In order to be able to add this file to the security book,
we need first to convert it to reST.
While this is not part of any book, mark it as :orphan:, in order
to avoid build warnings.
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+samsung@kernel.org>
- A fair pile of RST conversions, many from Mauro. These create more
than the usual number of simple but annoying merge conflicts with other
trees, unfortunately. He has a lot more of these waiting on the wings
that, I think, will go to you directly later on.
- A new document on how to use merges and rebases in kernel repos, and one
on Spectre vulnerabilities.
- Various improvements to the build system, including automatic markup of
function() references because some people, for reasons I will never
understand, were of the opinion that :c:func:``function()`` is
unattractive and not fun to type.
- We now recommend using sphinx 1.7, but still support back to 1.4.
- Lots of smaller improvements, warning fixes, typo fixes, etc.
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Merge tag 'docs-5.3' of git://git.lwn.net/linux
Pull Documentation updates from Jonathan Corbet:
"It's been a relatively busy cycle for docs:
- A fair pile of RST conversions, many from Mauro. These create more
than the usual number of simple but annoying merge conflicts with
other trees, unfortunately. He has a lot more of these waiting on
the wings that, I think, will go to you directly later on.
- A new document on how to use merges and rebases in kernel repos,
and one on Spectre vulnerabilities.
- Various improvements to the build system, including automatic
markup of function() references because some people, for reasons I
will never understand, were of the opinion that
:c:func:``function()`` is unattractive and not fun to type.
- We now recommend using sphinx 1.7, but still support back to 1.4.
- Lots of smaller improvements, warning fixes, typo fixes, etc"
* tag 'docs-5.3' of git://git.lwn.net/linux: (129 commits)
docs: automarkup.py: ignore exceptions when seeking for xrefs
docs: Move binderfs to admin-guide
Disable Sphinx SmartyPants in HTML output
doc: RCU callback locks need only _bh, not necessarily _irq
docs: format kernel-parameters -- as code
Doc : doc-guide : Fix a typo
platform: x86: get rid of a non-existent document
Add the RCU docs to the core-api manual
Documentation: RCU: Add TOC tree hooks
Documentation: RCU: Rename txt files to rst
Documentation: RCU: Convert RCU UP systems to reST
Documentation: RCU: Convert RCU linked list to reST
Documentation: RCU: Convert RCU basic concepts to reST
docs: filesystems: Remove uneeded .rst extension on toctables
scripts/sphinx-pre-install: fix out-of-tree build
docs: zh_CN: submitting-drivers.rst: Remove a duplicated Documentation/
Documentation: PGP: update for newer HW devices
Documentation: Add section about CPU vulnerabilities for Spectre
Documentation: platform: Delete x86-laptop-drivers.txt
docs: Note that :c:func: should no longer be used
...
Pull integrity updates from Mimi Zohar:
"Bug fixes, code clean up, and new features:
- IMA policy rules can be defined in terms of LSM labels, making the
IMA policy dependent on LSM policy label changes, in particular LSM
label deletions. The new environment, in which IMA-appraisal is
being used, frequently updates the LSM policy and permits LSM label
deletions.
- Prevent an mmap'ed shared file opened for write from also being
mmap'ed execute. In the long term, making this and other similar
changes at the VFS layer would be preferable.
- The IMA per policy rule template format support is needed for a
couple of new/proposed features (eg. kexec boot command line
measurement, appended signatures, and VFS provided file hashes).
- Other than the "boot-aggregate" record in the IMA measuremeent
list, all other measurements are of file data. Measuring and
storing the kexec boot command line in the IMA measurement list is
the first buffer based measurement included in the measurement
list"
* 'next-integrity' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity:
integrity: Introduce struct evm_xattr
ima: Update MAX_TEMPLATE_NAME_LEN to fit largest reasonable definition
KEXEC: Call ima_kexec_cmdline to measure the boot command line args
IMA: Define a new template field buf
IMA: Define a new hook to measure the kexec boot command line arguments
IMA: support for per policy rule template formats
integrity: Fix __integrity_init_keyring() section mismatch
ima: Use designated initializers for struct ima_event_data
ima: use the lsm policy update notifier
LSM: switch to blocking policy update notifiers
x86/ima: fix the Kconfig dependency for IMA_ARCH_POLICY
ima: Make arch_policy_entry static
ima: prevent a file already mmap'ed write to be mmap'ed execute
x86/ima: check EFI SetupMode too
A buffer(kexec boot command line arguments) measured into IMA
measuremnt list cannot be appraised, without already being
aware of the buffer contents. Since hashes are non-reversible,
raw buffer is needed for validation or regenerating hash for
appraisal/attestation.
