Just check for a NULL method instead of wiring up
sock_no_{get,set}sockopt.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Acked-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
The variable err is being initialized with a value that is never read
and it is being updated later with a new value. The initialization is
redundant and can be removed.
Addresses-Coverity: ("Unused value")
Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Now that crypto_rng_reset takes a const argument, we no longer
need to cast away the const qualifier.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Pull crypto update from Herbert Xu:
"Here is the crypto update for 4.1:
New interfaces:
- user-space interface for AEAD
- user-space interface for RNG (i.e., pseudo RNG)
New hashes:
- ARMv8 SHA1/256
- ARMv8 AES
- ARMv8 GHASH
- ARM assembler and NEON SHA256
- MIPS OCTEON SHA1/256/512
- MIPS img-hash SHA1/256 and MD5
- Power 8 VMX AES/CBC/CTR/GHASH
- PPC assembler AES, SHA1/256 and MD5
- Broadcom IPROC RNG driver
Cleanups/fixes:
- prevent internal helper algos from being exposed to user-space
- merge common code from assembly/C SHA implementations
- misc fixes"
* git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6: (169 commits)
crypto: arm - workaround for building with old binutils
crypto: arm/sha256 - avoid sha256 code on ARMv7-M
crypto: x86/sha512_ssse3 - move SHA-384/512 SSSE3 implementation to base layer
crypto: x86/sha256_ssse3 - move SHA-224/256 SSSE3 implementation to base layer
crypto: x86/sha1_ssse3 - move SHA-1 SSSE3 implementation to base layer
crypto: arm64/sha2-ce - move SHA-224/256 ARMv8 implementation to base layer
crypto: arm64/sha1-ce - move SHA-1 ARMv8 implementation to base layer
crypto: arm/sha2-ce - move SHA-224/256 ARMv8 implementation to base layer
crypto: arm/sha256 - move SHA-224/256 ASM/NEON implementation to base layer
crypto: arm/sha1-ce - move SHA-1 ARMv8 implementation to base layer
crypto: arm/sha1_neon - move SHA-1 NEON implementation to base layer
crypto: arm/sha1 - move SHA-1 ARM asm implementation to base layer
crypto: sha512-generic - move to generic glue implementation
crypto: sha256-generic - move to generic glue implementation
crypto: sha1-generic - move to generic glue implementation
crypto: sha512 - implement base layer for SHA-512
crypto: sha256 - implement base layer for SHA-256
crypto: sha1 - implement base layer for SHA-1
crypto: api - remove instance when test failed
crypto: api - Move alg ref count init to crypto_check_alg
...
Due to the change to RNGs to always return zero in success case, the RNG
interface must zeroize the buffer with the length provided by the
caller.
Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
After TIPC doesn't depend on iocb argument in its internal
implementations of sendmsg() and recvmsg() hooks defined in proto
structure, no any user is using iocb argument in them at all now.
Then we can drop the redundant iocb argument completely from kinds of
implementations of both sendmsg() and recvmsg() in the entire
networking stack.
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Suggested-by: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Ying Xue <ying.xue@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Fixes the following sparse warnings:
crypto/algif_rng.c:185:13: warning:
symbol 'rng_exit' was not declared. Should it be static?
Signed-off-by: Wei Yongjun <yongjun_wei@trendmicro.com.cn>
Acked-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
This patch adds the random number generator support for AF_ALG.
A random number generator's purpose is to generate data without
requiring the caller to provide any data. Therefore, the AF_ALG
interface handler for RNGs only implements a callback handler for
recvmsg.
The following parameters provided with a recvmsg are processed by the
RNG callback handler:
* sock - to resolve the RNG context data structure accessing the
RNG instance private to the socket
* len - this parameter allows userspace callers to specify how
many random bytes the RNG shall produce and return. As the
kernel context for the RNG allocates a buffer of 128 bytes to
store random numbers before copying them to userspace, the len
parameter is checked that it is not larger than 128. If a
caller wants more random numbers, a new request for recvmsg
shall be made.
The size of 128 bytes is chose because of the following considerations:
* to increase the memory footprint of the kernel too much (note,
that would be 128 bytes per open socket)
* 128 is divisible by any typical cryptographic block size an
RNG may have
* A request for random numbers typically only shall supply small
amount of data like for keys or IVs that should only require
one invocation of the recvmsg function.
Note, during instantiation of the RNG, the code checks whether the RNG
implementation requires seeding. If so, the RNG is seeded with output
from get_random_bytes.
A fully working example using all aspects of the RNG interface is
provided at http://www.chronox.de/libkcapi.html
Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
