With the previous patch applied pcibios_setup_device() will always be run
when pcibios_bus_add_device() is called. There are several code paths where
pcibios_setup_bus_device() is still called (the PowerPC specific PCI
hotplug support is one) so with just the previous patch applied the setup
can be run multiple times on a device, once before the device is added
to the bus and once after.
There's no need to run the setup in the early case any more so just
remove it entirely.
Signed-off-by: Oliver O'Halloran <oohall@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik@ozlabs.ru>
Reviewed-by: Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik@ozlabs.ru>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191028085424.12006-3-oohall@gmail.com
Move PCI device setup from pcibios_add_device() and pcibios_fixup_bus() to
pcibios_bus_add_device(). This ensures that platform-specific DMA and IOMMU
setup occurs after the device has been registered in sysfs, which is a
requirement for IOMMU group assignment to work
This fixes IOMMU group assignment for hotplugged devices on pseries, where
the existing behavior results in IOMMU assignment before registration.
Thanks to Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de> for the suggestion.
Signed-off-by: Shawn Anastasio <shawn@anastas.io>
Tested-by: Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik@ozlabs.ru>
Reviewed-by: Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik@ozlabs.ru>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191028085424.12006-2-oohall@gmail.com
On pseries there is a bug with adding hotplugged devices to an IOMMU
group. For a number of dumb reasons fixing that bug first requires
re-working how VFs are configured on PowerNV. For background, on
PowerNV we use the pcibios_sriov_enable() hook to do two things:
1. Create a pci_dn structure for each of the VFs, and
2. Configure the PHB's internal BARs so the MMIO range for each VF
maps to a unique PE.
Roughly speaking a PE is the hardware counterpart to a Linux IOMMU
group since all the devices in a PE share the same IOMMU table. A PE
also defines the set of devices that should be isolated in response to
a PCI error (i.e. bad DMA, UR/CA, AER events, etc). When isolated all
MMIO and DMA traffic to and from devicein the PE is blocked by the
root complex until the PE is recovered by the OS.
The requirement to block MMIO causes a giant headache because the P8
PHB generally uses a fixed mapping between MMIO addresses and PEs. As
a result we need to delay configuring the IOMMU groups for device
until after MMIO resources are assigned. For physical devices (i.e.
non-VFs) the PE assignment is done in pcibios_setup_bridge() which is
called immediately after the MMIO resources for downstream
devices (and the bridge's windows) are assigned. For VFs the setup is
more complicated because:
a) pcibios_setup_bridge() is not called again when VFs are activated, and
b) The pci_dev for VFs are created by generic code which runs after
pcibios_sriov_enable() is called.
The work around for this is a two step process:
1. A fixup in pcibios_add_device() is used to initialised the cached
pe_number in pci_dn, then
2. A bus notifier then adds the device to the IOMMU group for the PE
specified in pci_dn->pe_number.
A side effect fixing the pseries bug mentioned in the first paragraph
is moving the fixup out of pcibios_add_device() and into
pcibios_bus_add_device(), which is called much later. This results in
step 2. failing because pci_dn->pe_number won't be initialised when
the bus notifier is run.
We can fix this by removing the need for the fixup. The PE for a VF is
known before the VF is even scanned so we can initialise
pci_dn->pe_number pcibios_sriov_enable() instead. Unfortunately,
moving the initialisation causes two problems:
1. We trip the WARN_ON() in the current fixup code, and
2. The EEH core clears pdn->pe_number when recovering a VF and
relies on the fixup to correctly re-set it.
The only justification for either of these is a comment in
eeh_rmv_device() suggesting that pdn->pe_number *must* be set to
IODA_INVALID_PE in order for the VF to be scanned. However, this
comment appears to have no basis in reality. Both bugs can be fixed by
just deleting the code.
Tested-by: Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik@ozlabs.ru>
Reviewed-by: Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik@ozlabs.ru>
Signed-off-by: Oliver O'Halloran <oohall@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191028085424.12006-1-oohall@gmail.com
In entry_64.S there are places that open code saving and restoring the
non-volatile registers. There are already macros for doing this so use
them.
Signed-off-by: Jordan Niethe <jniethe5@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Donnellan <ajd@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191211023552.16480-1-jniethe5@gmail.com
Before commit 0366a1c70b ("powerpc/irq: Run softirqs off the top of
the irq stack"), check_stack_overflow() was called by do_IRQ(), before
switching to the irq stack.
In that commit, do_IRQ() was renamed __do_irq(), and is now executing
on the irq stack, so check_stack_overflow() has just become almost
useless.
Move check_stack_overflow() call in do_IRQ() to do the check while
still on the current stack.
Fixes: 0366a1c70b ("powerpc/irq: Run softirqs off the top of the irq stack")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@c-s.fr>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/e033aa8116ab12b7ca9a9c75189ad0741e3b9b5f.1575872340.git.christophe.leroy@c-s.fr
clock_getres in the vDSO library has to preserve the same behaviour
of posix_get_hrtimer_res().
