Any factors with a sizeof() of "unsigned char", "char", and "u8" were
dropped, since they're redundant.
The Coccinelle script used for this was:
// Fix redundant parens around sizeof().
@@
expression HANDLE;
type TYPE;
expression THING, E;
@@
(
f2fs_kvzalloc(HANDLE,
- (sizeof(TYPE)) * E
+ sizeof(TYPE) * E
, ...)
|
f2fs_kvzalloc(HANDLE,
- (sizeof(THING)) * E
+ sizeof(THING) * E
, ...)
)
// Drop single-byte sizes and redundant parens.
@@
expression HANDLE;
expression COUNT;
typedef u8;
typedef __u8;
@@
(
f2fs_kvzalloc(HANDLE,
- sizeof(u8) * (COUNT)
+ COUNT
, ...)
|
f2fs_kvzalloc(HANDLE,
- sizeof(__u8) * (COUNT)
+ COUNT
, ...)
|
f2fs_kvzalloc(HANDLE,
- sizeof(char) * (COUNT)
+ COUNT
, ...)
|
f2fs_kvzalloc(HANDLE,
- sizeof(unsigned char) * (COUNT)
+ COUNT
, ...)
|
f2fs_kvzalloc(HANDLE,
- sizeof(u8) * COUNT
+ COUNT
, ...)
|
f2fs_kvzalloc(HANDLE,
- sizeof(__u8) * COUNT
+ COUNT
, ...)
|
f2fs_kvzalloc(HANDLE,
- sizeof(char) * COUNT
+ COUNT
, ...)
|
f2fs_kvzalloc(HANDLE,
- sizeof(unsigned char) * COUNT
+ COUNT
, ...)
)
// 2-factor product with sizeof(type/expression) and identifier or constant.
@@
expression HANDLE;
type TYPE;
expression THING;
identifier COUNT_ID;
constant COUNT_CONST;
@@
(
f2fs_kvzalloc(HANDLE,
- sizeof(TYPE) * (COUNT_ID)
+ array_size(COUNT_ID, sizeof(TYPE))
, ...)
|
f2fs_kvzalloc(HANDLE,
- sizeof(TYPE) * COUNT_ID
+ array_size(COUNT_ID, sizeof(TYPE))
, ...)
|
f2fs_kvzalloc(HANDLE,
- sizeof(TYPE) * (COUNT_CONST)
+ array_size(COUNT_CONST, sizeof(TYPE))
, ...)
|
f2fs_kvzalloc(HANDLE,
- sizeof(TYPE) * COUNT_CONST
+ array_size(COUNT_CONST, sizeof(TYPE))
, ...)
|
f2fs_kvzalloc(HANDLE,
- sizeof(THING) * (COUNT_ID)
+ array_size(COUNT_ID, sizeof(THING))
, ...)
|
f2fs_kvzalloc(HANDLE,
- sizeof(THING) * COUNT_ID
+ array_size(COUNT_ID, sizeof(THING))
, ...)
|
f2fs_kvzalloc(HANDLE,
- sizeof(THING) * (COUNT_CONST)
+ array_size(COUNT_CONST, sizeof(THING))
, ...)
|
f2fs_kvzalloc(HANDLE,
- sizeof(THING) * COUNT_CONST
+ array_size(COUNT_CONST, sizeof(THING))
, ...)
)
// 2-factor product, only identifiers.
@@
expression HANDLE;
identifier SIZE, COUNT;
@@
f2fs_kvzalloc(HANDLE,
- SIZE * COUNT
+ array_size(COUNT, SIZE)
, ...)
// 3-factor product with 1 sizeof(type) or sizeof(expression), with
// redundant parens removed.
@@
expression HANDLE;
expression THING;
identifier STRIDE, COUNT;
type TYPE;
@@
(
f2fs_kvzalloc(HANDLE,
- sizeof(TYPE) * (COUNT) * (STRIDE)
+ array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(TYPE))
, ...)
|
f2fs_kvzalloc(HANDLE,
- sizeof(TYPE) * (COUNT) * STRIDE
+ array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(TYPE))
, ...)
|
f2fs_kvzalloc(HANDLE,
- sizeof(TYPE) * COUNT * (STRIDE)
+ array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(TYPE))
, ...)
|
f2fs_kvzalloc(HANDLE,
- sizeof(TYPE) * COUNT * STRIDE
+ array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(TYPE))
, ...)
|
f2fs_kvzalloc(HANDLE,
- sizeof(THING) * (COUNT) * (STRIDE)
+ array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(THING))
, ...)
|
f2fs_kvzalloc(HANDLE,
- sizeof(THING) * (COUNT) * STRIDE
+ array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(THING))
, ...)
|
f2fs_kvzalloc(HANDLE,
- sizeof(THING) * COUNT * (STRIDE)
+ array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(THING))
, ...)
|
f2fs_kvzalloc(HANDLE,
- sizeof(THING) * COUNT * STRIDE
+ array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(THING))
, ...)
)
// 3-factor product with 2 sizeof(variable), with redundant parens removed.
@@
expression HANDLE;
expression THING1, THING2;
identifier COUNT;
type TYPE1, TYPE2;
@@
(
f2fs_kvzalloc(HANDLE,
- sizeof(TYPE1) * sizeof(TYPE2) * COUNT
+ array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(TYPE1), sizeof(TYPE2))
, ...)
|
f2fs_kvzalloc(HANDLE,
- sizeof(TYPE1) * sizeof(THING2) * (COUNT)
+ array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(TYPE1), sizeof(TYPE2))
, ...)
|
f2fs_kvzalloc(HANDLE,
- sizeof(THING1) * sizeof(THING2) * COUNT
+ array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(THING1), sizeof(THING2))
, ...)
|
f2fs_kvzalloc(HANDLE,
- sizeof(THING1) * sizeof(THING2) * (COUNT)
+ array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(THING1), sizeof(THING2))
, ...)
|
f2fs_kvzalloc(HANDLE,
- sizeof(TYPE1) * sizeof(THING2) * COUNT
+ array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(TYPE1), sizeof(THING2))
, ...)
|
f2fs_kvzalloc(HANDLE,
- sizeof(TYPE1) * sizeof(THING2) * (COUNT)
+ array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(TYPE1), sizeof(THING2))
, ...)
)
// 3-factor product, only identifiers, with redundant parens removed.
@@
expression HANDLE;
identifier STRIDE, SIZE, COUNT;
@@
(
f2fs_kvzalloc(HANDLE,
- (COUNT) * STRIDE * SIZE
+ array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE)
, ...)
|
f2fs_kvzalloc(HANDLE,
- COUNT * (STRIDE) * SIZE
+ array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE)
, ...)
|
f2fs_kvzalloc(HANDLE,
- COUNT * STRIDE * (SIZE)
+ array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE)
, ...)
|
f2fs_kvzalloc(HANDLE,
- (COUNT) * (STRIDE) * SIZE
+ array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE)
, ...)
|
f2fs_kvzalloc(HANDLE,
- COUNT * (STRIDE) * (SIZE)
+ array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE)
, ...)
|
f2fs_kvzalloc(HANDLE,
- (COUNT) * STRIDE * (SIZE)
+ array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE)
, ...)
|
f2fs_kvzalloc(HANDLE,
- (COUNT) * (STRIDE) * (SIZE)
+ array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE)
, ...)
|
f2fs_kvzalloc(HANDLE,
- COUNT * STRIDE * SIZE
+ array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE)
, ...)
