Commit Graph

581 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Jia Zhang
81d30225bc x86/vdso: Remove hpet_page from vDSO
This trivial cleanup finalizes the removal of vDSO HPET support.

Fixes: 1ed95e52d9 ("x86/vdso: Remove direct HPET access through the vDSO")
Signed-off-by: Jia Zhang <zhang.jia@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: luto@kernel.org
Cc: bp@alien8.de
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190401114045.7280-1-zhang.jia@linux.alibaba.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2019-05-08 13:13:57 +02:00
Linus Torvalds
8f14772703 Merge branch 'x86-irq-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 irq updates from Ingo Molnar:
 "Here are the main changes in this tree:

   - Introduce x86-64 IRQ/exception/debug stack guard pages to detect
     stack overflows immediately and deterministically.

   - Clean up over a decade worth of cruft accumulated.

  The outcome of this should be more clear-cut faults/crashes when any
  of the low level x86 CPU stacks overflow, instead of silent memory
  corruption and sporadic failures much later on"

* 'x86-irq-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (33 commits)
  x86/irq: Fix outdated comments
  x86/irq/64: Remove stack overflow debug code
  x86/irq/64: Remap the IRQ stack with guard pages
  x86/irq/64: Split the IRQ stack into its own pages
  x86/irq/64: Init hardirq_stack_ptr during CPU hotplug
  x86/irq/32: Handle irq stack allocation failure proper
  x86/irq/32: Invoke irq_ctx_init() from init_IRQ()
  x86/irq/64: Rename irq_stack_ptr to hardirq_stack_ptr
  x86/irq/32: Rename hard/softirq_stack to hard/softirq_stack_ptr
  x86/irq/32: Make irq stack a character array
  x86/irq/32: Define IRQ_STACK_SIZE
  x86/dumpstack/64: Speedup in_exception_stack()
  x86/exceptions: Split debug IST stack
  x86/exceptions: Enable IST guard pages
  x86/exceptions: Disconnect IST index and stack order
  x86/cpu: Remove orig_ist array
  x86/cpu: Prepare TSS.IST setup for guard pages
  x86/dumpstack/64: Use cpu_entry_area instead of orig_ist
  x86/irq/64: Use cpu entry area instead of orig_ist
  x86/traps: Use cpu_entry_area instead of orig_ist
  ...
2019-05-06 15:56:41 -07:00
Linus Torvalds
53f8b081c1 Merge branch 'x86-entry-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 entry cleanup from Ingo Molnar:
 "A single commit that removes a redundant complication from
  preempt-schedule handling in the x86 entry code"

* 'x86-entry-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
  x86/entry: Remove unneeded need_resched() loop
2019-05-06 15:55:15 -07:00
Linus Torvalds
f725492dd1 Merge branch 'x86-asm-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 asm updates from Ingo Molnar:
 "This includes the following changes:

   - cpu_has() cleanups

   - sync_bitops.h modernization to the rmwcc.h facility, similarly to
     bitops.h

   - continued LTO annotations/fixes

   - misc cleanups and smaller cleanups"

* 'x86-asm-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
  x86/um/vdso: Drop unnecessary cc-ldoption
  x86/vdso: Rename variable to fix -Wshadow warning
  x86/cpu/amd: Exclude 32bit only assembler from 64bit build
  x86/asm: Mark all top level asm statements as .text
  x86/build/vdso: Add FORCE to the build rule of %.so
  x86/asm: Modernize sync_bitops.h
  x86/mm: Convert some slow-path static_cpu_has() callers to boot_cpu_has()
  x86: Convert some slow-path static_cpu_has() callers to boot_cpu_has()
  x86/asm: Clarify static_cpu_has()'s intended use
  x86/uaccess: Fix implicit cast of __user pointer
  x86/cpufeature: Remove __pure attribute to _static_cpu_has()
2019-05-06 15:32:35 -07:00
Linus Torvalds
6ec62961e6 Merge branch 'core-objtool-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull objtool updates from Ingo Molnar:
 "This is a series from Peter Zijlstra that adds x86 build-time uaccess
  validation of SMAP to objtool, which will detect and warn about the
  following uaccess API usage bugs and weirdnesses:

   - call to %s() with UACCESS enabled
   - return with UACCESS enabled
   - return with UACCESS disabled from a UACCESS-safe function
   - recursive UACCESS enable
   - redundant UACCESS disable
   - UACCESS-safe disables UACCESS

  As it turns out not leaking uaccess permissions outside the intended
  uaccess functionality is hard when the interfaces are complex and when
  such bugs are mostly dormant.

  As a bonus we now also check the DF flag. We had at least one
  high-profile bug in that area in the early days of Linux, and the
  checking is fairly simple. The checks performed and warnings emitted
  are:

   - call to %s() with DF set
   - return with DF set
   - return with modified stack frame
   - recursive STD
   - redundant CLD

  It's all x86-only for now, but later on this can also be used for PAN
  on ARM and objtool is fairly cross-platform in principle.

  While all warnings emitted by this new checking facility that got
  reported to us were fixed, there might be GCC version dependent
  warnings that were not reported yet - which we'll address, should they
  trigger.

  The warnings are non-fatal build warnings"

* 'core-objtool-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (27 commits)
  mm/uaccess: Use 'unsigned long' to placate UBSAN warnings on older GCC versions
  x86/uaccess: Dont leak the AC flag into __put_user() argument evaluation
  sched/x86_64: Don't save flags on context switch
  objtool: Add Direction Flag validation
  objtool: Add UACCESS validation
  objtool: Fix sibling call detection
  objtool: Rewrite alt->skip_orig
  objtool: Add --backtrace support
  objtool: Rewrite add_ignores()
  objtool: Handle function aliases
  objtool: Set insn->func for alternatives
  x86/uaccess, kcov: Disable stack protector
  x86/uaccess, ftrace: Fix ftrace_likely_update() vs. SMAP
  x86/uaccess, ubsan: Fix UBSAN vs. SMAP
  x86/uaccess, kasan: Fix KASAN vs SMAP
  x86/smap: Ditch __stringify()
  x86/uaccess: Introduce user_access_{save,restore}()
  x86/uaccess, signal: Fix AC=1 bloat
  x86/uaccess: Always inline user_access_begin()
  x86/uaccess, xen: Suppress SMAP warnings
  ...
2019-05-06 11:39:17 -07:00
Linus Torvalds
459e3a2153 gcc-9: properly declare the {pv,hv}clock_page storage
The pvlock_page and hvclock_page variables are (as the name implies)
addresses to pages, created by the linker script.

But we declared them as just "extern u8" variables, which _works_, but
now that gcc does some more bounds checking, it causes warnings like

    warning: array subscript 1 is outside array bounds of ‘u8[1]’

when we then access more than one byte from those variables.

Fix this by simply making the declaration of the variables match
reality, which makes the compiler happy too.

Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@-linux-foundation.org>
2019-05-01 11:20:53 -07:00
Leonardo Brás
b97369f07e x86/vdso: Rename variable to fix -Wshadow warning
The go32() and go64() functions has an argument and a local variable called ‘name’.
Rename both to clarify the code and to fix a warning with -Wshadow.

Signed-off-by: Leonardo Brás <leobras.c@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: David.Laight@aculab.com
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
Cc: Michal Marek <michal.lkml@markovi.net>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: helen@koikeco.de
Cc: linux-kbuild@vger.kernel.org
Cc: lkcamp@lists.libreplanetbr.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181023011022.GA6574@WindFlash
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2019-04-19 21:33:46 +02:00
Masahiro Yamada
3c454f47e6 x86/build/vdso: Add FORCE to the build rule of %.so
$(call if_changed,...) must have FORCE as a prerequisite.

Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1554280212-10578-1-git-send-email-yamada.masahiro@socionext.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2019-04-18 10:05:34 +02:00
Andy Lutomirski
e6401c1309 x86/irq/64: Split the IRQ stack into its own pages
Currently, the IRQ stack is hardcoded as the first page of the percpu
area, and the stack canary lives on the IRQ stack. The former gets in
the way of adding an IRQ stack guard page, and the latter is a potential
weakness in the stack canary mechanism.

Split the IRQ stack into its own private percpu pages.

[ tglx: Make 64 and 32 bit share struct irq_stack ]

Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Cc: "Chang S. Bae" <chang.seok.bae@intel.com>
Cc: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Cc: Feng Tang <feng.tang@intel.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Cc: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Cc: Jordan Borgner <mail@jordan-borgner.de>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: Maran Wilson <maran.wilson@oracle.com>
Cc: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
Cc: Nicolai Stange <nstange@suse.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Pu Wen <puwen@hygon.cn>
Cc: "Rafael Ávila de Espíndola" <rafael@espindo.la>
Cc: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Cc: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org>
Cc: xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190414160146.267376656@linutronix.de
2019-04-17 15:37:02 +02:00
Thomas Gleixner
758a2e3122 x86/irq/64: Rename irq_stack_ptr to hardirq_stack_ptr
Preparatory patch to share code with 32bit.

No functional changes.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: "Chang S. Bae" <chang.seok.bae@intel.com>
Cc: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
Cc: Nicolai Stange <nstange@suse.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Pingfan Liu <kernelfans@gmail.com>
Cc: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190414160145.912584074@linutronix.de
2019-04-17 15:27:10 +02:00
Thomas Gleixner
2a594d4ccf x86/exceptions: Split debug IST stack
The debug IST stack is actually two separate debug stacks to handle #DB
recursion. This is required because the CPU starts always at top of stack
on exception entry, which means on #DB recursion the second #DB would
overwrite the stack of the first.

The low level entry code therefore adjusts the top of stack on entry so a
secondary #DB starts from a different stack page. But the stack pages are
adjacent without a guard page between them.