In particular, posix_get_hrtimer_res() does:
sec = 0;
ns = hrtimer_resolution;
and hrtimer_resolution depends on the enablement of the high
resolution timers that can happen either at compile or at run time.
Fix the powerpc vdso implementation of clock_getres keeping a copy of
hrtimer_resolution in vdso data and using that directly.
Fixes: a7f290dad3 ("[PATCH] powerpc: Merge vdso's and add vdso support to 32 bits kernel")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@c-s.fr>
Acked-by: Shuah Khan <skhan@linuxfoundation.org>
[chleroy: changed CLOCK_REALTIME_RES to CLOCK_HRTIMER_RES]
Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@c-s.fr>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/a55eca3a5e85233838c2349783bcb5164dae1d09.1575273217.git.christophe.leroy@c-s.fr
When enabling CONFIG_RELOCATABLE and CONFIG_KASAN on FSL_BOOKE,
the kernel doesn't boot.
relocate_init() requires KASAN early shadow area to be set up because
it needs access to the device tree through generic functions.
Call kasan_early_init() before calling relocate_init()
Reported-by: Lexi Shao <shaolexi@huawei.com>
Fixes: 2edb16efc8 ("powerpc/32: Add KASAN support")
Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@c-s.fr>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/b58426f1664a4b344ff696d18cacf3b3e8962111.1575036985.git.christophe.leroy@c-s.fr
This is a series of cleanups for the y2038 work, mostly intended
for namespace cleaning: the kernel defines the traditional
time_t, timeval and timespec types that often lead to y2038-unsafe
code. Even though the unsafe usage is mostly gone from the kernel,
having the types and associated functions around means that we
can still grow new users, and that we may be missing conversions
to safe types that actually matter.
There are still a number of driver specific patches needed to
get the last users of these types removed, those have been
submitted to the respective maintainers.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20191108210236.1296047-1-arnd@arndb.de/
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
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Merge tag 'y2038-cleanups-5.5' of git://git.kernel.org:/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/arnd/playground
Pull y2038 cleanups from Arnd Bergmann:
"y2038 syscall implementation cleanups
This is a series of cleanups for the y2038 work, mostly intended for
namespace cleaning: the kernel defines the traditional time_t, timeval
and timespec types that often lead to y2038-unsafe code. Even though
the unsafe usage is mostly gone from the kernel, having the types and
associated functions around means that we can still grow new users,
and that we may be missing conversions to safe types that actually
matter.
There are still a number of driver specific patches needed to get the
last users of these types removed, those have been submitted to the
respective maintainers"
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20191108210236.1296047-1-arnd@arndb.de/
* tag 'y2038-cleanups-5.5' of git://git.kernel.org:/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/arnd/playground: (26 commits)
y2038: alarm: fix half-second cut-off
y2038: ipc: fix x32 ABI breakage
y2038: fix typo in powerpc vdso "LOPART"
y2038: allow disabling time32 system calls
y2038: itimer: change implementation to timespec64
y2038: move itimer reset into itimer.c
y2038: use compat_{get,set}_itimer on alpha
y2038: itimer: compat handling to itimer.c
y2038: time: avoid timespec usage in settimeofday()
y2038: timerfd: Use timespec64 internally
y2038: elfcore: Use __kernel_old_timeval for process times
y2038: make ns_to_compat_timeval use __kernel_old_timeval
y2038: socket: use __kernel_old_timespec instead of timespec
y2038: socket: remove timespec reference in timestamping
y2038: syscalls: change remaining timeval to __kernel_old_timeval
y2038: rusage: use __kernel_old_timeval
y2038: uapi: change __kernel_time_t to __kernel_old_time_t
y2038: stat: avoid 'time_t' in 'struct stat'
y2038: ipc: remove __kernel_time_t reference from headers
y2038: vdso: powerpc: avoid timespec references
...
Highlights:
- Infrastructure for secure boot on some bare metal Power9 machines. The
firmware support is still in development, so the code here won't actually
activate secure boot on any existing systems.
- A change to xmon (our crash handler / pseudo-debugger) to restrict it to
read-only mode when the kernel is lockdown'ed, otherwise it's trivial to drop
into xmon and modify kernel data, such as the lockdown state.
- Support for KASLR on 32-bit BookE machines (Freescale / NXP).
- Fixes for our flush_icache_range() and __kernel_sync_dicache() (VDSO) to work
with memory ranges >4GB.
- Some reworks of the pseries CMM (Cooperative Memory Management) driver to
make it behave more like other balloon drivers and enable some cleanups of
generic mm code.
- A series of fixes to our hardware breakpoint support to properly handle
unaligned watchpoint addresses.
Plus a bunch of other smaller improvements, fixes and cleanups.
