Andrew Morton reported that __xfrm_lookup generates this warning:
net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c: In function '__xfrm_lookup':
net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c:1449: warning: 'dst' may be used uninitialized in this function
This is because if policy->action is of an unexpected value then dst will
not be initialised. Of course, in practice this should never happen since
the input layer xfrm_user/af_key will filter out all illegal values. But
the compiler doesn't know that of course.
So this patch fixes this by taking the conservative approach and treat all
unknown actions the same as a blocking action.
Thanks to Andrew for finding this and providing an initial fix.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
This patch adds a new field to xfrm states called inner_mode. The existing
mode object is renamed to outer_mode.
This is the first part of an attempt to fix inter-family transforms. As it
is we always use the outer family when determining which mode to use. As a
result we may end up shoving IPv4 packets into netfilter6 and vice versa.
What we really want is to use the inner family for the first part of outbound
processing and the outer family for the second part. For inbound processing
we'd use the opposite pairing.
I've also added a check to prevent silly combinations such as transport mode
with inter-family transforms.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Currently BEET mode does not reinject the packet back into the stack
like tunnel mode does. Since BEET should behave just like tunnel mode
this is incorrect.
This patch fixes this by introducing a flags field to xfrm_mode that
tells the IPsec code whether it should terminate and reinject the packet
back into the stack.
It then sets the flag for BEET and tunnel mode.
I've also added a number of missing BEET checks elsewhere where we check
whether a given mode is a tunnel or not.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
The type and mode maps are only used by SAs, not policies. So it makes
sense to move them from xfrm_policy.c into xfrm_state.c. This also allows
us to mark xfrm_get_type/xfrm_put_type/xfrm_get_mode/xfrm_put_mode as
static.
The only other change I've made in the move is to get rid of the casts
on the request_module call for types. They're unnecessary because C
will promote them to ints anyway.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Constructs of the form
xfrm_state_hold(x);
foo(x);
xfrm_state_put(x);
tend to be broken because foo is either synchronous where this is totally
unnecessary or if foo is asynchronous then the reference count is in the
wrong spot.
In the case of xfrm_secpath_reject, the function is synchronous and therefore
we should just kill the reference count.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
This patch makes loopback_dev per network namespace. Adding
code to create a different loopback device for each network
namespace and adding the code to free a loopback device
when a network namespace exits.
This patch modifies all users the loopback_dev so they
access it as init_net.loopback_dev, keeping all of the
code compiling and working. A later pass will be needed to
update the users to use something other than the initial network
namespace.
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
This patch replaces all occurences to the static variable
loopback_dev to a pointer loopback_dev. That provides the
mindless, trivial, uninteressting change part for the dynamic
allocation for the loopback.
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Lezcano <dlezcano@fr.ibm.com>
Acked-By: Kirill Korotaev <dev@sw.ru>
Acked-by: Benjamin Thery <benjamin.thery@bull.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Every user of the network device notifiers is either a protocol
stack or a pseudo device. If a protocol stack that does not have
support for multiple network namespaces receives an event for a
device that is not in the initial network namespace it quite possibly
can get confused and do the wrong thing.
To avoid problems until all of the protocol stacks are converted
this patch modifies all netdev event handlers to ignore events on
devices that are not in the initial network namespace.
As the rest of the code is made network namespace aware these
checks can be removed.
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
This patch modifies the current ipsec audit layer
by breaking it up into purpose driven audit calls.
So far, the only audit calls made are when add/delete
an SA/policy. It had been discussed to give each
key manager it's own calls to do this, but I found
there to be much redundnacy since they did the exact
same things, except for how they got auid and sid, so I
combined them. The below audit calls can be made by any
key manager. Hopefully, this is ok.
Signed-off-by: Joy Latten <latten@austin.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
This patch cleans up duplicate includes in
net/xfrm/
Signed-off-by: Jesper Juhl <jesper.juhl@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
The security_secid_to_secctx() function returns memory that must be freed
by a call to security_release_secctx() which was not always happening. This
patch fixes two of these problems (all that I could find in the kernel source
at present).
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
This patch modifies the xfrm state selection logic to use the inner
addresses where the outer have been (incorrectly) used. This is
required for beet mode in general and interfamily setups in both
tunnel and beet mode.
Signed-off-by: Joakim Koskela <jookos@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Diego Beltrami <diego.beltrami@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Miika Komu <miika@iki.fi>
Acked-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Slab destructors were no longer supported after Christoph's
c59def9f22 change. They've been
BUGs for both slab and slub, and slob never supported them
either.