Add support to store/read the buffer contents in HEX.
The kexec cmdline hash is stored in the "d-ng" field of the
template data. It can be verified using
sudo cat /sys/kernel/security/integrity/ima/ascii_runtime_measurements |
grep kexec-cmdline | cut -d' ' -f 6 | xxd -r -p | sha256sum
- Add two new fields to ima_event_data to hold the buf and
buf_len
- Add a new template field 'buf' to be used to store/read
the buffer data.
- Updated process_buffer_meaurement to add the buffer to
ima_event_data. process_buffer_measurement added in
"Define a new IMA hook to measure the boot command line
arguments"
- Add a new template policy name ima-buf to represent
'd-ng|n-ng|buf'
Signed-off-by: Prakhar Srivastava <prsriva02@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Replace the uid/gid/perm permissions checking on a key with an ACL to allow
the SETATTR and SEARCH permissions to be split. This will also allow a
greater range of subjects to represented.
============
WHY DO THIS?
============
The problem is that SETATTR and SEARCH cover a slew of actions, not all of
which should be grouped together.
For SETATTR, this includes actions that are about controlling access to a
key:
(1) Changing a key's ownership.
(2) Changing a key's security information.
(3) Setting a keyring's restriction.
And actions that are about managing a key's lifetime:
(4) Setting an expiry time.
(5) Revoking a key.
and (proposed) managing a key as part of a cache:
(6) Invalidating a key.
Managing a key's lifetime doesn't really have anything to do with
controlling access to that key.
Expiry time is awkward since it's more about the lifetime of the content
and so, in some ways goes better with WRITE permission. It can, however,
be set unconditionally by a process with an appropriate authorisation token
for instantiating a key, and can also be set by the key type driver when a
key is instantiated, so lumping it with the access-controlling actions is
probably okay.
As for SEARCH permission, that currently covers:
(1) Finding keys in a keyring tree during a search.
(2) Permitting keyrings to be joined.
(3) Invalidation.
But these don't really belong together either, since these actions really
need to be controlled separately.
Finally, there are number of special cases to do with granting the
administrator special rights to invalidate or clear keys that I would like
to handle with the ACL rather than key flags and special checks.
===============
WHAT IS CHANGED
===============
The SETATTR permission is split to create two new permissions:
(1) SET_SECURITY - which allows the key's owner, group and ACL to be
changed and a restriction to be placed on a keyring.
(2) REVOKE - which allows a key to be revoked.
The SEARCH permission is split to create:
(1) SEARCH - which allows a keyring to be search and a key to be found.
(2) JOIN - which allows a keyring to be joined as a session keyring.
(3) INVAL - which allows a key to be invalidated.
The WRITE permission is also split to create:
(1) WRITE - which allows a key's content to be altered and links to be
added, removed and replaced in a keyring.
(2) CLEAR - which allows a keyring to be cleared completely. This is
split out to make it possible to give just this to an administrator.
(3) REVOKE - see above.
Keys acquire ACLs which consist of a series of ACEs, and all that apply are
unioned together. An ACE specifies a subject, such as:
(*) Possessor - permitted to anyone who 'possesses' a key
(*) Owner - permitted to the key owner
(*) Group - permitted to the key group
(*) Everyone - permitted to everyone
Note that 'Other' has been replaced with 'Everyone' on the assumption that
you wouldn't grant a permit to 'Other' that you wouldn't also grant to
everyone else.
Further subjects may be made available by later patches.
The ACE also specifies a permissions mask. The set of permissions is now:
VIEW Can view the key metadata
READ Can read the key content
WRITE Can update/modify the key content
SEARCH Can find the key by searching/requesting
LINK Can make a link to the key
SET_SECURITY Can change owner, ACL, expiry
INVAL Can invalidate
REVOKE Can revoke
JOIN Can join this keyring
CLEAR Can clear this keyring
The KEYCTL_SETPERM function is then deprecated.
