Excessive migration of pages can hurt the performance of workloads
that span multiple NUMA nodes. However, it turns out that the
p->numa_migrate_deferred knob is a really big hammer, which does
reduce migration rates, but does not actually help performance.
Now that the second stage of the automatic numa balancing code
has stabilized, it is time to replace the simplistic migration
deferral code with something smarter.
Signed-off-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Chegu Vinod <chegu_vinod@hp.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1390860228-21539-2-git-send-email-riel@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
When khungtaskd detects hung tasks, it prints out
backtraces from a number of those tasks.
Limiting the number of backtraces being printed
out can result in the user not seeing the information
necessary to debug the issue. The hung_task_warnings
sysctl controls this feature.
This patch makes it possible for hung_task_warnings
to accept a special value to print an unlimited
number of backtraces when khungtaskd detects hung
tasks.
The special value is -1. To use this value it is
necessary to change types from ulong to int.
Signed-off-by: Aaron Tomlin <atomlin@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Acked-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: oleg@redhat.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1390239253-24030-3-git-send-email-atomlin@redhat.com
[ Build warning fix. ]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
For general-purpose (i.e. distro) kernel builds it makes sense to build
with CONFIG_KEXEC to allow end users to choose what kind of things they
want to do with kexec. However, in the face of trying to lock down a
system with such a kernel, there needs to be a way to disable kexec_load
(much like module loading can be disabled). Without this, it is too easy
for the root user to modify kernel memory even when CONFIG_STRICT_DEVMEM
and modules_disabled are set. With this change, it is still possible to
load an image for use later, then disable kexec_load so the image (or lack
of image) can't be altered.
The intention is for using this in environments where "perfect"
enforcement is hard. Without a verified boot, along with verified
modules, and along with verified kexec, this is trying to give a system a
better chance to defend itself (or at least grow the window of
discoverability) against attack in the face of a privilege escalation.
In my mind, I consider several boot scenarios:
1) Verified boot of read-only verified root fs loading fd-based
verification of kexec images.
2) Secure boot of writable root fs loading signed kexec images.
3) Regular boot loading kexec (e.g. kcrash) image early and locking it.
4) Regular boot with no control of kexec image at all.
1 and 2 don't exist yet, but will soon once the verified kexec series has
landed. 4 is the state of things now. The gap between 2 and 4 is too
large, so this change creates scenario 3, a middle-ground above 4 when 2
and 1 are not possible for a system.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Cc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
commit 887c290e (sched/numa: Decide whether to favour task or group weights
based on swap candidate relationships) drop the check against
sysctl_numa_balancing_settle_count, this patch remove the sysctl.
Signed-off-by: Wanpeng Li <liwanp@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Acked-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Naoya Horiguchi <n-horiguchi@ah.jp.nec.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1386833006-6600-1-git-send-email-liwanp@linux.vnet.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Some setuid binaries will allow reading of files which have read
permission by the real user id. This is problematic with files which
use %pK because the file access permission is checked at open() time,
but the kptr_restrict setting is checked at read() time. If a setuid
binary opens a %pK file as an unprivileged user, and then elevates
permissions before reading the file, then kernel pointer values may be
leaked.
This happens for example with the setuid pppd application on Ubuntu 12.04:
$ head -1 /proc/kallsyms
00000000 T startup_32
$ pppd file /proc/kallsyms
pppd: In file /proc/kallsyms: unrecognized option 'c1000000'
This will only leak the pointer value from the first line, but other
setuid binaries may leak more information.
Fix this by adding a check that in addition to the current process having
CAP_SYSLOG, that effective user and group ids are equal to the real ids.
If a setuid binary reads the contents of a file which uses %pK then the
pointer values will be printed as NULL if the real user is unprivileged.
Update the sysctl documentation to reflect the changes, and also correct
the documentation to state the kptr_restrict=0 is the default.
This is a only temporary solution to the issue. The correct solution is
to do the permission check at open() time on files, and to replace %pK
with a function which checks the open() time permission. %pK uses in
printk should be removed since no sane permission check can be done, and
instead protected by using dmesg_restrict.
