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Merge tag 'audit-pr-20190702' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/audit
Pull audit updates from Paul Moore:
"This pull request is a bit early, but with some vacation time coming
up I wanted to send this out now just in case the remote Internet Gods
decide not to smile on me once the merge window opens. The patchset
for v5.3 is pretty minor this time, the highlights include:
- When the audit daemon is sent a signal, ensure we deliver
information about the sender even when syscall auditing is not
enabled/supported.
- Add the ability to filter audit records based on network address
family.
- Tighten the audit field filtering restrictions on string based
fields.
- Cleanup the audit field filtering verification code.
- Remove a few BUG() calls from the audit code"
* tag 'audit-pr-20190702' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/audit:
audit: remove the BUG() calls in the audit rule comparison functions
audit: enforce op for string fields
audit: add saddr_fam filter field
audit: re-structure audit field valid checks
audit: deliver signal_info regarless of syscall
Based on 1 normalized pattern(s):
this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify
it under the terms of the gnu general public license as published by
the free software foundation either version 2 of the license or at
your option any later version this program is distributed in the
hope that it will be useful but without any warranty without even
the implied warranty of merchantability or fitness for a particular
purpose see the gnu general public license for more details you
should have received a copy of the gnu general public license along
with this program if not write to the free software foundation inc
59 temple place suite 330 boston ma 02111 1307 usa
extracted by the scancode license scanner the SPDX license identifier
GPL-2.0-or-later
has been chosen to replace the boilerplate/reference in 1334 file(s).
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Allison Randal <allison@lohutok.net>
Reviewed-by: Richard Fontana <rfontana@redhat.com>
Cc: linux-spdx@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190527070033.113240726@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
When a process signals the audit daemon (shutdown, rotate, resume,
reconfig) but syscall auditing is not enabled, we still want to know the
identity of the process sending the signal to the audit daemon.
Move audit_signal_info() out of syscall auditing to general auditing but
create a new function audit_signal_info_syscall() to take care of the
syscall dependent parts for when syscall auditing is enabled.
Please see the github kernel audit issue
https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/111
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Emit an audit record every time selected NTP parameters are modified
from userspace (via adjtimex(2) or clock_adjtime(2)). These parameters
may be used to indirectly change system clock, and thus their
modifications should be audited.
Such events will now generate records of type AUDIT_TIME_ADJNTPVAL
containing the following fields:
- op -- which value was adjusted:
- offset -- corresponding to the time_offset variable
- freq -- corresponding to the time_freq variable
- status -- corresponding to the time_status variable
- adjust -- corresponding to the time_adjust variable
- tick -- corresponding to the tick_usec variable
- tai -- corresponding to the timekeeping's TAI offset
- old -- the old value
- new -- the new value
Example records:
type=TIME_ADJNTPVAL msg=audit(1530616044.507:7): op=status old=64 new=8256
type=TIME_ADJNTPVAL msg=audit(1530616044.511:11): op=freq old=0 new=49180377088000
The records of this type will be associated with the corresponding
syscall records.
An overview of parameter changes that can be done via do_adjtimex()
(based on information from Miroslav Lichvar) and whether they are
audited:
__timekeeping_set_tai_offset() -- sets the offset from the
International Atomic Time
(AUDITED)
NTP variables:
time_offset -- can adjust the clock by up to 0.5 seconds per call
and also speed it up or slow down by up to about
0.05% (43 seconds per day) (AUDITED)
time_freq -- can speed up or slow down by up to about 0.05%
(AUDITED)
time_status -- can insert/delete leap seconds and it also enables/
disables synchronization of the hardware real-time
clock (AUDITED)
time_maxerror, time_esterror -- change error estimates used to
inform userspace applications
(NOT AUDITED)
time_constant -- controls the speed of the clock adjustments that
are made when time_offset is set (NOT AUDITED)
time_adjust -- can temporarily speed up or slow down the clock by up
to 0.05% (AUDITED)
tick_usec -- a more extreme version of time_freq; can speed up or
slow down the clock by up to 10% (AUDITED)
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Emit an audit record whenever the system clock is changed (i.e. shifted
by a non-zero offset) by a syscall from userspace. The syscalls than can
(at the time of writing) trigger such record are:
- settimeofday(2), stime(2), clock_settime(2) -- via
do_settimeofday64()
- adjtimex(2), clock_adjtime(2) -- via do_adjtimex()
The new records have type AUDIT_TIME_INJOFFSET and contain the following
fields:
- sec -- the 'seconds' part of the offset
- nsec -- the 'nanoseconds' part of the offset
Example record (time was shifted backwards by ~15.875 seconds):
type=TIME_INJOFFSET msg=audit(1530616049.652:13): sec=-16 nsec=124887145
The records of this type will be associated with the corresponding
syscall records.
