There's no need to use a single scratch buffer and
calculate offsets into it, just use two separate
buffers for the separate variables.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
mac80211 has a defnition of AES_BLOCK_SIZE and
multiple definitions of AES_BLOCK_LEN. Remove
them all and use crypto/aes.h.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
Just like TKIP and CCMP, CMAC has the PN race.
It might not actually be possible to hit it now
since there aren't multiple ACs for management
frames, but fix it anyway.
Also move scratch buffers onto the stack.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
crypto_free_cipher() is a wrapper around crypto_free_tfm() which is a
wrapper around crypto_destroy_tfm() and the latter can handle being passed
a NULL pointer, so checking for NULL in the
ieee80211_aes_key_free()/ieee80211_aes_cmac_key_free() wrappers around
crypto_free_cipher() is pointless and just increase object code size
needlesly and makes us execute extra test/branch instructions that we
don't need.
Btw; don't we have to many wrappers around wrappers ad nauseam here?
Anyway, this patch removes the redundant conditionals.
Signed-off-by: Jesper Juhl <jj@chaosbits.net>
Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
ieee80211_add_key() currently returns -ENOMEM in case of any error,
including a missing crypto algorithm. Change ieee80211_key_alloc()
and ieee80211_aes_{key_setup_encrypt,cmac_key_setup}() to encode
errors with ERR_PTR() rather than returning NULL, and change
ieee80211_add_key() accordingly.
Compile-tested only.
Reported-by: Marcin Owsiany <porridge@debian.org>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Acked-by: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
Implement Broadcast/Multicast Integrity Protocol for management frame
protection. This patch adds the needed definitions for the new
information element (MMIE) and implementation for the new "encryption"
type (though, BIP is actually not encrypting data, it provides only
integrity protection). These routines will be used by a follow-on patch
that enables BIP for multicast/broadcast robust management frames.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Acked-by: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