The KEYCTL_SET_TIMEOUT function then is permitted if SET_SECURITY is set,
or if the caller has a valid instantiation auth token.
The KEYCTL_INVALIDATE function then requires INVAL.
The KEYCTL_REVOKE function then requires REVOKE.
The KEYCTL_JOIN_SESSION_KEYRING function then requires JOIN to join an
existing keyring.
The JOIN permission is enabled by default for session keyrings and manually
created keyrings only.
======================
BACKWARD COMPATIBILITY
======================
To maintain backward compatibility, KEYCTL_SETPERM will translate the
permissions mask it is given into a new ACL for a key - unless
KEYCTL_SET_ACL has been called on that key, in which case an error will be
returned.
It will convert possessor, owner, group and other permissions into separate
ACEs, if each portion of the mask is non-zero.
SETATTR permission turns on all of INVAL, REVOKE and SET_SECURITY. WRITE
permission turns on WRITE, REVOKE and, if a keyring, CLEAR. JOIN is turned
on if a keyring is being altered.
The KEYCTL_DESCRIBE function translates the ACL back into a permissions
mask to return depending on possessor, owner, group and everyone ACEs.
It will make the following mappings:
(1) INVAL, JOIN -> SEARCH
(2) SET_SECURITY -> SETATTR
(3) REVOKE -> WRITE if SETATTR isn't already set
(4) CLEAR -> WRITE
Note that the value subsequently returned by KEYCTL_DESCRIBE may not match
the value set with KEYCTL_SETATTR.
=======
TESTING
=======
This passes the keyutils testsuite for all but a couple of tests:
(1) tests/keyctl/dh_compute/badargs: The first wrong-key-type test now
returns EOPNOTSUPP rather than ENOKEY as READ permission isn't removed
if the type doesn't have ->read(). You still can't actually read the
key.
(2) tests/keyctl/permitting/valid: The view-other-permissions test doesn't
work as Other has been replaced with Everyone in the ACL.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Add a 'recurse' flag for keyring searches so that the flag can be omitted
and recursion disabled, thereby allowing just the nominated keyring to be
searched and none of the children.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
If a filesystem uses keys to hold authentication tokens, then it needs a
token for each VFS operation that might perform an authentication check -
either by passing it to the server, or using to perform a check based on
authentication data cached locally.
For open files this isn't a problem, since the key should be cached in the
file struct since it represents the subject performing operations on that
file descriptor.
During pathwalk, however, there isn't anywhere to cache the key, except
perhaps in the nameidata struct - but that isn't exposed to the
filesystems. Further, a pathwalk can incur a lot of operations, calling
one or more of the following, for instance:
->lookup()
->permission()
->d_revalidate()
->d_automount()
->get_acl()
->getxattr()
on each dentry/inode it encounters - and each one may need to call
request_key(). And then, at the end of pathwalk, it will call the actual
operation:
->mkdir()
->mknod()
->getattr()
->open()
...
which may need to go and get the token again.
However, it is very likely that all of the operations on a single
dentry/inode - and quite possibly a sequence of them - will all want to use
the same authentication token, which suggests that caching it would be a
good idea.
To this end:
(1) Make it so that a positive result of request_key() and co. that didn't
require upcalling to userspace is cached temporarily in task_struct.
(2) The cache is 1 deep, so a new result displaces the old one.
(3) The key is released by exit and by notify-resume.
(4) The cache is cleared in a newly forked process.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Provide a request_key_rcu() function that can be used to request a key
under RCU conditions. It can only search and check permissions; it cannot
allocate a new key, upcall or wait for an upcall to complete. It may
return a partially constructed key.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Move the RCU locks outwards from the keyring search functions so that it
will become possible to provide an RCU-capable partial request_key()
function in a later commit.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
The request_key() syscall allows a process to gain access to the 'possessor'
permits of any key that grants it Search permission by virtue of request_key()
not checking whether a key it finds grants Link permission to the caller.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Multi-line literal markups only work when they're idented at the
same level, with is not the case here:
Documentation/security/keys/core.rst:1597: WARNING: Inline literal start-string without end-string.
Documentation/security/keys/core.rst:1597: WARNING: Inline emphasis start-string without end-string.