Thanks to:
Alastair D'Silva, Andrew Donnellan, Aneesh Kumar K.V, Anthony Steinhauser,
Cédric Le Goater, Chris Packham, Chris Smart, Christophe Leroy, Christopher M.
Riedl, Christoph Hellwig, Claudio Carvalho, Daniel Axtens, David Hildenbrand,
Deb McLemore, Diana Craciun, Eric Richter, Geert Uytterhoeven, Greg
Kroah-Hartman, Greg Kurz, Gustavo L. F. Walbon, Hari Bathini, Harish, Jason
Yan, Krzysztof Kozlowski, Leonardo Bras, Mathieu Malaterre, Mauro S. M.
Rodrigues, Michal Suchanek, Mimi Zohar, Nathan Chancellor, Nathan Lynch, Nayna
Jain, Nick Desaulniers, Oliver O'Halloran, Qian Cai, Rasmus Villemoes, Ravi
Bangoria, Sam Bobroff, Santosh Sivaraj, Scott Wood, Thomas Huth, Tyrel
Datwyler, Vaibhav Jain, Valentin Longchamp, YueHaibing.
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Merge tag 'powerpc-5.5-1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/powerpc/linux
Pull powerpc updates from Michael Ellerman:
"Highlights:
- Infrastructure for secure boot on some bare metal Power9 machines.
The firmware support is still in development, so the code here
won't actually activate secure boot on any existing systems.
- A change to xmon (our crash handler / pseudo-debugger) to restrict
it to read-only mode when the kernel is lockdown'ed, otherwise it's
trivial to drop into xmon and modify kernel data, such as the
lockdown state.
- Support for KASLR on 32-bit BookE machines (Freescale / NXP).
- Fixes for our flush_icache_range() and __kernel_sync_dicache()
(VDSO) to work with memory ranges >4GB.
- Some reworks of the pseries CMM (Cooperative Memory Management)
driver to make it behave more like other balloon drivers and enable
some cleanups of generic mm code.
- A series of fixes to our hardware breakpoint support to properly
handle unaligned watchpoint addresses.
Plus a bunch of other smaller improvements, fixes and cleanups.
Thanks to: Alastair D'Silva, Andrew Donnellan, Aneesh Kumar K.V,
Anthony Steinhauser, Cédric Le Goater, Chris Packham, Chris Smart,
Christophe Leroy, Christopher M. Riedl, Christoph Hellwig, Claudio
Carvalho, Daniel Axtens, David Hildenbrand, Deb McLemore, Diana
Craciun, Eric Richter, Geert Uytterhoeven, Greg Kroah-Hartman, Greg
Kurz, Gustavo L. F. Walbon, Hari Bathini, Harish, Jason Yan, Krzysztof
Kozlowski, Leonardo Bras, Mathieu Malaterre, Mauro S. M. Rodrigues,
Michal Suchanek, Mimi Zohar, Nathan Chancellor, Nathan Lynch, Nayna
Jain, Nick Desaulniers, Oliver O'Halloran, Qian Cai, Rasmus Villemoes,
Ravi Bangoria, Sam Bobroff, Santosh Sivaraj, Scott Wood, Thomas Huth,
Tyrel Datwyler, Vaibhav Jain, Valentin Longchamp, YueHaibing"
* tag 'powerpc-5.5-1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/powerpc/linux: (144 commits)
powerpc/fixmap: fix crash with HIGHMEM
x86/efi: remove unused variables
powerpc: Define arch_is_kernel_initmem_freed() for lockdep
powerpc/prom_init: Use -ffreestanding to avoid a reference to bcmp
powerpc: Avoid clang warnings around setjmp and longjmp
powerpc: Don't add -mabi= flags when building with Clang
powerpc: Fix Kconfig indentation
powerpc/fixmap: don't clear fixmap area in paging_init()
selftests/powerpc: spectre_v2 test must be built 64-bit
powerpc/powernv: Disable native PCIe port management
powerpc/kexec: Move kexec files into a dedicated subdir.
powerpc/32: Split kexec low level code out of misc_32.S
powerpc/sysdev: drop simple gpio
powerpc/83xx: map IMMR with a BAT.
powerpc/32s: automatically allocate BAT in setbat()
powerpc/ioremap: warn on early use of ioremap()
powerpc: Add support for GENERIC_EARLY_IOREMAP
powerpc/fixmap: Use __fix_to_virt() instead of fix_to_virt()
powerpc/8xx: use the fixmapped IMMR in cpm_reset()
powerpc/8xx: add __init to cpm1 init functions
...
We failed to activate the mitigation for Spectre-RSB (Return Stack
Buffer, aka. ret2spec) on context switch, on CPUs prior to Power9
DD2.3.
That allows a process to poison the RSB (called Link Stack on Power
CPUs) and possibly misdirect speculative execution of another process.
If the victim process can be induced to execute a leak gadget then it
may be possible to extract information from the victim via a side
channel.