)
// Any remaining multi-factor products, first at least 3-factor products
// when they're not all constants...
@@
expression HANDLE;
expression E1, E2, E3;
constant C1, C2, C3;
@@
(
f2fs_kvzalloc(HANDLE, C1 * C2 * C3, ...)
|
f2fs_kvzalloc(HANDLE,
- E1 * E2 * E3
+ array3_size(E1, E2, E3)
, ...)
)
// And then all remaining 2 factors products when they're not all constants.
@@
expression HANDLE;
expression E1, E2;
constant C1, C2;
@@
(
f2fs_kvzalloc(HANDLE, C1 * C2, ...)
|
f2fs_kvzalloc(HANDLE,
- E1 * E2
+ array_size(E1, E2)
, ...)
)
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
|
||
|
Kees Cook
|
026f05079b |
treewide: Use array_size() in f2fs_kzalloc()
The f2fs_kzalloc() function has no 2-factor argument form, so
multiplication factors need to be wrapped in array_size(). This patch
replaces cases of:
f2fs_kzalloc(handle, a * b, gfp)
with:
f2fs_kzalloc(handle, array_size(a, b), gfp)
as well as handling cases of:
f2fs_kzalloc(handle, a * b * c, gfp)
with:
f2fs_kzalloc(handle, array3_size(a, b, c), gfp)
This does, however, attempt to ignore constant size factors like:
f2fs_kzalloc(handle, 4 * 1024, gfp)
though any constants defined via macros get caught up in the conversion.
Any factors with a sizeof() of "unsigned char", "char", and "u8" were
dropped, since they're redundant.
The Coccinelle script used for this was:
// Fix redundant parens around sizeof().
@@
expression HANDLE;
type TYPE;
expression THING, E;
@@
(
f2fs_kzalloc(HANDLE,
- (sizeof(TYPE)) * E
+ sizeof(TYPE) * E
, ...)
|
f2fs_kzalloc(HANDLE,
- (sizeof(THING)) * E
+ sizeof(THING) * E
, ...)
)
// Drop single-byte sizes and redundant parens.
@@
expression HANDLE;
expression COUNT;
typedef u8;
typedef __u8;
@@
(
f2fs_kzalloc(HANDLE,
- sizeof(u8) * (COUNT)
+ COUNT
, ...)
|
f2fs_kzalloc(HANDLE,
- sizeof(__u8) * (COUNT)
+ COUNT
, ...)
|
f2fs_kzalloc(HANDLE,
- sizeof(char) * (COUNT)
+ COUNT
, ...)
|
f2fs_kzalloc(HANDLE,
- sizeof(unsigned char) * (COUNT)
+ COUNT
, ...)
|
f2fs_kzalloc(HANDLE,
- sizeof(u8) * COUNT
+ COUNT
, ...)
|
f2fs_kzalloc(HANDLE,
- sizeof(__u8) * COUNT
+ COUNT
, ...)
|
f2fs_kzalloc(HANDLE,
- sizeof(char) * COUNT
+ COUNT
, ...)
|
f2fs_kzalloc(HANDLE,
- sizeof(unsigned char) * COUNT
+ COUNT
, ...)
)
// 2-factor product with sizeof(type/expression) and identifier or constant.
@@
expression HANDLE;
type TYPE;
expression THING;
identifier COUNT_ID;
constant COUNT_CONST;
@@
(
f2fs_kzalloc(HANDLE,
- sizeof(TYPE) * (COUNT_ID)
+ array_size(COUNT_ID, sizeof(TYPE))
, ...)
|
f2fs_kzalloc(HANDLE,
- sizeof(TYPE) * COUNT_ID
+ array_size(COUNT_ID, sizeof(TYPE))
, ...)
|
f2fs_kzalloc(HANDLE,
- sizeof(TYPE) * (COUNT_CONST)
+ array_size(COUNT_CONST, sizeof(TYPE))
, ...)
|
f2fs_kzalloc(HANDLE,
- sizeof(TYPE) * COUNT_CONST
+ array_size(COUNT_CONST, sizeof(TYPE))
, ...)
|
f2fs_kzalloc(HANDLE,
- sizeof(THING) * (COUNT_ID)
+ array_size(COUNT_ID, sizeof(THING))
, ...)
|
f2fs_kzalloc(HANDLE,
- sizeof(THING) * COUNT_ID
+ array_size(COUNT_ID, sizeof(THING))
, ...)
|
f2fs_kzalloc(HANDLE,
- sizeof(THING) * (COUNT_CONST)
+ array_size(COUNT_CONST, sizeof(THING))
, ...)
|
f2fs_kzalloc(HANDLE,
- sizeof(THING) * COUNT_CONST
+ array_size(COUNT_CONST, sizeof(THING))
, ...)
)
// 2-factor product, only identifiers.
@@
expression HANDLE;
identifier SIZE, COUNT;
@@
f2fs_kzalloc(HANDLE,
- SIZE * COUNT
+ array_size(COUNT, SIZE)
, ...)
// 3-factor product with 1 sizeof(type) or sizeof(expression), with
// redundant parens removed.
@@
expression HANDLE;
expression THING;
identifier STRIDE, COUNT;
type TYPE;
@@
(
f2fs_kzalloc(HANDLE,
- sizeof(TYPE) * (COUNT) * (STRIDE)
+ array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(TYPE))
, ...)
|
f2fs_kzalloc(HANDLE,
- sizeof(TYPE) * (COUNT) * STRIDE
+ array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(TYPE))
, ...)
|
f2fs_kzalloc(HANDLE,
- sizeof(TYPE) * COUNT * (STRIDE)
+ array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(TYPE))
, ...)
|
f2fs_kzalloc(HANDLE,
- sizeof(TYPE) * COUNT * STRIDE
+ array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(TYPE))
, ...)
|
f2fs_kzalloc(HANDLE,
- sizeof(THING) * (COUNT) * (STRIDE)
+ array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(THING))
, ...)
|
f2fs_kzalloc(HANDLE,
- sizeof(THING) * (COUNT) * STRIDE
+ array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(THING))
, ...)
|
f2fs_kzalloc(HANDLE,
- sizeof(THING) * COUNT * (STRIDE)
+ array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(THING))
, ...)
|
f2fs_kzalloc(HANDLE,
- sizeof(THING) * COUNT * STRIDE
+ array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(THING))
, ...)
)
// 3-factor product with 2 sizeof(variable), with redundant parens removed.
@@
expression HANDLE;
expression THING1, THING2;
identifier COUNT;
type TYPE1, TYPE2;
@@
(
f2fs_kzalloc(HANDLE,
- sizeof(TYPE1) * sizeof(TYPE2) * COUNT
+ array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(TYPE1), sizeof(TYPE2))
, ...)
|
f2fs_kzalloc(HANDLE,
- sizeof(TYPE1) * sizeof(THING2) * (COUNT)
+ array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(TYPE1), sizeof(TYPE2))
, ...)
|
f2fs_kzalloc(HANDLE,
- sizeof(THING1) * sizeof(THING2) * COUNT
+ array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(THING1), sizeof(THING2))
, ...)
|
f2fs_kzalloc(HANDLE,
- sizeof(THING1) * sizeof(THING2) * (COUNT)
+ array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(THING1), sizeof(THING2))
, ...)
|
f2fs_kzalloc(HANDLE,
- sizeof(TYPE1) * sizeof(THING2) * COUNT
+ array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(TYPE1), sizeof(THING2))
, ...)
|
f2fs_kzalloc(HANDLE,
- sizeof(TYPE1) * sizeof(THING2) * (COUNT)
+ array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(TYPE1), sizeof(THING2))
, ...)
