Commit Graph

797951 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
David S. Miller
d78a5ebd8b Merge branch '1GbE' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jkirsher/net-queue
Jeff Kirsher says:

====================
Intel Wired LAN Driver Fixes 2018-11-28

This series contains fixes to igb, ixgbe and i40e.

Yunjian Wang from Huawei resolves a variable that could potentially be
NULL before it is used.

Lihong fixes an i40e issue which goes back to 4.17 kernels, where
deleting any of the MAC filters was causing the incorrect syncing for
the PF.

Josh Elsasser caught that there were missing enum values in the link
capabilities for x550 devices, which was preventing link for 1000BaseLX
SFP modules.

Jan fixes the function header comments for XSK methods.
====================

Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2018-11-28 11:33:35 -08:00
Julian Wiedmann
9a764c1e59 s390/qeth: fix length check in SNMP processing
The response for a SNMP request can consist of multiple parts, which
the cmd callback stages into a kernel buffer until all parts have been
received. If the callback detects that the staging buffer provides
insufficient space, it bails out with error.
This processing is buggy for the first part of the response - while it
initially checks for a length of 'data_len', it later copies an
additional amount of 'offsetof(struct qeth_snmp_cmd, data)' bytes.

Fix the calculation of 'data_len' for the first part of the response.
This also nicely cleans up the memcpy code.

Fixes: 1da177e4c3 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Julian Wiedmann <jwi@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Ursula Braun <ubraun@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2018-11-28 11:16:54 -08:00
David S. Miller
e9d8faf93d Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pablo/nf
Pablo Neira Ayuso says:

====================
Netfilter fixes for net

The following patchset contains Netfilter fixes for net:

1) Disable BH while holding list spinlock in nf_conncount, from
   Taehee Yoo.

2) List corruption in nf_conncount, also from Taehee.

3) Fix race that results in leaving around an empty list node in
   nf_conncount, from Taehee Yoo.

4) Proper chain handling for inactive chains from the commit path,
   from Florian Westphal. This includes a selftest for this.

5) Do duplicate rule handles when replacing rules, also from Florian.

6) Remove net_exit path in xt_RATEEST that results in splat, from Taehee.

7) Possible use-after-free in nft_compat when releasing extensions.
   From Florian.

8) Memory leak in xt_hashlimit, from Taehee.

9) Call ip_vs_dst_notifier after ipv6_dev_notf, from Xin Long.

10) Fix cttimeout with udplite and gre, from Florian.

11) Preserve oif for IPv6 link-local generated traffic from mangle
    table, from Alin Nastac.

12) Missing error handling in masquerade notifiers, from Taehee Yoo.

13) Use mutex to protect registration/unregistration of masquerade
    extensions in order to prevent a race, from Taehee.

14) Incorrect condition check in tree_nodes_free(), also from Taehee.

15) Fix chain counter leak in rule replacement path, from Taehee.
====================

Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2018-11-28 11:02:45 -08:00
Pan Bian
c758940158 net: hisilicon: remove unexpected free_netdev
The net device ndev is freed via free_netdev when failing to register
the device. The control flow then jumps to the error handling code
block. ndev is used and freed again. Resulting in a use-after-free bug.

Signed-off-by: Pan Bian <bianpan2016@163.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2018-11-28 10:41:15 -08:00
Pan Bian
cfc435198f rapidio/rionet: do not free skb before reading its length
skb is freed via dev_kfree_skb_any, however, skb->len is read then. This
may result in a use-after-free bug.

Fixes: e6161d6426 ("rapidio/rionet: rework driver initialization and removal")
Signed-off-by: Pan Bian <bianpan2016@163.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2018-11-28 10:38:48 -08:00
Jan Sokolowski
529eb362a3 i40e: fix kerneldoc for xsk methods
One method, xsk_umem_setup, had an incorrect kernel doc
description, which has been corrected.

Also fixes small typos found in the comments.

Signed-off-by: Jan Sokolowski <jan.sokolowski@intel.com>
Tested-by: Andrew Bowers <andrewx.bowers@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Kirsher <jeffrey.t.kirsher@intel.com>
2018-11-28 08:45:00 -08:00
Linus Torvalds
121b018f8c for-4.20-rc4-tag
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Merge tag 'for-4.20-rc4-tag' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kdave/linux

Pull btrfs fixes from David Sterba:
 "Some of these bugs are being hit during testing so we'd like to get
  them merged, otherwise there are usual stability fixes for stable
  trees"

* tag 'for-4.20-rc4-tag' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kdave/linux:
  btrfs: relocation: set trans to be NULL after ending transaction
  Btrfs: fix race between enabling quotas and subvolume creation
  Btrfs: send, fix infinite loop due to directory rename dependencies
  Btrfs: ensure path name is null terminated at btrfs_control_ioctl
  Btrfs: fix rare chances for data loss when doing a fast fsync
  btrfs: Always try all copies when reading extent buffers
2018-11-28 08:38:20 -08:00
Linus Torvalds
5b26f7180c spi: Fixes for v4.20
A few driver specific fixes here, nothing big or that stands out for
 anyone other than the driver users.
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Merge tag 'spi-fix-v4.20-rc4' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/broonie/spi

Pull spi fixes from Mark Brown:
 "A few driver specific fixes here, nothing big or that stands out for
  anyone other than the driver users.