Split the debug stack into 3 stacks which are separated by guard pages. The
3rd stack is never mapped into the cpu_entry_area and is only there to
catch triple #DB nesting:

      --- top of DB_stack	<- Initial stack
      --- end of DB_stack
      	  guard page

      --- top of DB1_stack	<- Top of stack after entering first #DB
      --- end of DB1_stack
      	  guard page

      --- top of DB2_stack	<- Top of stack after entering second #DB
      --- end of DB2_stack
      	  guard page

If DB2 would not act as the final guard hole, a second #DB would point the
top of #DB stack to the stack below #DB1 which would be valid and not catch
the not so desired triple nesting.

The backing store does not allocate any memory for DB2 and its guard page
as it is not going to be mapped into the cpu_entry_area.

 - Adjust the low level entry code so it adjusts top of #DB with the offset
   between the stacks instead of exception stack size.

 - Make the dumpstack code aware of the new stacks.

 - Adjust the in_debug_stack() implementation and move it into the NMI code
   where it belongs. As this is NMI hotpath code, it just checks the full
   area between top of DB_stack and bottom of DB1_stack without checking
   for the guard page. That's correct because the NMI cannot hit a
   stackpointer pointing to the guard page between DB and DB1 stack.  Even
   if it would, then the NMI operation still is unaffected, but the resume
   of the debug exception on the topmost DB stack will crash by touching
   the guard page.

  [ bp: Make exception_stack_names static const char * const ]

Suggested-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
Cc: "Chang S. Bae" <chang.seok.bae@intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Qian Cai <cai@lca.pw>
Cc: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190414160145.439944544@linutronix.de
2019-04-17 15:14:28 +02:00
Thomas Gleixner
3207426925 x86/exceptions: Disconnect IST index and stack order
The entry order of the TSS.IST array and the order of the stack
storage/mapping are not required to be the same.

With the upcoming split of the debug stack this is going to fall apart as
the number of TSS.IST array entries stays the same while the actual stacks
are increasing.

Make them separate so that code like dumpstack can just utilize the mapping
order. The IST index is solely required for the actual TSS.IST array
initialization.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
Cc: "Chang S. Bae" <chang.seok.bae@intel.com>
Cc: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Cc: Dou Liyang <douly.fnst@cn.fujitsu.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: Nicolai Stange <nstange@suse.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Qian Cai <cai@lca.pw>
Cc: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190414160145.241588113@linutronix.de
2019-04-17 15:01:09 +02:00
Thomas Gleixner
8f34c5b5af x86/exceptions: Make IST index zero based
The defines for the exception stack (IST) array in the TSS are using the
SDM convention IST1 - IST7. That causes all sorts of code to subtract 1 for
array indices related to IST. That's confusing at best and does not provide
any value.

Make the indices zero based and fixup the usage sites. The only code which
needs to adjust the 0 based index is the interrupt descriptor setup which
needs to add 1 now.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
Cc: "Chang S. Bae" <chang.seok.bae@intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Cc: Dou Liyang <douly.fnst@cn.fujitsu.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Nicolai Stange <nstange@suse.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Qian Cai <cai@lca.pw>
Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190414160144.331772825@linutronix.de
2019-04-17 12:48:00 +02:00
Valentin Schneider
b5b447b6b4 x86/entry: Remove unneeded need_resched() loop
Since the enabling and disabling of IRQs within preempt_schedule_irq() is
contained in a need_resched() loop, there is no need for the outer
architecture specific loop.

Signed-off-by: Valentin Schneider <valentin.schneider@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190311224752.8337-14-valentin.schneider@arm.com
2019-04-05 15:08:03 +02:00
Peter Zijlstra
64604d54d3 sched/x86_64: Don't save flags on context switch
Now that we have objtool validating AC=1 state for all x86_64 code,
we can once again guarantee clean flags on schedule.

Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2019-04-03 11:02:24 +02:00
Peter Zijlstra
6690e86be8 sched/x86: Save [ER]FLAGS on context switch
Effectively reverts commit:

  2c7577a758 ("sched/x86_64: Don't save flags on context switch")

Specifically because SMAP uses FLAGS.AC which invalidates the claim
that the kernel has clean flags.

In particular; while preemption from interrupt return is fine (the
IRET frame on the exception stack contains FLAGS) it breaks any code
that does synchonous scheduling, including preempt_enable().

This has become a significant issue ever since commit:

  5b24a7a2aa ("Add 'unsafe' user access functions for batched accesses")

provided for means of having 'normal' C code between STAC / CLAC,
exposing the FLAGS.AC state. So far this hasn't led to trouble,
however fix it before it comes apart.

Reported-by: Julien Thierry <julien.thierry@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Acked-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Fixes: 5b24a7a2aa ("Add 'unsafe' user access functions for batched accesses")
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2019-04-03 09:36:27 +02:00
Linus Torvalds
a9dce6679d pidfd patches for v5.1-rc1
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
 
 iQIzBAABCgAdFiEE7btrcuORLb1XUhEwjrBW1T7ssS0FAlx+nn4ACgkQjrBW1T7s
 sS2kwg//aJUCwLIhV91gXUFN2jHTCf0/+5fnigEk7JhAT5wmAykxLM8tprLlIlyp
 HtwNQx54hq/6p010Ulo9K50VS6JRii+2lNSpC6IkqXXdHXXm0ViH+5I9Nru8SVJ+
 avRCYWNjW9Gn1EtcB2yv6KP3XffgnQ6ZLIr4QJwglOxgAqUaWZ68woSUlrIR5yFj
 j48wAxjsC3g2qwGLvXPeiwYZHwk6VnYmrZ3eWXPDthWRDC4zkjyBdchZZzFJagSC
 6sX8T9s5ua5juZMokEJaWjuBQQyfg0NYu41hupSdVjV7/0D3E+5/DiReInvLmSup
 63bZ85uKRqWTNgl4cmJ1W3aVe2RYYemMZCXVVYYvU+IKpvTSzzYY7us+FyMAIRUV
 bT+XPGzTWcGrChzv9bHZcBrkL91XGqyxRJz56jLl6EhRtqxmzmywf6mO6pS2WK4N
 r+aBDgXeJbG39KguCzwUgVX8hC6YlSxSP8Md+2sK+UoAdfTUvFtdCYnjhuACofCt
 saRvDIPF8N9qn4Ch3InzCKkrUTL/H3BZKBl2jo6tYQ9smUsFZW7lQoip5Ui/0VS+
 qksJ91djOc9facGoOorPazojY5fO5Lj3Hg+cGIoxUV0jPH483z7hWH0ALynb0f6z
 EDsgNyEUpIO2nJMJJfm37ysbU/j1gOpzQdaAEaWeknwtfecFPzM=
 =yOWp
 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

Merge tag 'pidfd-v5.1-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/brauner/linux

Pull pidfd system call from Christian Brauner:
 "This introduces the ability to use file descriptors from /proc/<pid>/
  as stable handles on struct pid. Even if a pid is recycled the handle
  will not change. For a start these fds can be used to send signals to
  the processes they refer to.

  With the ability to use /proc/<pid> fds as stable handles on struct
  pid we can fix a long-standing issue where after a process has exited
  its pid can be reused by another process. If a caller sends a signal
  to a reused pid it will end up signaling the wrong process.

  With this patchset we enable a variety of use cases. One obvious
  example is that we can now safely delegate an important part of
  process management - sending signals - to processes other than the
  parent of a given process by sending file descriptors around via scm
  rights and not fearing that the given process will have been recycled
  in the meantime. It also allows for easy testing whether a given
  process is still alive or not by sending signal 0 to a pidfd which is
  quite handy.

  There has been some interest in this feature e.g. from systems
  management (systemd, glibc) and container managers. I have requested
  and gotten comments from glibc to make sure that this syscall is
  suitable for their needs as well. In the future I expect it to take on
  most other pid-based signal syscalls. But such features are left for
  the future once they are needed.

  This has been sitting in linux-next for quite a while and has not
  caused any issues. It comes with selftests which verify basic
  functionality and also test that a recycled pid cannot be signaled via
  a pidfd.

  Jon has written about a prior version of this patchset. It should
  cover the basic functionality since not a lot has changed since then:

      https://lwn.net/Articles/773459/

  The commit message for the syscall itself is extensively documenting
  the syscall, including it's functionality and extensibility"

* tag 'pidfd-v5.1-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/brauner/linux:
  selftests: add tests for pidfd_send_signal()
  signal: add pidfd_send_signal() syscall
2019-03-16 13:47:14 -07:00
Linus Torvalds
38e7571c07 io_uring-2019-03-06
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
 
 iQJEBAABCAAuFiEEwPw5LcreJtl1+l5K99NY+ylx4KYFAlyAJvAQHGF4Ym9lQGtl
 cm5lbC5kawAKCRD301j7KXHgphb+EACFaKI2HIdjExQ5T7Cxebzwky+Qiro3FV55
 ziW00FZrkJ5g0h4ItBzh/5SDlcNQYZDMlA3s4xzWIMadWl5PjMPq1uJul0cITbSl
 WIJO5hpgNMXeUEhvcXUl6+f/WzpgYUxN40uW8N5V7EKlooaFVfudDqJGlvEv+UgB
 g8NWQYThSG+/e7r9OGwK0xDRVKfpjxVvmqmnDH3DrxKaDgSOwTf4xn1u41wKwfQ3
 3uPfQ+GBeTqt4a2AhOi7K6KQFNnj5Jz5CXYMiOZI2JGtLPcL6dmyBVD7K0a0HUr+
 rs4ghNdd1+puvPGNK4TX8qV0uiNrMctoRNVA/JDd1ZTYEKTmNLxeFf+olfYHlwuK
 K5FRs60/lgNzNkzcUpFvJHitPwYtxYJdB36PyswE1FZP1YviEeVoKNt9W8aIhEoA
 549uj90brfA74eCINGhq98pJqj9CNyCPw3bfi76f5Ej2utwYDb9S5Cp2gfSa853X
 qc/qNda9efEq7ikwCbPzhekRMXZo6TSXtaSmC2C+Vs5+mD1Scc4kdAvdCKGQrtr9
 aoy0iQMYO2NDZ/G5fppvXtMVuEPAZWbsGftyOe15IlMysjRze2ycJV8cFahKEVM9
 uBeXLyH1pqGU/j7ABP4+XRZ/sbHJTwjKJbnXhTgBsdU8XO/CR3U+kRQFTsidKMfH
 Wlo3uH2h2A==
 =p78E
 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

Merge tag 'io_uring-2019-03-06' of git://git.kernel.dk/linux-block

Pull io_uring IO interface from Jens Axboe:
 "Second attempt at adding the io_uring interface.