Signed-off-by: Ryan Mallon <rmallon@gmail.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Shared faults can lead to lots of unnecessary page migrations,
slowing down the system, and causing private faults to hit the
per-pgdat migration ratelimit.
This patch adds sysctl numa_balancing_migrate_deferred, which specifies
how many shared page migrations to skip unconditionally, after each page
migration that is skipped because it is a shared fault.
This reduces the number of page migrations back and forth in
shared fault situations. It also gives a strong preference to
the tasks that are already running where most of the memory is,
and to moving the other tasks to near the memory.
Testing this with a much higher scan rate than the default
still seems to result in fewer page migrations than before.
Memory seems to be somewhat better consolidated than previously,
with multi-instance specjbb runs on a 4 node system.
Signed-off-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Srikar Dronamraju <srikar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1381141781-10992-62-git-send-email-mgorman@suse.de
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
With scan rate adaptions based on whether the workload has properly
converged or not there should be no need for the scan period reset
hammer. Get rid of it.
Signed-off-by: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Srikar Dronamraju <srikar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1381141781-10992-60-git-send-email-mgorman@suse.de
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
This patch favours moving tasks towards NUMA node that recorded a higher
number of NUMA faults during active load balancing. Ideally this is
self-reinforcing as the longer the task runs on that node, the more faults
it should incur causing task_numa_placement to keep the task running on that
node. In reality a big weakness is that the nodes CPUs can be overloaded
and it would be more efficient to queue tasks on an idle node and migrate
to the new node. This would require additional smarts in the balancer so
for now the balancer will simply prefer to place the task on the preferred
node for a PTE scans which is controlled by the numa_balancing_settle_count
sysctl. Once the settle_count number of scans has complete the schedule
is free to place the task on an alternative node if the load is imbalanced.
[srikar@linux.vnet.ibm.com: Fixed statistics]
Signed-off-by: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Srikar Dronamraju <srikar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
[ Tunable and use higher faults instead of preferred. ]
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1381141781-10992-23-git-send-email-mgorman@suse.de
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
The NUMA PTE scan rate is controlled with a combination of the
numa_balancing_scan_period_min, numa_balancing_scan_period_max and
numa_balancing_scan_size. This scan rate is independent of the size
of the task and as an aside it is further complicated by the fact that
numa_balancing_scan_size controls how many pages are marked pte_numa and
not how much virtual memory is scanned.
In combination, it is almost impossible to meaningfully tune the min and
max scan periods and reasoning about performance is complex when the time
to complete a full scan is is partially a function of the tasks memory
size. This patch alters the semantic of the min and max tunables to be
about tuning the length time it takes to complete a scan of a tasks occupied
virtual address space. Conceptually this is a lot easier to understand. There
is a "sanity" check to ensure the scan rate is never extremely fast based on
the amount of virtual memory that should be scanned in a second. The default
of 2.5G seems arbitrary but it is to have the maximum scan rate after the
patch roughly match the maximum scan rate before the patch was applied.
On a similar note, numa_scan_period is in milliseconds and not
jiffies. Properly placed pages slow the scanning rate but adding 10 jiffies
to numa_scan_period means that the rate scanning slows depends on HZ which
is confusing. Get rid of the jiffies_to_msec conversion and treat it as ms.
Signed-off-by: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Srikar Dronamraju <srikar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1381141781-10992-18-git-send-email-mgorman@suse.de
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Add a new %P variable to be used in core_pattern. This variable contains
the global PID (PID in the init namespace) as %p contains the PID in the
current namespace which isn't always what we want.
The main use for this is to make it easier to handle crashes that happened
within a container. With that new variables it's possible to have the
crashes dumped into the container or forwarded to the host with the right
PID (from the host's point of view).
Signed-off-by: Stéphane Graber <stgraber@ubuntu.com>
Reported-by: Hans Feldt <hans.feldt@ericsson.com>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Andy Whitcroft <apw@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
This patch keeps track of how long perf's NMI handler is taking,
and also calculates how many samples perf can take a second. If
the sample length times the expected max number of samples
exceeds a configurable threshold, it drops the sample rate.
This way, we don't have a runaway sampling process eating up the
CPU.
This patch can tend to drop the sample rate down to level where
perf doesn't work very well. *BUT* the alternative is that my
system hangs because it spends all of its time handling NMIs.