  The omap2-mcspi fix is for issues that started showing up with a
  change in defconfig in this release to make cpuidle get turned on by
  default"

* tag 'spi-fix-v4.20-rc4' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/broonie/spi:
  spi: omap2-mcspi: Add missing suspend and resume calls
  spi: mediatek: use correct mata->xfer_len when in fifo transfer
  spi: uniphier: fix incorrect property items
2018-11-28 08:33:55 -08:00
Josh Elsasser
a8bf879af7 ixgbe: recognize 1000BaseLX SFP modules as 1Gbps
Add the two 1000BaseLX enum values to the X550's check for 1Gbps modules,
allowing the core driver code to establish a link over this SFP type.

This is done by the out-of-tree driver but the fix wasn't in mainline.

Fixes: e23f333678 ("ixgbe: Fix 1G and 10G link stability for X550EM_x SFP+”)
Fixes: 6a14ee0cfb ("ixgbe: Add X550 support function pointers")
Signed-off-by: Josh Elsasser <jelsasser@appneta.com>
Tested-by: Andrew Bowers <andrewx.bowers@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Kirsher <jeffrey.t.kirsher@intel.com>
2018-11-28 08:29:49 -08:00
Linus Torvalds
d8242d22d5 Bugfixes, many of them reported by syzkaller and mostly predating the
merge window.
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Merge tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm

Pull kvm fixes from Paolo Bonzini:
 "Bugfixes, many of them reported by syzkaller and mostly predating the
  merge window"

* tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm:
  kvm: svm: Ensure an IBPB on all affected CPUs when freeing a vmcb
  kvm: mmu: Fix race in emulated page table writes
  KVM: nVMX: vmcs12 revision_id is always VMCS12_REVISION even when copied from eVMCS
  KVM: nVMX: Verify eVMCS revision id match supported eVMCS version on eVMCS VMPTRLD
  KVM: nVMX/nSVM: Fix bug which sets vcpu->arch.tsc_offset to L1 tsc_offset
  x86/kvm/vmx: fix old-style function declaration
  KVM: x86: fix empty-body warnings
  KVM: VMX: Update shared MSRs to be saved/restored on MSR_EFER.LMA changes
  KVM: x86: Fix kernel info-leak in KVM_HC_CLOCK_PAIRING hypercall
  KVM: nVMX: Fix kernel info-leak when enabling KVM_CAP_HYPERV_ENLIGHTENED_VMCS more than once
  svm: Add mutex_lock to protect apic_access_page_done on AMD systems
  KVM: X86: Fix scan ioapic use-before-initialization
  KVM: LAPIC: Fix pv ipis use-before-initialization
  KVM: VMX: re-add ple_gap module parameter
  KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Fix handling for interrupted H_ENTER_NESTED
2018-11-28 08:29:18 -08:00
Lihong Yang
eab077aa84 i40e: Fix deletion of MAC filters
In __i40e_del_filter function, the flag __I40E_MACVLAN_SYNC_PENDING for
the PF state is wrongly set for the VSI. Deleting any of the MAC filters
has caused the incorrect syncing for the PF. Fix it by setting this state
flag to the intended PF.

CC: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Lihong Yang <lihong.yang@intel.com>
Tested-by: Andrew Bowers <andrewx.bowers@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Kirsher <jeffrey.t.kirsher@intel.com>
2018-11-28 08:27:47 -08:00
Yunjian Wang
e4c39f7926 igb: fix uninitialized variables
This patch fixes the variable 'phy_word' may be used uninitialized.

Signed-off-by: Yunjian Wang <wangyunjian@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Aaron Brown <aaron.f.brown@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Kirsher <jeffrey.t.kirsher@intel.com>
2018-11-28 08:27:47 -08:00
Kiran Kumar Modukuri
9a24ce5b66 cachefiles: Fix page leak in cachefiles_read_backing_file while vmscan is active
[Description]

In a heavily loaded system where the system pagecache is nearing memory
limits and fscache is enabled, pages can be leaked by fscache while trying
read pages from cachefiles backend.  This can happen because two
applications can be reading same page from a single mount, two threads can
be trying to read the backing page at same time.  This results in one of
the threads finding that a page for the backing file or netfs file is
already in the radix tree.  During the error handling cachefiles does not
clean up the reference on backing page, leading to page leak.

[Fix]
The fix is straightforward, to decrement the reference when error is
encountered.

  [dhowells: Note that I've removed the clearance and put of newpage as
   they aren't attested in the commit message and don't appear to actually
   achieve anything since a new page is only allocated is newpage!=NULL and
   any residual new page is cleared before returning.]

[Testing]
I have tested the fix using following method for 12+ hrs.

1) mkdir -p /mnt/nfs ; mount -o vers=3,fsc <server_ip>:/export /mnt/nfs
2) create 10000 files of 2.8MB in a NFS mount.
3) start a thread to simulate heavy VM presssure
   (while true ; do echo 3 > /proc/sys/vm/drop_caches ; sleep 1 ; done)&
4) start multiple parallel reader for data set at same time
   find /mnt/nfs -type f | xargs -P 80 cat > /dev/null &
   find /mnt/nfs -type f | xargs -P 80 cat > /dev/null &
   find /mnt/nfs -type f | xargs -P 80 cat > /dev/null &
   ..
   ..
   find /mnt/nfs -type f | xargs -P 80 cat > /dev/null &
   find /mnt/nfs -type f | xargs -P 80 cat > /dev/null &
5) finally check using cat /proc/fs/fscache/stats | grep -i pages ;
   free -h , cat /proc/meminfo and page-types -r -b lru
   to ensure all pages are freed.

