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109 Commits
Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
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Andrey Konovalov
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0116523cff |
kasan, mm: change hooks signatures
Patch series "kasan: add software tag-based mode for arm64", v13. This patchset adds a new software tag-based mode to KASAN [1]. (Initially this mode was called KHWASAN, but it got renamed, see the naming rationale at the end of this section). The plan is to implement HWASan [2] for the kernel with the incentive, that it's going to have comparable to KASAN performance, but in the same time consume much less memory, trading that off for somewhat imprecise bug detection and being supported only for arm64. The underlying ideas of the approach used by software tag-based KASAN are: 1. By using the Top Byte Ignore (TBI) arm64 CPU feature, we can store pointer tags in the top byte of each kernel pointer. 2. Using shadow memory, we can store memory tags for each chunk of kernel memory. 3. On each memory allocation, we can generate a random tag, embed it into the returned pointer and set the memory tags that correspond to this chunk of memory to the same value. 4. By using compiler instrumentation, before each memory access we can add a check that the pointer tag matches the tag of the memory that is being accessed. 5. On a tag mismatch we report an error. With this patchset the existing KASAN mode gets renamed to generic KASAN, with the word "generic" meaning that the implementation can be supported by any architecture as it is purely software. The new mode this patchset adds is called software tag-based KASAN. The word "tag-based" refers to the fact that this mode uses tags embedded into the top byte of kernel pointers and the TBI arm64 CPU feature that allows to dereference such pointers. The word "software" here means that shadow memory manipulation and tag checking on pointer dereference is done in software. As it is the only tag-based implementation right now, "software tag-based" KASAN is sometimes referred to as simply "tag-based" in this patchset. A potential expansion of this mode is a hardware tag-based mode, which would use hardware memory tagging support (announced by Arm [3]) instead of compiler instrumentation and manual shadow memory manipulation. Same as generic KASAN, software tag-based KASAN is strictly a debugging feature. [1] https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/dev-tools/kasan.html [2] http://clang.llvm.org/docs/HardwareAssistedAddressSanitizerDesign.html [3] https://community.arm.com/processors/b/blog/posts/arm-a-profile-architecture-2018-developments-armv85a ====== Rationale On mobile devices generic KASAN's memory usage is significant problem. One of the main reasons to have tag-based KASAN is to be able to perform a similar set of checks as the generic one does, but with lower memory requirements. Comment from Vishwath Mohan <vishwath@google.com>: I don't have data on-hand, but anecdotally both ASAN and KASAN have proven problematic to enable for environments that don't tolerate the increased memory pressure well. This includes (a) Low-memory form factors - Wear, TV, Things, lower-tier phones like Go, (c) Connected components like Pixel's visual core [1]. These are both places I'd love to have a low(er) memory footprint option at my disposal. Comment from Evgenii Stepanov <eugenis@google.com>: Looking at a live Android device under load, slab (according to /proc/meminfo) + kernel stack take 8-10% available RAM (~350MB). KASAN's overhead of 2x - 3x on top of it is not insignificant. Not having this overhead enables near-production use - ex. running KASAN/KHWASAN kernel on a personal, daily-use device to catch bugs that do not reproduce in test configuration. These are the ones that often cost the most engineering time to track down. CPU overhead is bad, but generally tolerable. RAM is critical, in our experience. Once it gets low enough, OOM-killer makes your life miserable. [1] https://www.blog.google/products/pixel/pixel-visual-core-image-processing-and-machine-learning-pixel-2/ ====== Technical details Software tag-based KASAN mode is implemented in a very similar way to the generic one. This patchset essentially does the following: 1. TCR_TBI1 is set to enable Top Byte Ignore. 2. Shadow memory is used (with a different scale, 1:16, so each shadow byte corresponds to 16 bytes of kernel memory) to store memory tags. 3. All slab objects are aligned to shadow scale, which is 16 bytes. 4. All pointers returned from the slab allocator are tagged with a random tag and the corresponding shadow memory is poisoned with the same value. 5. Compiler instrumentation is used to insert tag checks. Either by calling callbacks or by inlining them (CONFIG_KASAN_OUTLINE and CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE flags are reused). 6. When a tag mismatch is detected in callback instrumentation mode KASAN simply prints a bug report. In case of inline instrumentation, clang inserts a brk instruction, and KASAN has it's own brk handler, which reports the bug. 7. The memory in between slab objects is marked with a reserved tag, and acts as a redzone. 8. When a slab object is freed it's marked with a reserved tag. Bug detection is imprecise for two reasons: 1. We won't catch some small out-of-bounds accesses, that fall into the same shadow cell, as the last byte of a slab object. 2. We only have 1 byte to store tags, which means we have a 1/256 probability of a tag match for an incorrect access (actually even slightly less due to reserved tag values). Despite that there's a particular type of bugs that tag-based KASAN can detect compared to generic KASAN: use-after-free after the object has been allocated by someone else. ====== Testing Some kernel developers voiced a concern that changing the top byte of kernel pointers may lead to subtle bugs that are difficult to discover. To address this concern deliberate testing has been performed. It doesn't seem feasible to do some kind of static checking to find potential issues with pointer tagging, so a dynamic approach was taken. All pointer comparisons/subtractions have been instrumented in an LLVM compiler pass and a kernel module that would print a bug report whenever two pointers with different tags are being compared/subtracted (ignoring comparisons with NULL pointers and with pointers obtained by casting an error code to a pointer type) has been used. Then the kernel has been booted in QEMU and on an Odroid C2 board and syzkaller has been run. This yielded the following results. The two places that look interesting are: is_vmalloc_addr in include/linux/mm.h is_kernel_rodata in mm/util.c Here we compare a pointer with some fixed untagged values to make sure that the pointer lies in a particular part of the kernel address space. Since tag-based KASAN doesn't add tags to pointers that belong to rodata or vmalloc regions, this should work as is. To make sure debug checks to those two functions that check that the result doesn't change whether we operate on pointers with or without untagging has been added. A few other cases that don't look that interesting: Comparing pointers to achieve unique sorting order of pointee objects (e.g. sorting locks addresses before performing a double lock): tty_ldisc_lock_pair_timeout in drivers/tty/tty_ldisc.c pipe_double_lock in fs/pipe.c unix_state_double_lock in net/unix/af_unix.c lock_two_nondirectories in fs/inode.c mutex_lock_double in kernel/events/core.c ep_cmp_ffd in fs/eventpoll.c fsnotify_compare_groups fs/notify/mark.c Nothing needs to be done here, since the tags embedded into pointers don't change, so the sorting order would still be unique. Checks that a pointer belongs to some particular allocation: is_sibling_entry in lib/radix-tree.c object_is_on_stack in include/linux/sched/task_stack.h Nothing needs to be done here either, since two pointers can only belong to the same allocation if they have the same tag. Overall, since the kernel boots and works, there are no critical bugs. As for the rest, the traditional kernel testing way (use until fails) is the only one that looks feasible. Another point here is that tag-based KASAN is available under a separate config option that needs to be deliberately enabled. Even though it might be used in a "near-production" environment to find bugs that are not found during fuzzing or running tests, it is still a debug tool. ====== Benchmarks The following numbers were collected on Odroid C2 board. Both generic and tag-based KASAN were used in inline instrumentation mode. Boot time [1]: * ~1.7 sec for clean kernel * ~5.0 sec for generic KASAN * ~5.0 sec for tag-based KASAN Network performance [2]: * 8.33 Gbits/sec for clean kernel * 3.17 Gbits/sec for generic KASAN * 2.85 Gbits/sec for tag-based KASAN Slab memory usage after boot [3]: * ~40 kb for clean kernel * ~105 kb (~260% overhead) for generic KASAN * ~47 kb (~20% overhead) for tag-based KASAN KASAN memory overhead consists of three main parts: 1. Increased slab memory usage due to redzones. 2. Shadow memory (the whole reserved once during boot). 3. Quaratine (grows gradually until some preset limit; the more the limit, the more the chance to detect a use-after-free). Comparing tag-based vs generic KASAN for each of these points: 1. 20% vs 260% overhead. 2. 1/16th vs 1/8th of physical memory. 3. Tag-based KASAN doesn't require quarantine. [1] Time before the ext4 driver is initialized. [2] Measured as `iperf -s & iperf -c 127.0.0.1 -t 30`. [3] Measured as `cat /proc/meminfo | grep Slab`. ====== Some notes A few notes: 1. The patchset can be found here: https://github.com/xairy/kasan-prototype/tree/khwasan 2. Building requires a recent Clang version (7.0.0 or later). 3. Stack instrumentation is not supported yet and will be added later. This patch (of 25): Tag-based KASAN changes the value of the top byte of pointers returned from the kernel allocation functions (such as kmalloc). This patch updates KASAN hooks signatures and their usage in SLAB and SLUB code to reflect that. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/aec2b5e3973781ff8a6bb6760f8543643202c451.1544099024.git.andreyknvl@google.com Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Reviewed-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Reviewed-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> |