This rips out support for the dtor pointer from kmem_cache_create()
completely and fixes up every single callsite in the kernel (there were
about 224, not including the slab allocator definitions themselves,
or the documentation references).
Signed-off-by: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
XFRM expects xfrm_dst->u.next to be same pointer as dst->next, which
was broken by the dst_entry reordering in commit 1e19e02c~, causing
an oops in xfrm_bundle_ok when walking the bundle upwards.
Kill xfrm_dst->u.next and change the only user to use dst->next instead.
Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Currently we check for permission before deleting entries from SAD and
SPD, (see security_xfrm_policy_delete() security_xfrm_state_delete())
However we are not checking for authorization when flushing the SPD and
the SAD completely. It was perhaps missed in the original security hooks
patch.
This patch adds a security check when flushing entries from the SAD and
SPD. It runs the entire database and checks each entry for a denial.
If the process attempting the flush is unable to remove all of the
entries a denial is logged the the flush function returns an error
without removing anything.
This is particularly useful when a process may need to create or delete
its own xfrm entries used for things like labeled networking but that
same process should not be able to delete other entries or flush the
entire database.
Signed-off-by: Joy Latten<latten@austin.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
The current IPSEC rule resolution behavior we have does not work for a
lot of people, even though technically it's an improvement from the
-EAGAIN buisness we had before.
Right now we'll block until the key manager resolves the route. That
works for simple cases, but many folks would rather packets get
silently dropped until the key manager resolves the IPSEC rules.
We can't tell these folks to "set the socket non-blocking" because
they don't have control over the non-block setting of things like the
sockets used to resolve DNS deep inside of the resolver libraries in
libc.
With that in mind I coded up the patch below with some help from
Herbert Xu which provides packet-drop behavior during larval state
resolution, controllable via sysctl and off by default.
This lays the framework to either:
1) Make this default at some point or...
2) Move this logic into xfrm{4,6}_policy.c and implement the
ARP-like resolution queue we've all been dreaming of.
The idea would be to queue packets to the policy, then
once the larval state is resolved by the key manager we
re-resolve the route and push the packets out. The
packets would timeout if the rule didn't get resolved
in a certain amount of time.
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
The function xfrm_policy_byid takes a dir argument but finds the policy
using the index instead. We only use the dir argument to update the
policy count for that direction. Since the user can supply any value
for dir, this can corrupt our policy count.
I know this is the problem because a few days ago I was deleting
policies by hand using indicies and accidentally typed in the wrong
direction. It still deleted the policy and at the time I thought
that was cool. In retrospect it isn't such a good idea :)
I decided against letting it delete the policy anyway just in case
we ever remove the connection between indicies and direction.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Aggregate the SPD info TLVs.
Signed-off-by: Jamal Hadi Salim <hadi@cyberus.ca>
Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
On MIPv6 usage, XFRM sub policy is enabled.
When main (IPsec) and sub (MIPv6) policy selectors have the same
address set but different upper layer information (i.e. protocol
number and its ports or type/code), multiple bundle should be created.
However, currently we have issue to use the same bundle created for
the first time with all flows covered by the case.
It is useful for the bundle to have the upper layer information
to be restructured correctly if it does not match with the flow.
1. Bundle was created by two policies
Selector from another policy is added to xfrm_dst.
If the flow does not match the selector, it goes to slow path to
restructure new bundle by single policy.
2. Bundle was created by one policy
Flow cache is added to xfrm_dst as originated one. If the flow does
not match the cache, it goes to slow path to try searching another
policy.
Signed-off-by: Masahide NAKAMURA <nakam@linux-ipv6.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
With this patch you can use iproute2 in user space to efficiently see
how many policies exist in different directions.
Signed-off-by: Jamal Hadi Salim <hadi@cyberus.ca>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Spring cleaning time...
There seems to be a lot of places in the network code that have
extra bogus semicolons after conditionals. Most commonly is a
bogus semicolon after: switch() { }
Signed-off-by: Stephen Hemminger <shemminger@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Where appropriate, convert references to xtime.tv_sec to the
get_seconds() helper function.
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
This patch adds a space between printing of the src and dst ipv6 addresses.
Otherwise, audit or other test tools may fail to process the audit
record properly because they cannot find the dst address.
Signed-off-by: Joy Latten <latten@austin.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
The security hooks to check permissions to remove an xfrm_policy were
actually done after the policy was removed. Since the unlinking and
deletion are done in xfrm_policy_by* functions this moves the hooks
inside those 2 functions. There we have all the information needed to
do the security check and it can be done before the deletion. Since
auditing requires the result of that security check err has to be passed
back and forth from the xfrm_policy_by* functions.