Reviewed-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Signed-off-by: Shantanu Goel <sgoel01@yahoo.com>
Signed-off-by: Kiran Kumar Modukuri <kiran.modukuri@gmail.com>
[dja: forward ported to current upstream]
Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2018-11-28 14:47:05 +00:00
Frieder Schrempf
40b412897c mtd: nand: Fix memory allocation in nanddev_bbt_init()
Fix the size of the buffer allocated to store the in-memory BBT.
This bug was previously hidden by a different bug, that was fixed in
commit d098093ba0 ("mtd: nand: Fix nanddev_neraseblocks()").

Fixes: 9c3736a3de ("mtd: nand: Add core infrastructure to deal with NAND devices")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Frieder Schrempf <frieder.schrempf@kontron.de>
Acked-by: Miquel Raynal <miquel.raynal@bootlin.com>
Signed-off-by: Boris Brezillon <boris.brezillon@bootlin.com>
2018-11-28 15:41:50 +01:00
kiran.modukuri
3f2b7b9035 fscache: Fix race in fscache_op_complete() due to split atomic_sub & read
The code in fscache_retrieval_complete is using atomic_sub followed by an
atomic_read:

        atomic_sub(n_pages, &op->n_pages);
        if (atomic_read(&op->n_pages) <= 0)
                fscache_op_complete(&op->op, true);

This causes two threads doing a decrement of n_pages to race with each
other seeing the op->refcount 0 at same time - and they end up calling
fscache_op_complete() in both the threads leading to an assertion failure.

Fix this by using atomic_sub_return_relaxed() instead of two calls.  Note
that I'm using 'relaxed' rather than, say, 'release' as there aren't
multiple variables that appear to need ordering across the release.

The oops looks something like:

FS-Cache: Assertion failed
FS-Cache: 0 > 0 is false
...
kernel BUG at /usr/src/linux-4.4.0/fs/fscache/operation.c:449!
...
Workqueue: fscache_operation fscache_op_work_func [fscache]
...
RIP: 0010:[<ffffffffc037eacd>] fscache_op_complete+0x10d/0x180 [fscache]
...
Call Trace:
 [<ffffffffc1464cf9>] cachefiles_read_copier+0x3a9/0x410 [cachefiles]
 [<ffffffffc037e272>] fscache_op_work_func+0x22/0x50 [fscache]
 [<ffffffff81096da0>] process_one_work+0x150/0x3f0
 [<ffffffff8109751a>] worker_thread+0x11a/0x470
 [<ffffffff81808e59>] ? __schedule+0x359/0x980
 [<ffffffff81097400>] ? rescuer_thread+0x310/0x310
 [<ffffffff8109cdd6>] kthread+0xd6/0xf0
 [<ffffffff8109cd00>] ? kthread_park+0x60/0x60
 [<ffffffff8180d0cf>] ret_from_fork+0x3f/0x70
 [<ffffffff8109cd00>] ? kthread_park+0x60/0x60

This seen this in 4.4.x kernels and the same bug affects fscache in latest
upstreams kernels.

Fixes: 1bb4b7f98f ("FS-Cache: The retrieval remaining-pages counter needs to be atomic_t")
Signed-off-by: Kiran Kumar Modukuri <kiran.modukuri@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2018-11-28 13:19:20 +00:00
David Howells
e6bc06faf6 cachefiles: Fix an assertion failure when trying to update a failed object
If cachefiles gets an error other then ENOENT when trying to look up an
object in the cache (in this case, EACCES), the object state machine will
eventually transition to the DROP_OBJECT state.

This state invokes fscache_drop_object() which tries to sync the auxiliary
data with the cache (this is done lazily since commit 402cb8dda9) on an
incomplete cache object struct.

The problem comes when cachefiles_update_object_xattr() is called to
rewrite the xattr holding the data.  There's an assertion there that the
cache object points to a dentry as we're going to update its xattr.  The
assertion trips, however, as dentry didn't get set.

Fix the problem by skipping the update in cachefiles if the object doesn't
refer to a dentry.  A better way to do it could be to skip the update from
the DROP_OBJECT state handler in fscache, but that might deny the cache the
opportunity to update intermediate state.

If this error occurs, the kernel log includes lines that look like the
following:

 CacheFiles: Lookup failed error -13
 CacheFiles:
 CacheFiles: Assertion failed
 ------------[ cut here ]------------
 kernel BUG at fs/cachefiles/xattr.c:138!
 ...
 Workqueue: fscache_object fscache_object_work_func [fscache]
 RIP: 0010:cachefiles_update_object_xattr.cold.4+0x18/0x1a [cachefiles]
 ...
 Call Trace:
  cachefiles_update_object+0xdd/0x1c0 [cachefiles]
  fscache_update_aux_data+0x23/0x30 [fscache]
  fscache_drop_object+0x18e/0x1c0 [fscache]
  fscache_object_work_func+0x74/0x2b0 [fscache]
  process_one_work+0x18d/0x340
  worker_thread+0x2e/0x390
  ? pwq_unbound_release_workfn+0xd0/0xd0
  kthread+0x112/0x130
  ? kthread_bind+0x30/0x30
  ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40

Note that there are actually two issues here: (1) EACCES happened on a
cache object and (2) an oops occurred.  I think that the second is a
consequence of the first (it certainly looks like it ought to be).  This
patch only deals with the second.