)
// 3-factor product, only identifiers, with redundant parens removed.
@@
expression HANDLE;
identifier STRIDE, SIZE, COUNT;
@@
(
f2fs_kzalloc(HANDLE,
- (COUNT) * STRIDE * SIZE
+ array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE)
, ...)
|
f2fs_kzalloc(HANDLE,
- COUNT * (STRIDE) * SIZE
+ array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE)
, ...)
|
f2fs_kzalloc(HANDLE,
- COUNT * STRIDE * (SIZE)
+ array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE)
, ...)
|
f2fs_kzalloc(HANDLE,
- (COUNT) * (STRIDE) * SIZE
+ array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE)
, ...)
|
f2fs_kzalloc(HANDLE,
- COUNT * (STRIDE) * (SIZE)
+ array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE)
, ...)
|
f2fs_kzalloc(HANDLE,
- (COUNT) * STRIDE * (SIZE)
+ array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE)
, ...)
|
f2fs_kzalloc(HANDLE,
- (COUNT) * (STRIDE) * (SIZE)
+ array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE)
, ...)
|
f2fs_kzalloc(HANDLE,
- COUNT * STRIDE * SIZE
+ array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE)
, ...)
)
// Any remaining multi-factor products, first at least 3-factor products
// when they're not all constants...
@@
expression HANDLE;
expression E1, E2, E3;
constant C1, C2, C3;
@@
(
f2fs_kzalloc(HANDLE, C1 * C2 * C3, ...)
|
f2fs_kzalloc(HANDLE,
- E1 * E2 * E3
+ array3_size(E1, E2, E3)
, ...)
)
// And then all remaining 2 factors products when they're not all constants.
@@
expression HANDLE;
expression E1, E2;
constant C1, C2;
@@
(
f2fs_kzalloc(HANDLE, C1 * C2, ...)
|
f2fs_kzalloc(HANDLE,
- E1 * E2
+ array_size(E1, E2)
, ...)
)
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
|
||
|
Kees Cook
|
c86065938a |
treewide: Use array_size() in f2fs_kmalloc()
The f2fs_kmalloc() function has no 2-factor argument form, so
multiplication factors need to be wrapped in array_size(). This patch
replaces cases of:
f2fs_kmalloc(handle, a * b, gfp)
with:
f2fs_kmalloc(handle, array_size(a, b), gfp)
as well as handling cases of:
f2fs_kmalloc(handle, a * b * c, gfp)
with:
f2fs_kmalloc(handle, array3_size(a, b, c), gfp)
This does, however, attempt to ignore constant size factors like:
f2fs_kmalloc(handle, 4 * 1024, gfp)
though any constants defined via macros get caught up in the conversion.
Any factors with a sizeof() of "unsigned char", "char", and "u8" were
dropped, since they're redundant.
The Coccinelle script used for this was:
// Fix redundant parens around sizeof().
@@
expression HANDLE;
type TYPE;
expression THING, E;
@@
(
f2fs_kmalloc(HANDLE,
- (sizeof(TYPE)) * E
+ sizeof(TYPE) * E
, ...)
|
f2fs_kmalloc(HANDLE,
- (sizeof(THING)) * E
+ sizeof(THING) * E
, ...)
)
// Drop single-byte sizes and redundant parens.
@@
expression HANDLE;
expression COUNT;
typedef u8;
typedef __u8;
@@
(
f2fs_kmalloc(HANDLE,
- sizeof(u8) * (COUNT)
+ COUNT
, ...)
|
f2fs_kmalloc(HANDLE,
- sizeof(__u8) * (COUNT)
+ COUNT
, ...)
|
f2fs_kmalloc(HANDLE,
- sizeof(char) * (COUNT)
+ COUNT
, ...)
|
f2fs_kmalloc(HANDLE,
- sizeof(unsigned char) * (COUNT)
+ COUNT
, ...)
|
f2fs_kmalloc(HANDLE,
- sizeof(u8) * COUNT
+ COUNT
, ...)
|
f2fs_kmalloc(HANDLE,
- sizeof(__u8) * COUNT
+ COUNT
, ...)
|
f2fs_kmalloc(HANDLE,
- sizeof(char) * COUNT
+ COUNT
, ...)
|
f2fs_kmalloc(HANDLE,
- sizeof(unsigned char) * COUNT
+ COUNT
, ...)
)
// 2-factor product with sizeof(type/expression) and identifier or constant.
@@
expression HANDLE;
type TYPE;
expression THING;
identifier COUNT_ID;
constant COUNT_CONST;
@@
(
f2fs_kmalloc(HANDLE,
- sizeof(TYPE) * (COUNT_ID)
+ array_size(COUNT_ID, sizeof(TYPE))
, ...)
|
f2fs_kmalloc(HANDLE,
- sizeof(TYPE) * COUNT_ID
+ array_size(COUNT_ID, sizeof(TYPE))
, ...)
|
f2fs_kmalloc(HANDLE,
- sizeof(TYPE) * (COUNT_CONST)
+ array_size(COUNT_CONST, sizeof(TYPE))
, ...)
|
f2fs_kmalloc(HANDLE,
- sizeof(TYPE) * COUNT_CONST
+ array_size(COUNT_CONST, sizeof(TYPE))
, ...)
|
f2fs_kmalloc(HANDLE,
- sizeof(THING) * (COUNT_ID)
+ array_size(COUNT_ID, sizeof(THING))
, ...)
|
f2fs_kmalloc(HANDLE,
- sizeof(THING) * COUNT_ID
+ array_size(COUNT_ID, sizeof(THING))
, ...)
|
f2fs_kmalloc(HANDLE,
- sizeof(THING) * (COUNT_CONST)
+ array_size(COUNT_CONST, sizeof(THING))
, ...)
|
f2fs_kmalloc(HANDLE,
- sizeof(THING) * COUNT_CONST
+ array_size(COUNT_CONST, sizeof(THING))
, ...)
)
// 2-factor product, only identifiers.
@@
expression HANDLE;
identifier SIZE, COUNT;
@@
f2fs_kmalloc(HANDLE,
- SIZE * COUNT
+ array_size(COUNT, SIZE)
, ...)
// 3-factor product with 1 sizeof(type) or sizeof(expression), with
// redundant parens removed.
@@
expression HANDLE;
expression THING;
identifier STRIDE, COUNT;
type TYPE;
@@
(
f2fs_kmalloc(HANDLE,
- sizeof(TYPE) * (COUNT) * (STRIDE)
+ array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(TYPE))
, ...)
|
f2fs_kmalloc(HANDLE,
- sizeof(TYPE) * (COUNT) * STRIDE
+ array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(TYPE))
, ...)
|
f2fs_kmalloc(HANDLE,
- sizeof(TYPE) * COUNT * (STRIDE)
+ array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(TYPE))
, ...)
|
f2fs_kmalloc(HANDLE,
- sizeof(TYPE) * COUNT * STRIDE
+ array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(TYPE))
, ...)
|
f2fs_kmalloc(HANDLE,
- sizeof(THING) * (COUNT) * (STRIDE)
+ array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(THING))
, ...)
|
f2fs_kmalloc(HANDLE,
- sizeof(THING) * (COUNT) * STRIDE
+ array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(THING))
, ...)
|
f2fs_kmalloc(HANDLE,
- sizeof(THING) * COUNT * (STRIDE)
+ array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(THING))
, ...)
|
f2fs_kmalloc(HANDLE,
- sizeof(THING) * COUNT * STRIDE
+ array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(THING))
, ...)
