This is the mindless scripted replacement of kernel use of POLL*
variables as described by Al, done by this script:
for V in IN OUT PRI ERR RDNORM RDBAND WRNORM WRBAND HUP RDHUP NVAL MSG; do
L=`git grep -l -w POLL$V | grep -v '^t' | grep -v /um/ | grep -v '^sa' | grep -v '/poll.h$'|grep -v '^D'`
for f in $L; do sed -i "-es/^\([^\"]*\)\(\<POLL$V\>\)/\\1E\\2/" $f; done
done
with de-mangling cleanups yet to come.
NOTE! On almost all architectures, the EPOLL* constants have the same
values as the POLL* constants do. But they keyword here is "almost".
For various bad reasons they aren't the same, and epoll() doesn't
actually work quite correctly in some cases due to this on Sparc et al.
The next patch from Al will sort out the final differences, and we
should be all done.
Scripted-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Pull crypto updates from Herbert Xu:
"API:
- Enforce the setting of keys for keyed aead/hash/skcipher
algorithms.
- Add multibuf speed tests in tcrypt.
Algorithms:
- Improve performance of sha3-generic.
- Add native sha512 support on arm64.
- Add v8.2 Crypto Extentions version of sha3/sm3 on arm64.
- Avoid hmac nesting by requiring underlying algorithm to be unkeyed.
- Add cryptd_max_cpu_qlen module parameter to cryptd.
Drivers:
- Add support for EIP97 engine in inside-secure.
- Add inline IPsec support to chelsio.
- Add RevB core support to crypto4xx.
- Fix AEAD ICV check in crypto4xx.
- Add stm32 crypto driver.
- Add support for BCM63xx platforms in bcm2835 and remove bcm63xx.
- Add Derived Key Protocol (DKP) support in caam.
- Add Samsung Exynos True RNG driver.
- Add support for Exynos5250+ SoCs in exynos PRNG driver"
* 'linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6: (166 commits)
crypto: picoxcell - Fix error handling in spacc_probe()
crypto: arm64/sha512 - fix/improve new v8.2 Crypto Extensions code
crypto: arm64/sm3 - new v8.2 Crypto Extensions implementation
crypto: arm64/sha3 - new v8.2 Crypto Extensions implementation
crypto: testmgr - add new testcases for sha3
crypto: sha3-generic - export init/update/final routines
crypto: sha3-generic - simplify code
crypto: sha3-generic - rewrite KECCAK transform to help the compiler optimize
crypto: sha3-generic - fixes for alignment and big endian operation
crypto: aesni - handle zero length dst buffer
crypto: artpec6 - remove select on non-existing CRYPTO_SHA384
hwrng: bcm2835 - Remove redundant dev_err call in bcm2835_rng_probe()
crypto: stm32 - remove redundant dev_err call in stm32_cryp_probe()
crypto: axis - remove unnecessary platform_get_resource() error check
crypto: testmgr - test misuse of result in ahash
crypto: inside-secure - make function safexcel_try_push_requests static
crypto: aes-generic - fix aes-generic regression on powerpc
crypto: chelsio - Fix indentation warning
crypto: arm64/sha1-ce - get rid of literal pool
crypto: arm64/sha2-ce - move the round constant table to .rodata section
...
When chacha20_block() outputs the keystream block, it uses 'u32' stores
directly. However, the callers (crypto/chacha20_generic.c and
drivers/char/random.c) declare the keystream buffer as a 'u8' array,
which is not guaranteed to have the needed alignment.
Fix it by having both callers declare the keystream as a 'u32' array.
For now this is preferable to switching over to the unaligned access
macros because chacha20_block() is only being used in cases where we can
easily control the alignment (stack buffers).
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Patch series "kmemcheck: kill kmemcheck", v2.
As discussed at LSF/MM, kill kmemcheck.
KASan is a replacement that is able to work without the limitation of
kmemcheck (single CPU, slow). KASan is already upstream.
We are also not aware of any users of kmemcheck (or users who don't
consider KASan as a suitable replacement).
The only objection was that since KASAN wasn't supported by all GCC
versions provided by distros at that time we should hold off for 2
years, and try again.