I'll take a busted performance tool over an entire system that's
busted and undebuggable any day.
BTW, my suspicion is that there's still an underlying bug here.
Using the HPET instead of the TSC is definitely a contributing
factor, but I suspect there are some other things going on.
But, I can't go dig down on a bug like that with my machine
hanging all the time.
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: paulus@samba.org
Cc: acme@ghostprotocols.net
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave@sr71.net>
[ Prettified it a bit. ]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
The old softlockup detector has been replaced with new lockup
detector long ago.
Signed-off-by: Li Zefan <lizefan@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/51959687.9090305@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Add 3 new variables and sysctls to tune them (by one "next_id" variable
for messages, semaphores and shared memory respectively). This variable
can be used to set desired id for next allocated IPC object. By default
it's equal to -1 and old behaviour is preserved. If this variable is
non-negative, then desired idr will be extracted from it and used as a
start value to search for free IDR slot.
Notes:
1) this patch doesn't guarantee that the new object will have desired
id. So it's up to user space how to handle new object with wrong id.
2) After a sucessful id allocation attempt, "next_id" will be set back
to -1 (if it was non-negative).
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: checkpatch fixes]
Signed-off-by: Stanislav Kinsbursky <skinsbursky@parallels.com>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Some coredump handlers want to create a core file in a way compatible with
standard behavior. Standard behavior with fs.suid_dumpable = 2 is to
create core file with uid=gid=0. However, there was no way for coredump
handler to know that the process being dumped was suid'ed.
This patch adds the new %d specifier for format_corename() which simply
reports __get_dumpable(mm->flags), this is compatible with
/proc/sys/fs/suid_dumpable we already have.
Addresses https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=787135
Developed during a discussion with Denys Vlasenko.
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <vda.linux@googlemail.com>
Cc: Alex Kelly <alex.page.kelly@gmail.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>
Cc: Cong Wang <amwang@redhat.com>
Cc: Jiri Moskovcak <jmoskovc@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Cc: Alan Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Two of the bits in the tainted flag are not documented.
Signed-off-by: Larry Finger <Larry.Finger@lwfinger.net>
Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@xenotime.net>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
The sysctl works on the current task's pid namespace, getting and setting
its last_pid field.
Writing is allowed for CAP_SYS_ADMIN-capable tasks thus making it possible
to create a task with desired pid value. This ability is required badly
for the checkpoint/restore in userspace.
This approach suits all the parties for now.
Signed-off-by: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>
Acked-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Currently, messages are just output on the detection of stack
overflow, which is not sufficient for systems that need a
high reliability. This is because in general the overflow may
corrupt data, and the additional corruption may occur due to
reading them unless systems stop.
This patch adds the sysctl parameter
kernel.panic_on_stackoverflow and causes a panic when detecting
the overflows of kernel, IRQ and exception stacks except user
stack according to the parameter. It is disabled by default.
Signed-off-by: Mitsuo Hayasaka <mitsuo.hayasaka.hu@hitachi.com>
Cc: yrl.pp-manager.tt@hitachi.com
Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@xenotime.net>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20111129060836.11076.12323.stgit@ltc219.sdl.hitachi.co.jp
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Userspace needs to know the highest valid capability of the running
kernel, which right now cannot reliably be retrieved from the header files
only. The fact that this value cannot be determined properly right now
creates various problems for libraries compiled on newer header files
which are run on older kernels. They assume capabilities are available
which actually aren't. libcap-ng is one example. And we ran into the
same problem with systemd too.
Now the capability is exported in /proc/sys/kernel/cap_last_cap.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: make cap_last_cap const, per Ulrich]
Signed-off-by: Dan Ballard <dan@mindstab.net>
Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@xenotime.net>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Lennart Poettering <lennart@poettering.net>
Cc: Kay Sievers <kay.sievers@vrfy.org>
Cc: Ulrich Drepper <drepper@akkadia.org>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Add support for the shm_rmid_forced sysctl. If set to 1, all shared
memory objects in current ipc namespace will be automatically forced to
use IPC_RMID.
The POSIX way of handling shmem allows one to create shm objects and
call shmdt(), leaving shm object associated with no process, thus
consuming memory not counted via rlimits.