Fixes: 402cb8dda9 ("fscache: Attach the index key and aux data to the cookie")
Reported-by: Zhibin Li <zhibli@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2018-11-28 13:19:20 +00:00
Thomas Gleixner
55a974021e x86/speculation: Provide IBPB always command line options
Provide the possibility to enable IBPB always in combination with 'prctl'
and 'seccomp'.

Add the extra command line options and rework the IBPB selection to
evaluate the command instead of the mode selected by the STIPB switch case.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com>
Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
Cc: Waiman Long <longman9394@gmail.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Dave Stewart <david.c.stewart@intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181125185006.144047038@linutronix.de
2018-11-28 11:57:14 +01:00
Thomas Gleixner
6b3e64c237 x86/speculation: Add seccomp Spectre v2 user space protection mode
If 'prctl' mode of user space protection from spectre v2 is selected
on the kernel command-line, STIBP and IBPB are applied on tasks which
restrict their indirect branch speculation via prctl.

SECCOMP enables the SSBD mitigation for sandboxed tasks already, so it
makes sense to prevent spectre v2 user space to user space attacks as
well.

The Intel mitigation guide documents how STIPB works:
    
   Setting bit 1 (STIBP) of the IA32_SPEC_CTRL MSR on a logical processor
   prevents the predicted targets of indirect branches on any logical
   processor of that core from being controlled by software that executes
   (or executed previously) on another logical processor of the same core.

Ergo setting STIBP protects the task itself from being attacked from a task
running on a different hyper-thread and protects the tasks running on
different hyper-threads from being attacked.

While the document suggests that the branch predictors are shielded between
the logical processors, the observed performance regressions suggest that
STIBP simply disables the branch predictor more or less completely. Of
course the document wording is vague, but the fact that there is also no
requirement for issuing IBPB when STIBP is used points clearly in that
direction. The kernel still issues IBPB even when STIBP is used until Intel
clarifies the whole mechanism.

IBPB is issued when the task switches out, so malicious sandbox code cannot
mistrain the branch predictor for the next user space task on the same
logical processor.

Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com>
Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
Cc: Waiman Long <longman9394@gmail.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Dave Stewart <david.c.stewart@intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181125185006.051663132@linutronix.de
2018-11-28 11:57:14 +01:00
Thomas Gleixner
7cc765a67d x86/speculation: Enable prctl mode for spectre_v2_user
Now that all prerequisites are in place:

 - Add the prctl command line option

 - Default the 'auto' mode to 'prctl'

 - When SMT state changes, update the static key which controls the
   conditional STIBP evaluation on context switch.

 - At init update the static key which controls the conditional IBPB
   evaluation on context switch.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com>
Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
Cc: Waiman Long <longman9394@gmail.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Dave Stewart <david.c.stewart@intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181125185005.958421388@linutronix.de
2018-11-28 11:57:13 +01:00
Thomas Gleixner
9137bb27e6 x86/speculation: Add prctl() control for indirect branch speculation
Add the PR_SPEC_INDIRECT_BRANCH option for the PR_GET_SPECULATION_CTRL and
PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL prctls to allow fine grained per task control of
indirect branch speculation via STIBP and IBPB.

Invocations:
 Check indirect branch speculation status with
 - prctl(PR_GET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_SPEC_INDIRECT_BRANCH, 0, 0, 0);

 Enable indirect branch speculation with
 - prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_SPEC_INDIRECT_BRANCH, PR_SPEC_ENABLE, 0, 0);

 Disable indirect branch speculation with
 - prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_SPEC_INDIRECT_BRANCH, PR_SPEC_DISABLE, 0, 0);

 Force disable indirect branch speculation with
 - prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_SPEC_INDIRECT_BRANCH, PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE, 0, 0);

See Documentation/userspace-api/spec_ctrl.rst.

Signed-off-by: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com>
Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
Cc: Waiman Long <longman9394@gmail.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Dave Stewart <david.c.stewart@intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181125185005.866780996@linutronix.de
2018-11-28 11:57:13 +01:00
Thomas Gleixner
6893a959d7 x86/speculation: Prepare arch_smt_update() for PRCTL mode
The upcoming fine grained per task STIBP control needs to be updated on CPU
hotplug as well.

Split out the code which controls the strict mode so the prctl control code
can be added later. Mark the SMP function call argument __unused while at it.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com>
Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
Cc: Waiman Long <longman9394@gmail.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Dave Stewart <david.c.stewart@intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181125185005.759457117@linutronix.de
2018-11-28 11:57:13 +01:00
Thomas Gleixner
6d991ba509 x86/speculation: Prevent stale SPEC_CTRL msr content
The seccomp speculation control operates on all tasks of a process, but
only the current task of a process can update the MSR immediately. For the
other threads the update is deferred to the next context switch.

This creates the following situation with Process A and B:

Process A task 2 and Process B task 1 are pinned on CPU1. Process A task 2
does not have the speculation control TIF bit set. Process B task 1 has the
speculation control TIF bit set.

CPU0					CPU1
					MSR bit is set
					ProcB.T1 schedules out
					ProcA.T2 schedules in
					MSR bit is cleared
ProcA.T1
  seccomp_update()
  set TIF bit on ProcA.T2
					ProcB.T1 schedules in
					MSR is not updated  <-- FAIL

This happens because the context switch code tries to avoid the MSR update
if the speculation control TIF bits of the incoming and the outgoing task
are the same. In the worst case ProcB.T1 and ProcA.T2 are the only tasks
scheduling back and forth on CPU1, which keeps the MSR stale forever.