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Kirill Tkhai
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84c07d11aa |
mm: introduce CONFIG_MEMCG_KMEM as combination of CONFIG_MEMCG && !CONFIG_SLOB
Introduce new config option, which is used to replace repeating CONFIG_MEMCG && !CONFIG_SLOB pattern. Next patches add a little more memcg+kmem related code, so let's keep the defines more clearly. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/153063053670.1818.15013136946600481138.stgit@localhost.localdomain Signed-off-by: Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@virtuozzo.com> Acked-by: Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov.dev@gmail.com> Tested-by: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Chris Wilson <chris@chris-wilson.co.uk> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net> Cc: "Huang, Ying" <ying.huang@intel.com> Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Cc: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com> Cc: Li RongQing <lirongqing@baidu.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Matthias Kaehlcke <mka@chromium.org> Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@techsingularity.net> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org> Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org> Cc: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com> Cc: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com> Cc: Sahitya Tummala <stummala@codeaurora.org> Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au> Cc: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> |
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Shakeel Butt
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f9e13c0a5a |
slab, slub: skip unnecessary kasan_cache_shutdown()
The kasan quarantine is designed to delay freeing slab objects to catch use-after-free. The quarantine can be large (several percent of machine memory size). When kmem_caches are deleted related objects are flushed from the quarantine but this requires scanning the entire quarantine which can be very slow. We have seen the kernel busily working on this while holding slab_mutex and badly affecting cache_reaper, slabinfo readers and memcg kmem cache creations. It can easily reproduced by following script: yes . | head -1000000 | xargs stat > /dev/null for i in `seq 1 10`; do seq 500 | (cd /cg/memory && xargs mkdir) seq 500 | xargs -I{} sh -c 'echo $BASHPID > \ /cg/memory/{}/tasks && exec stat .' > /dev/null seq 500 | (cd /cg/memory && xargs rmdir) done The busy stack: kasan_cache_shutdown shutdown_cache memcg_destroy_kmem_caches mem_cgroup_css_free css_free_rwork_fn process_one_work worker_thread kthread ret_from_fork This patch is based on the observation that if the kmem_cache to be destroyed is empty then there should not be any objects of this cache in the quarantine. Without the patch the script got stuck for couple of hours. With the patch the script completed within a second. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180327230603.54721-1-shakeelb@google.com Signed-off-by: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com> Reviewed-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Acked-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Acked-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov.dev@gmail.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Greg Thelen <gthelen@google.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> |
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Alexey Dobriyan
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7bbdb81ee3 |
slab: make usercopy region 32-bit
If kmem case sizes are 32-bit, then usecopy region should be too. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180305200730.15812-21-adobriyan@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> |
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Alexey Dobriyan
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0293d1fdd6 |
slab: make kmem_cache_flags accept 32-bit object size
Now that all sizes are properly typed, propagate "unsigned int" down the callgraph. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180305200730.15812-19-adobriyan@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Acked-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> |
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Alexey Dobriyan
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f4957d5bd0 |
slab: make kmem_cache_create() work with 32-bit sizes
struct kmem_cache::size and ::align were always 32-bit. Out of curiosity I created 4GB kmem_cache, it oopsed with division by 0. kmem_cache_create(1UL<<32+1) created 1-byte cache as expected. size_t doesn't work and never did. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180305200730.15812-6-adobriyan@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> |
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Alexey Dobriyan
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361d575e5c |
slab: make create_boot_cache() work with 32-bit sizes
struct kmem_cache::size has always been "int", all those "size_t size" are fake. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180305200730.15812-5-adobriyan@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> |
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Alexey Dobriyan
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55de8b9c60 |
slab: make create_kmalloc_cache() work with 32-bit sizes
KMALLOC_MAX_CACHE_SIZE is 32-bit so is the largest kmalloc cache size. Christoph said: : : Ok SLABs maximum allocation size is limited to 32M (see : include/linux/slab.h: : : #define KMALLOC_SHIFT_HIGH ((MAX_ORDER + PAGE_SHIFT - 1) <= 25 ? \ : (MAX_ORDER + PAGE_SHIFT - 1) : 25) : : And SLUB/SLOB pass all larger requests to the page allocator anyways. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180305200730.15812-4-adobriyan@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Acked-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> |
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Linus Torvalds
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617aebe6a9 |
Currently, hardened usercopy performs dynamic bounds checking on slab
cache objects. This is good, but still leaves a lot of kernel memory available to be copied to/from userspace in the face of bugs. To further restrict what memory is available for copying, this creates a way to whitelist specific areas of a given slab cache object for copying to/from userspace, allowing much finer granularity of access control. Slab caches that are never exposed to userspace can declare no whitelist for their objects, thereby keeping them unavailable to userspace via dynamic copy operations. (Note, an implicit form of whitelisting is the use of constant sizes in usercopy operations and get_user()/put_user(); these bypass all hardened usercopy checks since these sizes cannot change at runtime.) This new check is WARN-by-default, so any mistakes can be found over the next several releases without breaking anyone's system. The series has roughly the following sections: - remove %p and improve reporting with offset - prepare infrastructure and whitelist kmalloc - update VFS subsystem with whitelists - update SCSI subsystem with whitelists - update network subsystem with whitelists - update process memory with whitelists - update per-architecture thread_struct with whitelists - update KVM with whitelists and fix ioctl bug - mark all other allocations as not whitelisted - update lkdtm for more sensible test overage -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1 Comment: Kees Cook <kees@outflux.net> iQIcBAABCgAGBQJabvleAAoJEIly9N/cbcAmO1kQAJnjVPutnLSbnUteZxtsv7W4 43Cggvokfxr6l08Yh3hUowNxZVKjhF9uwMVgRRg9Nl5WdYCN+vCQbHz+ZdzGJXKq cGqdKWgexMKX+aBdNDrK7BphUeD46sH7JWR+a/lDV/BgPxBCm9i5ZZCgXbPP89AZ NpLBji7gz49wMsnm/x135xtNlZ3dG0oKETzi7MiR+NtKtUGvoIszSKy5JdPZ4m8q 9fnXmHqmwM6uQFuzDJPt1o+D1fusTuYnjI7EgyrJRRhQ+BB3qEFZApXnKNDRS9Dm uB7jtcwefJCjlZVCf2+PWTOEifH2WFZXLPFlC8f44jK6iRW2Nc+wVRisJ3vSNBG1 gaRUe/FSge68eyfQj5OFiwM/2099MNkKdZ0fSOjEBeubQpiFChjgWgcOXa5Bhlrr C4CIhFV2qg/tOuHDAF+Q5S96oZkaTy5qcEEwhBSW15ySDUaRWFSrtboNt6ZVOhug d8JJvDCQWoNu1IQozcbv6xW/Rk7miy8c0INZ4q33YUvIZpH862+vgDWfTJ73Zy9H jR/8eG6t3kFHKS1vWdKZzOX1bEcnd02CGElFnFYUEewKoV7ZeeLsYX7zodyUAKyi Yp5CImsDbWWTsptBg6h9nt2TseXTxYCt2bbmpJcqzsqSCUwOQNQ4/YpuzLeG0ihc JgOmUnQNJWCTwUUw5AS1 =tzmJ -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Merge tag 'usercopy-v4.16-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux Pull hardened usercopy whitelisting from Kees Cook: "Currently, hardened usercopy performs dynamic bounds checking on slab cache objects. This is good, but still leaves a lot of kernel memory available to be copied to/from userspace in the face of bugs. To further