The fix is to correctly activate the link stack flush mitigation on
all CPUs that have any mitigation of Spectre v2 in userspace enabled.
There's a second commit which adds a link stack flush in the KVM guest
exit path. A leak via that path has not been demonstrated, but we
believe it's at least theoretically possible.
This is the fix for CVE-2019-18660.
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Merge tag 'powerpc-spectre-rsb' of powerpc-CVE-2019-18660.bundle
Pull powerpc Spectre-RSB fixes from Michael Ellerman:
"We failed to activate the mitigation for Spectre-RSB (Return Stack
Buffer, aka. ret2spec) on context switch, on CPUs prior to Power9
DD2.3.
That allows a process to poison the RSB (called Link Stack on Power
CPUs) and possibly misdirect speculative execution of another process.
If the victim process can be induced to execute a leak gadget then it
may be possible to extract information from the victim via a side
channel.
The fix is to correctly activate the link stack flush mitigation on
all CPUs that have any mitigation of Spectre v2 in userspace enabled.
There's a second commit which adds a link stack flush in the KVM guest
exit path. A leak via that path has not been demonstrated, but we
believe it's at least theoretically possible.
This is the fix for CVE-2019-18660"
* tag 'powerpc-spectre-rsb' of /home/torvalds/Downloads/powerpc-CVE-2019-18660.bundle:
KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Flush link stack on guest exit to host kernel
powerpc/book3s64: Fix link stack flush on context switch
Pull scheduler updates from Ingo Molnar:
"The biggest changes in this cycle were:
- Make kcpustat vtime aware (Frederic Weisbecker)
- Rework the CFS load_balance() logic (Vincent Guittot)
- Misc cleanups, smaller enhancements, fixes.
The load-balancing rework is the most intrusive change: it replaces
the old heuristics that have become less meaningful after the
introduction of the PELT metrics, with a grounds-up load-balancing
algorithm.
As such it's not really an iterative series, but replaces the old
load-balancing logic with the new one. We hope there are no
performance regressions left - but statistically it's highly probable
that there *is* going to be some workload that is hurting from these
chnages. If so then we'd prefer to have a look at that workload and
fix its scheduling, instead of reverting the changes"
* 'sched-core-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (46 commits)
rackmeter: Use vtime aware kcpustat accessor
leds: Use all-in-one vtime aware kcpustat accessor
cpufreq: Use vtime aware kcpustat accessors for user time
procfs: Use all-in-one vtime aware kcpustat accessor
sched/vtime: Bring up complete kcpustat accessor
sched/cputime: Support other fields on kcpustat_field()
sched/cpufreq: Move the cfs_rq_util_change() call to cpufreq_update_util()
sched/fair: Add comments for group_type and balancing at SD_NUMA level
sched/fair: Fix rework of find_idlest_group()
sched/uclamp: Fix overzealous type replacement
sched/Kconfig: Fix spelling mistake in user-visible help text
sched/core: Further clarify sched_class::set_next_task()
sched/fair: Use mul_u32_u32()
sched/core: Simplify sched_class::pick_next_task()
sched/core: Optimize pick_next_task()
sched/core: Make pick_next_task_idle() more consistent
sched/fair: Better document newidle_balance()
leds: Use vtime aware kcpustat accessor to fetch CPUTIME_SYSTEM
cpufreq: Use vtime aware kcpustat accessor to fetch CPUTIME_SYSTEM
procfs: Use vtime aware kcpustat accessor to fetch CPUTIME_SYSTEM
...
Pull x86 asm updates from Ingo Molnar:
"The main changes in this cycle were:
- Cross-arch changes to move the linker sections for NOTES and
EXCEPTION_TABLE into the RO_DATA area, where they belong on most
architectures. (Kees Cook)
- Switch the x86 linker fill byte from x90 (NOP) to 0xcc (INT3), to
trap jumps into the middle of those padding areas instead of
sliding execution. (Kees Cook)
- A thorough cleanup of symbol definitions within x86 assembler code.
The rather randomly named macros got streamlined around a
(hopefully) straightforward naming scheme:
SYM_START(name, linkage, align...)
SYM_END(name, sym_type)
SYM_FUNC_START(name)
SYM_FUNC_END(name)
SYM_CODE_START(name)
SYM_CODE_END(name)
SYM_DATA_START(name)
SYM_DATA_END(name)
etc - with about three times of these basic primitives with some
label, local symbol or attribute variant, expressed via postfixes.