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
[PM: fixed a line width problem in __audit_tk_injoffset()]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
auditsc_get_stamp() and audit_serial() are internal audit functions so
move their prototypes from include/linux/audit.h to kernel/audit.h
so they are not visible to the rest of the kernel.
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Don't fetch fcaps when umount2 is called to avoid a process hang while
it waits for the missing resource to (possibly never) re-appear.
Note the comment above user_path_mountpoint_at():
* A umount is a special case for path walking. We're not actually interested
* in the inode in this situation, and ESTALE errors can be a problem. We
* simply want track down the dentry and vfsmount attached at the mountpoint
* and avoid revalidating the last component.
This can happen on ceph, cifs, 9p, lustre, fuse (gluster) or NFS.
Please see the github issue tracker
https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/100
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
[PM: merge fuzz in audit_log_fcaps()]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
loginuid and sessionid (and audit_log_session_info) should be part of
CONFIG_AUDIT scope and not CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL since it is used in
CONFIG_CHANGE, ANOM_LINK, FEATURE_CHANGE (and INTEGRITY_RULE), none of
which are otherwise dependent on AUDITSYSCALL.
Please see github issue
https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/104
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
[PM: tweaked subject line for better grep'ing]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
There are many places, notably audit_log_task_info() and
audit_log_exit(), that take task_struct pointers but in reality they
are always working on the current task. This patch eliminates the
task_struct arguments and uses current directly which allows a number
of cleanups as well.
Acked-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
The audit_log_session_info() function is only used in kernel/audit*, so
move its prototype to kernel/audit.h
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Remove comparison of audit_enabled to magic numbers outside of audit.
Related: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/86
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Recognizing that the audit context is an internal audit value, use an
access function to set the audit context pointer for the task
rather than reaching directly into the task struct to set it.
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
[PM: merge fuzz in audit.h]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Recognizing that the audit context is an internal audit value, use an
access function to retrieve the audit context pointer for the task
rather than reaching directly into the task struct to get it.
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
[PM: merge fuzz in auditsc.c and selinuxfs.c, checkpatch.pl fixes]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Use a macro, "AUDIT_SID_UNSET", to replace each instance of
initialization and comparison to an audit session ID.
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Seccomp logging for "handled" actions such as RET_TRAP, RET_TRACE, or
RET_ERRNO can be very noisy for processes that are being audited. This
patch modifies the seccomp logging behavior to treat processes that are
being inspected via the audit subsystem the same as processes that
aren't under inspection. Handled actions will no longer be logged just
because the process is being inspected. Since v4.14, applications have
the ability to request logging of handled actions by using the
SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_LOG flag when loading seccomp filters.
With this patch, the logic for deciding if an action will be logged is:
if action == RET_ALLOW:
do not log
else if action not in actions_logged:
do not log
else if action == RET_KILL:
log
else if action == RET_LOG:
log
else if filter-requests-logging:
log
else:
do not log
Reported-by: Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
The decision to log a seccomp action will always be subject to the
value of the kernel.seccomp.actions_logged sysctl, even for processes
that are being inspected via the audit subsystem, in an upcoming patch.