Documentation/security/keys/core.rst:1597: WARNING: Inline emphasis start-string without end-string.
Documentation/security/keys/core.rst:1598: WARNING: Inline emphasis start-string without end-string.
Documentation/security/keys/core.rst:1598: WARNING: Inline emphasis start-string without end-string.
Documentation/security/keys/core.rst:1600: WARNING: Inline literal start-string without end-string.
Documentation/security/keys/core.rst:1600: WARNING: Inline emphasis start-string without end-string.
Documentation/security/keys/core.rst:1600: WARNING: Inline emphasis start-string without end-string.
Documentation/security/keys/core.rst:1600: WARNING: Inline emphasis start-string without end-string.
Documentation/security/keys/core.rst:1600: WARNING: Inline emphasis start-string without end-string.
Documentation/security/keys/core.rst:1666: WARNING: Inline literal start-string without end-string.
Documentation/security/keys/core.rst:1666: WARNING: Inline emphasis start-string without end-string.
Documentation/security/keys/core.rst:1666: WARNING: Inline emphasis start-string without end-string.
Documentation/security/keys/core.rst:1666: WARNING: Inline emphasis start-string without end-string.
Fix it by using a code-block instead.
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+samsung@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
The code-block tag is at the wrong place, causing those
warnings:
Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst:112: WARNING: Literal block expected; none found.
Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst:121: WARNING: Unexpected indentation.
Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst:122: WARNING: Block quote ends without a blank line; unexpected unindent.
Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst:123: WARNING: Block quote ends without a blank line; unexpected unindent.
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+samsung@kernel.org>
Acked-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
Acked-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Add a keyctl to atomically move a link to a key from one keyring to
another. The key must exist in "from" keyring and a flag can be given to
cause the operation to fail if there's a matching key already in the "to"
keyring.
This can be done with:
keyctl(KEYCTL_MOVE,
key_serial_t key,
key_serial_t from_keyring,
key_serial_t to_keyring,
unsigned int flags);
The key being moved must grant Link permission and both keyrings must grant
Write permission.
flags should be 0 or KEYCTL_MOVE_EXCL, with the latter preventing
displacement of a matching key from the "to" keyring.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
There is a lot of kern-doc for the LSM internals, but it wasn't visible
in the HTML output. This exposes some formatting flaws in lsm_hooks.h
that will be fixed in a later series of patches.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
The SCTP sections were ending up at the top-level table of contents
under the security section when they should have be sections with the
SCTP chapters. In addition to correcting the section and subsection
headings, this merges the SCTP documents into a single file to organize
the chapters more clearly, internally linkifies them, and adds the
missing SPDX header.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Pull integrity updates from James Morris:
"In Linux 4.19, a new LSM hook named security_kernel_load_data was
upstreamed, allowing LSMs and IMA to prevent the kexec_load syscall.
Different signature verification methods exist for verifying the
kexec'ed kernel image. This adds additional support in IMA to prevent
loading unsigned kernel images via the kexec_load syscall,
independently of the IMA policy rules, based on the runtime "secure
boot" flag. An initial IMA kselftest is included.
In addition, this pull request defines a new, separate keyring named
".platform" for storing the preboot/firmware keys needed for verifying
the kexec'ed kernel image's signature and includes the associated IMA
kexec usage of the ".platform" keyring.
(David Howell's and Josh Boyer's patches for reading the
preboot/firmware keys, which were previously posted for a different
use case scenario, are included here)"
* 'next-integrity' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security:
integrity: Remove references to module keyring
ima: Use inode_is_open_for_write
ima: Support platform keyring for kernel appraisal
efi: Allow the "db" UEFI variable to be suppressed
efi: Import certificates from UEFI Secure Boot
efi: Add an EFI signature blob parser
efi: Add EFI signature data types
integrity: Load certs to the platform keyring
integrity: Define a trusted platform keyring
selftests/ima: kexec_load syscall test
ima: don't measure/appraise files on efivarfs
x86/ima: retry detecting secure boot mode
docs: Extend trusted keys documentation for TPM 2.0
x86/ima: define arch_get_ima_policy() for x86
ima: add support for arch specific policies
ima: refactor ima_init_policy()
ima: prevent kexec_load syscall based on runtime secureboot flag
x86/ima: define arch_ima_get_secureboot
integrity: support new struct public_key_signature encoding field
document on perf security, more Italian translations, more
improvements to the memory-management docs, improvements to the
pathname lookup documentation, and the usual array of smaller
fixes.
