Commit Graph

3 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Casey Schaufler
d69dece5f5 LSM: Add /sys/kernel/security/lsm
I am still tired of having to find indirect ways to determine
what security modules are active on a system. I have added
/sys/kernel/security/lsm, which contains a comma separated
list of the active security modules. No more groping around
in /proc/filesystems or other clever hacks.

Unchanged from previous versions except for being updated
to the latest security next branch.

Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2017-01-19 13:18:29 +11:00
Kees Cook
b937190c40 LSM: LoadPin: provide enablement CONFIG
Instead of being enabled by default when SECURITY_LOADPIN is selected,
provide an additional (default off) config to determine the boot time
behavior. As before, the "loadpin.enabled=0/1" kernel parameter remains
available.

Suggested-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2016-05-17 20:10:30 +10:00
Kees Cook
9b091556a0 LSM: LoadPin for kernel file loading restrictions
This LSM enforces that kernel-loaded files (modules, firmware, etc)
must all come from the same filesystem, with the expectation that
such a filesystem is backed by a read-only device such as dm-verity
or CDROM. This allows systems that have a verified and/or unchangeable
filesystem to enforce module and firmware loading restrictions without
needing to sign the files individually.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2016-04-21 10:47:27 +10:00