Therefore, we need to emit an audit record on attempts at writing to the
actions_logged sysctl when auditing is enabled.
This patch updates the write handler for the actions_logged sysctl to
emit an audit record on attempts to write to the sysctl. Successful
writes to the sysctl will result in a record that includes a normalized
list of logged actions in the "actions" field and a "res" field equal to
1. Unsuccessful writes to the sysctl will result in a record that
doesn't include the "actions" field and has a "res" field equal to 0.
Not all unsuccessful writes to the sysctl are audited. For example, an
audit record will not be emitted if an unprivileged process attempts to
open the sysctl file for reading since that access control check is not
part of the sysctl's write handler.
Below are some example audit records when writing various strings to the
actions_logged sysctl.
Writing "not-a-real-action", when the kernel.seccomp.actions_logged
sysctl previously was "kill_process kill_thread trap errno trace log",
emits this audit record:
type=CONFIG_CHANGE msg=audit(1525392371.454:120): op=seccomp-logging
actions=? old-actions=kill_process,kill_thread,trap,errno,trace,log
res=0
If you then write "kill_process kill_thread errno trace log", this audit
record is emitted:
type=CONFIG_CHANGE msg=audit(1525392401.645:126): op=seccomp-logging
actions=kill_process,kill_thread,errno,trace,log
old-actions=kill_process,kill_thread,trap,errno,trace,log res=1
If you then write "log log errno trace kill_process kill_thread", which
is unordered and contains the log action twice, it results in the same
actions value as the previous record:
type=CONFIG_CHANGE msg=audit(1525392436.354:132): op=seccomp-logging
actions=kill_process,kill_thread,errno,trace,log
old-actions=kill_process,kill_thread,errno,trace,log res=1
If you then write an empty string to the sysctl, this audit record is
emitted:
type=CONFIG_CHANGE msg=audit(1525392494.413:138): op=seccomp-logging
actions=(none) old-actions=kill_process,kill_thread,errno,trace,log
res=1
No audit records are generated when reading the actions_logged sysctl.
Suggested-by: Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
In commit 45b578fe4c
("audit: link denied should not directly generate PATH record")
the need for the struct path *link parameter was removed.
Remove the now useless struct path argument.
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Merge tag 'audit-pr-20171113' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/audit
Pull audit updates from Paul Moore:
"Another relatively small pull request for audit, nine patches total.
The only real new bit of functionality is the patch from Richard which
adds the ability to filter records based on the filesystem type.
The remainder are bug fixes and cleanups; the bug fix highlights
include:
- ensuring that we properly audit init/PID-1 (me)
- allowing the audit daemon to shutdown the kernel/auditd connection
cleanly by setting the audit PID to zero (Steve)"
* tag 'audit-pr-20171113' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/audit:
audit: filter PATH records keyed on filesystem magic
Audit: remove unused audit_log_secctx function
audit: Allow auditd to set pid to 0 to end auditing
audit: Add new syscalls to the perm=w filter
audit: use audit_set_enabled() in audit_enable()
audit: convert audit_ever_enabled to a boolean
audit: don't use simple_strtol() anymore
audit: initialize the audit subsystem as early as possible
audit: ensure that 'audit=1' actually enables audit for PID 1
The function audit_log_secctx() is unused in the upstream kernel.
All it does is wrap another function that doesn't need wrapping.
It claims to give you the SELinux context, but that is not true if
you are using a different security module.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
The fanotify interface allows user space daemons to make access
control decisions. Under common criteria requirements, we need to
optionally record decisions based on policy. This patch adds a bit mask,
FAN_AUDIT, that a user space daemon can 'or' into the response decision
which will tell the kernel that it made a decision and record it.
It would be used something like this in user space code:
response.response = FAN_DENY | FAN_AUDIT;
write(fd, &response, sizeof(struct fanotify_response));
When the syscall ends, the audit system will record the decision as a
AUDIT_FANOTIFY auxiliary record to denote that the reason this event
occurred is the result of an access control decision from fanotify
rather than DAC or MAC policy.