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Merge tag 'docs-5.0' of git://git.lwn.net/linux
Pull documentation update from Jonathan Corbet:
"A fairly normal cycle for documentation stuff. We have a new document
on perf security, more Italian translations, more improvements to the
memory-management docs, improvements to the pathname lookup
documentation, and the usual array of smaller fixes.
As is often the case, there are a few reaches outside of
Documentation/ to adjust kerneldoc comments"
* tag 'docs-5.0' of git://git.lwn.net/linux: (38 commits)
docs: improve pathname-lookup document structure
configfs: fix wrong name of struct in documentation
docs/mm-api: link slab_common.c to "The Slab Cache" section
slab: make kmem_cache_create{_usercopy} description proper kernel-doc
doc:process: add links where missing
docs/core-api: make mm-api.rst more structured
x86, boot: documentation whitespace fixup
Documentation: devres: note checking needs when converting
doc🇮🇹 add some process/* translations
doc🇮🇹 fixes in process/1.Intro
Documentation: convert path-lookup from markdown to resturctured text
Documentation/admin-guide: update admin-guide index.rst
Documentation/admin-guide: introduce perf-security.rst file
scripts/kernel-doc: Fix struct and struct field attribute processing
Documentation: dev-tools: Fix typos in index.rst
Correct gen_init_cpio tool's documentation
Document /proc/pid PID reuse behavior
Documentation: update path-lookup.md for parallel lookups
Documentation: Use "while" instead of "whilst"
dmaengine: Add mailing list address to the documentation
...
Adding nvdimm key format type to encrypted keys in order to limit the size
of the key to 32bytes.
Signed-off-by: Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Extend the documentation for trusted keys with documentation for how to
set up a key for a TPM 2.0 so it can be used with a TPM 2.0 as well.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com>
Acked-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Acked-by: Jerry Snitselaar <jsnitsel@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Whilst making an unrelated change to some Documentation, Linus sayeth:
| Afaik, even in Britain, "whilst" is unusual and considered more
| formal, and "while" is the common word.
|
| [...]
|
| Can we just admit that we work with computers, and we don't need to
| use þe eald Englisc spelling of words that most of the world never
| uses?
dictionary.com refers to the word as "Chiefly British", which is
probably an undesirable attribute for technical documentation.
Replace all occurrences under Documentation/ with "while".
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Liam Girdwood <lgirdwood@gmail.com>
Cc: Chris Wilson <chris@chris-wilson.co.uk>
Cc: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@google.com>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Reported-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Pull keys updates from James Morris:
"Provide five new operations in the key_type struct that can be used to
provide access to asymmetric key operations. These will be implemented
for the asymmetric key type in a later patch and may refer to a key
retained in RAM by the kernel or a key retained in crypto hardware.
int (*asym_query)(const struct kernel_pkey_params *params,
struct kernel_pkey_query *info);
int (*asym_eds_op)(struct kernel_pkey_params *params,
const void *in, void *out);
int (*asym_verify_signature)(struct kernel_pkey_params *params,
const void *in, const void *in2);
Since encrypt, decrypt and sign are identical in their interfaces,
they're rolled together in the asym_eds_op() operation and there's an
operation ID in the params argument to distinguish them.
Verify is different in that we supply the data and the signature
instead and get an error value (or 0) as the only result on the
expectation that this may well be how a hardware crypto device may
work"
* 'next-keys2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (22 commits)
KEYS: asym_tpm: Add support for the sign operation [ver #2]
KEYS: asym_tpm: Implement tpm_sign [ver #2]
KEYS: asym_tpm: Implement signature verification [ver #2]
KEYS: asym_tpm: Implement the decrypt operation [ver #2]
KEYS: asym_tpm: Implement tpm_unbind [ver #2]
KEYS: asym_tpm: Add loadkey2 and flushspecific [ver #2]
KEYS: Move trusted.h to include/keys [ver #2]
KEYS: trusted: Expose common functionality [ver #2]
KEYS: asym_tpm: Implement encryption operation [ver #2]
KEYS: asym_tpm: Implement pkey_query [ver #2]
KEYS: Add parser for TPM-based keys [ver #2]
KEYS: asym_tpm: extract key size & public key [ver #2]
KEYS: asym_tpm: add skeleton for asym_tpm [ver #2]
crypto: rsa-pkcs1pad: Allow hash to be optional [ver #2]
KEYS: Implement PKCS#8 RSA Private Key parser [ver #2]
KEYS: Implement encrypt, decrypt and sign for software asymmetric key [ver #2]
KEYS: Allow the public_key struct to hold a private key [ver #2]
KEYS: Provide software public key query function [ver #2]
KEYS: Make the X.509 and PKCS7 parsers supply the sig encoding type [ver #2]
KEYS: Provide missing asymmetric key subops for new key type ops [ver #2]
...
