AuxXxilium/linux_dsm_epyc7002
1
0
Fork 0
mirror of https://github.com/AuxXxilium/linux_dsm_epyc7002.git synced 2024-12-26 07:35:19 +07:00
Code Issues Actions Packages Projects Releases Wiki Activity
857,208 Commits 1 Branch 0 Tags 2 GiB
6c59a962e0
Commit Graph

13 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Michael Ellerman
4414ef9536 mm/pkeys: Add an empty arch_pkeys_enabled() 
Add an empty arch_pkeys_enabled() in linux/pkeys.h for the
CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_PKEYS=n case.

Split out of a patch by Ram Pai <linuxram@us.ibm.com>.

Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Reviewed-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
 2018-05-09 11:51:46 +10:00
Michael Ellerman
555934a71b x86/pkeys: Move vma_pkey() into asm/pkeys.h 
Move the last remaining pkey helper, vma_pkey() into asm/pkeys.h

Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Reviewed-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
 2018-05-09 11:51:00 +10:00
Michael Ellerman
dbec10e58d mm/pkeys, powerpc, x86: Provide an empty vma_pkey() in linux/pkeys.h 
Consolidate the pkey handling by providing a common empty definition
of vma_pkey() in pkeys.h when CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_PKEYS=n.

This also removes another entanglement of pkeys.h and
asm/mmu_context.h.

Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Reviewed-by: Ram Pai <linuxram@us.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
 2018-05-09 11:50:41 +10:00
Michael Ellerman
cd419a5131 mm/pkeys: Remove include of asm/mmu_context.h from pkeys.h 
While trying to unify the pkey handling in show_smap() between x86 and
powerpc we stumbled across various build failures due to the order of
includes between the two arches.

Part of the problem is that linux/pkeys.h includes asm/mmu_context.h,
and the relationship between asm/mmu_context.h and asm/pkeys.h is not
consistent between the two arches.

It would be cleaner if linux/pkeys.h only included asm/pkeys.h,
creating a single integration point for the arch pkey definitions.

So this patch removes the include of asm/mmu_context.h from
linux/pkeys.h.

We can't prove that this is safe in the general case, but it passes
all the build tests I've thrown at it. Also asm/mmu_context.h is
included widely while linux/pkeys.h is not, so most likely any code
that is including linux/pkeys.h is already getting asm/mmu_context.h
from elsewhere.

Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
 2018-05-09 11:50:40 +10:00
Greg Kroah-Hartman
b24413180f License cleanup: add SPDX GPL-2.0 license identifier to files with no license 
Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which
makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license.

By default all files without license information are under the default
license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2.

Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0'
SPDX license identifier.  The SPDX identifier is a legally binding
shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text.

This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and
Philippe Ombredanne.

How this work was done:

Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of
the use cases:
 - file had no licensing information it it.
 - file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it,
 - file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information,

Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases
where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license
had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords.

The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to
a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the
output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX
tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne.  Philippe prepared the
base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files.

The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files
assessed.  Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner
results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s)
to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not
immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.

Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was:
 - Files considered eligible had to be source code files.
 - Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5
   lines of source
 - File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5
   lines).

All documentation files were explicitly excluded.

The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license
identifiers to apply.

 - when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was
   considered to have no license information in it, and the top level
   COPYING file license applied.

   For non */uapi/* files that summary was:

   SPDX license identifier                            # files
   ---------------------------------------------------|-------
   GPL-2.0                                              11139

   and resulted in the first patch in this series.

   If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH
   Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0".  Results of that was:

   SPDX license identifier                            # files
   ---------------------------------------------------|-------
   GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note                        930

   and resulted in the second patch in this series.

 - if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one
   of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if
   any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in
   it (per prior point).  Results summary:

   SPDX license identifier                            # files
   ---------------------------------------------------|------
   GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note                       270
   GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note                      169
   ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause)    21
   ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause)    17
   LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note                      15
   GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note                       14
   ((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause)    5
   LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note                       4
   LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note                        3
   ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT)              3
   ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT)             1

   and that resulted in the third patch in this series.

 - when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became
   the concluded license(s).

 - when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a
   license but the other didn't, or they both detected different
   licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred.

 - In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file
   resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and
   which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics).

 - When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was
   confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.

 - If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier,
   the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later
   in time.

In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the
spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the
source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation
by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.

Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from
FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners
disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights.  The
Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so
they are related.

Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets
for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the
files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks
in about 15000 files.

In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have
copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the
correct identifier.

Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual
inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch
version early this week with:
 - a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected
   license ids and scores
 - reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+
   files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct
 - reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license
   was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied
   SPDX license was correct

This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction.  This
worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the
different types of files to be modified.

These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg.  Thomas wrote a script to
parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the
format that the file expected.  This script was further refined by Greg
based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to
distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different
comment types.)  Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to
generate the patches.

Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
 2017-11-02 11:10:55 +01:00
Dave Jones
496063426d pkeys: Remove easily triggered WARN 
This easy-to-trigger warning shows up instantly when running
Trinity on a kernel with CONFIG_X86_INTEL_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS disabled.

At most this should have been a printk, but the -EINVAL alone should be more
than adequate indicator that something isn't available.

Signed-off-by: Dave Jones <davej@codemonkey.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
 2016-10-14 11:36:59 -07:00
Dave Hansen
acd547b298 x86/pkeys: Default to a restrictive init PKRU 
PKRU is the register that lets you disallow writes or all access to a given
protection key.

The XSAVE hardware defines an "init state" of 0 for PKRU: its most
permissive state, allowing access/writes to everything.  Since we start off
all new processes with the init state, we start all processes off with the
most permissive possible PKRU.

This is unfortunate.  If a thread is clone()'d [1] before a program has
time to set PKRU to a restrictive value, that thread will be able to write
to all data, no matter what pkey is set on it.  This weakens any integrity
guarantees that we want pkeys to provide.

To fix this, we define a very restrictive PKRU to override the
XSAVE-provided value when we create a new FPU context.  We choose a value
that only allows access to pkey 0, which is as restrictive as we can
practically make it.

This does not cause any practical problems with applications using
protection keys because we require them to specify initial permissions for
each key when it is allocated, which override the restrictive default.

In the end, this ensures that threads which do not know how to manage their
own pkey rights can not do damage to data which is pkey-protected.

I would have thought this was a pretty contrived scenario, except that I
heard a bug report from an MPX user who was creating threads in some very
early code before main().  It may be crazy, but folks evidently _do_ it.

Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave@sr71.net>
Cc: mgorman@techsingularity.net
Cc: arnd@arndb.de
Cc: linux-api@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Cc: luto@kernel.org
Cc: akpm@linux-foundation.org
Cc: torvalds@linux-foundation.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20160729163021.F3C25D4A@viggo.jf.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
 2016-09-09 13:02:28 +02:00
Dave Hansen
e8c24d3a23 x86/pkeys: Allocation/free syscalls 
This patch adds two new system calls:

	int pkey_alloc(unsigned long flags, unsigned long init_access_rights)
	int pkey_free(int pkey);

These implement an "allocator" for the protection keys
themselves, which can be thought of as analogous to the allocator
that the kernel has for file descriptors.  The kernel tracks
which numbers are in use, and only allows operations on keys that
are valid.  A key which was not obtained by pkey_alloc() may not,
for instance, be passed to pkey_mprotect().

These system calls are also very important given the kernel's use
of pkeys to implement execute-only support.  These help ensure
that userspace can never assume that it has control of a key
unless it first asks the kernel.  The kernel does not promise to
preserve PKRU (right register) contents except for allocated
pkeys.

The 'init_access_rights' argument to pkey_alloc() specifies the
rights that will be established for the returned pkey.  For
instance:

	pkey = pkey_alloc(flags, PKEY_DENY_WRITE);

will allocate 'pkey', but also sets the bits in PKRU[1] such that
writing to 'pkey' is already denied.

The kernel does not prevent pkey_free() from successfully freeing
in-use pkeys (those still assigned to a memory range by
pkey_mprotect()).  It would be expensive to implement the checks
for this, so we instead say, "Just don't do it" since sane
software will never do it anyway.

Any piece of userspace calling pkey_alloc() needs to be prepared
for it to fail.  Why?  pkey_alloc() returns the same error code
(ENOSPC) when there are no pkeys and when pkeys are unsupported.
They can be unsupported for a whole host of reasons, so apps must
be prepared for this.  Also, libraries or LD_PRELOADs might steal
keys before an application gets access to them.

This allocation mechanism could be implemented in userspace.
Even if we did it in userspace, we would still need additional
user/kernel interfaces to tell userspace which keys are being
used by the kernel internally (such as for execute-only
mappings).  Having the kernel provide this facility completely
removes the need for these additional interfaces, or having an
implementation of this in userspace at all.

Note that we have to make changes to all of the architectures
that do not use mman-common.h because we use the new
PKEY_DENY_ACCESS/WRITE macros in arch-independent code.