No change in functionality intended. (Jiri Slaby)
- Misc other changes, cleanups and smaller fixes"
* 'x86-asm-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (67 commits)
x86/entry/64: Remove pointless jump in paranoid_exit
x86/entry/32: Remove unused resume_userspace label
x86/build/vdso: Remove meaningless CFLAGS_REMOVE_*.o
m68k: Convert missed RODATA to RO_DATA
x86/vmlinux: Use INT3 instead of NOP for linker fill bytes
x86/mm: Report actual image regions in /proc/iomem
x86/mm: Report which part of kernel image is freed
x86/mm: Remove redundant address-of operators on addresses
xtensa: Move EXCEPTION_TABLE to RO_DATA segment
powerpc: Move EXCEPTION_TABLE to RO_DATA segment
parisc: Move EXCEPTION_TABLE to RO_DATA segment
microblaze: Move EXCEPTION_TABLE to RO_DATA segment
ia64: Move EXCEPTION_TABLE to RO_DATA segment
h8300: Move EXCEPTION_TABLE to RO_DATA segment
c6x: Move EXCEPTION_TABLE to RO_DATA segment
arm64: Move EXCEPTION_TABLE to RO_DATA segment
alpha: Move EXCEPTION_TABLE to RO_DATA segment
x86/vmlinux: Move EXCEPTION_TABLE to RO_DATA segment
x86/vmlinux: Actually use _etext for the end of the text segment
vmlinux.lds.h: Allow EXCEPTION_TABLE to live in RO_DATA
...
LLVM revision r374662 gives LLVM the ability to convert certain loops
into a reference to bcmp as an optimization; this breaks
prom_init_check.sh:
CALL arch/powerpc/kernel/prom_init_check.sh
Error: External symbol 'bcmp' referenced from prom_init.c
make[2]: *** [arch/powerpc/kernel/Makefile:196: prom_init_check] Error 1
bcmp is defined in lib/string.c as a wrapper for memcmp so this could
be added to the whitelist. However, commit
450e7dd400 ("powerpc/prom_init: don't use string functions from
lib/") copied memcmp as prom_memcmp to avoid KASAN instrumentation so
having bcmp be resolved to regular memcmp would break that assumption.
Furthermore, because the compiler is the one that inserted bcmp, we
cannot provide something like prom_bcmp.
To prevent LLVM from being clever with optimizations like this, use
-ffreestanding to tell LLVM we are not hosted so it is not free to
make transformations like this.
Reviewed-by: Nick Desaulneris <ndesaulniers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Nathan Chancellor <natechancellor@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191119045712.39633-4-natechancellor@gmail.com
Caching dates is never a good idea ;-)
Fixes: e7affb1dba ("powerpc/cache: add cache flush operation for various e500")
Signed-off-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert+renesas@glider.be>
Signed-off-by: Scott Wood <oss@buserror.net>
All of the remaining syscalls that pass a timeval (gettimeofday, utime,
futimesat) can trivially be changed to pass a __kernel_old_timeval
instead, which has a compatible layout, but avoids ambiguity with
the timeval type in user space.
Acked-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Acked-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
As a preparation to stop using 'struct timespec' in the kernel,
change the powerpc vdso implementation:
- split up the vdso data definition to have equivalent members
for seconds and nanoseconds instead of an xtime structure
- use timespec64 as an intermediate for the xtime update
- change the asm-offsets definition to be based the appropriate
fixed-length types
This is only a temporary fix for changing the types, in order
to actually support a 64-bit safe vdso32 version of clock_gettime(),
the entire powerpc vdso should be replaced with the generic
lib/vdso/ implementation. If that happens first, this patch
becomes obsolete.
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
The gettimeofday() function in vdso uses the traditional 'timeval'
structure layout, which will be incompatible with future versions of
glibc on 32-bit architectures that use a 64-bit time_t.
This interface is problematic for y2038, when time_t overflows on 32-bit
architectures, but the plan so far is that a libc with 64-bit time_t
will not call into the gettimeofday() vdso helper at all, and only
have a method for entering clock_gettime(). This means we don't have
to fix it here, though we probably want to add a new clock_gettime()
entry point using a 64-bit version of 'struct timespec' at some point.
Changing the vdso code to use __kernel_old_timeval helps isolate
this usage from the other ones that still need to be fixed properly,
and it gets us closer to removing the 'timeval' definition from the
kernel sources.
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
On some systems that are vulnerable to Spectre v2, it is up to
software to flush the link stack (return address stack), in order to
protect against Spectre-RSB.
When exiting from a guest we do some house keeping and then
potentially exit to C code which is several stack frames deep in the
host kernel. We will then execute a series of returns without
preceeding calls, opening up the possiblity that the guest could have
poisoned the link stack, and direct speculative execution of the host
to a gadget of some sort.
To prevent this we add a flush of the link stack on exit from a guest.
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
In commit ee13cb249f ("powerpc/64s: Add support for software count
cache flush"), I added support for software to flush the count
cache (indirect branch cache) on context switch if firmware told us
that was the required mitigation for Spectre v2.
As part of that code we also added a software flush of the link
stack (return address stack), which protects against Spectre-RSB
between user processes.
That is all correct for CPUs that activate that mitigation, which is
currently Power9 Nimbus DD2.3.