A sample event looks like this:
type=PATH msg=audit(1504310584.332:290): item=0 name="./evil-ls"
inode=1319561 dev=fc:03 mode=0100755 ouid=1000 ogid=1000 rdev=00:00
obj=unconfined_u:object_r:user_home_t:s0 nametype=NORMAL
type=CWD msg=audit(1504310584.332:290): cwd="/home/sgrubb"
type=SYSCALL msg=audit(1504310584.332:290): arch=c000003e syscall=2
success=no exit=-1 a0=32cb3fca90 a1=0 a2=43 a3=8 items=1 ppid=901
pid=959 auid=1000 uid=1000 gid=1000 euid=1000 suid=1000
fsuid=1000 egid=1000 sgid=1000 fsgid=1000 tty=pts1 ses=3 comm="bash"
exe="/usr/bin/bash" subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:
s0-s0:c0.c1023 key=(null)
type=FANOTIFY msg=audit(1504310584.332:290): resp=2
Prior to using the audit flag, the developer needs to call
fanotify_init or'ing in FAN_ENABLE_AUDIT to ensure that the kernel
supports auditing. The calling process must also have the CAP_AUDIT_WRITE
capability.
Signed-off-by: sgrubb <sgrubb@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
- sysctl and seccomp operation to discover available actions. (tyhicks)
- new per-filter configurable logging infrastructure and sysctl. (tyhicks)
- SECCOMP_RET_LOG to log allowed syscalls. (tyhicks)
- SECCOMP_RET_KILL_PROCESS as the new strictest possible action.
- self-tests for new behaviors.
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Merge tag 'seccomp-v4.14-rc2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux
Pull seccomp updates from Kees Cook:
"Major additions:
- sysctl and seccomp operation to discover available actions
(tyhicks)
- new per-filter configurable logging infrastructure and sysctl
(tyhicks)
- SECCOMP_RET_LOG to log allowed syscalls (tyhicks)
- SECCOMP_RET_KILL_PROCESS as the new strictest possible action
- self-tests for new behaviors"
[ This is the seccomp part of the security pull request during the merge
window that was nixed due to unrelated problems - Linus ]
* tag 'seccomp-v4.14-rc2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux:
samples: Unrename SECCOMP_RET_KILL
selftests/seccomp: Test thread vs process killing
seccomp: Implement SECCOMP_RET_KILL_PROCESS action
seccomp: Introduce SECCOMP_RET_KILL_PROCESS
seccomp: Rename SECCOMP_RET_KILL to SECCOMP_RET_KILL_THREAD
seccomp: Action to log before allowing
seccomp: Filter flag to log all actions except SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW
seccomp: Selftest for detection of filter flag support
seccomp: Sysctl to configure actions that are allowed to be logged
seccomp: Operation for checking if an action is available
seccomp: Sysctl to display available actions
seccomp: Provide matching filter for introspection
selftests/seccomp: Refactor RET_ERRNO tests
selftests/seccomp: Add simple seccomp overhead benchmark
selftests/seccomp: Add tests for basic ptrace actions
struct timespec is not y2038 safe. Replace
all uses of timespec by y2038 safe struct timespec64.
Even though timespec is used here to represent timeouts,
replace these with timespec64 so that it facilitates
in verification by creating a y2038 safe kernel image
that is free of timespec.
The syscall interfaces themselves are not changed as part
of the patch. They will be part of a different series.
Signed-off-by: Deepa Dinamani <deepa.kernel@gmail.com>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Cc: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Adminstrators can write to this sysctl to set the seccomp actions that
are allowed to be logged. Any actions not found in this sysctl will not
be logged.