restrict what memory is available for copying, this creates a way to whitelist specific areas of a given slab cache object for copying to/from userspace, allowing much finer granularity of access control. Slab caches that are never exposed to userspace can declare no whitelist for their objects, thereby keeping them unavailable to userspace via dynamic copy operations. (Note, an implicit form of whitelisting is the use of constant sizes in usercopy operations and get_user()/put_user(); these bypass all hardened usercopy checks since these sizes cannot change at runtime.) This new check is WARN-by-default, so any mistakes can be found over the next several releases without breaking anyone's system. The series has roughly the following sections: - remove %p and improve reporting with offset - prepare infrastructure and whitelist kmalloc - update VFS subsystem with whitelists - update SCSI subsystem with whitelists - update network subsystem with whitelists - update process memory with whitelists - update per-architecture thread_struct with whitelists - update KVM with whitelists and fix ioctl bug - mark all other allocations as not whitelisted - update lkdtm for more sensible test overage" * tag 'usercopy-v4.16-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux: (38 commits) lkdtm: Update usercopy tests for whitelisting usercopy: Restrict non-usercopy caches to size 0 kvm: x86: fix KVM_XEN_HVM_CONFIG ioctl kvm: whitelist struct kvm_vcpu_arch arm: Implement thread_struct whitelist for hardened usercopy arm64: Implement thread_struct whitelist for hardened usercopy x86: Implement thread_struct whitelist for hardened usercopy fork: Provide usercopy whitelisting for task_struct fork: Define usercopy region in thread_stack slab caches fork: Define usercopy region in mm_struct slab caches net: Restrict unwhitelisted proto caches to size 0 sctp: Copy struct sctp_sock.autoclose to userspace using put_user() sctp: Define usercopy region in SCTP proto slab cache caif: Define usercopy region in caif proto slab cache ip: Define usercopy region in IP proto slab cache net: Define usercopy region in struct proto slab cache scsi: Define usercopy region in scsi_sense_cache slab cache cifs: Define usercopy region in cifs_request slab cache vxfs: Define usercopy region in vxfs_inode slab cache ufs: Define usercopy region in ufs_inode_cache slab cache ... |
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Byongho Lee
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692ae74aaf |
mm/slab_common.c: make calculate_alignment() static
calculate_alignment() function is only used inside slab_common.c. So make it static and let the compiler do more optimizations. After this patch there's a small improvement in text and data size. $ gcc --version gcc (GCC) 7.2.1 20171128 Before: text data bss dec hex filename 9890457 3828702 1212364 14931523 e3d643 vmlinux After: text data bss dec hex filename 9890437 3828670 1212364 14931471 e3d60f vmlinux Also I fixed a style problem reported by checkpatch. WARNING: Missing a blank line after declarations #53: FILE: mm/slab_common.c:286: + unsigned long ralign = cache_line_size(); + while (size <= ralign / 2) Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171210080132.406-1-bhlee.kernel@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Byongho Lee <bhlee.kernel@gmail.com> Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> |
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David Windsor
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6c0c21adc7 |
usercopy: Mark kmalloc caches as usercopy caches
Mark the kmalloc slab caches as entirely whitelisted. These caches are frequently used to fulfill kernel allocations that contain data to be copied to/from userspace. Internal-only uses are also common, but are scattered in the kernel. For now, mark all the kmalloc caches as whitelisted. This patch is modified from Brad Spengler/PaX Team's PAX_USERCOPY whitelisting code in the last public patch of grsecurity/PaX based on my understanding of the code. Changes or omissions from the original code are mine and don't reflect the original grsecurity/PaX code. Signed-off-by: David Windsor <dave@nullcore.net> [kees: merged in moved kmalloc hunks, adjust commit log] Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Cc: linux-xfs@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> |
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David Windsor
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8eb8284b41 |
usercopy: Prepare for usercopy whitelisting
This patch prepares the slab allocator to handle caches having annotations (useroffset and usersize) defining usercopy regions. This patch is modified from Brad Spengler/PaX Team's PAX_USERCOPY whitelisting code in the last public patch of grsecurity/PaX based on my understanding of the code. Changes or omissions from the original code are mine and don't reflect the original grsecurity/PaX code. Currently, hardened usercopy performs dynamic bounds checking on slab cache objects. This is good, but still leaves a lot of kernel memory available to be copied to/from userspace in the face of bugs. To further restrict what memory is available for copying, this creates a way to whitelist specific areas of a given slab cache object for copying to/from userspace, allowing much finer granularity of access control. Slab caches that are never exposed to userspace can declare no whitelist for their objects, thereby keeping them unavailable to userspace via dynamic copy operations. (Note, an implicit form of whitelisting is the use of constant sizes in usercopy operations and get_user()/put_user(); these bypass hardened usercopy checks since these sizes cannot change at runtime.) To support this whitelist annotation, usercopy region offset and size members are added to struct kmem_cache. The slab allocator receives a new function, kmem_cache_create_usercopy(), that creates a new cache with a usercopy region defined, suitable for declaring spans of fields within the objects that get copied to/from userspace. In this patch, the default kmem_cache_create() marks the entire allocation as whitelisted, leaving it semantically unchanged. Once all fine-grained whitelists have been added (in subsequent patches), this will be changed to a usersize of 0, making caches created with kmem_cache_create() not copyable to/from userspace. After the entire usercopy whitelist series is applied, less than 15% of the slab cache memory remains exposed to potential usercopy bugs after a fresh boot: Total Slab Memory: 48074720 Usercopyable Memory: 6367532 13.2% task_struct 0.2% 4480/1630720 RAW 0.3% 300/96000 RAWv6 2.1% 1408/64768 ext4_inode_cache 3.0% 269760/8740224 dentry 11.1% 585984/5273856 mm_struct 29.1% 54912/188448 kmalloc-8 100.0% 24576/24576 kmalloc-16 100.0% 28672/28672 kmalloc-32 100.0% 81920/81920 kmalloc-192 100.0% 96768/96768 kmalloc-128 100.0% 143360/143360 names_cache 100.0% 163840/163840 kmalloc-64 100.0% 167936/167936 kmalloc-256 100.0% 339968/339968 kmalloc-512 100.0% 350720/350720 kmalloc-96 100.0% 455616/455616 kmalloc-8192 100.0% 655360/655360 kmalloc-1024 100.0% 812032/812032 kmalloc-4096 100.0% 819200/819200 kmalloc-2048 100.0% 1310720/1310720 After some kernel build workloads, the percentage (mainly driven by dentry and inode caches expanding) drops under 10%: Total Slab Memory: 95516184 Usercopyable Memory: 8497452 8.8% task_struct 0.2% 4000/1456000 RAW 0.3% 300/96000 RAWv6 2.1% 1408/64768 ext4_inode_cache 3.0% 1217280/39439872 dentry 11.1% 1623200/14608800 mm_struct 29.1% 73216/251264 kmalloc-8 100.0% 24576/24576 kmalloc-16 100.0% 28672/28672 kmalloc-32 100.0% 94208/94208 kmalloc-192 100.0% 96768/96768 kmalloc-128 100.0% 143360/143360 names_cache 100.0% 163840/163840 kmalloc-64 100.0% 245760/245760 kmalloc-256 100.0% 339968/339968 kmalloc-512 100.0% 350720/350720 kmalloc-96 100.0% 563520/563520 kmalloc-8192 100.0% 655360/655360 kmalloc-1024 100.0% 794624/794624 kmalloc-4096 100.0% 819200/819200 kmalloc-2048 100.0% 1257472/1257472 Signed-off-by: David Windsor <dave@nullcore.net> [kees: adjust commit log, split out a few extra kmalloc hunks] [kees: add field names to function declarations] [kees: convert BUGs to WARNs and fail closed] [kees: add attack surface reduction analysis to commit log] Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Cc: linux-xfs@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> |
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Levin, Alexander (Sasha Levin)
|
75f296d93b |
kmemcheck: stop using GFP_NOTRACK and SLAB_NOTRACK
Convert all allocations that used a NOTRACK flag to stop using it. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171007030159.22241-3-alexander.levin@verizon.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Tim Hansen <devtimhansen@gmail.com> Cc: Vegard Nossum <vegardno@ifi.uio.no> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> |
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Levin, Alexander (Sasha Levin)
|
4950276672 |
kmemcheck: remove annotations
Patch series "kmemcheck: kill kmemcheck", v2. As discussed at LSF/MM, kill kmemcheck. KASan is a replacement that is able to work without the limitation of kmemcheck (single CPU, slow). KASan is already upstream. We are also not aware of any users of kmemcheck (or users who don't consider KASan as a suitable replacement). The only objection was that since KASAN wasn't supported by all GCC versions provided by distros at that time we should hold off for 2 years, and try again. Now that 2 years have passed, and all distros provide gcc that supports KASAN, kill kmemcheck again for the very same reasons. This patch (of 4): Remove kmemcheck annotations, and calls to kmemcheck from the kernel. [alexander.levin@verizon.com: correctly remove kmemcheck call from dma_map_sg_attrs] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171012192151.26531-1-alexander.levin@verizon.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171007030159.22241-2-alexander.levin@verizon.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Tim Hansen <devtimhansen@gmail.com> Cc: Vegard Nossum <vegardno@ifi.uio.no> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> |