- Introduces the stackleak gcc plugin ported from grsecurity by Alexander
Popov, with x86 and arm64 support.
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Merge tag 'stackleak-v4.20-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux
Pull stackleak gcc plugin from Kees Cook:
"Please pull this new GCC plugin, stackleak, for v4.20-rc1. This plugin
was ported from grsecurity by Alexander Popov. It provides efficient
stack content poisoning at syscall exit. This creates a defense
against at least two classes of flaws:
- Uninitialized stack usage. (We continue to work on improving the
compiler to do this in other ways: e.g. unconditional zero init was
proposed to GCC and Clang, and more plugin work has started too).
- Stack content exposure. By greatly reducing the lifetime of valid
stack contents, exposures via either direct read bugs or unknown
cache side-channels become much more difficult to exploit. This
complements the existing buddy and heap poisoning options, but
provides the coverage for stacks.
The x86 hooks are included in this series (which have been reviewed by
Ingo, Dave Hansen, and Thomas Gleixner). The arm64 hooks have already
been merged through the arm64 tree (written by Laura Abbott and
reviewed by Mark Rutland and Will Deacon).
With VLAs having been removed this release, there is no need for
alloca() protection, so it has been removed from the plugin"
* tag 'stackleak-v4.20-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux:
arm64: Drop unneeded stackleak_check_alloca()
stackleak: Allow runtime disabling of kernel stack erasing
doc: self-protection: Add information about STACKLEAK feature
fs/proc: Show STACKLEAK metrics in the /proc file system
lkdtm: Add a test for STACKLEAK
gcc-plugins: Add STACKLEAK plugin for tracking the kernel stack
x86/entry: Add STACKLEAK erasing the kernel stack at the end of syscalls
Provide five keyctl functions that permit userspace to make use of the new
key type ops for accessing and driving asymmetric keys.
(*) Query an asymmetric key.
long keyctl(KEYCTL_PKEY_QUERY,
key_serial_t key, unsigned long reserved,
struct keyctl_pkey_query *info);
Get information about an asymmetric key. The information is returned
in the keyctl_pkey_query struct:
__u32 supported_ops;
A bit mask of flags indicating which ops are supported. This is
constructed from a bitwise-OR of:
KEYCTL_SUPPORTS_{ENCRYPT,DECRYPT,SIGN,VERIFY}
__u32 key_size;
The size in bits of the key.
__u16 max_data_size;
__u16 max_sig_size;
__u16 max_enc_size;
__u16 max_dec_size;
The maximum sizes in bytes of a blob of data to be signed, a signature
blob, a blob to be encrypted and a blob to be decrypted.
reserved must be set to 0. This is intended for future use to hand
over one or more passphrases needed unlock a key.
If successful, 0 is returned. If the key is not an asymmetric key,
EOPNOTSUPP is returned.
(*) Encrypt, decrypt, sign or verify a blob using an asymmetric key.
long keyctl(KEYCTL_PKEY_ENCRYPT,
const struct keyctl_pkey_params *params,
const char *info,
const void *in,
void *out);
long keyctl(KEYCTL_PKEY_DECRYPT,
const struct keyctl_pkey_params *params,
const char *info,
const void *in,
void *out);
long keyctl(KEYCTL_PKEY_SIGN,
const struct keyctl_pkey_params *params,
const char *info,
const void *in,
void *out);
long keyctl(KEYCTL_PKEY_VERIFY,
const struct keyctl_pkey_params *params,
const char *info,
const void *in,
const void *in2);
Use an asymmetric key to perform a public-key cryptographic operation
a blob of data.