In theory this could be remedied by IPIs, but chasing the remote task which
could be migrated is complex and full of races.

The straight forward solution is to avoid the asychronous update of the TIF
bit and defer it to the next context switch. The speculation control state
is stored in task_struct::atomic_flags by the prctl and seccomp updates
already.

Add a new TIF_SPEC_FORCE_UPDATE bit and set this after updating the
atomic_flags. Check the bit on context switch and force a synchronous
update of the speculation control if set. Use the same mechanism for
updating the current task.

Reported-by: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com>
Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
Cc: Waiman Long <longman9394@gmail.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Dave Stewart <david.c.stewart@intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.DEB.2.21.1811272247140.1875@nanos.tec.linutronix.de
2018-11-28 11:57:12 +01:00
Thomas Gleixner
e6da8bb6f9 x86/speculation: Split out TIF update
The update of the TIF_SSBD flag and the conditional speculation control MSR
update is done in the ssb_prctl_set() function directly. The upcoming prctl
support for controlling indirect branch speculation via STIBP needs the
same mechanism.

Split the code out and make it reusable. Reword the comment about updates
for other tasks.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com>
Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
Cc: Waiman Long <longman9394@gmail.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Dave Stewart <david.c.stewart@intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181125185005.652305076@linutronix.de
2018-11-28 11:57:12 +01:00
Thomas Gleixner
46f7ecb1e7 ptrace: Remove unused ptrace_may_access_sched() and MODE_IBRS
The IBPB control code in x86 removed the usage. Remove the functionality
which was introduced for this.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com>
Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
Cc: Waiman Long <longman9394@gmail.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Dave Stewart <david.c.stewart@intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181125185005.559149393@linutronix.de
2018-11-28 11:57:11 +01:00
Thomas Gleixner
4c71a2b6fd x86/speculation: Prepare for conditional IBPB in switch_mm()
The IBPB speculation barrier is issued from switch_mm() when the kernel
switches to a user space task with a different mm than the user space task
which ran last on the same CPU.

An additional optimization is to avoid IBPB when the incoming task can be
ptraced by the outgoing task. This optimization only works when switching
directly between two user space tasks. When switching from a kernel task to
a user space task the optimization fails because the previous task cannot
be accessed anymore. So for quite some scenarios the optimization is just
adding overhead.

The upcoming conditional IBPB support will issue IBPB only for user space
tasks which have the TIF_SPEC_IB bit set. This requires to handle the
following cases:

  1) Switch from a user space task (potential attacker) which has
     TIF_SPEC_IB set to a user space task (potential victim) which has
     TIF_SPEC_IB not set.

  2) Switch from a user space task (potential attacker) which has
     TIF_SPEC_IB not set to a user space task (potential victim) which has
     TIF_SPEC_IB set.

This needs to be optimized for the case where the IBPB can be avoided when
only kernel threads ran in between user space tasks which belong to the
same process.

The current check whether two tasks belong to the same context is using the
tasks context id. While correct, it's simpler to use the mm pointer because
it allows to mangle the TIF_SPEC_IB bit into it. The context id based
mechanism requires extra storage, which creates worse code.

When a task is scheduled out its TIF_SPEC_IB bit is mangled as bit 0 into
the per CPU storage which is used to track the last user space mm which was
running on a CPU. This bit can be used together with the TIF_SPEC_IB bit of
the incoming task to make the decision whether IBPB needs to be issued or
not to cover the two cases above.

As conditional IBPB is going to be the default, remove the dubious ptrace
check for the IBPB always case and simply issue IBPB always when the
process changes.

Move the storage to a different place in the struct as the original one
created a hole.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com>
Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
Cc: Waiman Long <longman9394@gmail.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Dave Stewart <david.c.stewart@intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181125185005.466447057@linutronix.de
2018-11-28 11:57:11 +01:00
Thomas Gleixner
5635d99953 x86/speculation: Avoid __switch_to_xtra() calls
The TIF_SPEC_IB bit does not need to be evaluated in the decision to invoke
__switch_to_xtra() when:

 - CONFIG_SMP is disabled

 - The conditional STIPB mode is disabled

The TIF_SPEC_IB bit still controls IBPB in both cases so the TIF work mask
checks might invoke __switch_to_xtra() for nothing if TIF_SPEC_IB is the
only set bit in the work masks.

Optimize it out by masking the bit at compile time for CONFIG_SMP=n and at
run time when the static key controlling the conditional STIBP mode is
disabled.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com>
Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
Cc: Waiman Long <longman9394@gmail.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Dave Stewart <david.c.stewart@intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181125185005.374062201@linutronix.de
2018-11-28 11:57:11 +01:00
Thomas Gleixner
ff16701a29 x86/process: Consolidate and simplify switch_to_xtra() code
Move the conditional invocation of __switch_to_xtra() into an inline
function so the logic can be shared between 32 and 64 bit.

Remove the handthrough of the TSS pointer and retrieve the pointer directly
in the bitmap handling function. Use this_cpu_ptr() instead of the
per_cpu() indirection.