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Alexey Dobriyan
|
d50112edde |
slab, slub, slob: add slab_flags_t
Add sparse-checked slab_flags_t for struct kmem_cache::flags (SLAB_POISON, etc). SLAB is bloated temporarily by switching to "unsigned long", but only temporarily. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171021100225.GA22428@avx2 Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Acked-by: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> |
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Yang Shi
|
852d8be0ad |
mm: oom: show unreclaimable slab info when unreclaimable slabs > user memory
The kernel may panic when an oom happens without killable process sometimes it is caused by huge unreclaimable slabs used by kernel. Although kdump could help debug such problem, however, kdump is not available on all architectures and it might be malfunction sometime. And, since kernel already panic it is worthy capturing such information in dmesg to aid touble shooting. Print out unreclaimable slab info (used size and total size) which actual memory usage is not zero (num_objs * size != 0) when unreclaimable slabs amount is greater than total user memory (LRU pages). The output looks like: Unreclaimable slab info: Name Used Total rpc_buffers 31KB 31KB rpc_tasks 7KB 7KB ebitmap_node 1964KB 1964KB avtab_node 5024KB 5024KB xfs_buf 1402KB 1402KB xfs_ili 134KB 134KB xfs_efi_item 115KB 115KB xfs_efd_item 115KB 115KB xfs_buf_item 134KB 134KB xfs_log_item_desc 342KB 342KB xfs_trans 1412KB 1412KB xfs_ifork 212KB 212KB [yang.s@alibaba-inc.com: v11] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1507656303-103845-4-git-send-email-yang.s@alibaba-inc.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1507152550-46205-4-git-send-email-yang.s@alibaba-inc.com Signed-off-by: Yang Shi <yang.s@alibaba-inc.com> Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> |
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Ingo Molnar
|
8c5db92a70 |
Merge branch 'linus' into locking/core, to resolve conflicts
Conflicts: include/linux/compiler-clang.h include/linux/compiler-gcc.h include/linux/compiler-intel.h include/uapi/linux/stddef.h Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> |
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Greg Kroah-Hartman
|
b24413180f |
License cleanup: add SPDX GPL-2.0 license identifier to files with no license
Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license. By default all files without license information are under the default license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2. Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0' SPDX license identifier. The SPDX identifier is a legally binding shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text. This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and Philippe Ombredanne. How this work was done: Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of the use cases: - file had no licensing information it it. - file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it, - file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information, Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords. The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne. Philippe prepared the base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files. The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files assessed. Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s) to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was: - Files considered eligible had to be source code files. - Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5 lines of source - File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5 lines). All documentation files were explicitly excluded. The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license identifiers to apply. - when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was considered to have no license information in it, and the top level COPYING file license applied. For non */uapi/* files that summary was: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------- GPL-2.0 11139 and resulted in the first patch in this series. If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0". Results of that was: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------- GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 930 and resulted in the second patch in this series. - if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in it (per prior point). Results summary: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------ GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 270 GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 169 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause) 21 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 17 LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 15 GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 14 ((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 5 LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 4 LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note 3 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT) 3 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT) 1 and that resulted in the third patch in this series. - when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became the concluded license(s). - when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a license but the other didn't, or they both detected different licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred. - In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics). - When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. - If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier, the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later in time. In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights. The Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so they are related. Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks in about 15000 files. In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the correct identifier. Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch version early this week with: - a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected license ids and scores - reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+ files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct - reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction. This worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the different types of files to be modified. These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg. Thomas wrote a script to parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the format that the file expected. This script was further refined by Greg based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different comment types.) Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to generate the patches. Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org> Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> |
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Will Deacon
|
506458efaf |
locking/barriers: Convert users of lockless_dereference() to READ_ONCE()
READ_ONCE() now has an implicit smp_read_barrier_depends() call, so it can be used instead of lockless_dereference() without any change in semantics. Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1508840570-22169-4-git-send-email-will.deacon@arm.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> |
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Peter Zijlstra
|
d92a8cfcb3 |
locking/lockdep: Rework FS_RECLAIM annotation
A while ago someone, and I cannot find the email just now, asked if we could not implement the RECLAIM_FS inversion stuff with a 'fake' lock like we use for other things like workqueues etc. I think this should be possible which allows reducing the 'irq' states and will reduce the amount of __bfs() lookups we do. Removing the 1 IRQ state results in 4 less __bfs() walks per dependency, improving lockdep performance. And by moving this annotation out of the lockdep code it becomes easier for the mm people to extend. Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Byungchul Park <byungchul.park@lge.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org> Cc: Nikolay Borisov <nborisov@suse.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: akpm@linux-foundation.org Cc: boqun.feng@gmail.com Cc: iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com Cc: kernel-team@lge.com Cc: kirill@shutemov.name Cc: npiggin@gmail.com Cc: walken@google.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> |
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Johannes Weiner
|
7779f21236 |
mm: memcontrol: account slab stats per lruvec
Josef's redesign of the balancing between slab caches and the page cache requires slab cache statistics at the lruvec level. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170530181724.27197-7-hannes@cmpxchg.org Signed-off-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Acked-by: Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov.dev@gmail.com> Cc: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> |