  Since the first one, we've added basic unit testing of the three
  system calls, that resides in liburing like the other unit tests that
  we have so far. It'll take a while to get full coverage of it, but
  we're working towards it. I've also added two basic test programs to
  tools/io_uring. One uses the raw interface and has support for all the
  various features that io_uring supports outside of standard IO, like
  fixed files, fixed IO buffers, and polled IO. The other uses the
  liburing API, and is a simplified version of cp(1).

  This adds support for a new IO interface, io_uring.

  io_uring allows an application to communicate with the kernel through
  two rings, the submission queue (SQ) and completion queue (CQ) ring.
  This allows for very efficient handling of IOs, see the v5 posting for
  some basic numbers:

    https://lore.kernel.org/linux-block/20190116175003.17880-1-axboe@kernel.dk/

  Outside of just efficiency, the interface is also flexible and
  extendable, and allows for future use cases like the upcoming NVMe
  key-value store API, networked IO, and so on. It also supports async
  buffered IO, something that we've always failed to support in the
  kernel.

  Outside of basic IO features, it supports async polled IO as well.
  This particular feature has already been tested at Facebook months ago
  for flash storage boxes, with 25-33% improvements. It makes polled IO
  actually useful for real world use cases, where even basic flash sees
  a nice win in terms of efficiency, latency, and performance. These
  boxes were IOPS bound before, now they are not.

  This series adds three new system calls. One for setting up an
  io_uring instance (io_uring_setup(2)), one for submitting/completing
  IO (io_uring_enter(2)), and one for aux functions like registrating
  file sets, buffers, etc (io_uring_register(2)). Through the help of
  Arnd, I've coordinated the syscall numbers so merge on that front
  should be painless.

  Jon did a writeup of the interface a while back, which (except for
  minor details that have been tweaked) is still accurate. Find that
  here:

    https://lwn.net/Articles/776703/

  Huge thanks to Al Viro for helping getting the reference cycle code
  correct, and to Jann Horn for his extensive reviews focused on both
  security and bugs in general.

  There's a userspace library that provides basic functionality for
  applications that don't need or want to care about how to fiddle with
  the rings directly. It has helpers to allow applications to easily set
  up an io_uring instance, and submit/complete IO through it without
  knowing about the intricacies of the rings. It also includes man pages
  (thanks to Jeff Moyer), and will continue to grow support helper
  functions and features as time progresses. Find it here:

    git://git.kernel.dk/liburing

  Fio has full support for the raw interface, both in the form of an IO
  engine (io_uring), but also with a small test application (t/io_uring)
  that can exercise and benchmark the interface"

* tag 'io_uring-2019-03-06' of git://git.kernel.dk/linux-block:
  io_uring: add a few test tools
  io_uring: allow workqueue item to handle multiple buffered requests
  io_uring: add support for IORING_OP_POLL
  io_uring: add io_kiocb ref count
  io_uring: add submission polling
  io_uring: add file set registration
  net: split out functions related to registering inflight socket files
  io_uring: add support for pre-mapped user IO buffers
  block: implement bio helper to add iter bvec pages to bio
  io_uring: batch io_kiocb allocation
  io_uring: use fget/fput_many() for file references
  fs: add fget_many() and fput_many()
  io_uring: support for IO polling
  io_uring: add fsync support
  Add io_uring IO interface
2019-03-08 14:48:40 -08:00
Christian Brauner
3eb39f4793
signal: add pidfd_send_signal() syscall
The kill() syscall operates on process identifiers (pid). After a process
has exited its pid can be reused by another process. If a caller sends a
signal to a reused pid it will end up signaling the wrong process. This
issue has often surfaced and there has been a push to address this problem [1].

This patch uses file descriptors (fd) from proc/<pid> as stable handles on
struct pid. Even if a pid is recycled the handle will not change. The fd
can be used to send signals to the process it refers to.
Thus, the new syscall pidfd_send_signal() is introduced to solve this
problem. Instead of pids it operates on process fds (pidfd).

/* prototype and argument /*
long pidfd_send_signal(int pidfd, int sig, siginfo_t *info, unsigned int flags);

/* syscall number 424 */
The syscall number was chosen to be 424 to align with Arnd's rework in his
y2038 to minimize merge conflicts (cf. [25]).

In addition to the pidfd and signal argument it takes an additional
siginfo_t and flags argument. If the siginfo_t argument is NULL then
pidfd_send_signal() is equivalent to kill(<positive-pid>, <signal>). If it
is not NULL pidfd_send_signal() is equivalent to rt_sigqueueinfo().
The flags argument is added to allow for future extensions of this syscall.
It currently needs to be passed as 0. Failing to do so will cause EINVAL.

/* pidfd_send_signal() replaces multiple pid-based syscalls */
The pidfd_send_signal() syscall currently takes on the job of
rt_sigqueueinfo(2) and parts of the functionality of kill(2), Namely, when a
positive pid is passed to kill(2). It will however be possible to also
replace tgkill(2) and rt_tgsigqueueinfo(2) if this syscall is extended.

/* sending signals to threads (tid) and process groups (pgid) */
Specifically, the pidfd_send_signal() syscall does currently not operate on
process groups or threads. This is left for future extensions.
In order to extend the syscall to allow sending signal to threads and
process groups appropriately named flags (e.g. PIDFD_TYPE_PGID, and
PIDFD_TYPE_TID) should be added. This implies that the flags argument will
determine what is signaled and not the file descriptor itself. Put in other
words, grouping in this api is a property of the flags argument not a
property of the file descriptor (cf. [13]). Clarification for this has been
requested by Eric (cf. [19]).
When appropriate extensions through the flags argument are added then
pidfd_send_signal() can additionally replace the part of kill(2) which
operates on process groups as well as the tgkill(2) and
rt_tgsigqueueinfo(2) syscalls.
How such an extension could be implemented has been very roughly sketched
in [14], [15], and [16]. However, this should not be taken as a commitment
to a particular implementation. There might be better ways to do it.
Right now this is intentionally left out to keep this patchset as simple as
possible (cf. [4]).

/* naming */
The syscall had various names throughout iterations of this patchset:
- procfd_signal()
- procfd_send_signal()
- taskfd_send_signal()
In the last round of reviews it was pointed out that given that if the
flags argument decides the scope of the signal instead of different types
of fds it might make sense to either settle for "procfd_" or "pidfd_" as
prefix. The community was willing to accept either (cf. [17] and [18]).
Given that one developer expressed strong preference for the "pidfd_"
prefix (cf. [13]) and with other developers less opinionated about the name
we should settle for "pidfd_" to avoid further bikeshedding.

The  "_send_signal" suffix was chosen to reflect the fact that the syscall
takes on the job of multiple syscalls. It is therefore intentional that the
name is not reminiscent of neither kill(2) nor rt_sigqueueinfo(2). Not the
fomer because it might imply that pidfd_send_signal() is a replacement for
kill(2), and not the latter because it is a hassle to remember the correct
spelling - especially for non-native speakers - and because it is not
descriptive enough of what the syscall actually does. The name
"pidfd_send_signal" makes it very clear that its job is to send signals.

/* zombies */
Zombies can be signaled just as any other process. No special error will be
reported since a zombie state is an unreliable state (cf. [3]). However,
this can be added as an extension through the @flags argument if the need
ever arises.

/* cross-namespace signals */
The patch currently enforces that the signaler and signalee either are in
the same pid namespace or that the signaler's pid namespace is an ancestor
of the signalee's pid namespace. This is done for the sake of simplicity
and because it is unclear to what values certain members of struct
siginfo_t would need to be set to (cf. [5], [6]).

/* compat syscalls */
It became clear that we would like to avoid adding compat syscalls
(cf. [7]).  The compat syscall handling is now done in kernel/signal.c
itself by adding __copy_siginfo_from_user_generic() which lets us avoid
compat syscalls (cf. [8]). It should be noted that the addition of
__copy_siginfo_from_user_any() is caused by a bug in the original
implementation of rt_sigqueueinfo(2) (cf. 12).
With upcoming rework for syscall handling things might improve
significantly (cf. [11]) and __copy_siginfo_from_user_any() will not gain
any additional callers.

/* testing */
This patch was tested on x64 and x86.

/* userspace usage */
An asciinema recording for the basic functionality can be found under [9].
With this patch a process can be killed via:

 #define _GNU_SOURCE
 #include <errno.h>
 #include <fcntl.h>
 #include <signal.h>
 #include <stdio.h>
 #include <stdlib.h>
 #include <string.h>
 #include <sys/stat.h>
 #include <sys/syscall.h>
 #include <sys/types.h>
 #include <unistd.h>

 static inline int do_pidfd_send_signal(int pidfd, int sig, siginfo_t *info,
                                         unsigned int flags)
 {
 #ifdef __NR_pidfd_send_signal
         return syscall(__NR_pidfd_send_signal, pidfd, sig, info, flags);
 #else
         return -ENOSYS;
 #endif
 }

 int main(int argc, char *argv[])
 {
         int fd, ret, saved_errno, sig;

         if (argc < 3)
                 exit(EXIT_FAILURE);

         fd = open(argv[1], O_DIRECTORY | O_CLOEXEC);
         if (fd < 0) {
                 printf("%s - Failed to open \"%s\"\n", strerror(errno), argv[1]);
                 exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
         }

         sig = atoi(argv[2]);

         printf("Sending signal %d to process %s\n", sig, argv[1]);
         ret = do_pidfd_send_signal(fd, sig, NULL, 0);

         saved_errno = errno;
         close(fd);
         errno = saved_errno;

         if (ret < 0) {
                 printf("%s - Failed to send signal %d to process %s\n",
                        strerror(errno), sig, argv[1]);
                 exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
         }

         exit(EXIT_SUCCESS);
 }

/* Q&A
 * Given that it seems the same questions get asked again by people who are
 * late to the party it makes sense to add a Q&A section to the commit
 * message so it's hopefully easier to avoid duplicate threads.
 *
 * For the sake of progress please consider these arguments settled unless
 * there is a new point that desperately needs to be addressed. Please make
 * sure to check the links to the threads in this commit message whether
 * this has not already been covered.
 */
Q-01: (Florian Weimer [20], Andrew Morton [21])
      What happens when the target process has exited?
A-01: Sending the signal will fail with ESRCH (cf. [22]).