Now that 2 years have passed, and all distros provide gcc that supports
KASAN, kill kmemcheck again for the very same reasons.
This patch (of 4):
Remove kmemcheck annotations, and calls to kmemcheck from the kernel.
[alexander.levin@verizon.com: correctly remove kmemcheck call from dma_map_sg_attrs]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171012192151.26531-1-alexander.levin@verizon.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171007030159.22241-2-alexander.levin@verizon.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Tim Hansen <devtimhansen@gmail.com>
Cc: Vegard Nossum <vegardno@ifi.uio.no>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Please do not apply this to mainline directly, instead please re-run the
coccinelle script shown below and apply its output.
For several reasons, it is desirable to use {READ,WRITE}_ONCE() in
preference to ACCESS_ONCE(), and new code is expected to use one of the
former. So far, there's been no reason to change most existing uses of
ACCESS_ONCE(), as these aren't harmful, and changing them results in
churn.
However, for some features, the read/write distinction is critical to
correct operation. To distinguish these cases, separate read/write
accessors must be used. This patch migrates (most) remaining
ACCESS_ONCE() instances to {READ,WRITE}_ONCE(), using the following
coccinelle script:
----
// Convert trivial ACCESS_ONCE() uses to equivalent READ_ONCE() and
// WRITE_ONCE()
// $ make coccicheck COCCI=/home/mark/once.cocci SPFLAGS="--include-headers" MODE=patch
virtual patch
@ depends on patch @
expression E1, E2;
@@
- ACCESS_ONCE(E1) = E2
+ WRITE_ONCE(E1, E2)
@ depends on patch @
expression E;
@@
- ACCESS_ONCE(E)
+ READ_ONCE(E)
----
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: davem@davemloft.net
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: mpe@ellerman.id.au
Cc: shuah@kernel.org
Cc: snitzer@redhat.com
Cc: thor.thayer@linux.intel.com
Cc: tj@kernel.org
Cc: viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk
Cc: will.deacon@arm.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1508792849-3115-19-git-send-email-paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Fix the warning message on the parisc and IA64 architectures to show the
correct function name of the caller by using %pS instead of %pF. The
message is printed with the value of _RET_IP_ which calls
__builtin_return_address(0) and as such returns the IP address caller
instead of pointer to a function descriptor of the caller.
The effect of this patch is visible on the parisc and ia64 architectures
only since those are the ones which use function descriptors while on
all others %pS and %pF will behave the same.
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
Fixes: eecabf5674 ("random: suppress spammy warnings about unseeded randomness")
Fixes: d06bfd1989 ("random: warn when kernel uses unseeded randomness")
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
callers can more safely get random bytes if they can block until the
CRNG is initialized.
Also print a warning if get_random_*() is called before the CRNG is
initialized. By default, only one single-line warning will be printed
per boot. If CONFIG_WARN_ALL_UNSEEDED_RANDOM is defined, then a
warning will be printed for each function which tries to get random
bytes before the CRNG is initialized. This can get spammy for certain
architecture types, so it is not enabled by default.
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Merge tag 'random_for_linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tytso/random
Pull random updates from Ted Ts'o:
"Add wait_for_random_bytes() and get_random_*_wait() functions so that
callers can more safely get random bytes if they can block until the
CRNG is initialized.
Also print a warning if get_random_*() is called before the CRNG is
initialized. By default, only one single-line warning will be printed
per boot. If CONFIG_WARN_ALL_UNSEEDED_RANDOM is defined, then a
warning will be printed for each function which tries to get random
bytes before the CRNG is initialized. This can get spammy for certain
architecture types, so it is not enabled by default"
* tag 'random_for_linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tytso/random:
random: reorder READ_ONCE() in get_random_uXX
random: suppress spammy warnings about unseeded randomness
random: warn when kernel uses unseeded randomness
net/route: use get_random_int for random counter
net/neighbor: use get_random_u32 for 32-bit hash random
rhashtable: use get_random_u32 for hash_rnd
ceph: ensure RNG is seeded before using
iscsi: ensure RNG is seeded before use
cifs: use get_random_u32 for 32-bit lock random
random: add get_random_{bytes,u32,u64,int,long,once}_wait family
random: add wait_for_random_bytes() API
Avoid the READ_ONCE in commit 4a072c71f4 ("random: silence compiler
warnings and fix race") if we can leave the function after
arch_get_random_XXX().