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Johannes Weiner
|
ed52be7bfd |
mm: memcontrol: use generic mod_memcg_page_state for kmem pages
The kmem-specific functions do the same thing. Switch and drop. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170530181724.27197-5-hannes@cmpxchg.org Signed-off-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Acked-by: Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov.dev@gmail.com> Cc: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> |
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Johannes Weiner
|
320492961c |
mm: memcontrol: use the node-native slab memory counters
Now that the slab counters are moved from the zone to the node level we can drop the private memcg node stats and use the official ones. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170530181724.27197-4-hannes@cmpxchg.org Signed-off-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Acked-by: Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov.dev@gmail.com> Cc: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> |
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Paul E. McKenney
|
5f0d5a3ae7 |
mm: Rename SLAB_DESTROY_BY_RCU to SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU
A group of Linux kernel hackers reported chasing a bug that resulted from their assumption that SLAB_DESTROY_BY_RCU provided an existence guarantee, that is, that no block from such a slab would be reallocated during an RCU read-side critical section. Of course, that is not the case. Instead, SLAB_DESTROY_BY_RCU only prevents freeing of an entire slab of blocks. However, there is a phrase for this, namely "type safety". This commit therefore renames SLAB_DESTROY_BY_RCU to SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU in order to avoid future instances of this sort of confusion. Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: <linux-mm@kvack.org> Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> [ paulmck: Add comments mentioning the old name, as requested by Eric Dumazet, in order to help people familiar with the old name find the new one. ] Acked-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> |
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Tejun Heo
|
01fb58bcba |
slab: remove synchronous synchronize_sched() from memcg cache deactivation path
With kmem cgroup support enabled, kmem_caches can be created and destroyed frequently and a great number of near empty kmem_caches can accumulate if there are a lot of transient cgroups and the system is not under memory pressure. When memory reclaim starts under such conditions, it can lead to consecutive deactivation and destruction of many kmem_caches, easily hundreds of thousands on moderately large systems, exposing scalability issues in the current slab management code. This is one of the patches to address the issue. slub uses synchronize_sched() to deactivate a memcg cache. synchronize_sched() is an expensive and slow operation and doesn't scale when a huge number of caches are destroyed back-to-back. While there used to be a simple batching mechanism, the batching was too restricted to be helpful. This patch implements slab_deactivate_memcg_cache_rcu_sched() which slub can use to schedule sched RCU callback instead of performing synchronize_sched() synchronously while holding cgroup_mutex. While this adds online cpus, mems and slab_mutex operations, operating on these locks back-to-back from the same kworker, which is what's gonna happen when there are many to deactivate, isn't expensive at all and this gets rid of the scalability problem completely. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170117235411.9408-9-tj@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Reported-by: Jay Vana <jsvana@fb.com> Acked-by: Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov.dev@gmail.com> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> |
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Tejun Heo
|
c9fc586403 |
slab: introduce __kmemcg_cache_deactivate()
__kmem_cache_shrink() is called with %true @deactivate only for memcg caches. Remove @deactivate from __kmem_cache_shrink() and introduce __kmemcg_cache_deactivate() instead. Each memcg-supporting allocator should implement it and it should deactivate and drain the cache. This is to allow memcg cache deactivation behavior to further deviate from simple shrinking without messing up __kmem_cache_shrink(). This is pure reorganization and doesn't introduce any observable behavior changes. v2: Dropped unnecessary ifdef in mm/slab.h as suggested by Vladimir. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170117235411.9408-8-tj@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Acked-by: Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov.dev@gmail.com> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> |
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Tejun Heo
|
510ded33e0 |
slab: implement slab_root_caches list
With kmem cgroup support enabled, kmem_caches can be created and destroyed frequently and a great number of near empty kmem_caches can accumulate if there are a lot of transient cgroups and the system is not under memory pressure. When memory reclaim starts under such conditions, it can lead to consecutive deactivation and destruction of many kmem_caches, easily hundreds of thousands on moderately large systems, exposing scalability issues in the current slab management code. This is one of the patches to address the issue. slab_caches currently lists all caches including root and memcg ones. This is the only data structure which lists the root caches and iterating root caches can only be done by walking the list while skipping over memcg caches. As there can be a huge number of memcg caches, this can become very expensive. This also can make /proc/slabinfo behave very badly. seq_file processes reads in 4k chunks and seeks to the previous Nth position on slab_caches list to resume after each chunk. With a lot of memcg cache churns on the list, reading /proc/slabinfo can become very slow and its content often ends up with duplicate and/or missing entries. This patch adds a new list slab_root_caches which lists only the root caches. When memcg is not enabled, it becomes just an alias of slab_caches. memcg specific list operations are collected into memcg_[un]link_cache(). Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170117235411.9408-7-tj@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Reported-by: Jay Vana <jsvana@fb.com> Acked-by: Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov@tarantool.org> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> |
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Tejun Heo
|
bc2791f857 |
slab: link memcg kmem_caches on their associated memory cgroup
With kmem cgroup support enabled, kmem_caches can be created and destroyed frequently and a great number of near empty kmem_caches can accumulate if there are a lot of transient cgroups and the system is not under memory pressure. When memory reclaim starts under such conditions, it can lead to consecutive deactivation and destruction of many kmem_caches, easily hundreds of thousands on moderately large systems, exposing scalability issues in the current slab management code. This is one of the patches to address the issue. While a memcg kmem_cache is listed on its root cache's ->children list, there is no direct way to iterate all kmem_caches which are assocaited with a memory cgroup. The only way to iterate them is walking all caches while filtering out caches which don't match, which would be most of them. This makes memcg destruction operations O(N^2) where N is the total number of slab caches which can be huge. This combined with the synchronous RCU operations can tie up a CPU and affect the whole machine for many hours when memory reclaim triggers offlining and destruction of the stale memcgs. This patch adds mem_cgroup->kmem_caches list which goes through memcg_cache_params->kmem_caches_node of all kmem_caches which are associated with the memcg. All memcg specific iterations, including stat file access, are updated to use the new list instead. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170117235411.9408-6-tj@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Reported-by: Jay Vana <jsvana@fb.com> Acked-by: Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov.dev@gmail.com> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> |
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Tejun Heo
|
9eeadc8b6e |
slab: reorganize memcg_cache_params
We're going to change how memcg caches are iterated. In preparation, clean up and reorganize memcg_cache_params. * The shared ->list is replaced by ->children in root and ->children_node in children. * ->is_root_cache is removed. Instead ->root_cache is moved out of the child union and now used by both root and children. NULL indicates root cache. Non-NULL a memcg one. This patch doesn't cause any observable behavior changes. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170117235411.9408-5-tj@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Acked-by: Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov.dev@gmail.com> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> |
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Tejun Heo
|
290b6a58b7 |
Revert "slub: move synchronize_sched out of slab_mutex on shrink"
Patch series "slab: make memcg slab destruction scalable", v3.