)
// 3-factor product with 2 sizeof(variable), with redundant parens removed.
@@
expression HANDLE;
expression THING1, THING2;
identifier COUNT;
type TYPE1, TYPE2;
@@
(
f2fs_kmalloc(HANDLE,
- sizeof(TYPE1) * sizeof(TYPE2) * COUNT
+ array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(TYPE1), sizeof(TYPE2))
, ...)
|
f2fs_kmalloc(HANDLE,
- sizeof(TYPE1) * sizeof(THING2) * (COUNT)
+ array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(TYPE1), sizeof(TYPE2))
, ...)
|
f2fs_kmalloc(HANDLE,
- sizeof(THING1) * sizeof(THING2) * COUNT
+ array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(THING1), sizeof(THING2))
, ...)
|
f2fs_kmalloc(HANDLE,
- sizeof(THING1) * sizeof(THING2) * (COUNT)
+ array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(THING1), sizeof(THING2))
, ...)
|
f2fs_kmalloc(HANDLE,
- sizeof(TYPE1) * sizeof(THING2) * COUNT
+ array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(TYPE1), sizeof(THING2))
, ...)
|
f2fs_kmalloc(HANDLE,
- sizeof(TYPE1) * sizeof(THING2) * (COUNT)
+ array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(TYPE1), sizeof(THING2))
, ...)
)
// 3-factor product, only identifiers, with redundant parens removed.
@@
expression HANDLE;
identifier STRIDE, SIZE, COUNT;
@@
(
f2fs_kmalloc(HANDLE,
- (COUNT) * STRIDE * SIZE
+ array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE)
, ...)
|
f2fs_kmalloc(HANDLE,
- COUNT * (STRIDE) * SIZE
+ array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE)
, ...)
|
f2fs_kmalloc(HANDLE,
- COUNT * STRIDE * (SIZE)
+ array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE)
, ...)
|
f2fs_kmalloc(HANDLE,
- (COUNT) * (STRIDE) * SIZE
+ array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE)
, ...)
|
f2fs_kmalloc(HANDLE,
- COUNT * (STRIDE) * (SIZE)
+ array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE)
, ...)
|
f2fs_kmalloc(HANDLE,
- (COUNT) * STRIDE * (SIZE)
+ array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE)
, ...)
|
f2fs_kmalloc(HANDLE,
- (COUNT) * (STRIDE) * (SIZE)
+ array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE)
, ...)
|
f2fs_kmalloc(HANDLE,
- COUNT * STRIDE * SIZE
+ array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE)
, ...)
)
// Any remaining multi-factor products, first at least 3-factor products
// when they're not all constants...
@@
expression HANDLE;
expression E1, E2, E3;
constant C1, C2, C3;
@@
(
f2fs_kmalloc(HANDLE, C1 * C2 * C3, ...)
|
f2fs_kmalloc(HANDLE,
- E1 * E2 * E3
+ array3_size(E1, E2, E3)
, ...)
)
// And then all remaining 2 factors products when they're not all constants.
@@
expression HANDLE;
expression E1, E2;
constant C1, C2;
@@
(
f2fs_kmalloc(HANDLE, C1 * C2, ...)
|
f2fs_kmalloc(HANDLE,
- E1 * E2
+ array_size(E1, E2)
, ...)
)
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
|
||
|
Linus Torvalds
|
d54d35c501 |
f2fs-for-4.18-rc1
In this round, we've mainly focused on discard, aka unmap, control along with fstrim for Android-specific usage model. In addition, we've fixed writepage flow which returned EAGAIN previously resulting in EIO of fsync(2) due to mapping's error state. In order to avoid old MM bug [1], we decided not to use __GFP_ZERO for the mapping for node and meta page caches. As always, we've cleaned up many places for future fsverity and symbol conflicts. Enhancement: - do discard/fstrim in lower priority considering fs utilization - split large discard commands into smaller ones for better responsiveness - add more sanity checks to address syzbot reports - add a mount option, fsync_mode=nobarrier, which can reduce # of cache flushes - clean up symbol namespace with modified function names - be strict on block allocation and IO control in corner cases Bug fix: - don't use __GFP_ZERO for mappings - fix error reports in writepage to avoid fsync() failure - avoid selinux denial on CAP_RESOURCE on resgid/resuid - fix some subtle race conditions in GC/atomic writes/shutdown - fix overflow bugs in sanity_check_raw_super - fix missing bits on get_flags Clean-up: - prepare the generic flow for future fsverity integration - fix some broken coding standard [1] https://lkml.org/lkml/2018/4/8/661 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQIzBAABCAAdFiEE00UqedjCtOrGVvQiQBSofoJIUNIFAlsepb8ACgkQQBSofoJI UNJdSw/+IhrYJFkJEN/pV4M5xSjYirl/P2WJ4AGi6HcpjEGmaDiBi2whod1Jw2NE 1auSMiby7K91VAmPvxMmmLhOdC8XgJ8jwY1nEaZMfmMXohlaD3FDY5bzYf5rJDF4 J184P6xUZ2IKlFVA4prwNQgYi3awPthVu1lxbFPp8GUHDbmr5ZXEysxPDzz2O0Em oE7WmklmyCHJPhmg/EcVXfF/Ekf3zMOVR+EI2otcDjnWIQioVetIK8CKi0MM4bkG X8Z318ANjGTd42woupXIzsiTrMRONY7zzkUvE+S6tfUjKZoIdofDM5OIXMdOxpxL DZ53WrwfeB74igD8jDZgqD6OaonIfDfCuKrwUASFAC2Ou4h3apj3ckUzoHtAhEUL z5yTSKTrtfuoSufhBp+nKKs3ijDgms76arw8x/pPdN6D6xDwIJtBPxC2sObPaj35 damv4GyM4+sbhGO/Gbie2q6za55IvYFZc7JNCC2D2K5tnBmUaa7/XdvxcyigniGk AZgkaddHePkAZpa5AYYirZR8bd7IFds0+m6VcybG0/pYb0qPEcI6U4mujBSCIwVy kXuD7su3jNjj6hWnCl5PSQo8yBWS5H8c6/o+5XHozzYA91dsLAmD8entuCreg6Hp NaIFio0qKULweLK86f66qQTsRPMpYRAtqPS0Ew0+3llKMcrlRp4= =JrW7 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Merge tag 'f2fs-for-4.18' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jaegeuk/f2fs Pull f2fs updates from Jaegeuk Kim: "In this round, we've mainly focused on discard, aka unmap, control along with fstrim for Android-specific usage model. In addition, we've fixed writepage flow which returned EAGAIN previously resulting in EIO of fsync(2) due to mapping's error state. In order to avoid old MM bug [1], we decided not to use __GFP_ZERO for the mapping for node and meta page caches. As always, we've cleaned up many places for future fsverity and symbol conflicts. Enhancements: - do discard/fstrim in lower priority considering fs utilization - split large discard commands into smaller ones for better responsiveness - add more sanity checks to address syzbot reports - add a mount option, fsync_mode=nobarrier, which can reduce # of cache flushes - clean up symbol namespace with modified function names - be strict on block allocation and IO control in corner cases Bug fixes: - don't use __GFP_ZERO for mappings - fix error reports in writepage to avoid fsync() failure - avoid selinux denial on CAP_RESOURCE on resgid/resuid - fix some subtle race conditions in GC/atomic writes/shutdown - fix overflow bugs in sanity_check_raw_super - fix missing bits on get_flags Clean-ups: - prepare the generic flow for future fsverity integration - fix some broken coding standard" [1] https://lkml.org/lkml/2018/4/8/661 * tag 'f2fs-for-4.18' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jaegeuk/f2fs: (79 commits) f2fs: fix to clear FI_VOLATILE_FILE correctly f2fs: let sync node IO interrupt async one f2fs: don't change wbc->sync_mode f2fs: fix to update mtime correctly fs: f2fs: insert space around that ':' and ', ' fs: f2fs: add missing blank lines after declarations fs: f2fs: changed variable type of offset "unsigned" to "loff_t" f2fs: clean up symbol namespace f2fs: make set_de_type() static f2fs: make __f2fs_write_data_pages() static f2fs: fix to avoid accessing cross the boundary f2fs: fix to let caller retry allocating block address disable loading f2fs module on PAGE_SIZE > 4KB f2fs: fix error path of move_data_page f2fs: don't drop dentry pages after fs shutdown f2fs: fix to avoid race during access gc_thread pointer f2fs: clean up with clear_radix_tree_dirty_tag f2fs: fix to don't trigger writeback during recovery f2fs: clear discard_wake earlier f2fs: let discard thread wait a little longer if dev is busy ... |
||
|
Deepa Dinamani
|
95582b0083 |
vfs: change inode times to use struct timespec64
struct timespec is not y2038 safe. Transition vfs to use
y2038 safe struct timespec64 instead.