With shm_rmid_forced=1 the shared memory object is counted at least for
one process, so OOM killer may effectively kill the fat process holding
the shared memory.
It obviously breaks POSIX - some programs relying on the feature would
stop working. So set shm_rmid_forced=1 only if you're sure nobody uses
"orphaned" memory. Use shm_rmid_forced=0 by default for compatability
reasons.
The feature was previously impemented in -ow as a configure option.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix documentation, per Randy]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix warning]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: readability/conventionality tweaks]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix shm_rmid_forced/shm_forced_rmid confusion, use standard comment layout]
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@xenotime.net>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Cc: Daniel Lezcano <daniel.lezcano@free.fr>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Alan Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Cc: Solar Designer <solar@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Refresh sysctl/kernel.txt. More specifically,
- drop stale index entries
- sync and sort index and entries
- reflow sticking out paragraphs to colwidth 72
- correct typos
- cleanup whitespace
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@xenotime.net>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Now, exe_file is not proc FS dependent, so we can use it to name core
file. So we add %E pattern for core file name cration which extract path
from mm_struct->exe_file. Then it converts slashes to exclamation marks
and pastes the result to the core file name itself.
This is useful for environments where binary names are longer than 16
character (the current->comm limitation). Also where there are binaries
with same name but in a different path. Further in case the binery itself
changes its current->comm after exec.
So by doing (s/$/#/ -- # is treated as git comment):
$ sysctl kernel.core_pattern='core.%p.%e.%E'
$ ln /bin/cat cat45678901234567890
$ ./cat45678901234567890
^Z
$ rm cat45678901234567890
$ fg
^\Quit (core dumped)
$ ls core*
we now get:
core.2434.cat456789012345.!root!cat45678901234567890 (deleted)
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Alan Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Reviewed-by: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Add the %pK printk format specifier and the /proc/sys/kernel/kptr_restrict
sysctl.
The %pK format specifier is designed to hide exposed kernel pointers,
specifically via /proc interfaces. Exposing these pointers provides an
easy target for kernel write vulnerabilities, since they reveal the
locations of writable structures containing easily triggerable function
pointers. The behavior of %pK depends on the kptr_restrict sysctl.
If kptr_restrict is set to 0, no deviation from the standard %p behavior
occurs. If kptr_restrict is set to 1, the default, if the current user
(intended to be a reader via seq_printf(), etc.) does not have CAP_SYSLOG
(currently in the LSM tree), kernel pointers using %pK are printed as 0's.
If kptr_restrict is set to 2, kernel pointers using %pK are printed as
0's regardless of privileges. Replacing with 0's was chosen over the
default "(null)", which cannot be parsed by userland %p, which expects
"(nil)".
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: check for IRQ context when !kptr_restrict, save an indent level, s/WARN/WARN_ONCE/]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixup]
[randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix kernel/sysctl.c warning]
Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: Thomas Graf <tgraf@infradead.org>
Cc: Eugene Teo <eugeneteo@kernel.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <kees.cook@canonical.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Eric Paris pointed out that it doesn't make sense to require
both CAP_SYS_ADMIN and CAP_SYSLOG for certain syslog actions.
So require CAP_SYSLOG, not CAP_SYS_ADMIN, when dmesg_restrict
is set.
(I'm also consolidating the now common error path)
Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <kees.cook@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
The kernel syslog contains debugging information that is often useful
during exploitation of other vulnerabilities, such as kernel heap
addresses. Rather than futilely attempt to sanitize hundreds (or
thousands) of printk statements and simultaneously cripple useful
debugging functionality, it is far simpler to create an option that
prevents unprivileged users from reading the syslog.
This patch, loosely based on grsecurity's GRKERNSEC_DMESG, creates the
dmesg_restrict sysctl. When set to "0", the default, no restrictions are
enforced. When set to "1", only users with CAP_SYS_ADMIN can read the
kernel syslog via dmesg(8) or other mechanisms.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: explain the config option in kernel.txt]
Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Acked-by: Eugene Teo <eugeneteo@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <kees.cook@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Add documentation for kernel/bootloader_type and
kernel/bootloader_version to sysctl/kernel.txt. This should really
have been done a long time ago.