Q-02:  (Andrew Morton [21])
       Is the task_struct pinned by the fd?
A-02:  No. A reference to struct pid is kept. struct pid - as far as I
       understand - was created exactly for the reason to not require to
       pin struct task_struct (cf. [22]).

Q-03: (Andrew Morton [21])
      Does the entire procfs directory remain visible? Just one entry
      within it?
A-03: The same thing that happens right now when you hold a file descriptor
      to /proc/<pid> open (cf. [22]).

Q-04: (Andrew Morton [21])
      Does the pid remain reserved?
A-04: No. This patchset guarantees a stable handle not that pids are not
      recycled (cf. [22]).

Q-05: (Andrew Morton [21])
      Do attempts to signal that fd return errors?
A-05: See {Q,A}-01.

Q-06: (Andrew Morton [22])
      Is there a cleaner way of obtaining the fd? Another syscall perhaps.
A-06: Userspace can already trivially retrieve file descriptors from procfs
      so this is something that we will need to support anyway. Hence,
      there's no immediate need to add another syscalls just to make
      pidfd_send_signal() not dependent on the presence of procfs. However,
      adding a syscalls to get such file descriptors is planned for a
      future patchset (cf. [22]).

Q-07: (Andrew Morton [21] and others)
      This fd-for-a-process sounds like a handy thing and people may well
      think up other uses for it in the future, probably unrelated to
      signals. Are the code and the interface designed to permit such
      future applications?
A-07: Yes (cf. [22]).

Q-08: (Andrew Morton [21] and others)
      Now I think about it, why a new syscall? This thing is looking
      rather like an ioctl?
A-08: This has been extensively discussed. It was agreed that a syscall is
      preferred for a variety or reasons. Here are just a few taken from
      prior threads. Syscalls are safer than ioctl()s especially when
      signaling to fds. Processes are a core kernel concept so a syscall
      seems more appropriate. The layout of the syscall with its four
      arguments would require the addition of a custom struct for the
      ioctl() thereby causing at least the same amount or even more
      complexity for userspace than a simple syscall. The new syscall will
      replace multiple other pid-based syscalls (see description above).
      The file-descriptors-for-processes concept introduced with this
      syscall will be extended with other syscalls in the future. See also
      [22], [23] and various other threads already linked in here.

Q-09: (Florian Weimer [24])
      What happens if you use the new interface with an O_PATH descriptor?
A-09:
      pidfds opened as O_PATH fds cannot be used to send signals to a
      process (cf. [2]). Signaling processes through pidfds is the
      equivalent of writing to a file. Thus, this is not an operation that
      operates "purely at the file descriptor level" as required by the
      open(2) manpage. See also [4].

/* References */
[1]:  https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20181029221037.87724-1-dancol@google.com/
[2]:  https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/874lbtjvtd.fsf@oldenburg2.str.redhat.com/
[3]:  https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20181204132604.aspfupwjgjx6fhva@brauner.io/
[4]:  https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20181203180224.fkvw4kajtbvru2ku@brauner.io/
[5]:  https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20181121213946.GA10795@mail.hallyn.com/
[6]:  https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20181120103111.etlqp7zop34v6nv4@brauner.io/
[7]:  https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/36323361-90BD-41AF-AB5B-EE0D7BA02C21@amacapital.net/
[8]:  https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/87tvjxp8pc.fsf@xmission.com/
[9]:  https://asciinema.org/a/IQjuCHew6bnq1cr78yuMv16cy
[11]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/F53D6D38-3521-4C20-9034-5AF447DF62FF@amacapital.net/
[12]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/87zhtjn8ck.fsf@xmission.com/
[13]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/871s6u9z6u.fsf@xmission.com/
[14]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20181206231742.xxi4ghn24z4h2qki@brauner.io/
[15]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20181207003124.GA11160@mail.hallyn.com/
[16]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20181207015423.4miorx43l3qhppfz@brauner.io/
[17]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAGXu5jL8PciZAXvOvCeCU3wKUEB_dU-O3q0tDw4uB_ojMvDEew@mail.gmail.com/
[18]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20181206222746.GB9224@mail.hallyn.com/
[19]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20181208054059.19813-1-christian@brauner.io/
[20]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/8736rebl9s.fsf@oldenburg.str.redhat.com/
[21]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20181228152012.dbf0508c2508138efc5f2bbe@linux-foundation.org/
[22]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20181228233725.722tdfgijxcssg76@brauner.io/
[23]: https://lwn.net/Articles/773459/
[24]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/8736rebl9s.fsf@oldenburg.str.redhat.com/
[25]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAK8P3a0ej9NcJM8wXNPbcGUyOUZYX+VLoDFdbenW3s3114oQZw@mail.gmail.com/

Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirsky <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian@brauner.io>
Reviewed-by: Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.ws>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Acked-by: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
2019-03-05 17:03:53 +01:00
Jens Axboe
edafccee56 io_uring: add support for pre-mapped user IO buffers
If we have fixed user buffers, we can map them into the kernel when we
setup the io_uring. That avoids the need to do get_user_pages() for
each and every IO.

To utilize this feature, the application must call io_uring_register()
after having setup an io_uring instance, passing in
IORING_REGISTER_BUFFERS as the opcode. The argument must be a pointer to
an iovec array, and the nr_args should contain how many iovecs the
application wishes to map.

If successful, these buffers are now mapped into the kernel, eligible
for IO. To use these fixed buffers, the application must use the
IORING_OP_READ_FIXED and IORING_OP_WRITE_FIXED opcodes, and then
set sqe->index to the desired buffer index. sqe->addr..sqe->addr+seq->len
must point to somewhere inside the indexed buffer.

The application may register buffers throughout the lifetime of the
io_uring instance. It can call io_uring_register() with
IORING_UNREGISTER_BUFFERS as the opcode to unregister the current set of
buffers, and then register a new set. The application need not
unregister buffers explicitly before shutting down the io_uring
instance.

It's perfectly valid to setup a larger buffer, and then sometimes only
use parts of it for an IO. As long as the range is within the originally
mapped region, it will work just fine.

For now, buffers must not be file backed. If file backed buffers are
passed in, the registration will fail with -1/EOPNOTSUPP. This
restriction may be relaxed in the future.

RLIMIT_MEMLOCK is used to check how much memory we can pin. A somewhat
arbitrary 1G per buffer size is also imposed.

Reviewed-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
2019-02-28 08:24:23 -07:00
Jens Axboe
2b188cc1bb Add io_uring IO interface
The submission queue (SQ) and completion queue (CQ) rings are shared
between the application and the kernel. This eliminates the need to
copy data back and forth to submit and complete IO.

IO submissions use the io_uring_sqe data structure, and completions
are generated in the form of io_uring_cqe data structures. The SQ
ring is an index into the io_uring_sqe array, which makes it possible
to submit a batch of IOs without them being contiguous in the ring.
The CQ ring is always contiguous, as completion events are inherently
unordered, and hence any io_uring_cqe entry can point back to an
arbitrary submission.

Two new system calls are added for this:

io_uring_setup(entries, params)
	Sets up an io_uring instance for doing async IO. On success,
	returns a file descriptor that the application can mmap to
	gain access to the SQ ring, CQ ring, and io_uring_sqes.

io_uring_enter(fd, to_submit, min_complete, flags, sigset, sigsetsize)
	Initiates IO against the rings mapped to this fd, or waits for
	them to complete, or both. The behavior is controlled by the
	parameters passed in. If 'to_submit' is non-zero, then we'll
	try and submit new IO. If IORING_ENTER_GETEVENTS is set, the
	kernel will wait for 'min_complete' events, if they aren't
	already available. It's valid to set IORING_ENTER_GETEVENTS
	and 'min_complete' == 0 at the same time, this allows the
	kernel to return already completed events without waiting
	for them. This is useful only for polling, as for IRQ
	driven IO, the application can just check the CQ ring
	without entering the kernel.

With this setup, it's possible to do async IO with a single system
call. Future developments will enable polled IO with this interface,
and polled submission as well. The latter will enable an application
to do IO without doing ANY system calls at all.

For IRQ driven IO, an application only needs to enter the kernel for
completions if it wants to wait for them to occur.

Each io_uring is backed by a workqueue, to support buffered async IO
as well. We will only punt to an async context if the command would
need to wait for IO on the device side. Any data that can be accessed
directly in the page cache is done inline. This avoids the slowness
issue of usual threadpools, since cached data is accessed as quickly
as a sync interface.

Sample application: http://git.kernel.dk/cgit/fio/plain/t/io_uring.c

Reviewed-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
2019-02-28 08:24:23 -07:00
Thomas Gleixner
41ea39101d y2038: Add time64 system calls
This series finally gets us to the point of having system calls with
 64-bit time_t on all architectures, after a long time of incremental
 preparation patches.
 
 There was actually one conversion that I missed during the summer,
 i.e. Deepa's timex series, which I now updated based the 5.0-rc1 changes
 and review comments.
 