The change was made with the help of the following cocinelle
script. This catches about 80% of the changes.
All the header file and logic changes are included in the
first 5 rules. The rest are trivial substitutions.
I avoid changing any of the function signatures or any other
filesystem specific data structures to keep the patch simple
for review.
The script can be a little shorter by combining different cases.
But, this version was sufficient for my usecase.
virtual patch
@ depends on patch @
identifier now;
@@
- struct timespec
+ struct timespec64
current_time ( ... )
{
- struct timespec now = current_kernel_time();
+ struct timespec64 now = current_kernel_time64();
...
- return timespec_trunc(
+ return timespec64_trunc(
... );
}
@ depends on patch @
identifier xtime;
@@
struct \( iattr \| inode \| kstat \) {
...
- struct timespec xtime;
+ struct timespec64 xtime;
...
}
@ depends on patch @
identifier t;
@@
struct inode_operations {
...
int (*update_time) (...,
- struct timespec t,
+ struct timespec64 t,
...);
...
}
@ depends on patch @
identifier t;
identifier fn_update_time =~ "update_time$";
@@
fn_update_time (...,
- struct timespec *t,
+ struct timespec64 *t,
...) { ... }
@ depends on patch @
identifier t;
@@
lease_get_mtime( ... ,
- struct timespec *t
+ struct timespec64 *t
) { ... }
@te depends on patch forall@
identifier ts;
local idexpression struct inode *inode_node;
identifier i_xtime =~ "^i_[acm]time$";
identifier ia_xtime =~ "^ia_[acm]time$";
identifier fn_update_time =~ "update_time$";
identifier fn;
expression e, E3;
local idexpression struct inode *node1;
local idexpression struct inode *node2;
local idexpression struct iattr *attr1;
local idexpression struct iattr *attr2;
local idexpression struct iattr attr;
identifier i_xtime1 =~ "^i_[acm]time$";
identifier i_xtime2 =~ "^i_[acm]time$";
identifier ia_xtime1 =~ "^ia_[acm]time$";
identifier ia_xtime2 =~ "^ia_[acm]time$";
@@
(
(
- struct timespec ts;
+ struct timespec64 ts;
|
- struct timespec ts = current_time(inode_node);
+ struct timespec64 ts = current_time(inode_node);
)
<+... when != ts
(
- timespec_equal(&inode_node->i_xtime, &ts)
+ timespec64_equal(&inode_node->i_xtime, &ts)
|
- timespec_equal(&ts, &inode_node->i_xtime)
+ timespec64_equal(&ts, &inode_node->i_xtime)
|
- timespec_compare(&inode_node->i_xtime, &ts)
+ timespec64_compare(&inode_node->i_xtime, &ts)
|
- timespec_compare(&ts, &inode_node->i_xtime)
+ timespec64_compare(&ts, &inode_node->i_xtime)
|
ts = current_time(e)
|
fn_update_time(..., &ts,...)
|
inode_node->i_xtime = ts
|
node1->i_xtime = ts
|
ts = inode_node->i_xtime
|
<+... attr1->ia_xtime ...+> = ts
|
ts = attr1->ia_xtime
|
ts.tv_sec
|
ts.tv_nsec
|
btrfs_set_stack_timespec_sec(..., ts.tv_sec)
|
btrfs_set_stack_timespec_nsec(..., ts.tv_nsec)
|
- ts = timespec64_to_timespec(
+ ts =
...
-)
|
- ts = ktime_to_timespec(
+ ts = ktime_to_timespec64(
...)
|
- ts = E3
+ ts = timespec_to_timespec64(E3)
|
- ktime_get_real_ts(&ts)
+ ktime_get_real_ts64(&ts)
|
fn(...,
- ts
+ timespec64_to_timespec(ts)
,...)
)
...+>
(
<... when != ts
- return ts;
+ return timespec64_to_timespec(ts);
...>
)
|
- timespec_equal(&node1->i_xtime1, &node2->i_xtime2)
+ timespec64_equal(&node1->i_xtime2, &node2->i_xtime2)
|
- timespec_equal(&node1->i_xtime1, &attr2->ia_xtime2)
+ timespec64_equal(&node1->i_xtime2, &attr2->ia_xtime2)
|
- timespec_compare(&node1->i_xtime1, &node2->i_xtime2)
+ timespec64_compare(&node1->i_xtime1, &node2->i_xtime2)
|
node1->i_xtime1 =
- timespec_trunc(attr1->ia_xtime1,
+ timespec64_trunc(attr1->ia_xtime1,
...)
|
- attr1->ia_xtime1 = timespec_trunc(attr2->ia_xtime2,
+ attr1->ia_xtime1 = timespec64_trunc(attr2->ia_xtime2,
...)
|
- ktime_get_real_ts(&attr1->ia_xtime1)
+ ktime_get_real_ts64(&attr1->ia_xtime1)
|
- ktime_get_real_ts(&attr.ia_xtime1)
+ ktime_get_real_ts64(&attr.ia_xtime1)
)
@ depends on patch @
struct inode *node;
struct iattr *attr;
identifier fn;
identifier i_xtime =~ "^i_[acm]time$";
identifier ia_xtime =~ "^ia_[acm]time$";
expression e;
@@
(
- fn(node->i_xtime);
+ fn(timespec64_to_timespec(node->i_xtime));
|
fn(...,
- node->i_xtime);
+ timespec64_to_timespec(node->i_xtime));
|
- e = fn(attr->ia_xtime);
+ e = fn(timespec64_to_timespec(attr->ia_xtime));
)
@ depends on patch forall @
struct inode *node;
struct iattr *attr;
identifier i_xtime =~ "^i_[acm]time$";
identifier ia_xtime =~ "^ia_[acm]time$";
identifier fn;
@@
{
+ struct timespec ts;
<+...