1. PKRU is the Protection Key Rights User register.  It is a
   usermode-accessible register that controls whether writes
   and/or access to each individual pkey is allowed or denied.

Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Mel Gorman <mgorman@techsingularity.net>
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave@sr71.net>
Cc: arnd@arndb.de
Cc: linux-api@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Cc: luto@kernel.org
Cc: akpm@linux-foundation.org
Cc: torvalds@linux-foundation.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20160729163015.444FE75F@viggo.jf.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
 2016-09-09 13:02:27 +02:00
Dave Hansen
a8502b67d7 x86/pkeys: Make mprotect_key() mask off additional vm_flags 
Today, mprotect() takes 4 bits of data: PROT_READ/WRITE/EXEC/NONE.
Three of those bits: READ/WRITE/EXEC get translated directly in to
vma->vm_flags by calc_vm_prot_bits().  If a bit is unset in
mprotect()'s 'prot' argument then it must be cleared in vma->vm_flags
during the mprotect() call.

We do this clearing today by first calculating the VMA flags we
want set, then clearing the ones we do not want to inherit from
the original VMA:

	vm_flags = calc_vm_prot_bits(prot, key);
	...
	newflags = vm_flags;
	newflags |= (vma->vm_flags & ~(VM_READ | VM_WRITE | VM_EXEC));

However, we *also* want to mask off the original VMA's vm_flags in
which we store the protection key.

To do that, this patch adds a new macro:

	ARCH_VM_PKEY_FLAGS

which allows the architecture to specify additional bits that it would
like cleared.  We use that to ensure that the VM_PKEY_BIT* bits get
cleared.

Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Mel Gorman <mgorman@techsingularity.net>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave@sr71.net>
Cc: arnd@arndb.de
Cc: linux-api@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Cc: luto@kernel.org
Cc: akpm@linux-foundation.org
Cc: torvalds@linux-foundation.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20160729163013.E48D6981@viggo.jf.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
 2016-09-09 13:02:26 +02:00
Dave Hansen
7d06d9c9bd mm: Implement new pkey_mprotect() system call 
pkey_mprotect() is just like mprotect, except it also takes a
protection key as an argument.  On systems that do not support
protection keys, it still works, but requires that key=0.
Otherwise it does exactly what mprotect does.

I expect it to get used like this, if you want to guarantee that
any mapping you create can *never* be accessed without the right
protection keys set up.

	int real_prot = PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE;
	pkey = pkey_alloc(0, PKEY_DENY_ACCESS);
	ptr = mmap(NULL, PAGE_SIZE, PROT_NONE, MAP_ANONYMOUS|MAP_PRIVATE, -1, 0);
	ret = pkey_mprotect(ptr, PAGE_SIZE, real_prot, pkey);

This way, there is *no* window where the mapping is accessible
since it was always either PROT_NONE or had a protection key set
that denied all access.

We settled on 'unsigned long' for the type of the key here.  We
only need 4 bits on x86 today, but I figured that other
architectures might need some more space.

Semantically, we have a bit of a problem if we combine this
syscall with our previously-introduced execute-only support:
What do we do when we mix execute-only pkey use with
pkey_mprotect() use?  For instance:

	pkey_mprotect(ptr, PAGE_SIZE, PROT_WRITE, 6); // set pkey=6
	mprotect(ptr, PAGE_SIZE, PROT_EXEC);  // set pkey=X_ONLY_PKEY?
	mprotect(ptr, PAGE_SIZE, PROT_WRITE); // is pkey=6 again?

To solve that, we make the plain-mprotect()-initiated execute-only
support only apply to VMAs that have the default protection key (0)
set on them.

Proposed semantics:
1. protection key 0 is special and represents the default,
   "unassigned" protection key.  It is always allocated.
2. mprotect() never affects a mapping's pkey_mprotect()-assigned
   protection key. A protection key of 0 (even if set explicitly)
   represents an unassigned protection key.
   2a. mprotect(PROT_EXEC) on a mapping with an assigned protection
       key may or may not result in a mapping with execute-only
       properties.  pkey_mprotect() plus pkey_set() on all threads
       should be used to _guarantee_ execute-only semantics if this
       is not a strong enough semantic.
3. mprotect(PROT_EXEC) may result in an "execute-only" mapping. The
   kernel will internally attempt to allocate and dedicate a
   protection key for the purpose of execute-only mappings.  This
   may not be possible in cases where there are no free protection
   keys available.  It can also happen, of course, in situations
   where there is no hardware support for protection keys.

Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Mel Gorman <mgorman@techsingularity.net>
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave@sr71.net>
Cc: arnd@arndb.de
Cc: linux-api@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Cc: luto@kernel.org
Cc: akpm@linux-foundation.org
Cc: torvalds@linux-foundation.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20160729163012.3DDD36C4@viggo.jf.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
 2016-09-09 13:02:26 +02:00
Dave Hansen
62b5f7d013 mm/core, x86/mm/pkeys: Add execute-only protection keys support 
Protection keys provide new page-based protection in hardware.
But, they have an interesting attribute: they only affect data
accesses and never affect instruction fetches.  That means that
if we set up some memory which is set as "access-disabled" via
protection keys, we can still execute from it.

This patch uses protection keys to set up mappings to do just that.
If a user calls:

	mmap(..., PROT_EXEC);
or
	mprotect(ptr, sz, PROT_EXEC);

(note PROT_EXEC-only without PROT_READ/WRITE), the kernel will
notice this, and set a special protection key on the memory.  It
also sets the appropriate bits in the Protection Keys User Rights
(PKRU) register so that the memory becomes unreadable and
unwritable.

I haven't found any userspace that does this today.  With this
facility in place, we expect userspace to move to use it
eventually.  Userspace _could_ start doing this today.  Any
PROT_EXEC calls get converted to PROT_READ inside the kernel, and
would transparently be upgraded to "true" PROT_EXEC with this
code.  IOW, userspace never has to do any PROT_EXEC runtime
detection.

This feature provides enhanced protection against leaking
executable memory contents.  This helps thwart attacks which are
attempting to find ROP gadgets on the fly.

But, the security provided by this approach is not comprehensive.
The PKRU register which controls access permissions is a normal
user register writable from unprivileged userspace.  An attacker
who can execute the 'wrpkru' instruction can easily disable the
protection provided by this feature.

The protection key that is used for execute-only support is
permanently dedicated at compile time.  This is fine for now
because there is currently no API to set a protection key other
than this one.

Despite there being a constant PKRU value across the entire
system, we do not set it unless this feature is in use in a
process.  That is to preserve the PKRU XSAVE 'init state',
which can lead to faster context switches.

PKRU *is* a user register and the kernel is modifying it.  That
means that code doing:

	pkru = rdpkru()
	pkru |= 0x100;
	mmap(..., PROT_EXEC);
	wrpkru(pkru);

could lose the bits in PKRU that enforce execute-only
permissions.  To avoid this, we suggest avoiding ever calling
mmap() or mprotect() when the PKRU value is expected to be
unstable.

Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Aneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Chen Gang <gang.chen.5i5j@gmail.com>
Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Cc: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave@sr71.net>
Cc: David Hildenbrand <dahi@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Piotr Kwapulinski <kwapulinski.piotr@gmail.com>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: Vladimir Murzin <vladimir.murzin@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: keescook@google.com
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20160212210240.CB4BB5CA@viggo.jf.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
 2016-02-18 19:46:33 +01:00
Dave Hansen
8459429693 x86/mm/pkeys: Allow kernel to modify user pkey rights register 
The Protection Key Rights for User memory (PKRU) is a 32-bit
user-accessible register.  It contains two bits for each
protection key: one to write-disable (WD) access to memory
covered by the key and another to access-disable (AD).

Userspace can read/write the register with the RDPKRU and WRPKRU
instructions.  But, the register is saved and restored with the
XSAVE family of instructions, which means we have to treat it
like a floating point register.

The kernel needs to write to the register if it wants to
implement execute-only memory or if it implements a system call
to change PKRU.

To do this, we need to create a 'pkru_state' buffer, read the old
contents in to it, modify it, and then tell the FPU code that
there is modified data in there so it can (possibly) move the
buffer back in to the registers.

This uses the fpu__xfeature_set_state() function that we defined
in the previous patch.

Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave@sr71.net>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20160212210236.0BE13217@viggo.jf.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
 2016-02-18 19:46:32 +01:00
Dave Hansen
66d375709d mm/core, x86/mm/pkeys: Add arch_validate_pkey() 
The syscall-level code is passed a protection key and need to
return an appropriate error code if the protection key is bogus.
We will be using this in subsequent patches.

Note that this also begins a series of arch-specific calls that
we need to expose in otherwise arch-independent code.  We create
a linux/pkeys.h header where we will put *all* the stubs for
these functions.

Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave@sr71.net>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20160212210232.774EEAAB@viggo.jf.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
 2016-02-18 19:46:31 +01:00