 The following system calls are now added on all 32-bit architectures
 using the same system call numbers:
 
 403 clock_gettime64
 404 clock_settime64
 405 clock_adjtime64
 406 clock_getres_time64
 407 clock_nanosleep_time64
 408 timer_gettime64
 409 timer_settime64
 410 timerfd_gettime64
 411 timerfd_settime64
 412 utimensat_time64
 413 pselect6_time64
 414 ppoll_time64
 416 io_pgetevents_time64
 417 recvmmsg_time64
 418 mq_timedsend_time64
 419 mq_timedreceiv_time64
 420 semtimedop_time64
 421 rt_sigtimedwait_time64
 422 futex_time64
 423 sched_rr_get_interval_time64
 
 Each one of these corresponds directly to an existing system call
 that includes a 'struct timespec' argument, or a structure containing
 a timespec or (in case of clock_adjtime) timeval. Not included here
 are new versions of getitimer/setitimer and getrusage/waitid, which
 are planned for the future but only needed to make a consistent API
 rather than for correct operation beyond y2038. These four system
 calls are based on 'timeval', and it has not been finally decided
 what the replacement kernel interface will use instead.
 
 So far, I have done a lot of build testing across most architectures,
 which has found a number of bugs. Runtime testing so far included
 testing LTP on 32-bit ARM with the existing system calls, to ensure
 we do not regress for existing binaries, and a test with a 32-bit
 x86 build of LTP against a modified version of the musl C library
 that has been adapted to the new system call interface [3].
 This library can be used for testing on all architectures supported
 by musl-1.1.21, but it is not how the support is getting integrated
 into the official musl release. Official musl support is planned
 but will require more invasive changes to the library.
 
 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190110162435.309262-1-arnd@arndb.de/T/
 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190118161835.2259170-1-arnd@arndb.de/
 Link: https://git.linaro.org/people/arnd/musl-y2038.git/ [2]
 Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
 Version: GnuPG v2
 
 iQIcBAABCAAGBQJcXf7/AAoJEGCrR//JCVInPSUP/RhsQSCKMGtONB/vVICQhwep
 PybhzBSpHWFxszzTi6BEPN1zS9B069G9mDollRBYZCckyPqL/Bv6sI/vzQZdNk01
 Q6Nw92OnNE1QP8owZ5TjrZhpbtopWdqIXjsbGZlloUemvuJP2JwvKovQUcn5CPTQ
 jbnqU04CVyFFJYVxAnGJ+VSeWNrjW/cm/m+rhLFjUcwW7Y3aodxsPqPP6+K9hY9P
 yIWfcH42WBeEWGm1RSBOZOScQl4SGCPUAhFydl/TqyEQagyegJMIyMOv9wZ5AuTT
 xK644bDVmNsrtJDZDpx+J8hytXCk1LrnKzkHR/uK80iUIraF/8D7PlaPgTmEEjko
 XcrywEkvkXTVU3owCm2/sbV+8fyFKzSPipnNfN1JNxEX71A98kvMRtPjDueQq/GA
 Yh81rr2YLF2sUiArkc2fNpENT7EGhrh1q6gviK3FB8YDgj1kSgPK5wC/X0uolC35
 E7iC2kg4NaNEIjhKP/WKluCaTvjRbvV+0IrlJLlhLTnsqbA57ZKCCteiBrlm7wQN
 4csUtCyxchR9Ac2o/lj+Mf53z68Zv74haIROp18K2dL7ZpVcOPnA3XHeauSAdoyp
 wy2Ek6ilNvlNB+4x+mRntPoOsyuOUGv7JXzB9JvweLWUd9G7tvYeDJQp/0YpDppb
 K4UWcKnhtEom0DgK08vY
 =IZVb
 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

Merge tag 'y2038-new-syscalls' of git://git.kernel.org:/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/arnd/playground into timers/2038

Pull y2038 - time64 system calls from Arnd Bergmann:

This series finally gets us to the point of having system calls with 64-bit
time_t on all architectures, after a long time of incremental preparation
patches.

There was actually one conversion that I missed during the summer,
i.e. Deepa's timex series, which I now updated based the 5.0-rc1 changes
and review comments.

The following system calls are now added on all 32-bit architectures using
the same system call numbers:

403 clock_gettime64
404 clock_settime64
405 clock_adjtime64
406 clock_getres_time64
407 clock_nanosleep_time64
408 timer_gettime64
409 timer_settime64
410 timerfd_gettime64
411 timerfd_settime64
412 utimensat_time64
413 pselect6_time64
414 ppoll_time64
416 io_pgetevents_time64
417 recvmmsg_time64
418 mq_timedsend_time64
419 mq_timedreceiv_time64
420 semtimedop_time64
421 rt_sigtimedwait_time64
422 futex_time64
423 sched_rr_get_interval_time64

Each one of these corresponds directly to an existing system call that
includes a 'struct timespec' argument, or a structure containing a timespec
or (in case of clock_adjtime) timeval. Not included here are new versions
of getitimer/setitimer and getrusage/waitid, which are planned for the
future but only needed to make a consistent API rather than for correct
operation beyond y2038. These four system calls are based on 'timeval', and
it has not been finally decided what the replacement kernel interface will
use instead.

So far, I have done a lot of build testing across most architectures, which
has found a number of bugs. Runtime testing so far included testing LTP on
32-bit ARM with the existing system calls, to ensure we do not regress for
existing binaries, and a test with a 32-bit x86 build of LTP against a
modified version of the musl C library that has been adapted to the new
system call interface [3].  This library can be used for testing on all
architectures supported by musl-1.1.21, but it is not how the support is
getting integrated into the official musl release. Official musl support is
planned but will require more invasive changes to the library.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190110162435.309262-1-arnd@arndb.de/T/
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190118161835.2259170-1-arnd@arndb.de/
Link: https://git.linaro.org/people/arnd/musl-y2038.git/ [2]
2019-02-10 21:24:43 +01:00
Thomas Gleixner
fd659cc095 arch: System call unification and cleanup
The system call tables have diverged a bit over the years, and a number
 of the recent additions never made it into all architectures, for one
 reason or another.
 
 This is an attempt to clean it up as far as we can without breaking
 compatibility, doing a number of steps:
 
 - Add system calls that have not yet been integrated into all
   architectures but that we definitely want there. This includes
   {,f}statfs64() and get{eg,eu,g,p,u,pp}id() on alpha, which have
   been missing traditionally.
 
 - The s390 compat syscall handling is cleaned up to be more like
   what we do on other architectures, while keeping the 31-bit
   pointer extension. This was merged as a shared branch by the
   s390 maintainers and is included here in order to base the other
   patches on top.
 
 - Add the separate ipc syscalls on all architectures that
   traditionally only had sys_ipc(). This version is done without
   support for IPC_OLD that is we have in sys_ipc. The
   new semtimedop_time64 syscall will only be added here, not
   in sys_ipc
 
 - Add syscall numbers for a couple of syscalls that we probably
   don't need everywhere, in particular pkey_* and rseq,
   for the purpose of symmetry: if it's in asm-generic/unistd.h,
   it makes sense to have it everywhere. I expect that any future
   system calls will get assigned on all platforms together, even
   when they appear to be specific to a single architecture.
 
 - Prepare for having the same system call numbers for any future
   calls. In combination with the generated tables, this hopefully
   makes it easier to add new calls across all architectures
   together.
 
 All of the above are technically separate from the y2038 work,
 but are done as preparation before we add the new 64-bit time_t
 system calls everywhere, providing a common baseline set of system
 calls.
 
 I expect that glibc and other libraries that want to use 64-bit
 time_t will require linux-5.1 kernel headers for building in
 the future, and at a much later point may also require linux-5.1
 or a later version as the minimum kernel at runtime. Having a
 common baseline then allows the removal of many architecture or
 kernel version specific workarounds.
 
 Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
 Version: GnuPG v2
 
 iQIcBAABCAAGBQJcXf6XAAoJEGCrR//JCVInIm4P/AlkMmQRa/B2ziWMW6PifPoI
 v18r44017rA1BPENyZvumJUdM5mDvNofOW8F2DYQ7Uiys2YtXenwe/Cf8LHn2n6c
 TMXGQryQpvNmfDCyU+0UjF8m2+poFMrL4aRTXtjODh1YTsPNgeDC+KFMCAAtZmZd
 cVbXFudtbdYKD/pgCX4SI1CWAMBiXe2e+ukPdJVr+iqusCMTApf+GOuyvDBZY9s/
 vURb+tIS87HZ/jehWfZFSuZt+Gu7b3ijUXNC8v9qSIxNYekw62vBNl6F09HE79uB
 Bv4OujAODqKvI9gGyydBzLJNzaMo0ryQdusyqcJHT7MY/8s+FwcYAXyTlQ3DbbB4
 2u/c+58OwJ9Zk12p4LXZRA47U+vRhQt2rO4+zZWs2txNNJY89ZvCm/Z04KOiu5Xz
 1Nnj607KGzthYRs2gs68AwzGGyf0uykIQ3RcaJLIBlX1Nd8BWO0ZgAguCvkXbQMX
 XNXJTd92HmeuKKpiO0n/M4/mCeP0cafBRPCZbKlHyTl0Jeqd/HBQEO9Z8Ifwyju3
 mXz9JCR9VlPCkX605keATbjtPGZf3XQtaXlQnezitDudXk8RJ33EpPcbhx76wX7M
 Rux37ByqEOzk4wMGX9YQyNU7z7xuVg4sJAa2LlJqYeKXHtym+u3gG7SGP5AsYjmk
 6mg2+9O2yZuLhQtOtrwm
 =s4wf
 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

Merge tag 'y2038-syscall-cleanup' of git://git.kernel.org:/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/arnd/playground into timers/2038

Pull preparatory work for y2038 changes from Arnd Bergmann:

System call unification and cleanup

The system call tables have diverged a bit over the years, and a number of
the recent additions never made it into all architectures, for one reason
or another.

This is an attempt to clean it up as far as we can without breaking
compatibility, doing a number of steps:

 - Add system calls that have not yet been integrated into all architectures
   but that we definitely want there. This includes {,f}statfs64() and
   get{eg,eu,g,p,u,pp}id() on alpha, which have been missing traditionally.

 - The s390 compat syscall handling is cleaned up to be more like what we
   do on other architectures, while keeping the 31-bit pointer
   extension. This was merged as a shared branch by the s390 maintainers
   and is included here in order to base the other patches on top.