(
+ ts = timespec64_to_timespec(node->i_xtime);
fn (...,
- &node->i_xtime,
+ &ts,
...);
|
+ ts = timespec64_to_timespec(attr->ia_xtime);
fn (...,
- &attr->ia_xtime,
+ &ts,
...);
)
...+>
}
@ depends on patch forall @
struct inode *node;
struct iattr *attr;
struct kstat *stat;
identifier ia_xtime =~ "^ia_[acm]time$";
identifier i_xtime =~ "^i_[acm]time$";
identifier xtime =~ "^[acm]time$";
identifier fn, ret;
@@
{
+ struct timespec ts;
<+...
(
+ ts = timespec64_to_timespec(node->i_xtime);
ret = fn (...,
- &node->i_xtime,
+ &ts,
...);
|
+ ts = timespec64_to_timespec(node->i_xtime);
ret = fn (...,
- &node->i_xtime);
+ &ts);
|
+ ts = timespec64_to_timespec(attr->ia_xtime);
ret = fn (...,
- &attr->ia_xtime,
+ &ts,
...);
|
+ ts = timespec64_to_timespec(attr->ia_xtime);
ret = fn (...,
- &attr->ia_xtime);
+ &ts);
|
+ ts = timespec64_to_timespec(stat->xtime);
ret = fn (...,
- &stat->xtime);
+ &ts);
)
...+>
}
@ depends on patch @
struct inode *node;
struct inode *node2;
identifier i_xtime1 =~ "^i_[acm]time$";
identifier i_xtime2 =~ "^i_[acm]time$";
identifier i_xtime3 =~ "^i_[acm]time$";
struct iattr *attrp;
struct iattr *attrp2;
struct iattr attr ;
identifier ia_xtime1 =~ "^ia_[acm]time$";
identifier ia_xtime2 =~ "^ia_[acm]time$";
struct kstat *stat;
struct kstat stat1;
struct timespec64 ts;
identifier xtime =~ "^[acmb]time$";
expression e;
@@
(
( node->i_xtime2 \| attrp->ia_xtime2 \| attr.ia_xtime2 \) = node->i_xtime1 ;
|
node->i_xtime2 = \( node2->i_xtime1 \| timespec64_trunc(...) \);
|
node->i_xtime2 = node->i_xtime1 = node->i_xtime3 = \(ts \| current_time(...) \);
|
node->i_xtime1 = node->i_xtime3 = \(ts \| current_time(...) \);
|
stat->xtime = node2->i_xtime1;
|
stat1.xtime = node2->i_xtime1;
|
( node->i_xtime2 \| attrp->ia_xtime2 \) = attrp->ia_xtime1 ;
|
( attrp->ia_xtime1 \| attr.ia_xtime1 \) = attrp2->ia_xtime2;
|
- e = node->i_xtime1;
+ e = timespec64_to_timespec( node->i_xtime1 );
|
- e = attrp->ia_xtime1;
+ e = timespec64_to_timespec( attrp->ia_xtime1 );
|
node->i_xtime1 = current_time(...);
|
node->i_xtime2 = node->i_xtime1 = node->i_xtime3 =
- e;
+ timespec_to_timespec64(e);
|
node->i_xtime1 = node->i_xtime3 =
- e;
+ timespec_to_timespec64(e);
|
- node->i_xtime1 = e;
+ node->i_xtime1 = timespec_to_timespec64(e);
)
Signed-off-by: Deepa Dinamani <deepa.kernel@gmail.com>
Cc: <anton@tuxera.com>
Cc: <balbi@kernel.org>
Cc: <bfields@fieldses.org>
Cc: <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Cc: <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: <dsterba@suse.com>
Cc: <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Cc: <hch@lst.de>
Cc: <hirofumi@mail.parknet.co.jp>
Cc: <hubcap@omnibond.com>
Cc: <jack@suse.com>
Cc: <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Cc: <jaharkes@cs.cmu.edu>
Cc: <jslaby@suse.com>
Cc: <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: <mark@fasheh.com>
Cc: <miklos@szeredi.hu>
Cc: <nico@linaro.org>
Cc: <reiserfs-devel@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: <richard@nod.at>
Cc: <sage@redhat.com>
Cc: <sfrench@samba.org>
Cc: <swhiteho@redhat.com>
Cc: <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>
Cc: <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
|
||
|
Linus Torvalds
|
fd59ccc530 |
Add bunch of cleanups, and add support for the Speck128/256
algorithms. Yes, Speck is contrversial, but the intention is to use them only for the lowest end Android devices, where the alternative *really* is no encryption at all for data stored at rest. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQEzBAABCAAdFiEEK2m5VNv+CHkogTfJ8vlZVpUNgaMFAlsW/RAACgkQ8vlZVpUN gaO1pwf/WOusoXBK5sUuiC8d9I5s+OlPhTKhrh+BcL7/xhOkyh2xDv2FEwsjhwUf qo26AMf7DsWKWgJ6wDQ1z+PIuPSNeQy5dCKbz2hbfNjET3vdk2NuvPWnIbFrmIek LB6Ii9jKlPJRO4T3nMrE9JzJZLsoX5OKRSgYTT3EviuW/wSXaFyi7onFnyKXBnF/ e689tE50P42PgTEDKs4RDw43PwEGbcl5Vtj+Lnoh6VGX/pYvL/9ZbEYlKrgqSOU4 DmckR8D8UU/Gy6G5bvMsVuJpLEU7vBxupOOHI/nJFwR6tuYi0Q1j7C/zH8BvWp5e o8P5GpOWk7Gm346FaUlkAZ+25bCU+A== =EBeE -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Merge tag 'fscrypt_for_linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tytso/fscrypt Pull fscrypt updates from Ted Ts'o: "Add bunch of cleanups, and add support for the Speck128/256 algorithms. Yes, Speck is contrversial, but the intention is to use them only for the lowest end Android devices, where the alternative *really* is no encryption at all for data stored at rest" * tag 'fscrypt_for_linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tytso/fscrypt: fscrypt: log the crypto algorithm implementations fscrypt: add Speck128/256 support fscrypt: only derive the needed portion of the key fscrypt: separate key lookup from key derivation fscrypt: use a common logging function fscrypt: remove internal key size constants fscrypt: remove unnecessary check for non-logon key type fscrypt: make fscrypt_operations.max_namelen an integer fscrypt: drop empty name check from fname_decrypt() fscrypt: drop max_namelen check from fname_decrypt() fscrypt: don't special-case EOPNOTSUPP from fscrypt_get_encryption_info() fscrypt: don't clear flags on crypto transform fscrypt: remove stale comment from fscrypt_d_revalidate() fscrypt: remove error messages for skcipher_request_alloc() failure fscrypt: remove unnecessary NULL check when allocating skcipher fscrypt: clean up after fscrypt_prepare_lookup() conversions fs, fscrypt: only define ->s_cop when FS_ENCRYPTION is enabled fscrypt: use unbound workqueue for decryption |
||
|
Chao Yu
|
dfa742803f |
f2fs: fix to clear FI_VOLATILE_FILE correctly
Thread A Thread B - f2fs_release_file - clear_inode_flag(FI_VOLATILE_FILE) - wb_writeback - writeback_sb_inodes - __writeback_single_inode - do_writepages - f2fs_write_data_pages - __write_data_page all volatile file's pages are writebacked to storage - set_inode_flag(FI_DROP_CACHE) - filemap_fdatawrite There is a hole that mm can flush all dirty pages of volatile file as inode is not tagged with both FI_VOLATILE_FILE and FI_DROP_CACHE flags, we should never writeback the page #0 and also it's unneeded to writeback other pages. This patch adjusts to relocate clear_inode_flag(FI_VOLATILE_FILE), so that FI_VOLATILE_FILE flag can be remained before all dirty pages were dropped to avoid issue. Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org> |
||
|
Chao Yu
|
c29fd0c0e2 |
f2fs: let sync node IO interrupt async one
Although mixed sync/async IOs can have continuous LBA, as they have different IO priority, block IO scheduler will add them into different queues and commit them separately, result in splited IOs which causes wrose performance. This patch gives high priority to synchronous IO of nodes, means that once synchronous flow starts, it can interrupt asynchronous writeback flow of system flusher, so more big IOs can be expected. Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org> |