For example, all SECCOMP_RET_KILL, SECCOMP_RET_TRAP, and
SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO actions would be loggable if "kill trap errno" were
written to the sysctl. SECCOMP_RET_TRACE actions would not be logged
since its string representation ("trace") wasn't present in the sysctl
value.
The path to the sysctl is:
/proc/sys/kernel/seccomp/actions_logged
The actions_avail sysctl can be read to discover the valid action names
that can be written to the actions_logged sysctl with the exception of
"allow". SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW actions cannot be configured for logging.
The default setting for the sysctl is to allow all actions to be logged
except SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW. While only SECCOMP_RET_KILL actions are
currently logged, an upcoming patch will allow applications to request
additional actions to be logged.
There's one important exception to this sysctl. If a task is
specifically being audited, meaning that an audit context has been
allocated for the task, seccomp will log all actions other than
SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW despite the value of actions_logged. This exception
preserves the existing auditing behavior of tasks with an allocated
audit context.
With this patch, the logic for deciding if an action will be logged is:
if action == RET_ALLOW:
do not log
else if action == RET_KILL && RET_KILL in actions_logged:
log
else if audit_enabled && task-is-being-audited:
log
else:
do not log
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
struct timespec is not y2038 safe.
Audit timestamps are recorded in string format into
an audit buffer for a given context.
These mark the entry timestamps for the syscalls.
Use y2038 safe struct timespec64 to represent the times.
The log strings can handle this transition as strings can
hold upto 1024 characters.
Signed-off-by: Deepa Dinamani <deepa.kernel@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Acked-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
We were setting the portid incorrectly in the netlink message headers,
fix that to always be 0 (nlmsg_pid = 0).
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Pull audit updates from Paul Moore:
"The audit changes for v4.11 are relatively small compared to what we
did for v4.10, both in terms of size and impact.
- two patches from Steve tweak the formatting for some of the audit
records to make them more consistent with other audit records.
- three patches from Richard record the name of a module on module
load, fix the logging of sockaddr information when using
socketcall() on 32-bit systems, and add the ability to reset
audit's lost record counter.
- my lone patch just fixes an annoying style nit that I was reminded
about by one of Richard's patches.
All these patches pass our test suite"
* 'stable-4.11' of git://git.infradead.org/users/pcmoore/audit:
audit: remove unnecessary curly braces from switch/case statements
audit: log module name on init_module
audit: log 32-bit socketcalls
audit: add feature audit_lost reset
audit: Make AUDIT_ANOM_ABEND event normalized
audit: Make AUDIT_KERNEL event conform to the specification
32-bit socketcalls were not being logged by audit on x86_64 systems.
Log them. This is basically a duplicate of the call from
net/socket.c:sys_socketcall(), but it addresses the impedance mismatch
between 32-bit userspace process and 64-bit kernel audit.
See: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/14
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Acked-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
RFE: add additional fields for use in audit filter exclude rules
https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/5
Re-factor and combine audit_filter_type() with audit_filter_user() to
use audit_filter_user_rules() to enable the exclude filter to
additionally filter on PID, UID, GID, AUID, LOGINUID_SET, SUBJ_*.
The process of combining the similar audit_filter_user() and
audit_filter_type() functions, required inverting the meaning and
including the ALWAYS action of the latter.
Include audit_filter_user_rules() into audit_filter(), removing
unneeded logic in the process.
Keep the check to quit early if the list is empty.
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
[PM: checkpatch.pl fixes - whitespace damage, wrapped description]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
The audit_tty and audit_tty_log_passwd fields are actually bool
values, so merge into single memory location to access atomically.
NB: audit log operations may still occur after tty audit is disabled
which is consistent with the existing functionality
Signed-off-by: Peter Hurley <peter@hurleysoftware.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris:
- EVM gains support for loading an x509 cert from the kernel
(EVM_LOAD_X509), into the EVM trusted kernel keyring.
- Smack implements 'file receive' process-based permission checking for
sockets, rather than just depending on inode checks.
- Misc enhancments for TPM & TPM2.