What I got wrong is that on older CPUs, where firmware has disabled
the count cache, we also need to flush the link stack on context
switch.
To fix it we create a new feature bit which is not set by firmware,
which tells us we need to flush the link stack. We set that when
firmware tells us that either of the existing Spectre v2 mitigations
are enabled.
Then we adjust the patching code so that if we see that feature bit we
enable the link stack flush. If we're also told to flush the count
cache in software then we fall through and do that also.
On the older CPUs we don't need to do do the software count cache
flush, firmware has disabled it, so in that case we patch in an early
return after the link stack flush.
The naming of some of the functions is awkward after this patch,
because they're called "count cache" but they also do link stack. But
we'll fix that up in a later commit to ease backporting.
This is the fix for CVE-2019-18660.
Reported-by: Anthony Steinhauser <asteinhauser@google.com>
Fixes: ee13cb249f ("powerpc/64s: Add support for software count cache flush")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.4+
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Like all other architectures such as x86 or arm64, include KASLR offset
in VMCOREINFO ELF notes to assist in debugging. After this, we can use
crash --kaslr option to parse vmcore generated from a kaslr kernel.
Note: The crash tool needs to support --kaslr too.
Signed-off-by: Jason Yan <yanaijie@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Scott Wood <oss@buserror.net>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
When kaslr is enabled, the kernel offset is different for every boot.
This brings some difficult to debug the kernel. Dump out the kernel
offset when panic so that we can easily debug the kernel.
This code is derived from x86/arm64 which has similar functionality.
Signed-off-by: Jason Yan <yanaijie@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@c-s.fr>
Reviewed-by: Diana Craciun <diana.craciun@nxp.com>
Tested-by: Diana Craciun <diana.craciun@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Scott Wood <oss@buserror.net>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
This patch add support to boot kernel from places other than KERNELBASE.
Since CONFIG_RELOCATABLE has already supported, what we need to do is
map or copy kernel to a proper place and relocate. Freescale Book-E
parts expect lowmem to be mapped by fixed TLB entries(TLB1). The TLB1
entries are not suitable to map the kernel directly in a randomized
region, so we chose to copy the kernel to a proper place and restart to
relocate.
The offset of the kernel was not randomized yet(a fixed 64M is set). We
will randomize it in the next patch.
Signed-off-by: Jason Yan <yanaijie@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Diana Craciun <diana.craciun@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@c-s.fr>
Signed-off-by: Scott Wood <oss@buserror.net>
[mpe: Use PTRRELOC() in early_init()]
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Add a new helper reloc_kernel_entry() to jump back to the start of the
new kernel. After we put the new kernel in a randomized place we can use
this new helper to enter the kernel and begin to relocate again.
Signed-off-by: Jason Yan <yanaijie@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@c-s.fr>
Reviewed-by: Diana Craciun <diana.craciun@nxp.com>
Tested-by: Diana Craciun <diana.craciun@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Scott Wood <oss@buserror.net>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Add a new helper create_kaslr_tlb_entry() to create a tlb entry by the
virtual and physical address. This is a preparation to support boot kernel
at a randomized address.
Signed-off-by: Jason Yan <yanaijie@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@c-s.fr>
Reviewed-by: Diana Craciun <diana.craciun@nxp.com>
Tested-by: Diana Craciun <diana.craciun@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Scott Wood <oss@buserror.net>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
M_IF_NEEDED is defined too many times. Move it to a common place and
rename it to MAS2_M_IF_NEEDED which is much readable.
Signed-off-by: Jason Yan <yanaijie@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@c-s.fr>
Reviewed-by: Diana Craciun <diana.craciun@nxp.com>
Tested-by: Diana Craciun <diana.craciun@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Scott Wood <oss@buserror.net>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Currently it is not possible to distinguish the case when fadump is
supported by firmware and disabled in kernel and completely unsupported
using the kernel sysfs interface. User can investigate the devicetree
but it is more reasonable to provide sysfs files in case we get some
fadumpv2 in the future.
With this patch sysfs files are available whenever fadump is supported
by firmware.
There is duplicate message about lack of support by firmware in
fadump_reserve_mem and setup_fadump. Remove the duplicate message in
setup_fadump.