 - Add the separate ipc syscalls on all architectures that traditionally
   only had sys_ipc(). This version is done without support for IPC_OLD
   that is we have in sys_ipc. The new semtimedop_time64 syscall will only
   be added here, not in sys_ipc

 - Add syscall numbers for a couple of syscalls that we probably don't need
   everywhere, in particular pkey_* and rseq, for the purpose of symmetry:
   if it's in asm-generic/unistd.h, it makes sense to have it everywhere. I
   expect that any future system calls will get assigned on all platforms
   together, even when they appear to be specific to a single architecture.

 - Prepare for having the same system call numbers for any future calls. In
   combination with the generated tables, this hopefully makes it easier to
   add new calls across all architectures together.

All of the above are technically separate from the y2038 work, but are done
as preparation before we add the new 64-bit time_t system calls everywhere,
providing a common baseline set of system calls.

I expect that glibc and other libraries that want to use 64-bit time_t will
require linux-5.1 kernel headers for building in the future, and at a much
later point may also require linux-5.1 or a later version as the minimum
kernel at runtime. Having a common baseline then allows the removal of many
architecture or kernel version specific workarounds.
2019-02-10 20:44:19 +01:00
Arnd Bergmann
48166e6ea4 y2038: add 64-bit time_t syscalls to all 32-bit architectures
This adds 21 new system calls on each ABI that has 32-bit time_t
today. All of these have the exact same semantics as their existing
counterparts, and the new ones all have macro names that end in 'time64'
for clarification.

This gets us to the point of being able to safely use a C library
that has 64-bit time_t in user space. There are still a couple of
loose ends to tie up in various areas of the code, but this is the
big one, and should be entirely uncontroversial at this point.

In particular, there are four system calls (getitimer, setitimer,
waitid, and getrusage) that don't have a 64-bit counterpart yet,
but these can all be safely implemented in the C library by wrapping
around the existing system calls because the 32-bit time_t they
pass only counts elapsed time, not time since the epoch. They
will be dealt with later.

Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Acked-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Acked-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
2019-02-07 00:13:28 +01:00
Arnd Bergmann
d33c577ccc y2038: rename old time and utime syscalls
The time, stime, utime, utimes, and futimesat system calls are only
used on older architectures, and we do not provide y2038 safe variants
of them, as they are replaced by clock_gettime64, clock_settime64,
and utimensat_time64.

However, for consistency it seems better to have the 32-bit architectures
that still use them call the "time32" entry points (leaving the
traditional handlers for the 64-bit architectures), like we do for system
calls that now require two versions.

Note: We used to always define __ARCH_WANT_SYS_TIME and
__ARCH_WANT_SYS_UTIME and only set __ARCH_WANT_COMPAT_SYS_TIME and
__ARCH_WANT_SYS_UTIME32 for compat mode on 64-bit kernels. Now this is
reversed: only 64-bit architectures set __ARCH_WANT_SYS_TIME/UTIME, while
we need __ARCH_WANT_SYS_TIME32/UTIME32 for 32-bit architectures and compat
mode. The resulting asm/unistd.h changes look a bit counterintuitive.

This is only a cleanup patch and it should not change any behavior.

Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Acked-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Acked-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
2019-02-07 00:13:28 +01:00
Arnd Bergmann
00bf25d693 y2038: use time32 syscall names on 32-bit
This is the big flip, where all 32-bit architectures set COMPAT_32BIT_TIME
and use the _time32 system calls from the former compat layer instead
of the system calls that take __kernel_timespec and similar arguments.

The temporary redirects for __kernel_timespec, __kernel_itimerspec
and __kernel_timex can get removed with this.

It would be easy to split this commit by architecture, but with the new
generated system call tables, it's easy enough to do it all at once,
which makes it a little easier to check that the changes are the same
in each table.

Acked-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
2019-02-07 00:13:28 +01:00
Arnd Bergmann
8dabe7245b y2038: syscalls: rename y2038 compat syscalls
A lot of system calls that pass a time_t somewhere have an implementation
using a COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINEx() on 64-bit architectures, and have
been reworked so that this implementation can now be used on 32-bit
architectures as well.

The missing step is to redefine them using the regular SYSCALL_DEFINEx()
to get them out of the compat namespace and make it possible to build them
on 32-bit architectures.

Any system call that ends in 'time' gets a '32' suffix on its name for
that version, while the others get a '_time32' suffix, to distinguish
them from the normal version, which takes a 64-bit time argument in the
future.

In this step, only 64-bit architectures are changed, doing this rename
first lets us avoid touching the 32-bit architectures twice.

Acked-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
2019-02-07 00:13:27 +01:00
Arnd Bergmann
7948450d45 x86/x32: use time64 versions of sigtimedwait and recvmmsg
x32 has always followed the time64 calling conventions of these
syscalls, which required a special hack in compat_get_timespec
aka get_old_timespec32 to continue working.

Since we now have the time64 syscalls, use those explicitly.

Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
2019-02-07 00:13:27 +01:00
Arnd Bergmann
0d6040d468 arch: add split IPC system calls where needed
The IPC system call handling is highly inconsistent across architectures,
some use sys_ipc, some use separate calls, and some use both.  We also
have some architectures that require passing IPC_64 in the flags, and
others that set it implicitly.

For the addition of a y2038 safe semtimedop() system call, I chose to only
support the separate entry points, but that requires first supporting
the regular ones with their own syscall numbers.

The IPC_64 is now implied by the new semctl/shmctl/msgctl system
calls even on the architectures that require passing it with the ipc()
multiplexer.

I'm not adding the new semtimedop() or semop() on 32-bit architectures,
those will get implemented using the new semtimedop_time64() version
that gets added along with the other time64 calls.
Three 64-bit architectures (powerpc, s390 and sparc) get semtimedop().

Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Acked-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Acked-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
2019-01-25 17:22:50 +01:00
Jan Beulich
fc24d75a7f x86/entry/64/compat: Fix stack switching for XEN PV
While in the native case entry into the kernel happens on the trampoline
stack, PV Xen kernels get entered with the current thread stack right
away. Hence source and destination stacks are identical in that case,
and special care is needed.

Other than in sync_regs() the copying done on the INT80 path isn't
NMI / #MC safe, as either of these events occurring in the middle of the
stack copying would clobber data on the (source) stack.

There is similar code in interrupt_entry() and nmi(), but there is no fixup
required because those code paths are unreachable in XEN PV guests.

[ tglx: Sanitized subject, changelog, Fixes tag and stable mail address. Sigh ]

Fixes: 7f2590a110 ("x86/entry/64: Use a per-CPU trampoline stack for IDT entries")
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Acked-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org>
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/5C3E1128020000780020DFAD@prv1-mh.provo.novell.com
2019-01-18 00:39:33 +01:00
Masahiro Yamada
e9666d10a5 jump_label: move 'asm goto' support test to Kconfig
Currently, CONFIG_JUMP_LABEL just means "I _want_ to use jump label".

The jump label is controlled by HAVE_JUMP_LABEL, which is defined
like this:

  #if defined(CC_HAVE_ASM_GOTO) && defined(CONFIG_JUMP_LABEL)
  # define HAVE_JUMP_LABEL
  #endif

We can improve this by testing 'asm goto' support in Kconfig, then
make JUMP_LABEL depend on CC_HAS_ASM_GOTO.

Ugly #ifdef HAVE_JUMP_LABEL will go away, and CONFIG_JUMP_LABEL will
match to the real kernel capability.

Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
Acked-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> (powerpc)
Tested-by: Sedat Dilek <sedat.dilek@gmail.com>
2019-01-06 09:46:51 +09:00
Linus Torvalds
96d4f267e4 Remove 'type' argument from access_ok() function
Nobody has actually used the type (VERIFY_READ vs VERIFY_WRITE) argument
of the user address range verification function since we got rid of the
old racy i386-only code to walk page tables by hand.

It existed because the original 80386 would not honor the write protect
bit when in kernel mode, so you had to do COW by hand before doing any
user access.  But we haven't supported that in a long time, and these
days the 'type' argument is a purely historical artifact.

A discussion about extending 'user_access_begin()' to do the range
checking resulted this patch, because there is no way we're going to
move the old VERIFY_xyz interface to that model.  And it's best done at
the end of the merge window when I've done most of my merges, so let's
just get this done once and for all.

This patch was mostly done with a sed-script, with manual fix-ups for
the cases that weren't of the trivial 'access_ok(VERIFY_xyz' form.

There were a couple of notable cases:

 - csky still had the old "verify_area()" name as an alias.

 - the iter_iov code had magical hardcoded knowledge of the actual
   values of VERIFY_{READ,WRITE} (not that they mattered, since nothing
   really used it)

 - microblaze used the type argument for a debug printout

but other than those oddities this should be a total no-op patch.

I tried to fix up all architectures, did fairly extensive grepping for
access_ok() uses, and the changes are trivial, but I may have missed
something.  Any missed conversion should be trivially fixable, though.

Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-01-03 18:57:57 -08:00
Linus Torvalds
e57d9f638a Merge branch 'x86-mm-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 mm updates from Ingo Molnar:
 "The main changes in this cycle were:

   - Update and clean up x86 fault handling, by Andy Lutomirski.

   - Drop usage of __flush_tlb_all() in kernel_physical_mapping_init()
     and related fallout, by Dan Williams.

   - CPA cleanups and reorganization by Peter Zijlstra: simplify the
     flow and remove a few warts.