With kmem cgroup support enabled, kmem_caches can be created and
destroyed frequently and a great number of near empty kmem_caches can
accumulate if there are a lot of transient cgroups and the system is not
under memory pressure. When memory reclaim starts under such
conditions, it can lead to consecutive deactivation and destruction of
many kmem_caches, easily hundreds of thousands on moderately large
systems, exposing scalability issues in the current slab management
code.
I've seen machines which end up with hundred thousands of caches and
many millions of kernfs_nodes. The current code is O(N^2) on the total
number of caches and has synchronous rcu_barrier() and
synchronize_sched() in cgroup offline / release path which is executed
while holding cgroup_mutex. Combined, this leads to very expensive and
slow cache destruction operations which can easily keep running for half
a day.
This also messes up /proc/slabinfo along with other cache iterating
operations. seq_file operates on 4k chunks and on each 4k boundary
tries to seek to the last position in the list. With a huge number of
caches on the list, this becomes very slow and very prone to the list
content changing underneath it leading to a lot of missing and/or
duplicate entries.
This patchset addresses the scalability problem.
* Add root and per-memcg lists. Update each user to use the
appropriate list.
* Make rcu_barrier() for SLAB_DESTROY_BY_RCU caches globally batched
and asynchronous.
* For dying empty slub caches, remove the sysfs files after
deactivation so that we don't end up with millions of sysfs files
without any useful information on them.
This patchset contains the following nine patches.
0001-Revert-slub-move-synchronize_sched-out-of-slab_mutex.patch
0002-slub-separate-out-sysfs_slab_release-from-sysfs_slab.patch
0003-slab-remove-synchronous-rcu_barrier-call-in-memcg-ca.patch
0004-slab-reorganize-memcg_cache_params.patch
0005-slab-link-memcg-kmem_caches-on-their-associated-memo.patch
0006-slab-implement-slab_root_caches-list.patch
0007-slab-introduce-__kmemcg_cache_deactivate.patch
0008-slab-remove-synchronous-synchronize_sched-from-memcg.patch
0009-slab-remove-slub-sysfs-interface-files-early-for-emp.patch
0010-slab-use-memcg_kmem_cache_wq-for-slab-destruction-op.patch
0001 reverts an existing optimization to prepare for the following
changes. 0002 is a prep patch. 0003 makes rcu_barrier() in release
path batched and asynchronous. 0004-0006 separate out the lists.
0007-0008 replace synchronize_sched() in slub destruction path with
call_rcu_sched(). 0009 removes sysfs files early for empty dying
caches. 0010 makes destruction work items use a workqueue with limited
concurrency.
This patch (of 10):
Revert
|
||
Vlastimil Babka
|
af3b5f8764 |
mm, slab: rename kmalloc-node cache to kmalloc-<size>
SLAB as part of its bootstrap pre-creates one kmalloc cache that can fit the kmem_cache_node management structure, and puts it into the generic kmalloc cache array (e.g. for 128b objects). The name of this cache is "kmalloc-node", which is confusing for readers of /proc/slabinfo as the cache is used for generic allocations (and not just the kmem_cache_node struct) and it appears as the kmalloc-128 cache is missing. An easy solution is to use the kmalloc-<size> name when pre-creating the cache, which we can get from the kmalloc_info array. Example /proc/slabinfo before the patch: ... kmalloc-256 1647 1984 256 16 1 : tunables 120 60 8 : slabdata 124 124 828 kmalloc-192 1974 1974 192 21 1 : tunables 120 60 8 : slabdata 94 94 133 kmalloc-96 1332 1344 128 32 1 : tunables 120 60 8 : slabdata 42 42 219 kmalloc-64 2505 5952 64 64 1 : tunables 120 60 8 : slabdata 93 93 715 kmalloc-32 4278 4464 32 124 1 : tunables 120 60 8 : slabdata 36 36 346 kmalloc-node 1352 1376 128 32 1 : tunables 120 60 8 : slabdata 43 43 53 kmem_cache 132 147 192 21 1 : tunables 120 60 8 : slabdata 7 7 0 After the patch: ... kmalloc-256 1672 2160 256 16 1 : tunables 120 60 8 : slabdata 135 135 807 kmalloc-192 1992 2016 192 21 1 : tunables 120 60 8 : slabdata 96 96 203 kmalloc-96 1159 1184 128 32 1 : tunables 120 60 8 : slabdata 37 37 116 kmalloc-64 2561 4864 64 64 1 : tunables 120 60 8 : slabdata 76 76 785 kmalloc-32 4253 4340 32 124 1 : tunables 120 60 8 : slabdata 35 35 270 kmalloc-128 1256 1280 128 32 1 : tunables 120 60 8 : slabdata 40 40 39 kmem_cache 125 147 192 21 1 : tunables 120 60 8 : slabdata 7 7 0 [vbabka@suse.cz: export the whole kmalloc_info structure instead of just a name accessor, per Christoph Lameter] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/54e80303-b814-4232-66d4-95b34d3eb9d0@suse.cz Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170203181008.24898-1-vbabka@suse.cz Signed-off-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Reviewed-by: Matthew Wilcox <mawilcox@microsoft.com> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> |
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David Rientjes
|
bf00bd3458 |
mm, slab: maintain total slab count instead of active count
Rather than tracking the number of active slabs for each node, track the total number of slabs. This is a minor improvement that avoids active slab tracking when a slab goes from free to partial or partial to free. For slab debugging, this also removes an explicit free count since it can easily be inferred by the difference in number of total objects and number of active objects. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.DEB.2.10.1612042020110.115755@chino.kir.corp.google.com Signed-off-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Suggested-by: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Cc: Greg Thelen <gthelen@google.com> Cc: Aruna Ramakrishna <aruna.ramakrishna@oracle.com> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> |
||
Greg Thelen
|
f728b0a5d7 |
mm, slab: faster active and free stats
Reading /proc/slabinfo or monitoring slabtop(1) can become very
expensive if there are many slab caches and if there are very lengthy
per-node partial and/or free lists.