The parameter block pointed to by params contains a number of integer
values:
__s32 key_id;
__u32 in_len;
__u32 out_len;
__u32 in2_len;
For a given operation, the in and out buffers are used as follows:
Operation ID in,in_len out,out_len in2,in2_len
======================= =============== =============== ===========
KEYCTL_PKEY_ENCRYPT Raw data Encrypted data -
KEYCTL_PKEY_DECRYPT Encrypted data Raw data -
KEYCTL_PKEY_SIGN Raw data Signature -
KEYCTL_PKEY_VERIFY Raw data - Signature
info is a string of key=value pairs that supply supplementary
information.
The __spare space in the parameter block must be set to 0. This is
intended, amongst other things, to allow the passing of passphrases
required to unlock a key.
If successful, encrypt, decrypt and sign all return the amount of data
written into the output buffer. Verification returns 0 on success.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Reviewed-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Reviewed-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
Provide five new operations in the key_type struct that can be used to
provide access to asymmetric key operations. These will be implemented for
the asymmetric key type in a later patch and may refer to a key retained in
RAM by the kernel or a key retained in crypto hardware.
int (*asym_query)(const struct kernel_pkey_params *params,
struct kernel_pkey_query *info);
int (*asym_eds_op)(struct kernel_pkey_params *params,
const void *in, void *out);
int (*asym_verify_signature)(struct kernel_pkey_params *params,
const void *in, const void *in2);
Since encrypt, decrypt and sign are identical in their interfaces, they're
rolled together in the asym_eds_op() operation and there's an operation ID
in the params argument to distinguish them.
Verify is different in that we supply the data and the signature instead
and get an error value (or 0) as the only result on the expectation that
this may well be how a hardware crypto device may work.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Reviewed-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Reviewed-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
readability improvements for the formatted output, some LICENSES updates
including the addition of the ISC license, the removal of the unloved and
unmaintained 00-INDEX files, the deprecated APIs document from Kees, more
MM docs from Mike Rapoport, and the usual pile of typo fixes and
corrections.
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Merge tag 'docs-4.20' of git://git.lwn.net/linux
Pull documentation updates from Jonathan Corbet:
"This is a fairly typical cycle for documentation. There's some welcome
readability improvements for the formatted output, some LICENSES
updates including the addition of the ISC license, the removal of the
unloved and unmaintained 00-INDEX files, the deprecated APIs document
from Kees, more MM docs from Mike Rapoport, and the usual pile of typo
fixes and corrections"
* tag 'docs-4.20' of git://git.lwn.net/linux: (41 commits)
docs: Fix typos in histogram.rst
docs: Introduce deprecated APIs list
kernel-doc: fix declaration type determination
doc: fix a typo in adding-syscalls.rst
docs/admin-guide: memory-hotplug: remove table of contents
doc: printk-formats: Remove bogus kobject references for device nodes
Documentation: preempt-locking: Use better example
dm flakey: Document "error_writes" feature
docs/completion.txt: Fix a couple of punctuation nits
LICENSES: Add ISC license text
LICENSES: Add note to CDDL-1.0 license that it should not be used
docs/core-api: memory-hotplug: add some details about locking internals
docs/core-api: rename memory-hotplug-notifier to memory-hotplug
docs: improve readability for people with poorer eyesight
yama: clarify ptrace_scope=2 in Yama documentation
docs/vm: split memory hotplug notifier description to Documentation/core-api
docs: move memory hotplug description into admin-guide/mm
doc: Fix acronym "FEKEK" in ecryptfs
docs: fix some broken documentation references
iommu: Fix passthrough option documentation
...
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Fix Documentation location reference for where LSM descriptions should
be placed.
Suggested-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
"FEFEK" was incorrectly used as acronym for "File Encryption Key
Encryption Key". This replaces all occurences with "FEKEK".
Signed-off-by: Felix Eckhofer <felix@eckhofer.com>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Add information about STACKLEAK feature to the "Memory poisoning"
section of self-protection.rst.
Signed-off-by: Alexander Popov <alex.popov@linux.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
The changes to automatically test for working stack protector compiler
support in the Kconfig files removed the special STACKPROTECTOR_AUTO
option that picked the strongest stack protector that the compiler
supported.
