__reload_late() is called from stop_machine context and thus cannot
acquire a non-raw spinlock on PREEMPT_RT.
Signed-off-by: Scott Wood <swood@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ashok Raj <ashok.raj@intel.com>
Cc: Clark Williams <williams@redhat.com>
Cc: Pei Zhang <pezhang@redhat.com>
Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180524154420.24455-1-swood@redhat.com
Pull x86 store buffer fixes from Thomas Gleixner:
"Two fixes for the SSBD mitigation code:
- expose SSBD properly to guests. This got broken when the CPU
feature flags got reshuffled.
- simplify the CPU detection logic to avoid duplicate entries in the
tables"
* 'x86-pti-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
x86/speculation: Simplify the CPU bug detection logic
KVM/VMX: Expose SSBD properly to guests
PPC:
- Close a hole which could possibly lead to the host timebase getting
out of sync.
- Three fixes relating to PTEs and TLB entries for radix guests.
- Fix a bug which could lead to an interrupt never getting delivered
to the guest, if it is pending for a guest vCPU when the vCPU gets
offlined.
s390:
- Fix false negatives in VSIE validity check (Cc stable)
x86:
- Fix time drift of VMX preemption timer when a guest uses LAPIC timer
in periodic mode (Cc stable)
- Unconditionally expose CPUID.IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES to allow
migration from hosts that don't need retpoline mitigation (Cc stable)
- Fix guest crashes on reboot by properly coupling CR4.OSXSAVE and
CPUID.OSXSAVE (Cc stable)
- Report correct RIP after Hyper-V hypercall #UD (introduced in -rc6)
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Merge tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm
Pull KVM fixes from Radim Krčmář:
"PPC:
- Close a hole which could possibly lead to the host timebase getting
out of sync.
- Three fixes relating to PTEs and TLB entries for radix guests.
- Fix a bug which could lead to an interrupt never getting delivered
to the guest, if it is pending for a guest vCPU when the vCPU gets
offlined.
s390:
- Fix false negatives in VSIE validity check (Cc stable)
x86:
- Fix time drift of VMX preemption timer when a guest uses LAPIC
timer in periodic mode (Cc stable)
- Unconditionally expose CPUID.IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES to allow
migration from hosts that don't need retpoline mitigation (Cc
stable)
- Fix guest crashes on reboot by properly coupling CR4.OSXSAVE and
CPUID.OSXSAVE (Cc stable)
- Report correct RIP after Hyper-V hypercall #UD (introduced in
-rc6)"
* tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm:
KVM: x86: fix #UD address of failed Hyper-V hypercalls
kvm: x86: IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES is always supported
KVM: x86: Update cpuid properly when CR4.OSXAVE or CR4.PKE is changed
x86/kvm: fix LAPIC timer drift when guest uses periodic mode
KVM: s390: vsie: fix < 8k check for the itdba
KVM: PPC: Book 3S HV: Do ptesync in radix guest exit path
KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: XIVE: Resend re-routed interrupts on CPU priority change
KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Make radix clear pte when unmapping
KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Make radix use correct tlbie sequence in kvmppc_radix_tlbie_page
KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Snapshot timebase offset on guest entry
If the hypercall was called from userspace or real mode, KVM injects #UD
and then advances RIP, so it looks like #UD was caused by the following
instruction. This probably won't cause more than confusion, but could
give an unexpected access to guest OS' instruction emulator.
Also, refactor the code to count hv hypercalls that were handled by the
virt userspace.
Fixes: 6356ee0c96 ("x86: Delay skip of emulated hypercall instruction")
Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
If there is a possibility that a VM may migrate to a Skylake host,
then the hypervisor should report IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES.RSBA[bit 2]
as being set (future work, of course). This implies that
CPUID.(EAX=7,ECX=0):EDX.ARCH_CAPABILITIES[bit 29] should be
set. Therefore, kvm should report this CPUID bit as being supported
whether or not the host supports it. Userspace is still free to clear
the bit if it chooses.
For more information on RSBA, see Intel's white paper, "Retpoline: A
Branch Target Injection Mitigation" (Document Number 337131-001),
currently available at https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=199511.
Since the IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR is emulated in kvm, there is no
dependency on hardware support for this feature.
Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Fixes: 28c1c9fabf ("KVM/VMX: Emulate MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
The CPUID bits of OSXSAVE (function=0x1) and OSPKE (func=0x7, leaf=0x0)
allows user apps to detect if OS has set CR4.OSXSAVE or CR4.PKE. KVM is
supposed to update these CPUID bits when CR4 is updated. Current KVM
code doesn't handle some special cases when updates come from emulator.
Here is one example:
Step 1: guest boots
Step 2: guest OS enables XSAVE ==> CR4.OSXSAVE=1 and CPUID.OSXSAVE=1
Step 3: guest hot reboot ==> QEMU reset CR4 to 0, but CPUID.OSXAVE==1
Step 4: guest os checks CPUID.OSXAVE, detects 1, then executes xgetbv
Step 4 above will cause an #UD and guest crash because guest OS hasn't
turned on OSXAVE yet. This patch solves the problem by comparing the the
old_cr4 with cr4. If the related bits have been changed,
kvm_update_cpuid() needs to be called.
Signed-off-by: Wei Huang <wei@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Bandan Das <bsd@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Since 4.10, commit 8003c9ae20 (KVM: LAPIC: add APIC Timer
periodic/oneshot mode VMX preemption timer support), guests using
periodic LAPIC timers (such as FreeBSD 8.4) would see their timers
drift significantly over time.
Differences in the underlying clocks and numerical errors means the
periods of the two timers (hv and sw) are not the same. This
difference will accumulate with every expiry resulting in a large
error between the hv and sw timer.