Commit
|
||
Thomas Garnier
|
e70954fd6d |
mm/slab_common.c: check kmem_create_cache flags are common
Verify that kmem_create_cache flags are not allocator specific. It is done before removing flags that are not available with the current configuration. The current kmem_cache_create removes incorrect flags but do not validate the callers are using them right. This change will ensure that callers are not trying to create caches with flags that won't be used because allocator specific. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1478553075-120242-2-git-send-email-thgarnie@google.com Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> |
||
Vladimir Davydov
|
89e364db71 |
slub: move synchronize_sched out of slab_mutex on shrink
synchronize_sched() is a heavy operation and calling it per each cache owned by a memory cgroup being destroyed may take quite some time. What is worse, it's currently called under the slab_mutex, stalling all works doing cache creation/destruction. Actually, there isn't much point in calling synchronize_sched() for each cache - it's enough to call it just once - after setting cpu_partial for all caches and before shrinking them. This way, we can also move it out of the slab_mutex, which we have to hold for iterating over the slab cache list. Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=172991 Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/0a10d71ecae3db00fb4421bcd3f82bcc911f4be4.1475329751.git.vdavydov.dev@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov.dev@gmail.com> Reported-by: Doug Smythies <dsmythies@telus.net> Acked-by: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> |
||
Aruna Ramakrishna
|
07a63c41fa |
mm/slab: improve performance of gathering slabinfo stats
On large systems, when some slab caches grow to millions of objects (and many gigabytes), running 'cat /proc/slabinfo' can take up to 1-2 seconds. During this time, interrupts are disabled while walking the slab lists (slabs_full, slabs_partial, and slabs_free) for each node, and this sometimes causes timeouts in other drivers (for instance, Infiniband). This patch optimizes 'cat /proc/slabinfo' by maintaining a counter for total number of allocated slabs per node, per cache. This counter is updated when a slab is created or destroyed. This enables us to skip traversing the slabs_full list while gathering slabinfo statistics, and since slabs_full tends to be the biggest list when the cache is large, it results in a dramatic performance improvement. Getting slabinfo statistics now only requires walking the slabs_free and slabs_partial lists, and those lists are usually much smaller than slabs_full. We tested this after growing the dentry cache to 70GB, and the performance improved from 2s to 5ms. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1472517876-26814-1-git-send-email-aruna.ramakrishna@oracle.com Signed-off-by: Aruna Ramakrishna <aruna.ramakrishna@oracle.com> Acked-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> |
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Alexander Potapenko
|
80a9201a59 |
mm, kasan: switch SLUB to stackdepot, enable memory quarantine for SLUB
For KASAN builds: - switch SLUB allocator to using stackdepot instead of storing the allocation/deallocation stacks in the objects; - change the freelist hook so that parts of the freelist can be put into the quarantine. [aryabinin@virtuozzo.com: fixes] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1468601423-28676-1-git-send-email-aryabinin@virtuozzo.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1468347165-41906-3-git-send-email-glider@google.com Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Andrey Konovalov <adech.fo@gmail.com> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Steven Rostedt (Red Hat) <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Cc: Kostya Serebryany <kcc@google.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Kuthonuzo Luruo <kuthonuzo.luruo@hpe.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> |
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Vladimir Davydov
|
452647784b |
mm: memcontrol: cleanup kmem charge functions
- Handle memcg_kmem_enabled check out to the caller. This reduces the number of function definitions making the code easier to follow. At the same time it doesn't result in code bloat, because all of these functions are used only in one or two places. - Move __GFP_ACCOUNT check to the caller as well so that one wouldn't have to dive deep into memcg implementation to see which allocations are charged and which are not. - Refresh comments. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/52882a28b542c1979fd9a033b4dc8637fc347399.1464079537.git.vdavydov@virtuozzo.com Signed-off-by: Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org> Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> |
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Thomas Garnier
|
7c00fce98c |
mm: reorganize SLAB freelist randomization
The kernel heap allocators are using a sequential freelist making their allocation predictable. This predictability makes kernel heap overflow easier to exploit. An attacker can careful prepare the kernel heap to control the following chunk overflowed. For example these attacks exploit the predictability of the heap: - Linux Kernel CAN SLUB overflow (https://goo.gl/oMNWkU) - Exploiting Linux Kernel Heap corruptions (http://goo.gl/EXLn95) ***Problems that needed solving: - Randomize the Freelist (singled linked) used in the SLUB allocator. - Ensure good performance to encourage usage. - Get best entropy in early boot stage. ***Parts: - 01/02 Reorganize the SLAB Freelist randomization to share elements with the SLUB implementation. - 02/02 The SLUB Freelist randomization implementation. Similar approach than the SLAB but tailored to the singled freelist used in SLUB. ***Performance data: slab_test impact is between 3% to 4% on average for 100000 attempts without smp. It is a very focused testing, kernbench show the overall impact on the system is way lower. Before: Single thread testing ===================== 1. Kmalloc: Repeatedly allocate then free test 100000 times kmalloc(8) -> 49 cycles kfree -> 77 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(16) -> 51 cycles kfree -> 79 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(32) -> 53 cycles kfree -> 83 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(64) -> 62 cycles kfree -> 90 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(128) -> 81 cycles kfree -> 97 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(256) -> 98 cycles kfree -> 121 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(512) -> 95 cycles kfree -> 122 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(1024) -> 96 cycles kfree -> 126 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(2048) -> 115 cycles kfree -> 140 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(4096) -> 149 cycles kfree -> 171 cycles 2. Kmalloc: alloc/free test 100000 times kmalloc(8)/kfree -> 70 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(16)/kfree -> 70 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(32)/kfree -> 70 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(64)/kfree -> 70 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(128)/kfree -> 70 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(256)/kfree -> 69 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(512)/kfree -> 70 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(1024)/kfree -> 73 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(2048)/kfree -> 72 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(4096)/kfree -> 71 cycles After: Single thread testing ===================== 1. Kmalloc: Repeatedly allocate then free test 100000 times kmalloc(8) -> 57 cycles kfree -> 78 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(16) -> 61 cycles kfree -> 81 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(32) -> 76 cycles kfree -> 93 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(64) -> 83 cycles kfree -> 94 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(128) -> 106 cycles kfree -> 107 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(256) -> 118 cycles kfree -> 117 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(512) -> 114 cycles kfree -> 116 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(1024) -> 115 cycles kfree -> 118 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(2048) -> 147 cycles kfree -> 131 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(4096) -> 214 cycles kfree -> 161 cycles 2. Kmalloc: alloc/free test 100000 times kmalloc(8)/kfree -> 66 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(16)/kfree -> 66 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(32)/kfree -> 66 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(64)/kfree -> 66 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(128)/kfree -> 65 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(256)/kfree -> 67 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(512)/kfree -> 67 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(1024)/kfree -> 64 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(2048)/kfree -> 67 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(4096)/kfree -> 67 cycles Kernbench, before: Average Optimal load -j 12 Run (std deviation): Elapsed Time 101.873 (1.16069) User Time 1045.22 (1.60447) System Time 88.969 (0.559195) Percent CPU 1112.9 (13.8279) Context Switches 189140 (2282.15) Sleeps 99008.6 (768.091) After: Average Optimal load -j 12 Run (std deviation): Elapsed Time 102.47 (0.562732) User Time 1045.3 (1.34263) System Time 88.311 (0.342554) Percent CPU 1105.8 (6.49444) Context Switches 189081 (2355.78) Sleeps 99231.5 (800.358) This patch (of 2): This commit reorganizes the previous SLAB freelist randomization to prepare for the SLUB implementation. It moves functions that will be shared to slab_common. The entropy functions are changed to align with the SLUB implementation, now using get_random_(int|long) functions. These functions were chosen because they provide a bit more entropy early on boot and better performance when specific arch instructions are not available. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix build] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1464295031-26375-2-git-send-email-thgarnie@google.com Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> |
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Alexander Potapenko
|
55834c5909 |
mm: kasan: initial memory quarantine implementation