Cc: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Unfortunately, on some models of some architectures getting a fully
seeded CRNG is extremely difficult, and so this can result in dmesg
getting spammed for a surprisingly long time. This is really bad from
a security perspective, and so architecture maintainers really need to
do what they can to get the CRNG seeded sooner after the system is
booted. However, users can't do anything actionble to address this,
and spamming the kernel messages log will only just annoy people.
For developers who want to work on improving this situation,
CONFIG_WARN_UNSEEDED_RANDOM has been renamed to
CONFIG_WARN_ALL_UNSEEDED_RANDOM. By default the kernel will always
print the first use of unseeded randomness. This way, hopefully the
security obsessed will be happy that there is _some_ indication when
the kernel boots there may be a potential issue with that architecture
or subarchitecture. To see all uses of unseeded randomness,
developers can enable CONFIG_WARN_ALL_UNSEEDED_RANDOM.
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
The add_device_randomness() function would ignore incoming bytes if the
crng wasn't ready. This additionally makes sure to make an early enough
call to add_latent_entropy() to influence the initial stack canary,
which is especially important on non-x86 systems where it stays the same
through the life of the boot.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170626233038.GA48751@beast
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Jessica Yu <jeyu@redhat.com>
Cc: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Viresh Kumar <viresh.kumar@linaro.org>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Prarit Bhargava <prarit@redhat.com>
Cc: Lokesh Vutla <lokeshvutla@ti.com>
Cc: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
Cc: AKASHI Takahiro <takahiro.akashi@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
This enables an important dmesg notification about when drivers have
used the crng without it being seeded first. Prior, these errors would
occur silently, and so there hasn't been a great way of diagnosing these
types of bugs for obscure setups. By adding this as a config option, we
can leave it on by default, so that we learn where these issues happen,
in the field, will still allowing some people to turn it off, if they
really know what they're doing and do not want the log entries.
However, we don't leave it _completely_ by default. An earlier version
of this patch simply had `default y`. I'd really love that, but it turns
out, this problem with unseeded randomness being used is really quite
present and is going to take a long time to fix. Thus, as a compromise
between log-messages-for-all and nobody-knows, this is `default y`,
except it is also `depends on DEBUG_KERNEL`. This will ensure that the
curious see the messages while others don't have to.
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
This enables users of get_random_{bytes,u32,u64,int,long} to wait until
the pool is ready before using this function, in case they actually want
to have reliable randomness.
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Odd versions of gcc for the sh4 architecture will actually warn about
flags being used while uninitialized, so we set them to zero. Non crazy
gccs will optimize that out again, so it doesn't make a difference.
Next, over aggressive gccs could inline the expression that defines
use_lock, which could then introduce a race resulting in a lock
imbalance. By using READ_ONCE, we prevent that fate. Finally, we make
that assignment const, so that gcc can still optimize a nice amount.
Finally, we fix a potential deadlock between primary_crng.lock and
batched_entropy_reset_lock, where they could be called in opposite
order. Moving the call to invalidate_batched_entropy to outside the lock
rectifies this issue.
Fixes: b169c13de4
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
It's possible that get_random_{u32,u64} is used before the crng has
initialized, in which case, its output might not be cryptographically
secure. For this problem, directly, this patch set is introducing the
*_wait variety of functions, but even with that, there's a subtle issue:
what happens to our batched entropy that was generated before
initialization. Prior to this commit, it'd stick around, supplying bad
numbers. After this commit, we force the entropy to be re-extracted
after each phase of the crng has initialized.
In order to avoid a race condition with the position counter, we
introduce a simple rwlock for this invalidation. Since it's only during
this awkward transition period, after things are all set up, we stop
using it, so that it doesn't have an impact on performance.
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.11+
Linus pointed out that there is a much more efficient way of avoiding
the problem that we were trying to address in commit 9dfa7bba35:
"fix race in drivers/char/random.c:get_reg()".