Signed-off-by: Michal Suchanek <msuchanek@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Hari Bathini <hbathini@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191107164757.15140-1-msuchanek@suse.de
Currently when an EEH error is detected, the system log receives the
same (or almost the same) message twice:
EEH: PHB#0 failure detected, location: N/A
EEH: PHB#0 failure detected, location: N/A
or
EEH: eeh_dev_check_failure: Frozen PHB#0-PE#0 detected
EEH: Frozen PHB#0-PE#0 detected
This looks like a bug, but in fact the messages are from different
functions and mean slightly different things. So keep both but change
one of the messages slightly, so that it's clear they are different:
EEH: PHB#0 failure detected, location: N/A
EEH: Recovering PHB#0, location: N/A
or
EEH: eeh_dev_check_failure: Frozen PHB#0-PE#0 detected
EEH: Recovering PHB#0-PE#0
Signed-off-by: Sam Bobroff <sbobroff@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/43817cb6e6631b0828b9a6e266f60d1f8ca8eb22.1571288375.git.sbobroff@linux.ibm.com
The FSF does not reside in "675 Mass Ave, Cambridge" anymore...
let's simply use proper SPDX identifiers instead.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Russell Currey <ruscur@russell.cc>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190828060737.32531-1-thuth@redhat.com
Avoids confusion when printing Oops message like below
Faulting instruction address: 0xc00000000008bdb4
Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [#1]
LE PAGE_SIZE=64K MMU=Radix MMU=Hash SMP NR_CPUS=2048 NUMA PowerNV
This was because we never clear the MMU_FTR_HPTE_TABLE feature flag
even if we run with radix translation. It was discussed that we should
look at this feature flag as an indication of the capability to run
hash translation and we should not clear the flag even if we run in
radix translation. All the code paths check for radix_enabled() check and
if found true consider we are running with radix translation. Follow the
same sequence for finding the MMU translation string to be used in Oops
message.
Signed-off-by: Aneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@c-s.fr>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190711145814.17970-1-aneesh.kumar@linux.ibm.com
Use DEFINE_DEBUGFS_ATTRIBUTE rather than DEFINE_SIMPLE_ATTRIBUTE
for debugfs files.
Semantic patch information:
Rationale: DEFINE_SIMPLE_ATTRIBUTE + debugfs_create_file()
imposes some significant overhead as compared to
DEFINE_DEBUGFS_ATTRIBUTE + debugfs_create_file_unsafe().
Generated by: scripts/coccinelle/api/debugfs/debugfs_simple_attr.cocci
Signed-off-by: YueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1543498518-107601-1-git-send-email-yuehaibing@huawei.com
On powerpc, watchpoint match range is double-word granular. On a
watchpoint hit, DAR is set to the first byte of overlap between actual
access and watched range. And thus it's quite possible that DAR does
not point inside user specified range. Ex, say user creates a
watchpoint with address range 0x1004 to 0x1007. So hw would be
configured to watch from 0x1000 to 0x1007. If there is a 4 byte access
from 0x1002 to 0x1005, DAR will point to 0x1002 and thus interrupt
handler considers it as extraneous, but it's actually not, because
part of the access belongs to what user has asked.
Instead of blindly ignoring the exception, get actual address range by
analysing an instruction, and ignore only if actual range does not
overlap with user specified range.
Note: The behavior is unchanged for 8xx.
Signed-off-by: Ravi Bangoria <ravi.bangoria@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191017093204.7511-5-ravi.bangoria@linux.ibm.com
ptrace_set_debugreg() does not consider new length while overwriting
the watchpoint. Fix that. ppc_set_hwdebug() aligns watchpoint address
to doubleword boundary but does not change the length. If address
range is crossing doubleword boundary and length is less then 8, we
will lose samples from second doubleword. So fix that as well.
Signed-off-by: Ravi Bangoria <ravi.bangoria@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191017093204.7511-4-ravi.bangoria@linux.ibm.com
Watchpoint match range is always doubleword(8 bytes) aligned on
powerpc. If the given range is crossing doubleword boundary, we need
to increase the length such that next doubleword also get
covered. Ex,
address len = 6 bytes
|=========.
|------------v--|------v--------|
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---------------|---------------|
<---8 bytes--->
In such case, current code configures hw as:
start_addr = address & ~HW_BREAKPOINT_ALIGN
len = 8 bytes
And thus read/write in last 4 bytes of the given range is ignored.
Fix this by including next doubleword in the length.
Signed-off-by: Ravi Bangoria <ravi.bangoria@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191017093204.7511-3-ravi.bangoria@linux.ibm.com
The issue was showing "Mitigation" message via sysfs whatever the
state of "RFI Flush", but it should show "Vulnerable" when it is
disabled.
If you have "L1D private" feature enabled and not "RFI Flush" you are
vulnerable to meltdown attacks.
"RFI Flush" is the key feature to mitigate the meltdown whatever the
"L1D private" state.
SEC_FTR_L1D_THREAD_PRIV is a feature for Power9 only.