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Chao Yu
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aae764ece6 |
f2fs: don't change wbc->sync_mode
We should never falsify wbc->sync_mode passed from mm, otherwise mm can trigger writeback with wrong IO priority. Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org> |
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Chao Yu
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a1f72ac2c0 |
f2fs: fix to update mtime correctly
If we change system time to the past, get_mtime() will return a overflowed time, and SIT_I(sbi)->max_mtime will be udpated incorrectly, this patch fixes the two issues. Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org> |
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Linus Torvalds
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cf626b0da7 |
Merge branch 'hch.procfs' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs
Pull procfs updates from Al Viro:
"Christoph's proc_create_... cleanups series"
* 'hch.procfs' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: (44 commits)
xfs, proc: hide unused xfs procfs helpers
isdn/gigaset: add back gigaset_procinfo assignment
proc: update SIZEOF_PDE_INLINE_NAME for the new pde fields
tty: replace ->proc_fops with ->proc_show
ide: replace ->proc_fops with ->proc_show
ide: remove ide_driver_proc_write
isdn: replace ->proc_fops with ->proc_show
atm: switch to proc_create_seq_private
atm: simplify procfs code
bluetooth: switch to proc_create_seq_data
netfilter/x_tables: switch to proc_create_seq_private
netfilter/xt_hashlimit: switch to proc_create_{seq,single}_data
neigh: switch to proc_create_seq_data
hostap: switch to proc_create_{seq,single}_data
bonding: switch to proc_create_seq_data
rtc/proc: switch to proc_create_single_data
drbd: switch to proc_create_single
resource: switch to proc_create_seq_data
staging/rtl8192u: simplify procfs code
jfs: simplify procfs code
...
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youngjun yoo
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1061fd484b |
fs: f2fs: insert space around that ':' and ', '
clean up checkpatch error: ERROR: space required after that ':' ERROR: space required after that ',' Signed-off-by: youngjun yoo <youngjun.willow@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org> |
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youngjun yoo
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f11e98bdbe |
fs: f2fs: add missing blank lines after declarations
clean up checkpatch warning: WARNING: Missing a blank line after declarations Signed-off-by: youngjun yoo <youngjun.willow@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org> |
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youngjun yoo
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193bea1dd8 |
fs: f2fs: changed variable type of offset "unsigned" to "loff_t"
clean up checkpatch warning: WARNING: Prefer 'unsigned int' to bare use of 'unsigned' Signed-off-by: youngjun yoo <youngjun.willow@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org> |
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Chao Yu
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4d57b86dd8 |
f2fs: clean up symbol namespace
As Ted reported: "Hi, I was looking at f2fs's sources recently, and I noticed that there is a very large number of non-static symbols which don't have a f2fs prefix. There's well over a hundred (see attached below). As one example, in fs/f2fs/dir.c there is: unsigned char get_de_type(struct f2fs_dir_entry *de) This function is clearly only useful for f2fs, but it has a generic name. This means that if any other file system tries to have the same symbol name, there will be a symbol conflict and the kernel would not successfully build. It also means that when someone is looking f2fs sources, it's not at all obvious whether a function such as read_data_page(), invalidate_blocks(), is a generic kernel function found in the fs, mm, or block layers, or a f2fs specific function. You might want to fix this at some point. Hopefully Kent's bcachefs isn't similarly using genericly named functions, since that might cause conflicts with f2fs's functions --- but just as this would be a problem that we would rightly insist that Kent fix, this is something that we should have rightly insisted that f2fs should have fixed before it was integrated into the mainline kernel. acquire_orphan_inode add_ino_entry add_orphan_inode allocate_data_block allocate_new_segments alloc_nid alloc_nid_done alloc_nid_failed available_free_memory ...." This patch adds "f2fs_" prefix for all non-static symbols in order to: a) avoid conflict with other kernel generic symbols; b) to indicate the function is f2fs specific one instead of generic one; Reported-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org> |
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Chao Yu
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2e79d951ff |
f2fs: make set_de_type() static
Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org> |
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Chao Yu
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fc99fe27b9 |
f2fs: make __f2fs_write_data_pages() static
Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org> |
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Chao Yu
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9fd62605bb |
f2fs: fix to avoid accessing cross the boundary
Configure io_bits with 2 and enable LFS mode, generic/017 reports below dmesg: BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 00000039 *pdpt = 000000002fcb2001 *pde = 0000000000000000 Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP Modules linked in: crc32_generic zram f2fs(O) bnep rfcomm bluetooth ecdh_generic snd_intel8x0 snd_ac97_codec ac97_bus snd_pcm snd_seq_midi snd_seq_midi_event snd_rawmidi pcbc snd_seq joydev aesni_intel aes_i586 snd_seq_device snd_timer crypto_simd cryptd snd soundcore i2c_piix4 serio_raw mac_hid video parport_pc ppdev lp parport hid_generic usbhid psmouse hid e1000 CPU: 2 PID: 20779 Comm: xfs_io Tainted: G O 4.17.0-rc2 #38 Hardware name: innotek GmbH VirtualBox/VirtualBox, BIOS VirtualBox 12/01/2006 EIP: is_checkpointed_data+0x84/0xd0 [f2fs] EFLAGS: 00010207 CPU: 2 EAX: 00000000 EBX: f5cd7000 ECX: fffffe32 EDX: 00000039 ESI: 000001cd EDI: ec95fb6c EBP: e264bd80 ESP: e264bd6c DS: 007b ES: 007b FS: 00d8 GS: 0033 SS: 0068 CR0: 80050033 CR2: 00000039 CR3: 2fe55660 CR4: 000406f0 Call Trace: __exchange_data_block+0xb3f/0x1000 [f2fs] f2fs_fallocate+0xab9/0x16b0 [f2fs] vfs_fallocate+0x17c/0x2d0 ksys_fallocate+0x42/0x70 sys_fallocate+0x31/0x40 do_fast_syscall_32+0xaa/0x22c entry_SYSENTER_32+0x4c/0x7b EIP: 0xb7f98c51 EFLAGS: 00000293 CPU: 2 EAX: ffffffda EBX: 00000003 ECX: 00000008 EDX: 01001000 ESI: 00000000 EDI: 00001000 EBP: 00000000 ESP: bfc0357c DS: 007b ES: 007b FS: 0000 GS: 0033 SS: 007b Code: 00 00 d3 e8 8b 4d ec 2b 02 8b 55 f0 6b c0 1c 03 41 70 29 d6 8b 93 d0 06 00 00 8b 40 0c 83 ea 01 21 d6 89 f2 89 f1 c1 ea 03 f7 d1 <0f> be 14 10 83 e1 07 b8 01 00 00 00 d3 e0 85 c2 89 f8 0f 95 c3 EIP: is_checkpointed_data+0x84/0xd0 [f2fs] SS:ESP: 0068:e264bd6c CR2: 0000000000000039 ---[ end trace 9a4d4087cce6080a ]--- This is because in recovery flow of __exchange_data_block, we didn't pass olen to __roll_back_blkaddrs, instead we passed len, which indicates wrong array size, result in copying random block address into dnode page. Later, once that random block address was accessed by is_checkpointed_data, it can cause NULL pointer dereference. Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org> |