   - Other misc cleanups"

* 'x86-mm-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (29 commits)
  x86/mm/dump_pagetables: Use DEFINE_SHOW_ATTRIBUTE()
  x86/mm/cpa: Rename @addrinarray to @numpages
  x86/mm/cpa: Better use CLFLUSHOPT
  x86/mm/cpa: Fold cpa_flush_range() and cpa_flush_array() into a single cpa_flush() function
  x86/mm/cpa: Make cpa_data::numpages invariant
  x86/mm/cpa: Optimize cpa_flush_array() TLB invalidation
  x86/mm/cpa: Simplify the code after making cpa->vaddr invariant
  x86/mm/cpa: Make cpa_data::vaddr invariant
  x86/mm/cpa: Add __cpa_addr() helper
  x86/mm/cpa: Add ARRAY and PAGES_ARRAY selftests
  x86/mm: Drop usage of __flush_tlb_all() in kernel_physical_mapping_init()
  x86/mm: Validate kernel_physical_mapping_init() PTE population
  generic/pgtable: Introduce set_pte_safe()
  generic/pgtable: Introduce {p4d,pgd}_same()
  generic/pgtable: Make {pmd, pud}_same() unconditionally available
  x86/fault: Clean up the page fault oops decoder a bit
  x86/fault: Decode page fault OOPSes better
  x86/vsyscall/64: Use X86_PF constants in the simulated #PF error code
  x86/oops: Show the correct CS value in show_regs()
  x86/fault: Don't try to recover from an implicit supervisor access
  ...
2018-12-26 18:08:18 -08:00
Linus Torvalds
312a466155 Merge branch 'x86-cleanups-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 cleanups from Ingo Molnar:
 "Misc cleanups"

* 'x86-cleanups-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
  x86/kprobes: Remove trampoline_handler() prototype
  x86/kernel: Fix more -Wmissing-prototypes warnings
  x86: Fix various typos in comments
  x86/headers: Fix -Wmissing-prototypes warning
  x86/process: Avoid unnecessary NULL check in get_wchan()
  x86/traps: Complete prototype declarations
  x86/mce: Fix -Wmissing-prototypes warnings
  x86/gart: Rewrite early_gart_iommu_check() comment
2018-12-26 17:03:51 -08:00
Linus Torvalds
38fabca18f Merge branch 'x86-asm-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 asm updates from Ingo Molnar:
 "Two changes:

   - Remove (some) remnants of the vDSO's fake section table mechanism
     that were left behind when the vDSO build process reverted to using
     "objdump -S" to strip the userspace image.

   - Remove hardcoded POPCNT mnemonics now that the minimum binutils
     version supports the symbolic form"

* 'x86-asm-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
  x86/vdso: Remove a stale/misleading comment from the linker script
  x86/vdso: Remove obsolete "fake section table" reservation
  x86: Use POPCNT mnemonics in arch_hweight.h
2018-12-26 16:25:06 -08:00
Linus Torvalds
70ad6368e8 Merge branch 'x86-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 fixes from Ingo Molnar:
 "The biggest part is a series of reverts for the macro based GCC
  inlining workarounds. It caused regressions in distro build and other
  kernel tooling environments, and the GCC project was very receptive to
  fixing the underlying inliner weaknesses - so as time ran out we
  decided to do a reasonably straightforward revert of the patches. The
  plan is to rely on the 'asm inline' GCC 9 feature, which might be
  backported to GCC 8 and could thus become reasonably widely available
  on modern distros.

  Other than those reverts, there's misc fixes from all around the
  place.

  I wish our final x86 pull request for v4.20 was smaller..."

* 'x86-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
  Revert "kbuild/Makefile: Prepare for using macros in inline assembly code to work around asm() related GCC inlining bugs"
  Revert "x86/objtool: Use asm macros to work around GCC inlining bugs"
  Revert "x86/refcount: Work around GCC inlining bug"
  Revert "x86/alternatives: Macrofy lock prefixes to work around GCC inlining bugs"
  Revert "x86/bug: Macrofy the BUG table section handling, to work around GCC inlining bugs"
  Revert "x86/paravirt: Work around GCC inlining bugs when compiling paravirt ops"
  Revert "x86/extable: Macrofy inline assembly code to work around GCC inlining bugs"
  Revert "x86/cpufeature: Macrofy inline assembly code to work around GCC inlining bugs"
  Revert "x86/jump-labels: Macrofy inline assembly code to work around GCC inlining bugs"
  x86/mtrr: Don't copy uninitialized gentry fields back to userspace
  x86/fsgsbase/64: Fix the base write helper functions
  x86/mm/cpa: Fix cpa_flush_array() TLB invalidation
  x86/vdso: Pass --eh-frame-hdr to the linker
  x86/mm: Fix decoy address handling vs 32-bit builds
  x86/intel_rdt: Ensure a CPU remains online for the region's pseudo-locking sequence
  x86/dump_pagetables: Fix LDT remap address marker
  x86/mm: Fix guard hole handling
2018-12-21 09:22:24 -08:00
Ingo Molnar
e769742d35 Revert "x86/jump-labels: Macrofy inline assembly code to work around GCC inlining bugs"
This reverts commit 5bdcd510c2.

The macro based workarounds for GCC's inlining bugs caused regressions: distcc
and other distro build setups broke, and the fixes are not easy nor will they
solve regressions on already existing installations.

So we are reverting this patch and the 8 followup patches.

What makes this revert easier is that GCC9 will likely include the new 'asm inline'
syntax that makes inlining of assembly blocks a lot more robust.

This is a superior method to any macro based hackeries - and might even be
backported to GCC8, which would make all modern distros get the inlining
fixes as well.

Many thanks to Masahiro Yamada and others for helping sort out these problems.

Reported-by: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Richard Biener <rguenther@suse.de>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Segher Boessenkool <segher@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Nadav Amit <namit@vmware.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2018-12-19 11:58:10 +01:00
Ingo Molnar
02117e42db Merge branch 'x86/urgent' into x86/mm, to pick up dependent fix
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2018-12-17 18:48:25 +01:00
Alistair Strachan
cd01544a26 x86/vdso: Pass --eh-frame-hdr to the linker
Commit

  379d98ddf4 ("x86: vdso: Use $LD instead of $CC to link")

accidentally broke unwinding from userspace, because ld would strip the
.eh_frame sections when linking.

Originally, the compiler would implicitly add --eh-frame-hdr when
invoking the linker, but when this Makefile was converted from invoking
ld via the compiler, to invoking it directly (like vmlinux does),
the flag was missed. (The EH_FRAME section is important for the VDSO
shared libraries, but not for vmlinux.)

Fix the problem by explicitly specifying --eh-frame-hdr, which restores
parity with the old method.

See relevant bug reports for additional info:

  https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=201741
  https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1659295

Fixes: 379d98ddf4 ("x86: vdso: Use $LD instead of $CC to link")
Reported-by: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Carlos O'Donell <carlos@redhat.com>
Reported-by: "H. J. Lu" <hjl.tools@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Alistair Strachan <astrachan@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Tested-by: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Carlos O'Donell <carlos@redhat.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Joel Fernandes <joel@joelfernandes.org>
Cc: kernel-team@android.com
Cc: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: X86 ML <x86@kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181214223637.35954-1-astrachan@google.com
2018-12-15 11:37:51 +01:00
Linus Torvalds
8586ca8a21 Merge branch 'x86-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 fixes from Ingo Molnar:
 "Three fixes: a boot parameter re-(re-)fix, a retpoline build artifact
  fix and an LLVM workaround"

* 'x86-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
  x86/vdso: Drop implicit common-page-size linker flag
  x86/build: Fix compiler support check for CONFIG_RETPOLINE
  x86/boot: Clear RSDP address in boot_params for broken loaders
2018-12-09 15:09:55 -08:00
Nick Desaulniers
ac3e233d29 x86/vdso: Drop implicit common-page-size linker flag
GNU linker's -z common-page-size's default value is based on the target
architecture. arch/x86/entry/vdso/Makefile sets it to the architecture
default, which is implicit and redundant. Drop it.

Fixes: 2aae950b21 ("x86_64: Add vDSO for x86-64 with gettimeofday/clock_gettime/getcpu")
Reported-by: Dmitry Golovin <dima@golovin.in>
Reported-by: Bill Wendling <morbo@google.com>
Suggested-by: Dmitry Golovin <dima@golovin.in>
Suggested-by: Rui Ueyama <ruiu@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Acked-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>
Cc: Fangrui Song <maskray@google.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181206191231.192355-1-ndesaulniers@google.com
Link: https://bugs.llvm.org/show_bug.cgi?id=38774
Link: https://github.com/ClangBuiltLinux/linux/issues/31
2018-12-07 18:57:38 +01:00
Andrea Righi
a50480cb6d kprobes/x86: Blacklist non-attachable interrupt functions
These interrupt functions are already non-attachable by kprobes.
Blacklist them explicitly so that they can show up in
/sys/kernel/debug/kprobes/blacklist and tools like BCC can use this
additional information.

Signed-off-by: Andrea Righi <righi.andrea@gmail.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Anil S Keshavamurthy <anil.s.keshavamurthy@intel.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Naveen N. Rao <naveen.n.rao@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181206095648.GA8249@Dell
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2018-12-06 16:52:03 +01:00
Sean Christopherson
29434801e7 x86/vdso: Remove a stale/misleading comment from the linker script
Once upon a time, vdso2c aggressively stripped data from the vDSO
image when generating the final userspace image.  This included
stripping the .altinstructions and .altinstr_replacement sections.
Eventually, the stripping process reverted to "objdump -S" and no
longer removed the aforementioned sections, but the comment remained.

Keeping the .alt* sections at the end of the PT_LOAD segment is no
longer necessary, but there's no harm in doing so and it's a helpful
reminder that they don't need to be included in the final vDSO image,
i.e. someone may want to take another stab at zapping/stripping the
unneeded sections.

Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Acked-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@surriel.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Fixes: da861e18ec ("x86, vdso: Get rid of the fake section mechanism")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181204212600.28090-3-sean.j.christopherson@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2018-12-05 08:58:12 +01:00
Sean Christopherson
24b7c77bbb x86/vdso: Remove obsolete "fake section table" reservation
At one point the vDSO image was manually stripped down by vdso2c in an
attempt to minimize the size of the image mapped into userspace.  Part
of that stripping process involved building a fake section table so as
not to break userspace processes that parse the section table.  Memory
for the fake section table was reserved in the .rodata section so that
vdso2c could simply copy the entire PT_LOAD segment into the userspace
image after building the fake table.