This patch also fixes a bug where a deletion that failed the security
check could cause improper accounting on the xfrm_policy
(xfrm_get_policy didn't have a put on the exit path for the hold taken
by xfrm_policy_by*)
It also fixes the return code when no policy is found in
xfrm_add_pol_expire. In old code (at least back in the 2.6.18 days) err
wasn't used before the return when no policy is found and so the
initialization would cause err to be ENOENT. But since err has since
been used above when we don't get a policy back from the xfrm_policy_by*
function we would always return 0 instead of the intended ENOENT. Also
fixed some white space damage in the same area.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Venkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@trustedcs.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Fix the address family to refer encap_family
when comparing with a kernel generated xfrm_state
Signed-off-by: Kazunori MIYAZAWA <miyazawa@linux-ipv6.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Make sure that this function is called correctly, and
add BUG() checking to ensure the arguments are sane.
Based upon a patch by Joy Latten.
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Extend the XFRM framework so that endpoint address(es) in the XFRM
databases could be dynamically updated according to a request (MIGRATE
message) from user application. Target XFRM policy is first identified
by the selector in the MIGRATE message. Next, the endpoint addresses
of the matching templates and XFRM states are updated according to
the MIGRATE message.
Signed-off-by: Shinta Sugimoto <shinta.sugimoto@ericsson.com>
Signed-off-by: Masahide NAKAMURA <nakam@linux-ipv6.org>
Signed-off-by: YOSHIFUJI Hideaki <yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
The recent hashing introduced an off-by-one bug in policy list insertion.
Instead of adding after the last entry with a lesser or equal priority,
we're adding after the successor of that entry.
This patch fixes this and also adds a warning if we detect a duplicate
entry in the policy list. This should never happen due to this if clause.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Replace all uses of kmem_cache_t with struct kmem_cache.
The patch was generated using the following script:
#!/bin/sh
#
# Replace one string by another in all the kernel sources.
#
set -e
for file in `find * -name "*.c" -o -name "*.h"|xargs grep -l $1`; do
quilt add $file
sed -e "1,\$s/$1/$2/g" $file >/tmp/$$
mv /tmp/$$ $file
quilt refresh
done
The script was run like this
sh replace kmem_cache_t "struct kmem_cache"
Signed-off-by: Christoph Lameter <clameter@sgi.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Disables auditing in ipsec when CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL is
disabled in the kernel.
Also includes a bug fix for xfrm_state.c as a result of
original ipsec audit patch.
Signed-off-by: Joy Latten <latten@austin.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
An audit message occurs when an ipsec SA
or ipsec policy is created/deleted.
Signed-off-by: Joy Latten <latten@austin.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
This change optimizes the dumping of Security policies.
1) Before this change ..
speedopolis:~# time ./ip xf pol
real 0m22.274s
user 0m0.000s
sys 0m22.269s
2) Turn off sub-policies
speedopolis:~# ./ip xf pol
real 0m13.496s
user 0m0.000s
sys 0m13.493s
i suppose the above is to be expected
3) With this change ..
speedopolis:~# time ./ip x policy
real 0m7.901s
user 0m0.008s
sys 0m7.896s
Conflicts:
drivers/infiniband/core/iwcm.c
drivers/net/chelsio/cxgb2.c
drivers/net/wireless/bcm43xx/bcm43xx_main.c
drivers/net/wireless/prism54/islpci_eth.c
drivers/usb/core/hub.h
drivers/usb/input/hid-core.c
net/core/netpoll.c
Fix up merge failures with Linus's head and fix new compilation failures.
Signed-Off-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Miika Komu <miika@iki.fi>
Signed-off-by: Diego Beltrami <Diego.Beltrami@hiit.fi>
Signed-off-by: Kazunori Miyazawa <miyazawa@linux-ipv6.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Fix the selection of an SA for an outgoing packet to be at the same
context as the originating socket/flow. This eliminates the SELinux
policy's ability to use/sendto SAs with contexts other than the socket's.
With this patch applied, the SELinux policy will require one or more of the
following for a socket to be able to communicate with/without SAs:
1. To enable a socket to communicate without using labeled-IPSec SAs:
allow socket_t unlabeled_t:association { sendto recvfrom }
2. To enable a socket to communicate with labeled-IPSec SAs:
allow socket_t self:association { sendto };
allow socket_t peer_sa_t:association { recvfrom };
Signed-off-by: Venkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
This treats the security errors encountered in the case of
socket policy matching, the same as how these are treated in
the case of main/sub policies, which is to return a full lookup
failure.