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
get_reg() can be reentered on architectures with prioritized interrupts
(m68k in this case), causing f->reg_index to be incremented after the
range check. Out of bounds memory access past the pt_regs struct results.
This will go mostly undetected unless access is beyond end of memory.
Prevent the race by disabling interrupts in get_reg().
Tested on m68k (Atari Falcon, and ARAnyM emulator).
Kudos to Geert Uytterhoeven for helping to trace this race.
Signed-off-by: Michael Schmitz <schmitzmic@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Building arm allnodefconfig causes the following build warning:
drivers/char/random.c:318:12: warning: 'random_min_urandom_seed' defined but not used [-Wunused-variable]
Fix the warning by moving 'random_min_urandom_seed' declaration inside
the CONFIG_SYSCTL ifdef block, where it is actually used.
While at it, remove the comment prior to the variable declaration.
Signed-off-by: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Many times, when a user wants a random number, he wants a random number
of a guaranteed size. So, thinking of get_random_int and get_random_long
in terms of get_random_u32 and get_random_u64 makes it much easier to
achieve this. It also makes the code simpler.
On 32-bit platforms, get_random_int and get_random_long are both aliased
to get_random_u32. On 64-bit platforms, int->u32 and long->u64.
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Now that our crng uses chacha20, we can rely on its speedy
characteristics for replacing MD5, while simultaneously achieving a
higher security guarantee. Before the idea was to use these functions if
you wanted random integers that aren't stupidly insecure but aren't
necessarily secure either, a vague gray zone, that hopefully was "good
enough" for its users. With chacha20, we can strengthen this claim,
since either we're using an rdrand-like instruction, or we're using the
same crng as /dev/urandom. And it's faster than what was before.
We could have chosen to replace this with a SipHash-derived function,
which might be slightly faster, but at the cost of having yet another
RNG construction in the kernel. By moving to chacha20, we have a single
RNG to analyze and verify, and we also already get good performance
improvements on all platforms.
Implementation-wise, rather than use a generic buffer for both
get_random_int/long and memcpy based on the size needs, we use a
specific buffer for 32-bit reads and for 64-bit reads. This way, we're
guaranteed to always have aligned accesses on all platforms. While
slightly more verbose in C, the assembly this generates is a lot
simpler than otherwise.
Finally, on 32-bit platforms where longs and ints are the same size,
we simply alias get_random_int to get_random_long.
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Suggested-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
The variable random_min_urandom_seed is not needed any more as it
defined the reseeding behavior of the nonblocking pool. Though it is not
needed any more, it is left in the code for user space interface
compatibility.
Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
The variable limit was used to identify the nonblocking pool's unlimited
random number generation. As the nonblocking pool is a thing of the
past, remove the limit variable and any conditions around it (i.e.
preserve the branches for limit == 1).
Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
The urandom_init_wait wait queue is a left over from the pre-ChaCha20
times and can therefore be savely removed.
Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
The function maybe_reseed_primary_crng is not used anywhere and thus can
be removed.
Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
This was entirely automated, using the script by Al:
PATT='^[[:blank:]]*#[[:blank:]]*include[[:blank:]]*<asm/uaccess.h>'
sed -i -e "s!$PATT!#include <linux/uaccess.h>!" \
$(git grep -l "$PATT"|grep -v ^include/linux/uaccess.h)
to do the replacement at the end of the merge window.
Requested-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
extract as much possible uncertainty from a running system at boot time as
possible, hoping to capitalize on any possible variation in CPU operation
(due to runtime data differences, hardware differences, SMP ordering,
thermal timing variation, cache behavior, etc).
At the very least, this plugin is a much more comprehensive example for
how to manipulate kernel code using the gcc plugin internals.
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Merge tag 'gcc-plugins-v4.9-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux
Pull gcc plugins update from Kees Cook:
"This adds a new gcc plugin named "latent_entropy". It is designed to
extract as much possible uncertainty from a running system at boot
time as possible, hoping to capitalize on any possible variation in
CPU operation (due to runtime data differences, hardware differences,
SMP ordering, thermal timing variation, cache behavior, etc).