- Cleanups and bugfixes for SELinux, Keys, and IMA.
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (41 commits)
selinux: Inode label revalidation performance fix
KEYS: refcount bug fix
ima: ima_write_policy() limit locking
IMA: policy can be updated zero times
selinux: rate-limit netlink message warnings in selinux_nlmsg_perm()
selinux: export validatetrans decisions
gfs2: Invalid security labels of inodes when they go invalid
selinux: Revalidate invalid inode security labels
security: Add hook to invalidate inode security labels
selinux: Add accessor functions for inode->i_security
security: Make inode argument of inode_getsecid non-const
security: Make inode argument of inode_getsecurity non-const
selinux: Remove unused variable in selinux_inode_init_security
keys, trusted: seal with a TPM2 authorization policy
keys, trusted: select hash algorithm for TPM2 chips
keys, trusted: fix: *do not* allow duplicate key options
tpm_ibmvtpm: properly handle interrupted packet receptions
tpm_tis: Tighten IRQ auto-probing
tpm_tis: Refactor the interrupt setup
tpm_tis: Get rid of the duplicate IRQ probing code
...
Previously we were emitting seccomp audit records regardless of the
audit_enabled setting, a deparature from the rest of audit. This
patch makes seccomp auditing consistent with the rest of the audit
record generation code in that when audit_enabled=0 nothing is logged
by the audit subsystem.
The bulk of this patch is moving the CONFIG_AUDIT block ahead of the
CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL block in include/linux/audit.h; the only real
code change was in the audit_seccomp() definition.
Signed-off-by: Tony Jones <tonyj@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Make the inode argument of the inode_getsecid hook non-const so that we
can use it to revalidate invalid security labels.
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
This patch makes audit_string_contains_control return bool to improve
readability due to this particular function only using either one or
zero as its return value.
Signed-off-by: Yaowei Bai <bywxiaobai@163.com>
[PM: tweaked subject line]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
This patch makes audit_dummy_context return bool due to this
particular function only using either one or zero as its return
value.
No functional change.
Signed-off-by: Yaowei Bai <bywxiaobai@163.com>
[PM: subject line tweak]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
This adds the ability audit the actions of a not-yet-running process.
This patch implements the ability to filter on the executable path. Instead of
just hard coding the ino and dev of the executable we care about at the moment
the rule is inserted into the kernel, use the new audit_fsnotify
infrastructure to manage this dynamically. This means that if the filename
does not yet exist but the containing directory does, or if the inode in
question is unlinked and creat'd (aka updated) the rule will just continue to
work. If the containing directory is moved or deleted or the filesystem is
unmounted, the rule is deleted automatically. A future enhancement would be to
have the rule survive across directory disruptions.
This is a heavily modified version of a patch originally submitted by Eric
Paris with some ideas from Peter Moody.
Cc: Peter Moody <peter@hda3.com>
Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
[PM: minor whitespace clean to satisfy ./scripts/checkpatch]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Clean up a number of places were casted magic numbers are used to represent
unset inode and device numbers in preparation for the audit by executable path
patch set.
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
[PM: enclosed the _UNSET macros in parentheses for ./scripts/checkpatch]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Pull getname/putname updates from Al Viro:
"Rework of getname/getname_kernel/etc., mostly from Paul Moore. Gets
rid of quite a pile of kludges between namei and audit..."
* 'getname2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs:
audit: replace getname()/putname() hacks with reference counters
audit: fix filename matching in __audit_inode() and __audit_inode_child()
audit: enable filename recording via getname_kernel()
simpler calling conventions for filename_mountpoint()
fs: create proper filename objects using getname_kernel()
fs: rework getname_kernel to handle up to PATH_MAX sized filenames
cut down the number of do_path_lookup() callers
Pull audit fix from Paul Moore:
"Just one patch from the audit tree for v3.20, and a very minor one at
that.