Signed-off-by: Venkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Currently when an IPSec policy rule doesn't specify a security
context, it is assumed to be "unlabeled" by SELinux, and so
the IPSec policy rule fails to match to a flow that it would
otherwise match to, unless one has explicitly added an SELinux
policy rule allowing the flow to "polmatch" to the "unlabeled"
IPSec policy rules. In the absence of such an explicitly added
SELinux policy rule, the IPSec policy rule fails to match and
so the packet(s) flow in clear text without the otherwise applicable
xfrm(s) applied.
The above SELinux behavior violates the SELinux security notion of
"deny by default" which should actually translate to "encrypt by
default" in the above case.
This was first reported by Evgeniy Polyakov and the way James Morris
was seeing the problem was when connecting via IPsec to a
confined service on an SELinux box (vsftpd), which did not have the
appropriate SELinux policy permissions to send packets via IPsec.
With this patch applied, SELinux "polmatching" of flows Vs. IPSec
policy rules will only come into play when there's a explicit context
specified for the IPSec policy rule (which also means there's corresponding
SELinux policy allowing appropriate domains/flows to polmatch to this context).
Secondly, when a security module is loaded (in this case, SELinux), the
security_xfrm_policy_lookup() hook can return errors other than access denied,
such as -EINVAL. We were not handling that correctly, and in fact
inverting the return logic and propagating a false "ok" back up to
xfrm_lookup(), which then allowed packets to pass as if they were not
associated with an xfrm policy.
The solution for this is to first ensure that errno values are
correctly propagated all the way back up through the various call chains
from security_xfrm_policy_lookup(), and handled correctly.
Then, flow_cache_lookup() is modified, so that if the policy resolver
fails (typically a permission denied via the security module), the flow
cache entry is killed rather than having a null policy assigned (which
indicates that the packet can pass freely). This also forces any future
lookups for the same flow to consult the security module (e.g. SELinux)
for current security policy (rather than, say, caching the error on the
flow cache entry).
This patch: Fix the selinux side of things.
This makes sure SELinux polmatching of flow contexts to IPSec policy
rules comes into play only when an explicit context is associated
with the IPSec policy rule.
Also, this no longer defaults the context of a socket policy to
the context of the socket since the "no explicit context" case
is now handled properly.
Signed-off-by: Venkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
When a security module is loaded (in this case, SELinux), the
security_xfrm_policy_lookup() hook can return an access denied permission
(or other error). We were not handling that correctly, and in fact
inverting the return logic and propagating a false "ok" back up to
xfrm_lookup(), which then allowed packets to pass as if they were not
associated with an xfrm policy.
The way I was seeing the problem was when connecting via IPsec to a
confined service on an SELinux box (vsftpd), which did not have the
appropriate SELinux policy permissions to send packets via IPsec.
The first SYNACK would be blocked, because of an uncached lookup via
flow_cache_lookup(), which would fail to resolve an xfrm policy because
the SELinux policy is checked at that point via the resolver.
However, retransmitted SYNACKs would then find a cached flow entry when
calling into flow_cache_lookup() with a null xfrm policy, which is
interpreted by xfrm_lookup() as the packet not having any associated
policy and similarly to the first case, allowing it to pass without
transformation.
The solution presented here is to first ensure that errno values are
correctly propagated all the way back up through the various call chains
from security_xfrm_policy_lookup(), and handled correctly.
Then, flow_cache_lookup() is modified, so that if the policy resolver
fails (typically a permission denied via the security module), the flow
cache entry is killed rather than having a null policy assigned (which
indicates that the packet can pass freely). This also forces any future
lookups for the same flow to consult the security module (e.g. SELinux)
for current security policy (rather than, say, caching the error on the
flow cache entry).
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
When we flush policies, we do a type match so we might not
actually delete all policies matching a certain direction.
So keep track of how many policies we actually kill and
subtract that number from xfrm_policy_count[dir] at the
end.
Based upon a patch by Masahide NAKAMURA.
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Hashing SAs by source address breaks templates with wildcards as tunnel
source since the source address used for hashing/lookup is still 0/0.
Move source address lookup to xfrm_tmpl_resolve_one() so we can use the
real address in the lookup.
Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
It seems that during the MIPv6 respin, some code which was originally
conditionally compiled around CONFIG_XFRM_ADVANCED was accidently left
in after the config option was removed.
This patch removes an extraneous pointer (xerr_idxp) which is no
longer needed.
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Masahide NAKAMURA <nakam@linux-ipv6.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