At the very least, this plugin is a much more comprehensive example
for how to manipulate kernel code using the gcc plugin internals"
* tag 'gcc-plugins-v4.9-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux:
latent_entropy: Mark functions with __latent_entropy
gcc-plugins: Add latent_entropy plugin
All call sites for randomize_range have been updated to use the much
simpler and more robust randomize_addr(). Remove the now unnecessary
code.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20160803233913.32511-8-jason@lakedaemon.net
Signed-off-by: Jason Cooper <jason@lakedaemon.net>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
To date, all callers of randomize_range() have set the length to 0, and
check for a zero return value. For the current callers, the only way to
get zero returned is if end <= start. Since they are all adding a
constant to the start address, this is unnecessary.
We can remove a bunch of needless checks by simplifying the API to do just
what everyone wants, return an address between [start, start + range).
While we're here, s/get_random_int/get_random_long/. No current call site
is adversely affected by get_random_int(), since all current range
requests are < UINT_MAX. However, we should match caller expectations to
avoid coming up short (ha!) in the future.
All current callers to randomize_range() chose to use the start address if
randomize_range() failed. Therefore, we simplify things by just returning
the start address on error.
randomize_range() will be removed once all callers have been converted
over to randomize_addr().
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20160803233913.32511-2-jason@lakedaemon.net
Signed-off-by: Jason Cooper <jason@lakedaemon.net>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: "Roberts, William C" <william.c.roberts@intel.com>
Cc: Yann Droneaud <ydroneaud@opteya.com>
Cc: Russell King <linux@arm.linux.org.uk>
Cc: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Nick Kralevich <nnk@google.com>
Cc: Jeffrey Vander Stoep <jeffv@google.com>
Cc: Daniel Cashman <dcashman@android.com>
Cc: Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@mellanox.com>
Cc: Guan Xuetao <gxt@mprc.pku.edu.cn>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
The __latent_entropy gcc attribute can be used only on functions and
variables. If it is on a function then the plugin will instrument it for
gathering control-flow entropy. If the attribute is on a variable then
the plugin will initialize it with random contents. The variable must
be an integer, an integer array type or a structure with integer fields.
These specific functions have been selected because they are init
functions (to help gather boot-time entropy), are called at unpredictable
times, or they have variable loops, each of which provide some level of
latent entropy.
Signed-off-by: Emese Revfy <re.emese@gmail.com>
[kees: expanded commit message]
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
On a system with sparse node ids, eg. a powerpc system with 4 nodes
numbered like so:
node 0: [mem 0x0000000000000000-0x00000007ffffffff]
node 1: [mem 0x0000000800000000-0x0000000fffffffff]
node 16: [mem 0x0000001000000000-0x00000017ffffffff]
node 17: [mem 0x0000001800000000-0x0000001fffffffff]
The code in rand_initialize() will allocate 4 pointers for the pool
array, and initialise them correctly.
However when go to use the pool, in eg. extract_crng(), we use the
numa_node_id() to index into the array. For the higher numbered node ids
this leads to random memory corruption, depending on what was kmalloc'ed
adjacent to the pool array.
Fix it by using nr_node_ids to size the pool array.
Fixes: 1e7f583af6 ("random: make /dev/urandom scalable for silly userspace programs")
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
This fixes a crash on s390 with fake NUMA enabled.