Quarantine isolates freed objects in a separate queue. The objects are returned to the allocator later, which helps to detect use-after-free errors. When the object is freed, its state changes from KASAN_STATE_ALLOC to KASAN_STATE_QUARANTINE. The object is poisoned and put into quarantine instead of being returned to the allocator, therefore every subsequent access to that object triggers a KASAN error, and the error handler is able to say where the object has been allocated and deallocated. When it's time for the object to leave quarantine, its state becomes KASAN_STATE_FREE and it's returned to the allocator. From now on the allocator may reuse it for another allocation. Before that happens, it's still possible to detect a use-after free on that object (it retains the allocation/deallocation stacks). When the allocator reuses this object, the shadow is unpoisoned and old allocation/deallocation stacks are wiped. Therefore a use of this object, even an incorrect one, won't trigger ASan warning. Without the quarantine, it's not guaranteed that the objects aren't reused immediately, that's why the probability of catching a use-after-free is lower than with quarantine in place. Quarantine isolates freed objects in a separate queue. The objects are returned to the allocator later, which helps to detect use-after-free errors. Freed objects are first added to per-cpu quarantine queues. When a cache is destroyed or memory shrinking is requested, the objects are moved into the global quarantine queue. Whenever a kmalloc call allows memory reclaiming, the oldest objects are popped out of the global queue until the total size of objects in quarantine is less than 3/4 of the maximum quarantine size (which is a fraction of installed physical memory). As long as an object remains in the quarantine, KASAN is able to report accesses to it, so the chance of reporting a use-after-free is increased. Once the object leaves quarantine, the allocator may reuse it, in which case the object is unpoisoned and KASAN can't detect incorrect accesses to it. Right now quarantine support is only enabled in SLAB allocator. Unification of KASAN features in SLAB and SLUB will be done later. This patch is based on the "mm: kasan: quarantine" patch originally prepared by Dmitry Chernenkov. A number of improvements have been suggested by Andrey Ryabinin. [glider@google.com: v9] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1462987130-144092-1-git-send-email-glider@google.com Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Cc: Andrey Konovalov <adech.fo@gmail.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Konstantin Serebryany <kcc@google.com> Cc: Dmitry Chernenkov <dmitryc@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> |
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Alexander Potapenko
|
505f5dcb1c |
mm, kasan: add GFP flags to KASAN API
Add GFP flags to KASAN hooks for future patches to use. This patch is based on the "mm: kasan: unified support for SLUB and SLAB allocators" patch originally prepared by Dmitry Chernenkov. Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Cc: Andrey Konovalov <adech.fo@gmail.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Konstantin Serebryany <kcc@google.com> Cc: Dmitry Chernenkov <dmitryc@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> |
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Vladimir Davydov
|
27ee57c93f |
mm: memcontrol: report slab usage in cgroup2 memory.stat
Show how much memory is used for storing reclaimable and unreclaimable in-kernel data structures allocated from slab caches. Signed-off-by: Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov@virtuozzo.com> Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> |
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Laura Abbott
|
becfda68ab |
slub: convert SLAB_DEBUG_FREE to SLAB_CONSISTENCY_CHECKS
SLAB_DEBUG_FREE allows expensive consistency checks at free to be turned on or off. Expand its use to be able to turn off all consistency checks. This gives a nice speed up if you only want features such as poisoning or tracing. Credit to Mathias Krause for the original work which inspired this series Signed-off-by: Laura Abbott <labbott@fedoraproject.org> Acked-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <js1304@gmail.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> |
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Jesper Dangaard Brouer
|
9f706d6820 |
mm: fix some spelling
Fix up trivial spelling errors, noticed while reading the code. Signed-off-by: Jesper Dangaard Brouer <brouer@redhat.com> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Cc: Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov@virtuozzo.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> |
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Jesper Dangaard Brouer
|
fab9963a69 |
mm: fault-inject take over bootstrap kmem_cache check
Remove the SLAB specific function slab_should_failslab(), by moving the check against fault-injection for the bootstrap slab, into the shared function should_failslab() (used by both SLAB and SLUB). This is a step towards sharing alloc_hook's between SLUB and SLAB. This bootstrap slab "kmem_cache" is used for allocating struct kmem_cache objects to the allocator itself. Signed-off-by: Jesper Dangaard Brouer <brouer@redhat.com> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Cc: Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov@virtuozzo.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> |
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Jesper Dangaard Brouer
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11c7aec2a9 |
mm/slab: move SLUB alloc hooks to common mm/slab.h
First step towards sharing alloc_hook's between SLUB and SLAB allocators. Move the SLUB allocators *_alloc_hook to the common mm/slab.h for internal slab definitions. Signed-off-by: Jesper Dangaard Brouer <brouer@redhat.com> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Cc: Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov@virtuozzo.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> |
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Dmitry Safonov
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52b4b950b5 |
mm: slab: free kmem_cache_node after destroy sysfs file
When slub_debug alloc_calls_show is enabled we will try to track location and user of slab object on each online node, kmem_cache_node structure and cpu_cache/cpu_slub shouldn't be freed till there is the last reference to sysfs file. This fixes the following panic: BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000020 IP: list_locations+0x169/0x4e0 PGD 257304067 PUD 438456067 PMD 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP CPU: 3 PID: 973074 Comm: cat ve: 0 Not tainted 3.10.0-229.7.2.ovz.9.30-00007-japdoll-dirty #2 9.30 Hardware name: DEPO Computers To Be Filled By O.E.M./H67DE3, BIOS L1.60c 07/14/2011 task: ffff88042a5dc5b0 ti: ffff88037f8d8000 task.ti: ffff88037f8d8000 RIP: list_locations+0x169/0x4e0 Call Trace: alloc_calls_show+0x1d/0x30 slab_attr_show+0x1b/0x30 sysfs_read_file+0x9a/0x1a0 vfs_read+0x9c/0x170 SyS_read+0x58/0xb0 system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b Code: 5e 07 12 00 b9 00 04 00 00 3d 00 04 00 00 0f 4f c1 3d 00 04 00 00 89 45 b0 0f 84 c3 00 00 00 48 63 45 b0 49 8b 9c c4 f8 00 00 00 <48> 8b 43 20 48 85 c0 74 b6 48 89 df e8 46 37 44 00 48 8b 53 10 CR2: 0000000000000020 Separated __kmem_cache_release from __kmem_cache_shutdown which now called on slab_kmem_cache_release (after the last reference to sysfs file object has dropped). Reintroduced locking in free_partial as sysfs file might access cache's partial list after shutdowning - partial revert of the commit |
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Johannes Weiner
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127424c86b |
mm: memcontrol: move kmem accounting code to CONFIG_MEMCG
The cgroup2 memory controller will account important in-kernel memory consumers per default. Move all necessary components to CONFIG_MEMCG. Signed-off-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Acked-by: Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> |
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Vladimir Davydov
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230e9fc286 |
slab: add SLAB_ACCOUNT flag
Currently, if we want to account all objects of a particular kmem cache, we have to pass __GFP_ACCOUNT to each kmem_cache_alloc call, which is inconvenient. This patch introduces SLAB_ACCOUNT flag which if passed to kmem_cache_create will force accounting for every allocation from this cache even if __GFP_ACCOUNT is not passed. This patch does not make any of the existing caches use this flag - it will be done later in the series. Note, a cache with SLAB_ACCOUNT cannot be merged with a cache w/o SLAB_ACCOUNT, because merged caches share the same kmem_cache struct and hence cannot have different sets of SLAB_* flags. Thus using this flag will probably reduce the number of merged slabs even if kmem accounting is not used (only compiled in). Signed-off-by: Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov@virtuozzo.com> Suggested-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Cc: Greg Thelen <gthelen@google.com> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> |
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Jesper Dangaard Brouer
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865762a811 |
slab/slub: adjust kmem_cache_alloc_bulk API
Adjust kmem_cache_alloc_bulk API before we have any real users. Adjust API to return type 'int' instead of previously type 'bool'. This is done to allow future extension of the bulk alloc API. A future extension could be to allow SLUB to stop at a page boundary, when specified by a flag, and then return the number of objects. The advantage of this approach, would make it easier to make bulk alloc run without local IRQs disabled. With an approach of cmpxchg "stealing" the entire c->freelist or page->freelist. To avoid overshooting we would stop processing at a slab-page boundary. Else we always end up returning some objects at the cost of another cmpxchg. To keep compatible with future users of this API linking against an older kernel when using the new flag, we need to return the number of allocated objects with this API change. Signed-off-by: Jesper Dangaard Brouer <brouer@redhat.com> Cc: Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov@virtuozzo.com> Acked-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> |