That was all a nice cleanup - it makes no sense to have the AUTO case
now that the Kconfig phase can just determine the compiler support
directly.
HOWEVER.
It also meant that doing "make oldconfig" would now _disable_ the strong
stackprotector if you had AUTO enabled, because in a legacy config file,
the sane stack protector configuration would look like
CONFIG_HAVE_CC_STACKPROTECTOR=y
# CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_NONE is not set
# CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_REGULAR is not set
# CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_STRONG is not set
CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_AUTO=y
and when you ran this through "make oldconfig" with the Kbuild changes,
it would ask you about the regular CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR (that had
been renamed from CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_REGULAR to just
CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR), but it would think that the STRONG version
used to be disabled (because it was really enabled by AUTO), and would
disable it in the new config, resulting in:
CONFIG_HAVE_CC_STACKPROTECTOR=y
CONFIG_CC_HAS_STACKPROTECTOR_NONE=y
CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR=y
# CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_STRONG is not set
CONFIG_CC_HAS_SANE_STACKPROTECTOR=y
That's dangerously subtle - people could suddenly find themselves with
the weaker stack protector setup without even realizing.
The solution here is to just rename not just the old RECULAR stack
protector option, but also the strong one. This does that by just
removing the CC_ prefix entirely for the user choices, because it really
is not about the compiler support (the compiler support now instead
automatially impacts _visibility_ of the options to users).
This results in "make oldconfig" actually asking the user for their
choice, so that we don't have any silent subtle security model changes.
The end result would generally look like this:
CONFIG_HAVE_CC_STACKPROTECTOR=y
CONFIG_CC_HAS_STACKPROTECTOR_NONE=y
CONFIG_STACKPROTECTOR=y
CONFIG_STACKPROTECTOR_STRONG=y
CONFIG_CC_HAS_SANE_STACKPROTECTOR=y
where the "CC_" versions really are about internal compiler
infrastructure, not the user selections.
Acked-by: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
A number of new docs were added, but they're currently not on
the index.rst from the session they're supposed to be, causing
Sphinx warnings.
Add them.
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+samsung@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Update SELinux-sctp.rst "SCTP Peer Labeling" section to reflect
how the association permission is validated.
Reported-by: Dominick Grift <dac.override@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Haines <richard_c_haines@btinternet.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
The SELinux SCTP implementation is explained in:
Documentation/security/SELinux-sctp.rst
Signed-off-by: Richard Haines <richard_c_haines@btinternet.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
The SCTP security hooks are explained in:
Documentation/security/LSM-sctp.rst
Signed-off-by: Richard Haines <richard_c_haines@btinternet.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
This patch updates the documentation with the observations that led
to commit bdcf0a423e ("kernel: make groups_sort calling a
responsibility group_info allocators") and the new behaviour required.
Specifically that groups_sort() should be called on a new group_list
before set_groups() or set_current_groups() is called.
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.com>
[jc: use proper :c:func: references]
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Hashing addresses printed with printk specifier %p was implemented
recently. During development a number of issues were raised regarding
leaking kernel addresses to userspace. Other documentation was updated but
security/self-protection missed out.
Add self-protection documentation regarding printing kernel addresses.
Signed-off-by: Tobin C. Harding <me@tobin.cc>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
When keyctl_read() is passed a buffer that is too small, the behavior is
inconsistent. Some key types will fill as much of the buffer as
possible, while others won't copy anything. Moreover, the in-kernel
documentation contradicted the man page on this point.
Update the in-kernel documentation to say that this point is
unspecified.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Sphinx will now generate the table of contents automatically, which
avoids having the ToC getting out of sync with the rest of the document.
Signed-off-by: Josh Holland <anowlcalledjosh@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Several paths in the security/keys documentation were incorrect.
Signed-off-by: Josh Holland <anowlcalledjosh@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Provide more specific examples of keyring restrictions as applied to
X.509 signature chain verification.
Signed-off-by: Mat Martineau <mathew.j.martineau@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
The white space in the big enumerated list was inconsistent, leading to
some strange formatting artifacts.
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Adjusts for ReST markup and moves under keys security devel index.
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
This creates a new section in the security development index for kernel
keys, and adjusts for ReST markup.
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