Eventually, the entire fake section table approach was dropped in favor
of stripping the vdso "the old fashioned way", i.e. via objdump -S.
But, the reservation in .rodata for the fake table was left behind.
Remove the reserveration along with a few other related defines and
section entries.

Removing the fake section table placeholder zaps a whopping 0x340 bytes
from the 64-bit vDSO image, which drops the current image's size to
under 4k, i.e. reduces the effective size of the userspace vDSO mapping
by a full page.

Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Acked-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@surriel.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Fixes: da861e18ec ("x86, vdso: Get rid of the fake section mechanism")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181204212600.28090-2-sean.j.christopherson@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2018-12-05 08:58:11 +01:00
Ingo Molnar
a97673a1c4 x86: Fix various typos in comments
Go over arch/x86/ and fix common typos in comments,
and a typo in an actual function argument name.

No change in functionality intended.

Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2018-12-03 10:49:13 +01:00
Andy Lutomirski
af2ebdcf04 x86/vsyscall/64: Use X86_PF constants in the simulated #PF error code
Rather than hardcoding 6 with a comment, use the defined constants.

Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@surriel.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/e023f20352b0d05a8b0205629897917262d2ad68.1542841400.git.luto@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2018-11-22 09:24:27 +01:00
Linus Torvalds
2d6bb6adb7 New gcc plugin: stackleak
- Introduces the stackleak gcc plugin ported from grsecurity by Alexander
   Popov, with x86 and arm64 support.
 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
 Comment: Kees Cook <kees@outflux.net>
 
 iQJKBAABCgA0FiEEpcP2jyKd1g9yPm4TiXL039xtwCYFAlvQvn4WHGtlZXNjb29r
 QGNocm9taXVtLm9yZwAKCRCJcvTf3G3AJpSfD/sErFreuPT1beSw994Lr9Zx4k9v
 ERsuXxWBENaJOJXbOOHMfVEcEeG/1uhPSp7hlw/dpHfh0anATTrcYqm8RNKbfK+k
 o06+JK14OJfpm5Ghq/7OizhdNLCMT8wMU3XZtWfy65VSJGjEFx8Y48vMeQtpWtUK
 ylSzi9JV6j2iUBF9oibtiT53+yqsqAtX80X1G7HRCgv9kxuKMhZr+Q5oGV6+ViyQ
 Azj8mNn06iRnhHKd17WxDJr0GjSibzz4weS/9XgP3t3EcNWJo1EgBlD2KV3tOfP5
 nzmqfqTqrcjxs/tyjdh6vVCSlYucNtyCQGn63qyShQYSg6mZwclR2fY8YSTw6PWw
 GfYWFOWru9z+qyQmwFkQ9bSQS2R+JIT0oBCj9VmtF9XmPCy7K2neJsQclzSPBiCW
 wPgXVQS4IA4684O5CmDOVMwmDpGvhdBNUR6cqSzGLxQOHY1csyXubMNUsqU3g9xk
 Ob4pEy/xrrIw4WpwHcLHSEW5gV1/OLhsT0fGRJJiC947L3cN5s9EZp7FLbIS0zlk
 qzaXUcLmn6AgcfkYwg5cI3RMLaN2V0eDCMVTWZJ1wbrmUV9chAaOnTPTjNqLOTht
 v3b1TTxXG4iCpMmOFf59F8pqgAwbBDlfyNSbySZ/Pq5QH69udz3Z9pIUlYQnSJHk
 u6q++2ReDpJXF81rBw==
 =Ks6B
 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

Merge tag 'stackleak-v4.20-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux

Pull stackleak gcc plugin from Kees Cook:
 "Please pull this new GCC plugin, stackleak, for v4.20-rc1. This plugin
  was ported from grsecurity by Alexander Popov. It provides efficient
  stack content poisoning at syscall exit. This creates a defense
  against at least two classes of flaws:

   - Uninitialized stack usage. (We continue to work on improving the
     compiler to do this in other ways: e.g. unconditional zero init was
     proposed to GCC and Clang, and more plugin work has started too).

   - Stack content exposure. By greatly reducing the lifetime of valid
     stack contents, exposures via either direct read bugs or unknown
     cache side-channels become much more difficult to exploit. This
     complements the existing buddy and heap poisoning options, but
     provides the coverage for stacks.

  The x86 hooks are included in this series (which have been reviewed by
  Ingo, Dave Hansen, and Thomas Gleixner). The arm64 hooks have already
  been merged through the arm64 tree (written by Laura Abbott and
  reviewed by Mark Rutland and Will Deacon).

  With VLAs having been removed this release, there is no need for
  alloca() protection, so it has been removed from the plugin"

* tag 'stackleak-v4.20-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux:
  arm64: Drop unneeded stackleak_check_alloca()
  stackleak: Allow runtime disabling of kernel stack erasing
  doc: self-protection: Add information about STACKLEAK feature
  fs/proc: Show STACKLEAK metrics in the /proc file system
  lkdtm: Add a test for STACKLEAK
  gcc-plugins: Add STACKLEAK plugin for tracking the kernel stack
  x86/entry: Add STACKLEAK erasing the kernel stack at the end of syscalls
2018-11-01 11:46:27 -07:00
Matthew Wilcox
b13fd1dc9f x86: convert vdso to use vm_fault_t
Return vm_fault_t codes directly from the appropriate mm routines instead
of converting from errnos ourselves.  Fixes a minor bug where we'd return
SIGBUS instead of the correct OOM code if we ran out of memory allocating
page tables.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180828145728.11873-5-willy@infradead.org
Signed-off-by: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Nicolas Pitre <nicolas.pitre@linaro.org>
Cc: Souptick Joarder <jrdr.linux@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2018-10-26 16:25:19 -07:00
Linus Torvalds
ba9f6f8954 Merge branch 'siginfo-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace
Pull siginfo updates from Eric Biederman:
 "I have been slowly sorting out siginfo and this is the culmination of
  that work.

  The primary result is in several ways the signal infrastructure has
  been made less error prone. The code has been updated so that manually
  specifying SEND_SIG_FORCED is never necessary. The conversion to the
  new siginfo sending functions is now complete, which makes it
  difficult to send a signal without filling in the proper siginfo
  fields.

  At the tail end of the patchset comes the optimization of decreasing
  the size of struct siginfo in the kernel from 128 bytes to about 48
  bytes on 64bit. The fundamental observation that enables this is by
  definition none of the known ways to use struct siginfo uses the extra
  bytes.

  This comes at the cost of a small user space observable difference.
  For the rare case of siginfo being injected into the kernel only what
  can be copied into kernel_siginfo is delivered to the destination, the
  rest of the bytes are set to 0. For cases where the signal and the
  si_code are known this is safe, because we know those bytes are not
  used. For cases where the signal and si_code combination is unknown
  the bits that won't fit into struct kernel_siginfo are tested to
  verify they are zero, and the send fails if they are not.

  I made an extensive search through userspace code and I could not find
  anything that would break because of the above change. If it turns out
  I did break something it will take just the revert of a single change
  to restore kernel_siginfo to the same size as userspace siginfo.

  Testing did reveal dependencies on preferring the signo passed to
  sigqueueinfo over si->signo, so bit the bullet and added the
  complexity necessary to handle that case.

  Testing also revealed bad things can happen if a negative signal
  number is passed into the system calls. Something no sane application
  will do but something a malicious program or a fuzzer might do. So I
  have fixed the code that performs the bounds checks to ensure negative
  signal numbers are handled"

* 'siginfo-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace: (80 commits)
  signal: Guard against negative signal numbers in copy_siginfo_from_user32
  signal: Guard against negative signal numbers in copy_siginfo_from_user
  signal: In sigqueueinfo prefer sig not si_signo
  signal: Use a smaller struct siginfo in the kernel
  signal: Distinguish between kernel_siginfo and siginfo
  signal: Introduce copy_siginfo_from_user and use it's return value
  signal: Remove the need for __ARCH_SI_PREABLE_SIZE and SI_PAD_SIZE
  signal: Fail sigqueueinfo if si_signo != sig
  signal/sparc: Move EMT_TAGOVF into the generic siginfo.h
  signal/unicore32: Use force_sig_fault where appropriate
  signal/unicore32: Generate siginfo in ucs32_notify_die
  signal/unicore32: Use send_sig_fault where appropriate
  signal/arc: Use force_sig_fault where appropriate
  signal/arc: Push siginfo generation into unhandled_exception
  signal/ia64: Use force_sig_fault where appropriate
  signal/ia64: Use the force_sig(SIGSEGV,...) in ia64_rt_sigreturn
  signal/ia64: Use the generic force_sigsegv in setup_frame
  signal/arm/kvm: Use send_sig_mceerr
  signal/arm: Use send_sig_fault where appropriate
  signal/arm: Use force_sig_fault where appropriate
  ...
2018-10-24 11:22:39 +01:00
Linus Torvalds
034bda1cd5 Merge branch 'x86-vdso-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 vdso updates from Ingo Molnar:
 "Two main changes:

   - Cleanups, simplifications and CLOCK_TAI support (Thomas Gleixner)

   - Improve code generation (Andy Lutomirski)"

* 'x86-vdso-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
  x86/vdso: Rearrange do_hres() to improve code generation
  x86/vdso: Document vgtod_ts better
  x86/vdso: Remove "memory" clobbers in the vDSO syscall fallbacks
  x66/vdso: Add CLOCK_TAI support
  x86/vdso: Move cycle_last handling into the caller
  x86/vdso: Simplify the invalid vclock case
  x86/vdso: Replace the clockid switch case
  x86/vdso: Collapse coarse functions
  x86/vdso: Collapse high resolution functions
  x86/vdso: Introduce and use vgtod_ts
  x86/vdso: Use unsigned int consistently for vsyscall_gtod_data:: Seq
  x86/vdso: Enforce 64bit clocksource
  x86/time: Implement clocksource_arch_init()
  clocksource: Provide clocksource_arch_init()
2018-10-23 19:07:25 +01:00