This is a preparatory change so integration of conditional indirect branch
speculation optimization happens only in one place.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com>
Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
Cc: Waiman Long <longman9394@gmail.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Dave Stewart <david.c.stewart@intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181125185005.280855518@linutronix.de
2018-11-28 11:57:11 +01:00
Tim Chen
5bfbe3ad58 x86/speculation: Prepare for per task indirect branch speculation control
To avoid the overhead of STIBP always on, it's necessary to allow per task
control of STIBP.

Add a new task flag TIF_SPEC_IB and evaluate it during context switch if
SMT is active and flag evaluation is enabled by the speculation control
code. Add the conditional evaluation to x86_virt_spec_ctrl() as well so the
guest/host switch works properly.

This has no effect because TIF_SPEC_IB cannot be set yet and the static key
which controls evaluation is off. Preparatory patch for adding the control
code.

[ tglx: Simplify the context switch logic and make the TIF evaluation
  	depend on SMP=y and on the static key controlling the conditional
  	update. Rename it to TIF_SPEC_IB because it controls both STIBP and
  	IBPB ]

Signed-off-by: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com>
Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
Cc: Waiman Long <longman9394@gmail.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Dave Stewart <david.c.stewart@intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181125185005.176917199@linutronix.de
2018-11-28 11:57:10 +01:00
Thomas Gleixner
fa1202ef22 x86/speculation: Add command line control for indirect branch speculation
Add command line control for user space indirect branch speculation
mitigations. The new option is: spectre_v2_user=

The initial options are:

    -  on:   Unconditionally enabled
    - off:   Unconditionally disabled
    -auto:   Kernel selects mitigation (default off for now)

When the spectre_v2= command line argument is either 'on' or 'off' this
implies that the application to application control follows that state even
if a contradicting spectre_v2_user= argument is supplied.

Originally-by: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com>
Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
Cc: Waiman Long <longman9394@gmail.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Dave Stewart <david.c.stewart@intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181125185005.082720373@linutronix.de
2018-11-28 11:57:10 +01:00
Thomas Gleixner
495d470e98 x86/speculation: Unify conditional spectre v2 print functions
There is no point in having two functions and a conditional at the call
site.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com>
Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
Cc: Waiman Long <longman9394@gmail.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Dave Stewart <david.c.stewart@intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181125185004.986890749@linutronix.de
2018-11-28 11:57:09 +01:00
Thomas Gleixner
30ba72a990 x86/speculataion: Mark command line parser data __initdata
No point to keep that around.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com>
Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
Cc: Waiman Long <longman9394@gmail.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Dave Stewart <david.c.stewart@intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181125185004.893886356@linutronix.de
2018-11-28 11:57:09 +01:00
Thomas Gleixner
8770709f41 x86/speculation: Mark string arrays const correctly
checkpatch.pl muttered when reshuffling the code:
 WARNING: static const char * array should probably be static const char * const

Fix up all the string arrays.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com>
Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
Cc: Waiman Long <longman9394@gmail.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Dave Stewart <david.c.stewart@intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181125185004.800018931@linutronix.de
2018-11-28 11:57:09 +01:00
Thomas Gleixner
15d6b7aab0 x86/speculation: Reorder the spec_v2 code
Reorder the code so it is better grouped. No functional change.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com>
Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
Cc: Waiman Long <longman9394@gmail.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Dave Stewart <david.c.stewart@intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181125185004.707122879@linutronix.de
2018-11-28 11:57:08 +01:00
Thomas Gleixner
130d6f946f x86/l1tf: Show actual SMT state
Use the now exposed real SMT state, not the SMT sysfs control knob
state. This reflects the state of the system when the mitigation status is
queried.

This does not change the warning in the VMX launch code. There the
dependency on the control knob makes sense because siblings could be
brought online anytime after launching the VM.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com>
Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
Cc: Waiman Long <longman9394@gmail.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Dave Stewart <david.c.stewart@intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181125185004.613357354@linutronix.de
2018-11-28 11:57:08 +01:00
Thomas Gleixner
a74cfffb03 x86/speculation: Rework SMT state change
arch_smt_update() is only called when the sysfs SMT control knob is
changed. This means that when SMT is enabled in the sysfs control knob the
system is considered to have SMT active even if all siblings are offline.

To allow finegrained control of the speculation mitigations, the actual SMT
state is more interesting than the fact that siblings could be enabled.

Rework the code, so arch_smt_update() is invoked from each individual CPU
hotplug function, and simplify the update function while at it.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com>
Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
Cc: Waiman Long <longman9394@gmail.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Dave Stewart <david.c.stewart@intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181125185004.521974984@linutronix.de
2018-11-28 11:57:07 +01:00
Thomas Gleixner
321a874a7e sched/smt: Expose sched_smt_present static key
Make the scheduler's 'sched_smt_present' static key globaly available, so
it can be used in the x86 speculation control code.

Provide a query function and a stub for the CONFIG_SMP=n case.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com>
Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
Cc: Waiman Long <longman9394@gmail.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Dave Stewart <david.c.stewart@intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181125185004.430168326@linutronix.de
2018-11-28 11:57:07 +01:00
Thomas Gleixner
dbe733642e x86/Kconfig: Select SCHED_SMT if SMP enabled
CONFIG_SCHED_SMT is enabled by all distros, so there is not a real point to
have it configurable. The runtime overhead in the core scheduler code is
minimal because the actual SMT scheduling parts are conditional on a static
key.