Reported-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Fixes: 1e7f583af6 ("random: make /dev/urandom scalable for silly userspace programs")
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Don't allow RNDADDTOENTCNT or RNDADDENTROPY to accept a negative
entropy value. It doesn't make any sense to subtract from the entropy
counter, and it can trigger a warning:
random: negative entropy/overflow: pool input count -40000
------------[ cut here ]------------
WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 6828 at drivers/char/random.c:670[< none
>] credit_entropy_bits+0x21e/0xad0 drivers/char/random.c:670
Modules linked in:
CPU: 3 PID: 6828 Comm: a.out Not tainted 4.7.0-rc4+ #4
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
ffffffff880b58e0 ffff88005dd9fcb0 ffffffff82cc838f ffffffff87158b40
fffffbfff1016b1c 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 ffffffff87158b40
ffffffff83283dae 0000000000000009 ffff88005dd9fcf8 ffffffff8136d27f
Call Trace:
[< inline >] __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:15
[<ffffffff82cc838f>] dump_stack+0x12e/0x18f lib/dump_stack.c:51
[<ffffffff8136d27f>] __warn+0x19f/0x1e0 kernel/panic.c:516
[<ffffffff8136d48c>] warn_slowpath_null+0x2c/0x40 kernel/panic.c:551
[<ffffffff83283dae>] credit_entropy_bits+0x21e/0xad0 drivers/char/random.c:670
[< inline >] credit_entropy_bits_safe drivers/char/random.c:734
[<ffffffff8328785d>] random_ioctl+0x21d/0x250 drivers/char/random.c:1546
[< inline >] vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:43
[<ffffffff8185316c>] do_vfs_ioctl+0x18c/0xff0 fs/ioctl.c:674
[< inline >] SYSC_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:689
[<ffffffff8185405f>] SyS_ioctl+0x8f/0xc0 fs/ioctl.c:680
[<ffffffff86a995c0>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x23/0xc1
arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:207
---[ end trace 5d4902b2ba842f1f ]---
This was triggered using the test program:
// autogenerated by syzkaller (http://github.com/google/syzkaller)
int main() {
int fd = open("/dev/random", O_RDWR);
int val = -5000;
ioctl(fd, RNDADDTOENTCNT, &val);
return 0;
}
It's harmless in that (a) only root can trigger it, and (b) after
complaining the code never does let the entropy count go negative, but
it's better to simply not allow this userspace from passing in a
negative entropy value altogether.
Google-Bug-Id: #29575089
Reported-By: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
On a system with a 4 socket (NUMA) system where a large number of
application threads were all trying to read from /dev/urandom, this
can result in the system spending 80% of its time contending on the
global urandom spinlock. The application should have used its own
PRNG, but let's try to help it from running, lemming-like, straight
over the locking cliff.
Reported-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
get_random_long() reads from the get_random_int_hash array using an
unsigned long pointer. For this code to be guaranteed correct on all
architectures, the array must be aligned to an unsigned long boundary.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
The Hyper-V Linux Integration Services use the VMBus implementation for
communication with the Hypervisor. VMBus registers its own interrupt
handler that completely bypasses the common Linux interrupt handling.
This implies that the interrupt entropy collector is not triggered.
This patch adds the interrupt entropy collection callback into the VMBus
interrupt handler function.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <stephan.mueller@atsec.com>
Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Since systemd is consistently using /dev/urandom before it is
initialized, we can't see the other potentially dangerous users of
/dev/urandom immediately after boot. So print the first ten such
complaints instead.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
If we have a hardware RNG and are using the in-kernel rngd, we should
use this to initialize the non-blocking pool so that getrandom(2)
doesn't block unnecessarily.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Commit d07e22597d ("mm: mmap: add new /proc tunable for mmap_base
ASLR") added the ability to choose from a range of values to use for
entropy count in generating the random offset to the mmap_base address.
The maximum value on this range was set to 32 bits for 64-bit x86
systems, but this value could be increased further, requiring more than
the 32 bits of randomness provided by get_random_int(), as is already
possible for arm64. Add a new function: get_random_long() which more
naturally fits with the mmap usage of get_random_int() but operates
exactly the same as get_random_int().
Also, fix the shifting constant in mmap_rnd() to be an unsigned long so
that values greater than 31 bits generate an appropriate mask without
overflow. This is especially important on x86, as its shift instruction
uses a 5-bit mask for the shift operand, which meant that any value for
mmap_rnd_bits over 31 acts as a no-op and effectively disables mmap_base
randomization.
Finally, replace calls to get_random_int() with get_random_long() where
appropriate.
This patch (of 2):
Add get_random_long().
Signed-off-by: Daniel Cashman <dcashman@android.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Nick Kralevich <nnk@google.com>
Cc: Jeff Vander Stoep <jeffv@google.com>
Cc: Mark Salyzyn <salyzyn@android.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
This patch removes the kernel blocking API as it has been completely
replaced by the callback API.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
The get_blocking_random_bytes API is broken because the wait can
be arbitrarily long (potentially forever) so there is no safe way
of calling it from within the kernel.