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Shen Feng <shen@cn.fujitsu.com>
Introduce core pipe limiting sysctl.
Since we can dump cores to pipe, rather than directly to the filesystem,
we create a condition in which a user can create a very high load on the
system simply by running bad applications.
If the pipe reader specified in core_pattern is poorly written, we can
have lots of ourstandig resources and processes in the system.
This sysctl introduces an ability to limit that resource consumption.
core_pipe_limit defines how many in-flight dumps may be run in parallel,
dumps beyond this value are skipped and a note is made in the kernel log.
A special value of 0 in core_pipe_limit denotes unlimited core dumps may
be handled (this is the default value).
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes]
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Reported-by: Earl Chew <earl_chew@agilent.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru>
Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>
Cc: Alan Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
When syslog is not possible, at the same time there's no serial/net
console available, it will be hard to read the printk messages. For
example oops/panic/warning messages in shutdown phase.
Add a printk delay feature, we can make each printk message delay some
milliseconds.
Setting the delay by proc/sysctl interface: /proc/sys/kernel/printk_delay
The value range from 0 - 10000, default value is 0
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix a few things]
Signed-off-by: Dave Young <hidave.darkstar@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
The documentation for /proc/sys/kernel/* does not mention the possible
value 2 for randomize-va-space yet. While being there, doing some
reformatting, fixing grammar problems and clarifying the correlations
between randomize-va-space, kernel parameter "norandmaps" and the
CONFIG_COMPAT_BRK option.
Signed-off-by: Horst Schirmeier <horst@schirmeier.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Now /proc/sys is described in many places and much information is
redundant. This patch updates the proc.txt and move the /proc/sys
desciption out to the files in Documentation/sysctls.
Details are:
merge
- 2.1 /proc/sys/fs - File system data
- 2.11 /proc/sys/fs/mqueue - POSIX message queues filesystem
- 2.17 /proc/sys/fs/epoll - Configuration options for the epoll interface
with Documentation/sysctls/fs.txt.
remove
- 2.2 /proc/sys/fs/binfmt_misc - Miscellaneous binary formats
since it's not better then the Documentation/binfmt_misc.txt.
merge
- 2.3 /proc/sys/kernel - general kernel parameters
with Documentation/sysctls/kernel.txt
remove
- 2.5 /proc/sys/dev - Device specific parameters
since it's obsolete the sysfs is used now.
remove
- 2.6 /proc/sys/sunrpc - Remote procedure calls
since it's not better then the Documentation/sysctls/sunrpc.txt
move
- 2.7 /proc/sys/net - Networking stuff
- 2.9 Appletalk
- 2.10 IPX
to newly created Documentation/sysctls/net.txt.
remove
- 2.8 /proc/sys/net/ipv4 - IPV4 settings
since it's not better then the Documentation/networking/ip-sysctl.txt.
add
- Chapter 3 Per-Process Parameters
to descibe /proc/<pid>/xxx parameters.
Signed-off-by: Shen Feng <shen@cn.fujitsu.com>
Cc: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Implement a sysctl file that disables module-loading system-wide since
there is no longer a viable way to remove CAP_SYS_MODULE after the system
bounding capability set was removed in 2.6.25.
Value can only be set to "1", and is tested only if standard capability
checks allow CAP_SYS_MODULE. Given existing /dev/mem protections, this
should allow administrators a one-way method to block module loading
after initial boot-time module loading has finished.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees.cook@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
This fills in the documentation for all of the current kernel taint
flags, and fixes the number for TAINT_CRAP, which was incorrectly
described.
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@xenotime.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
We need to add a flag for all code that is in the drivers/staging/
directory to prevent all other kernel developers from worrying about
issues here, and to notify users that the drivers might not be as good
as they are normally used to.
Based on code from Andreas Gruenbacher and Jeff Mahoney to provide a
TAINT flag for the support level of a kernel module in the Novell
enterprise kernel release.
This is the kernel portion of this feature, the ability for the flag to
be set needs to be done in the build process and will happen in a
follow-up patch.