This allows to expose the scheduler's SMT state static key to the
speculation control code. Alternatively the scheduler's static key could be
made always available when CONFIG_SMP is enabled, but that's just adding an
unused static key to every other architecture for nothing.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com>
Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
Cc: Waiman Long <longman9394@gmail.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Dave Stewart <david.c.stewart@intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181125185004.337452245@linutronix.de
2018-11-28 11:57:07 +01:00
Peter Zijlstra (Intel)
c5511d03ec sched/smt: Make sched_smt_present track topology
Currently the 'sched_smt_present' static key is enabled when at CPU bringup
SMT topology is observed, but it is never disabled. However there is demand
to also disable the key when the topology changes such that there is no SMT
present anymore.

Implement this by making the key count the number of cores that have SMT
enabled.

In particular, the SMT topology bits are set before interrrupts are enabled
and similarly, are cleared after interrupts are disabled for the last time
and the CPU dies.

Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com>
Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
Cc: Waiman Long <longman9394@gmail.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Dave Stewart <david.c.stewart@intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181125185004.246110444@linutronix.de
2018-11-28 11:57:06 +01:00
Tim Chen
01daf56875 x86/speculation: Reorganize speculation control MSRs update
The logic to detect whether there's a change in the previous and next
task's flag relevant to update speculation control MSRs is spread out
across multiple functions.

Consolidate all checks needed for updating speculation control MSRs into
the new __speculation_ctrl_update() helper function.

This makes it easy to pick the right speculation control MSR and the bits
in MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL that need updating based on TIF flags changes.

Originally-by: Thomas Lendacky <Thomas.Lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com>
Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
Cc: Waiman Long <longman9394@gmail.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Dave Stewart <david.c.stewart@intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181125185004.151077005@linutronix.de
2018-11-28 11:57:06 +01:00
Thomas Gleixner
26c4d75b23 x86/speculation: Rename SSBD update functions
During context switch, the SSBD bit in SPEC_CTRL MSR is updated according
to changes of the TIF_SSBD flag in the current and next running task.

Currently, only the bit controlling speculative store bypass disable in
SPEC_CTRL MSR is updated and the related update functions all have
"speculative_store" or "ssb" in their names.

For enhanced mitigation control other bits in SPEC_CTRL MSR need to be
updated as well, which makes the SSB names inadequate.

Rename the "speculative_store*" functions to a more generic name. No
functional change.

Signed-off-by: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com>
Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
Cc: Waiman Long <longman9394@gmail.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Dave Stewart <david.c.stewart@intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181125185004.058866968@linutronix.de
2018-11-28 11:57:06 +01:00
Tim Chen
34bce7c969 x86/speculation: Disable STIBP when enhanced IBRS is in use
If enhanced IBRS is active, STIBP is redundant for mitigating Spectre v2
user space exploits from hyperthread sibling.

Disable STIBP when enhanced IBRS is used.

Signed-off-by: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com>
Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
Cc: Waiman Long <longman9394@gmail.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Dave Stewart <david.c.stewart@intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181125185003.966801480@linutronix.de
2018-11-28 11:57:05 +01:00
Tim Chen
a8f76ae41c x86/speculation: Move STIPB/IBPB string conditionals out of cpu_show_common()
The Spectre V2 printout in cpu_show_common() handles conditionals for the
various mitigation methods directly in the sprintf() argument list. That's
hard to read and will become unreadable if more complex decisions need to
be made for a particular method.

Move the conditionals for STIBP and IBPB string selection into helper
functions, so they can be extended later on.

Signed-off-by: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com>
Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
Cc: Waiman Long <longman9394@gmail.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Dave Stewart <david.c.stewart@intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181125185003.874479208@linutronix.de
2018-11-28 11:57:05 +01:00
Tim Chen
b86bda0426 x86/speculation: Remove unnecessary ret variable in cpu_show_common()
Signed-off-by: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com>
Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
Cc: Waiman Long <longman9394@gmail.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Dave Stewart <david.c.stewart@intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181125185003.783903657@linutronix.de
2018-11-28 11:57:05 +01:00
Tim Chen
24848509aa x86/speculation: Clean up spectre_v2_parse_cmdline()
Remove the unnecessary 'else' statement in spectre_v2_parse_cmdline()
to save an indentation level.

Signed-off-by: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com>
Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
Cc: Waiman Long <longman9394@gmail.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Dave Stewart <david.c.stewart@intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181125185003.688010903@linutronix.de
2018-11-28 11:57:04 +01:00
Tim Chen
8eb729b77f x86/speculation: Update the TIF_SSBD comment
"Reduced Data Speculation" is an obsolete term. The correct new name is
"Speculative store bypass disable" - which is abbreviated into SSBD.

Signed-off-by: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com>
Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
Cc: Waiman Long <longman9394@gmail.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Dave Stewart <david.c.stewart@intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181125185003.593893901@linutronix.de
2018-11-28 11:57:04 +01:00
Zhenzhong Duan
ef014aae8f x86/retpoline: Remove minimal retpoline support
Now that CONFIG_RETPOLINE hard depends on compiler support, there is no
reason to keep the minimal retpoline support around which only provided
basic protection in the assembly files.

Suggested-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Zhenzhong Duan <zhenzhong.duan@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: <srinivas.eeda@oracle.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/f06f0a89-5587-45db-8ed2-0a9d6638d5c0@default
2018-11-28 11:57:03 +01:00
Zhenzhong Duan
4cd24de3a0 x86/retpoline: Make CONFIG_RETPOLINE depend on compiler support
Since retpoline capable compilers are widely available, make
CONFIG_RETPOLINE hard depend on the compiler capability.