This patch replaces it with a callback API instead. The callback
is invoked potentially from interrupt context so the user needs
to schedule their own work thread if necessary.
In addition to adding callbacks, they can also be removed as
otherwise this opens up a way for user-space to allocate kernel
memory with no bound (by opening algif_rng descriptors and then
closing them).
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
The added API calls provide a synchronous function call
get_blocking_random_bytes where the caller is blocked until
the nonblocking_pool is initialized.
CC: Andreas Steffen <andreas.steffen@strongswan.org>
CC: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
CC: Sandy Harris <sandyinchina@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
If more than one application invokes getrandom(2) before the pool
is ready, then all bar one will be stuck forever because we use
wake_up_interruptible which wakes up a single task.
This patch replaces it with wake_up_all.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
There was a bad typo in commit 43759d4f42 ("random: use an improved
fast_mix() function") and I didn't notice because it "looked right", so
I saw what I expected to see when I reviewed it.
Only months later did I look and notice it's not the Threefish-inspired
mix function that I had designed and optimized.
Mea Culpa. Each input bit still has a chance to affect each output bit,
and the fast pool is spilled *long* before it fills, so it's not a total
disaster, but it's definitely not the intended great improvement.
I'm still working on finding better rotation constants. These are good
enough, but since it's unrolled twice, it's possible to get better
mixing for free by using eight different constants rather than repeating
the same four.
Signed-off-by: George Spelvin <linux@horizon.com>
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.16+
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
optimized away by GCC. This is important when we are wiping
cryptographically sensitive material.
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Merge tag 'random_for_linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tytso/random
Pull /dev/random updates from Ted Ts'o:
"This adds a memzero_explicit() call which is guaranteed not to be
optimized away by GCC. This is important when we are wiping
cryptographically sensitive material"
* tag 'random_for_linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tytso/random:
crypto: memzero_explicit - make sure to clear out sensitive data
random: add and use memzero_explicit() for clearing data
zatimend has reported that in his environment (3.16/gcc4.8.3/corei7)
memset() calls which clear out sensitive data in extract_{buf,entropy,
entropy_user}() in random driver are being optimized away by gcc.
Add a helper memzero_explicit() (similarly as explicit_bzero() variants)
that can be used in such cases where a variable with sensitive data is
being cleared out in the end. Other use cases might also be in crypto
code. [ I have put this into lib/string.c though, as it's always built-in
and doesn't need any dependencies then. ]
Fixes kernel bugzilla: 82041
Reported-by: zatimend@hotmail.co.uk
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
A single case of using __get_cpu_var for address calculation.
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
call, which is a superset of OpenBSD's getentropy(2) call, for use
with userspace crypto libraries such as LibreSSL. Also add the
ability to have a kernel thread to pull entropy from hardware rng
devices into /dev/random.
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Merge tag 'random_for_linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tytso/random
Pull randomness updates from Ted Ts'o:
"Cleanups and bug fixes to /dev/random, add a new getrandom(2) system
call, which is a superset of OpenBSD's getentropy(2) call, for use
with userspace crypto libraries such as LibreSSL.
Also add the ability to have a kernel thread to pull entropy from
hardware rng devices into /dev/random"
* tag 'random_for_linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tytso/random:
hwrng: Pass entropy to add_hwgenerator_randomness() in bits, not bytes
random: limit the contribution of the hw rng to at most half
random: introduce getrandom(2) system call
hw_random: fix sparse warning (NULL vs 0 for pointer)
random: use registers from interrupted code for CPU's w/o a cycle counter
hwrng: add per-device entropy derating
hwrng: create filler thread
random: add_hwgenerator_randomness() for feeding entropy from devices
random: use an improved fast_mix() function
random: clean up interrupt entropy accounting for archs w/o cycle counters
random: only update the last_pulled time if we actually transferred entropy
random: remove unneeded hash of a portion of the entropy pool
random: always update the entropy pool under the spinlock