Cc: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@suse.de>
Cc: Jeff Mahoney <jeffm@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
This patch fixes a reference to Documentation/kmod.txt
which was apparently renamed to Documentation/debugging-modules.txt
Signed-off-by: Michael Opdenacker <michael@free-electrons.com>
Cc: "Randy.Dunlap" <rdunlap@xenotime.net>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Control the trigger limit for softlockup warnings. This is useful for
debugging softlockups, by lowering the softlockup_thresh to identify
possible softlockups earlier.
This patch:
1. Adds a sysctl softlockup_thresh with valid values of 1-60s
(Higher value to disable false positives)
2. Changes the softlockup printk to print the cpu softlockup time
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: Fix various warnings and add definition of "two"]
Signed-off-by: Ravikiran Thirumalai <kiran@scalex86.org>
Signed-off-by: Shai Fultheim <shai@scalex86.org>
Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Fix various typos in kernel docs and Kconfigs, 2.6.21-rc4.
Signed-off-by: Matt LaPlante <kernel1@cyberdogtech.com>
Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
Fix the misspellings of "propogate", "writting" and (oh, the shame
:-) "kenrel" in the source tree.
Signed-off-by: Robert P. J. Day <rpjday@mindspring.com>
Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
Add sysctl for kstack_depth_to_print. This lets users change
the amount of raw stack data printed in dump_stack() without
having to reboot.
Signed-off-by: Chuck Ebbert <76306.1226@compuserve.com>
Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@suse.de>
The pipe-a-coredump-to-a-program feature was undocumented.
*Grumble*.
NB: a good enhancement to that patch would be: save all the stuff that a
core file can get from the %x expansions in the environment.
Signed-off-by: Matthias Urlichs <matthias@urlichs.de>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Sergey Vlasov noticed that there is not kernel.suid_dumpable, but
fs.suid_dumpable.
How KERN_SETUID_DUMPABLE ended up in fs_table[]? Hell knows...
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Currently, acpi video options can only be set on kernel command line. That's
little inflexible; I'd like userland s2ram application that just works, and
modifying kernel command line according to whitelist is not fun. It is better
to just allow s2ram application to set video options just before suspend
(according to the whitelist).
This implements sysctl to allow setting suspend video options without reboot.
(akpm: Documentation updates for this new sysctl are pending..)
Signed-off-by: Pavel Machek <pavel@suse.cz>
Cc: "Brown, Len" <len.brown@intel.com>
Cc: "Antonino A. Daplas" <adaplas@pol.net>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Add a new `suid_dumpable' sysctl:
This value can be used to query and set the core dump mode for setuid
or otherwise protected/tainted binaries. The modes are
0 - (default) - traditional behaviour. Any process which has changed
privilege levels or is execute only will not be dumped
1 - (debug) - all processes dump core when possible. The core dump is
owned by the current user and no security is applied. This is intended
for system debugging situations only. Ptrace is unchecked.
2 - (suidsafe) - any binary which normally would not be dumped is dumped
readable by root only. This allows the end user to remove such a dump but
not access it directly. For security reasons core dumps in this mode will
not overwrite one another or other files. This mode is appropriate when
adminstrators are attempting to debug problems in a normal environment.
(akpm:
> > +EXPORT_SYMBOL(suid_dumpable);
>
> EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL?
No problem to me.
> > if (current->euid == current->uid && current->egid == current->gid)
> > current->mm->dumpable = 1;
>
> Should this be SUID_DUMP_USER?
Actually the feedback I had from last time was that the SUID_ defines
should go because its clearer to follow the numbers. They can go
everywhere (and there are lots of places where dumpable is tested/used
as a bool in untouched code)
> Maybe this should be renamed to `dump_policy' or something. Doing that
> would help us catch any code which isn't using the #defines, too.
Fair comment. The patch was designed to be easy to maintain for Red Hat
rather than for merging. Changing that field would create a gigantic
diff because it is used all over the place.
)
Signed-off-by: Alan Cox <alan@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Initial git repository build. I'm not bothering with the full history,
even though we have it. We can create a separate "historical" git
archive of that later if we want to, and in the meantime it's about
3.2GB when imported into git - space that would just make the early
git days unnecessarily complicated, when we don't have a lot of good
infrastructure for it.
Let it rip!