Break the build when CONFIG_RETPOLINE is enabled and the compiler does not
support it. Emit an error message in that case:

 "arch/x86/Makefile:226: *** You are building kernel with non-retpoline
  compiler, please update your compiler..  Stop."

[dwmw: Fail the build with non-retpoline compiler]

Suggested-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Zhenzhong Duan <zhenzhong.duan@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
Cc: Michal Marek <michal.lkml@markovi.net>
Cc: <srinivas.eeda@oracle.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/cca0cb20-f9e2-4094-840b-fb0f8810cd34@default
2018-11-28 11:57:03 +01:00
Hui Wang
8159a6a4a7 ALSA: usb-audio: Add vendor and product name for Dell WD19 Dock
Like the Dell WD15 Dock, the WD19 Dock (0bda:402e) doens't provide
useful string for the vendor and product names too. In order to share
the UCM with WD15, here we keep the profile_name same as the WD15.

Signed-off-by: Hui Wang <hui.wang@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
2018-11-28 10:59:49 +01:00
Taehee Yoo
ca08987885 netfilter: nf_tables: deactivate expressions in rule replecement routine
There is no expression deactivation call from the rule replacement path,
hence, chain counter is not decremented. A few steps to reproduce the
problem:

   %nft add table ip filter
   %nft add chain ip filter c1
   %nft add chain ip filter c1
   %nft add rule ip filter c1 jump c2
   %nft replace rule ip filter c1 handle 3 accept
   %nft flush ruleset

<jump c2> expression means immediate NFT_JUMP to chain c2.
Reference count of chain c2 is increased when the rule is added.

When rule is deleted or replaced, the reference counter of c2 should be
decreased via nft_rule_expr_deactivate() which calls
nft_immediate_deactivate().

Splat looks like:
[  214.396453] WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 21 at net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c:1432 nf_tables_chain_destroy.isra.38+0x2f9/0x3a0 [nf_tables]
[  214.398983] Modules linked in: nf_tables nfnetlink
[  214.398983] CPU: 1 PID: 21 Comm: kworker/1:1 Not tainted 4.20.0-rc2+ #44
[  214.398983] Workqueue: events nf_tables_trans_destroy_work [nf_tables]
[  214.398983] RIP: 0010:nf_tables_chain_destroy.isra.38+0x2f9/0x3a0 [nf_tables]
[  214.398983] Code: 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 80 3c 02 00 0f 85 8e 00 00 00 48 8b 7b 58 e8 e1 2c 4e c6 48 89 df e8 d9 2c 4e c6 eb 9a <0f> 0b eb 96 0f 0b e9 7e fe ff ff e8 a7 7e 4e c6 e9 a4 fe ff ff e8
[  214.398983] RSP: 0018:ffff8881152874e8 EFLAGS: 00010202
[  214.398983] RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: ffff88810ef9fc28 RCX: ffff8881152876f0
[  214.398983] RDX: dffffc0000000000 RSI: 1ffff11022a50ede RDI: ffff88810ef9fc78
[  214.398983] RBP: 1ffff11022a50e9d R08: 0000000080000000 R09: 0000000000000000
[  214.398983] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 1ffff11022a50eba
[  214.398983] R13: ffff888114446e08 R14: ffff8881152876f0 R15: ffffed1022a50ed6
[  214.398983] FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff888116400000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[  214.398983] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[  214.398983] CR2: 00007fab9bb5f868 CR3: 000000012aa16000 CR4: 00000000001006e0
[  214.398983] Call Trace:
[  214.398983]  ? nf_tables_table_destroy.isra.37+0x100/0x100 [nf_tables]
[  214.398983]  ? __kasan_slab_free+0x145/0x180
[  214.398983]  ? nf_tables_trans_destroy_work+0x439/0x830 [nf_tables]
[  214.398983]  ? kfree+0xdb/0x280
[  214.398983]  nf_tables_trans_destroy_work+0x5f5/0x830 [nf_tables]
[ ... ]

Fixes: bb7b40aecb ("netfilter: nf_tables: bogus EBUSY in chain deletions")
Reported by: Christoph Anton Mitterer <calestyo@scientia.net>
Link: https://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=914505
Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=201791
Signed-off-by: Taehee Yoo <ap420073@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
2018-11-28 10:56:40 +01:00
Borislav Petkov
60c8144afc x86/MCE/AMD: Fix the thresholding machinery initialization order
Currently, the code sets up the thresholding interrupt vector and only
then goes about initializing the thresholding banks. Which is wrong,
because an early thresholding interrupt would cause a NULL pointer
dereference when accessing those banks and prevent the machine from
booting.

Therefore, set the thresholding interrupt vector only *after* having
initialized the banks successfully.

Fixes: 18807ddb7f ("x86/mce/AMD: Reset Threshold Limit after logging error")
Reported-by: Rafał Miłecki <rafal@milecki.pl>
Reported-by: John Clemens <clemej@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Tested-by: Rafał Miłecki <rafal@milecki.pl>
Tested-by: John Clemens <john@deater.net>
Cc: Aravind Gopalakrishnan <aravindksg.lkml@gmail.com>
Cc: linux-edac@vger.kernel.org
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: x86@kernel.org
Cc: Yazen Ghannam <Yazen.Ghannam@amd.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181127101700.2964-1-zajec5@gmail.com
Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=201291
2018-11-28 10:10:36 +01:00