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Chao Yu
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fe16efe6a7 |
f2fs: fix to let caller retry allocating block address
Configure io_bits with 2 and enable LFS mode, generic/013 reports below dmesg: BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 00000104 *pdpt = 0000000029b7b001 *pde = 0000000000000000 Oops: 0002 [#1] PREEMPT SMP Modules linked in: crc32_generic zram f2fs(O) rfcomm bnep bluetooth ecdh_generic snd_intel8x0 snd_ac97_codec ac97_bus snd_pcm snd_seq_midi snd_seq_midi_event snd_rawmidi snd_seq pcbc joydev snd_seq_device aesni_intel snd_timer aes_i586 snd crypto_simd cryptd soundcore i2c_piix4 serio_raw mac_hid video parport_pc ppdev lp parport hid_generic psmouse usbhid hid e1000 CPU: 0 PID: 11161 Comm: fsstress Tainted: G O 4.17.0-rc2 #38 Hardware name: innotek GmbH VirtualBox/VirtualBox, BIOS VirtualBox 12/01/2006 EIP: f2fs_submit_page_write+0x28d/0x550 [f2fs] EFLAGS: 00010206 CPU: 0 EAX: e863dcd8 EBX: 00000000 ECX: 00000100 EDX: 00000200 ESI: e863dcf4 EDI: f6f82768 EBP: e863dbb0 ESP: e863db74 DS: 007b ES: 007b FS: 00d8 GS: 0033 SS: 0068 CR0: 80050033 CR2: 00000104 CR3: 29a62020 CR4: 000406f0 Call Trace: do_write_page+0x6f/0xc0 [f2fs] write_data_page+0x4a/0xd0 [f2fs] do_write_data_page+0x327/0x630 [f2fs] __write_data_page+0x34b/0x820 [f2fs] __f2fs_write_data_pages+0x42d/0x8c0 [f2fs] f2fs_write_data_pages+0x27/0x30 [f2fs] do_writepages+0x1a/0x70 __filemap_fdatawrite_range+0x94/0xd0 filemap_write_and_wait_range+0x3d/0xa0 __generic_file_write_iter+0x11a/0x1f0 f2fs_file_write_iter+0xdd/0x3b0 [f2fs] __vfs_write+0xd2/0x150 vfs_write+0x9b/0x190 ksys_write+0x45/0x90 sys_write+0x16/0x20 do_fast_syscall_32+0xaa/0x22c entry_SYSENTER_32+0x4c/0x7b EIP: 0xb7fc8c51 EFLAGS: 00000246 CPU: 0 EAX: ffffffda EBX: 00000003 ECX: 09cde000 EDX: 00001000 ESI: 00000003 EDI: 00001000 EBP: 00000000 ESP: bfbded38 DS: 007b ES: 007b FS: 0000 GS: 0033 SS: 007b Code: e8 f9 77 34 c9 8b 45 e0 8b 80 b8 00 00 00 39 45 d8 0f 84 bb 02 00 00 8b 45 e0 8b 80 b8 00 00 00 8d 50 d8 8b 08 89 55 f0 8b 50 04 <89> 51 04 89 0a c7 00 00 01 00 00 c7 40 04 00 02 00 00 8b 45 dc EIP: f2fs_submit_page_write+0x28d/0x550 [f2fs] SS:ESP: 0068:e863db74 CR2: 0000000000000104 ---[ end trace 4cac79c0d1305ee6 ]--- allocate_data_block will submit all sequential pending IOs sorted by a FIFO list, If we failed to submit other user's IO due to unaligned write, we will retry to allocate new block address for current IO, then it will initialize fio.list again, if fio was in the list before, it can break FIFO list, result in above panic. Thread A Thread B - do_write_page - allocate_data_block - list_add_tail : fioA cached in FIFO list. - do_write_page - allocate_data_block - list_add_tail : fioB cached in FIFO list. - f2fs_submit_page_write : fail to submit IO - allocate_data_block - INIT_LIST_HEAD - f2fs_submit_page_write - list_del <-- NULL pointer dereference This patch adds fio.retry parameter to indicate failure status for each IO, and avoid bailing out if there is still pending IO in FIFO list for fixing. Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org> |
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Anatoly Pugachev
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4071e67cff |
disable loading f2fs module on PAGE_SIZE > 4KB
The following patch disables loading of f2fs module on architectures
which have PAGE_SIZE > 4096 , since it is impossible to mount f2fs on
such architectures , log messages are:
mount: /mnt: wrong fs type, bad option, bad superblock on
/dev/vdiskb1, missing codepage or helper program, or other error.
/dev/vdiskb1: F2FS filesystem,
UUID=1d8b9ca4-2389-4910-af3b-10998969f09c, volume name ""
May 15 18:03:13 ttip kernel: F2FS-fs (vdiskb1): Invalid
page_cache_size (8192), supports only 4KB
May 15 18:03:13 ttip kernel: F2FS-fs (vdiskb1): Can't find valid F2FS
filesystem in 1th superblock
May 15 18:03:13 ttip kernel: F2FS-fs (vdiskb1): Invalid
page_cache_size (8192), supports only 4KB
May 15 18:03:13 ttip kernel: F2FS-fs (vdiskb1): Can't find valid F2FS
filesystem in 2th superblock
May 15 18:03:13 ttip kernel: F2FS-fs (vdiskb1): Invalid
page_cache_size (8192), supports only 4KB
which was introduced by git commit
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Chao Yu
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14a28559f4 |
f2fs: fix error path of move_data_page
This patch fixes error path of move_data_page: - clear cold data flag if it fails to write page. - redirty page for non-ENOMEM case. Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org> |
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Chao Yu
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1174abfd83 |
f2fs: don't drop dentry pages after fs shutdown
As description in commit "f2fs: don't drop any page on f2fs_cp_error() case": "We still provide readdir() after shtudown, so we should keep pages to avoid additional IOs." In order to provider lastest directory structure, let's keep dentry pages in cache after fs shutdown. Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org> |
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Chao Yu
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250dbf5151 |
f2fs: fix to avoid race during access gc_thread pointer
Thread A Thread B - f2fs_remount - stop_gc_thread - f2fs_sbi_store sbi->gc_thread = NULL; access sbi->gc_thread->gc_* Previously, we allocate memory for sbi->gc_thread based on background gc thread mount option, the memory can be released if we turn off that mount option, but still there are several places access gc_thread pointer without considering race condition, result in NULL point dereference. In order to fix this issue, use sb->s_umount to exclude those operations. Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org> |
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Chao Yu
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aec2f729fc |
f2fs: clean up with clear_radix_tree_dirty_tag
Introduce clear_radix_tree_dirty_tag to include common codes for cleanup. Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org> |