So the message should be as the truth table shows:
CPU | L1D private | RFI Flush | sysfs
----|-------------|-----------|-------------------------------------
P9 | False | False | Vulnerable
P9 | False | True | Mitigation: RFI Flush
P9 | True | False | Vulnerable: L1D private per thread
P9 | True | True | Mitigation: RFI Flush, L1D private per thread
P8 | False | False | Vulnerable
P8 | False | True | Mitigation: RFI Flush
Output before this fix:
# cat /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/meltdown
Mitigation: RFI Flush, L1D private per thread
# echo 0 > /sys/kernel/debug/powerpc/rfi_flush
# cat /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/meltdown
Mitigation: L1D private per thread
Output after fix:
# cat /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/meltdown
Mitigation: RFI Flush, L1D private per thread
# echo 0 > /sys/kernel/debug/powerpc/rfi_flush
# cat /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/meltdown
Vulnerable: L1D private per thread
Signed-off-by: Gustavo L. F. Walbon <gwalbon@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mauro S. M. Rodrigues <maurosr@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190502210907.42375-1-gwalbon@linux.ibm.com
Advertise client support for the PAPR architected ibm,drc-info device
tree property during CAS handshake.
Fixes: c7a3275e0f ("powerpc/pseries: Revert support for ibm,drc-info devtree property")
Signed-off-by: Tyrel Datwyler <tyreld@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1573449697-5448-11-git-send-email-tyreld@linux.ibm.com
Merge the secureboot support, as well as the IMA changes needed to
support it.
From Nayna's cover letter:
In order to verify the OS kernel on PowerNV systems, secure boot
requires X.509 certificates trusted by the platform. These are
stored in secure variables controlled by OPAL, called OPAL secure
variables. In order to enable users to manage the keys, the secure
variables need to be exposed to userspace.
OPAL provides the runtime services for the kernel to be able to
access the secure variables. This patchset defines the kernel
interface for the OPAL APIs. These APIs are used by the hooks, which
load these variables to the keyring and expose them to the userspace
for reading/writing.
Overall, this patchset adds the following support:
* expose secure variables to the kernel via OPAL Runtime API interface
* expose secure variables to the userspace via kernel sysfs interface
* load kernel verification and revocation keys to .platform and
.blacklist keyring respectively.
The secure variables can be read/written using simple linux
utilities cat/hexdump.
For example:
Path to the secure variables is: /sys/firmware/secvar/vars
Each secure variable is listed as directory.
$ ls -l
total 0
drwxr-xr-x. 2 root root 0 Aug 20 21:20 db
drwxr-xr-x. 2 root root 0 Aug 20 21:20 KEK
drwxr-xr-x. 2 root root 0 Aug 20 21:20 PK
The attributes of each of the secure variables are (for example: PK):
$ ls -l
total 0
-r--r--r--. 1 root root 4096 Oct 1 15:10 data
-r--r--r--. 1 root root 65536 Oct 1 15:10 size
--w-------. 1 root root 4096 Oct 1 15:12 update
The "data" is used to read the existing variable value using
hexdump. The data is stored in ESL format. The "update" is used to
write a new value using cat. The update is to be submitted as AUTH
file.
PowerNV secure variables, which store the keys used for OS kernel
verification, are managed by the firmware. These secure variables need to
be accessed by the userspace for addition/deletion of the certificates.
This patch adds the sysfs interface to expose secure variables for PowerNV
secureboot. The users shall use this interface for manipulating
the keys stored in the secure variables.
Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Eric Richter <erichte@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1573441836-3632-3-git-send-email-nayna@linux.ibm.com
The X.509 certificates trusted by the platform and required to secure
boot the OS kernel are wrapped in secure variables, which are
controlled by OPAL.
This patch adds firmware/kernel interface to read and write OPAL
secure variables based on the unique key.
This support can be enabled using CONFIG_OPAL_SECVAR.
Signed-off-by: Claudio Carvalho <cclaudio@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Richter <erichte@linux.ibm.com>
[mpe: Make secvar_ops __ro_after_init, only build opal-secvar.c if PPC_SECURE_BOOT=y]
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1573441836-3632-2-git-send-email-nayna@linux.ibm.com
The arch specific kernel module policy rule requires kernel modules to
be signed, either as an IMA signature, stored as an xattr, or as an
appended signature. As a result, kernel modules appended signatures
could be enforced without "sig_enforce" being set or reflected in
/sys/module/module/parameters/sig_enforce. This patch sets
"sig_enforce".
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1572492694-6520-10-git-send-email-zohar@linux.ibm.com
This patch updates the arch-specific policies for PowerNV system to
make sure that the binary hash is not blacklisted.
Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1572492694-6520-9-git-send-email-zohar@linux.ibm.com
This patch defines an arch-specific trusted boot only policy and a
combined secure and trusted boot policy.
Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1572492694-6520-5-git-send-email-zohar@linux.ibm.com
While secure boot permits only properly verified signed kernels to be
booted, trusted boot calculates the file hash of the kernel image and
stores the measurement prior to boot, that can be subsequently
compared against good known values via attestation services.
This patch reads the trusted boot state of a PowerNV system. The state
is used to conditionally enable additional measurement rules in the
IMA arch-specific policies.
Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Richter <erichte@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/e9eeee6b-b9bf-1e41-2954-61dbd6fbfbcf@linux.ibm.com