The patch simply removes an old, unused field from the audit_krule
structure, a private audit-only struct. In audit related news, we did
a proper overhaul of the audit pathname code and removed the nasty
getname()/putname() hacks for audit, you should see those patches in
Al's vfs tree if you haven't already.
That's it for audit this time, let's hope for a quiet -rcX series"
* 'upstream' of git://git.infradead.org/users/pcmoore/audit:
audit: remove vestiges of vers_ops
In order to ensure that filenames are not released before the audit
subsystem is done with the strings there are a number of hacks built
into the fs and audit subsystems around getname() and putname(). To
say these hacks are "ugly" would be kind.
This patch removes the filename hackery in favor of a more
conventional reference count based approach. The diffstat below tells
most of the story; lots of audit/fs specific code is replaced with a
traditional reference count based approach that is easily understood,
even by those not familiar with the audit and/or fs subsystems.
CC: viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk
CC: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Should have been removed with commit 18900909 ("audit: remove the old
depricated kernel interface").
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Pull audit fixes from Paul Moore:
"Four patches to fix various problems with the audit subsystem, all are
fairly small and straightforward.
One patch fixes a problem where we weren't using the correct gfp
allocation flags (GFP_KERNEL regardless of context, oops), one patch
fixes a problem with old userspace tools (this was broken for a
while), one patch fixes a problem where we weren't recording pathnames
correctly, and one fixes a problem with PID based filters.
In general I don't think there is anything controversial with this
patchset, and it fixes some rather unfortunate bugs; the allocation
flag one can be particularly scary looking for users"
* 'upstream' of git://git.infradead.org/users/pcmoore/audit:
audit: restore AUDIT_LOGINUID unset ABI
audit: correctly record file names with different path name types
audit: use supplied gfp_mask from audit_buffer in kauditd_send_multicast_skb
audit: don't attempt to lookup PIDs when changing PID filtering audit rules
A regression was caused by commit 780a7654ce:
audit: Make testing for a valid loginuid explicit.
(which in turn attempted to fix a regression caused by e1760bd)
When audit_krule_to_data() fills in the rules to get a listing, there was a
missing clause to convert back from AUDIT_LOGINUID_SET to AUDIT_LOGINUID.
This broke userspace by not returning the same information that was sent and
expected.
The rule:
auditctl -a exit,never -F auid=-1
gives:
auditctl -l
LIST_RULES: exit,never f24=0 syscall=all
when it should give:
LIST_RULES: exit,never auid=-1 (0xffffffff) syscall=all
Tag it so that it is reported the same way it was set. Create a new
private flags audit_krule field (pflags) to store it that won't interact with
the public one from the API.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.10-rc1+
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
... for situations when we don't have any candidate in pathnames - basically,
in descriptor-based syscalls.
[Folded the build fix for !CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL configs from Chen Gang]
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
There's only one audit_classify_compat_syscall() definition, so it doesn't
need to be weak.
Remove the "weak" attribute from the audit_classify_compat_syscall()
declaration.
Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
Acked-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
CC: AKASHI Takahiro <takahiro.akashi@linaro.org>
Since only one of val, uid, gid and lsm* are used at any given time, combine
them to reduce the size of the struct audit_field.
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Since the arch is found locally in __audit_syscall_entry(), there is no need to
pass it in as a parameter. Delete it from the parameter list.
x86* was the only arch to call __audit_syscall_entry() directly and did so from
assembly code.
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: x86@kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-audit@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
---
As this patch relies on changes in the audit tree, I think it
appropriate to send it through my tree rather than the x86 tree.
avr32 does not have an asm/syscall.h file. We need the
syscall_get_arch() definition from that file for all arch's which
support CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL. Obviously avr32 is not one of those
arch's. Move the include inside the CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL such that we
only do the include if we need the results.
When the syscall_get_arch() call is moved inside __audit_syscall_entry()
this include can be dropped entirely. But that is going to require some
assembly changes on x86* in a patch that is not ready for the tree...
Reported-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