This means the sw timer may be running slow when compared to the hv
timer. When the timer is switched from hv to sw, the now active sw
timer will expire late. The guest VCPU is reentered and it switches to
using the hv timer. This timer catches up, injecting multiple IRQs
into the guest (of which the guest only sees one as it does not get to
run until the hv timer has caught up) and thus the guest's timer rate
is low (and becomes increasing slower over time as the sw timer lags
further and further behind).
I believe a similar problem would occur if the hv timer is the slower
one, but I have not observed this.
Fix this by synchronizing the deadlines for both timers to the same
time source on every tick. This prevents the errors from accumulating.
Fixes: 8003c9ae20
Cc: Wanpeng Li <wanpeng.li@hotmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@nutanix.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@tencent.com>
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Only CPUs which speculate can speculate. Therefore, it seems prudent
to test for cpu_no_speculation first and only then determine whether
a specific speculating CPU is susceptible to store bypass speculation.
This is underlined by all CPUs currently listed in cpu_no_speculation
were present in cpu_no_spec_store_bypass as well.
Signed-off-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: bp@suse.de
Cc: konrad.wilk@oracle.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180522090539.GA24668@light.dominikbrodowski.net
The X86_FEATURE_SSBD is an synthetic CPU feature - that is
it bit location has no relevance to the real CPUID 0x7.EBX[31]
bit position. For that we need the new CPU feature name.
Fixes: 52817587e7 ("x86/cpufeatures: Disentangle SSBD enumeration")
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: "Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180521215449.26423-2-konrad.wilk@oracle.com
Merge speculative store buffer bypass fixes from Thomas Gleixner:
- rework of the SPEC_CTRL MSR management to accomodate the new fancy
SSBD (Speculative Store Bypass Disable) bit handling.
- the CPU bug and sysfs infrastructure for the exciting new Speculative
Store Bypass 'feature'.
- support for disabling SSB via LS_CFG MSR on AMD CPUs including
Hyperthread synchronization on ZEN.
- PRCTL support for dynamic runtime control of SSB
- SECCOMP integration to automatically disable SSB for sandboxed
processes with a filter flag for opt-out.
- KVM integration to allow guests fiddling with SSBD including the new
software MSR VIRT_SPEC_CTRL to handle the LS_CFG based oddities on
AMD.
- BPF protection against SSB
.. this is just the core and x86 side, other architecture support will
come separately.
* 'speck-v20' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (49 commits)
bpf: Prevent memory disambiguation attack
x86/bugs: Rename SSBD_NO to SSB_NO
KVM: SVM: Implement VIRT_SPEC_CTRL support for SSBD
x86/speculation, KVM: Implement support for VIRT_SPEC_CTRL/LS_CFG
x86/bugs: Rework spec_ctrl base and mask logic
x86/bugs: Remove x86_spec_ctrl_set()
x86/bugs: Expose x86_spec_ctrl_base directly
x86/bugs: Unify x86_spec_ctrl_{set_guest,restore_host}
x86/speculation: Rework speculative_store_bypass_update()
x86/speculation: Add virtualized speculative store bypass disable support
x86/bugs, KVM: Extend speculation control for VIRT_SPEC_CTRL
x86/speculation: Handle HT correctly on AMD
x86/cpufeatures: Add FEATURE_ZEN
x86/cpufeatures: Disentangle SSBD enumeration
x86/cpufeatures: Disentangle MSR_SPEC_CTRL enumeration from IBRS
x86/speculation: Use synthetic bits for IBRS/IBPB/STIBP
KVM: SVM: Move spec control call after restore of GS
x86/cpu: Make alternative_msr_write work for 32-bit code
x86/bugs: Fix the parameters alignment and missing void
x86/bugs: Make cpu_show_common() static
...
Pull x86 fixes from Thomas Gleixner:
"An unfortunately larger set of fixes, but a large portion is
selftests:
- Fix the missing clusterid initializaiton for x2apic cluster
management which caused boot failures due to IPIs being sent to the
wrong cluster
- Drop TX_COMPAT when a 64bit executable is exec()'ed from a compat
task
- Wrap access to __supported_pte_mask in __startup_64() where clang
compile fails due to a non PC relative access being generated.
- Two fixes for 5 level paging fallout in the decompressor:
- Handle GOT correctly for paging_prepare() and
cleanup_trampoline()
- Fix the page table handling in cleanup_trampoline() to avoid
page table corruption.
- Stop special casing protection key 0 as this is inconsistent with
the manpage and also inconsistent with the allocation map handling.
- Override the protection key wen moving away from PROT_EXEC to
prevent inaccessible memory.
- Fix and update the protection key selftests to address breakage and
to cover the above issue
- Add a MOV SS self test"
[ Part of the x86 fixes were in the earlier core pull due to dependencies ]
* 'x86-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (21 commits)
x86/mm: Drop TS_COMPAT on 64-bit exec() syscall
x86/apic/x2apic: Initialize cluster ID properly
x86/boot/compressed/64: Fix moving page table out of trampoline memory
x86/boot/compressed/64: Set up GOT for paging_prepare() and cleanup_trampoline()
x86/pkeys: Do not special case protection key 0
x86/pkeys/selftests: Add a test for pkey 0
x86/pkeys/selftests: Save off 'prot' for allocations
x86/pkeys/selftests: Fix pointer math
x86/pkeys: Override pkey when moving away from PROT_EXEC
x86/pkeys/selftests: Fix pkey exhaustion test off-by-one
x86/pkeys/selftests: Add PROT_EXEC test
x86/pkeys/selftests: Factor out "instruction page"
x86/pkeys/selftests: Allow faults on unknown keys
x86/pkeys/selftests: Avoid printf-in-signal deadlocks
x86/pkeys/selftests: Remove dead debugging code, fix dprint_in_signal
x86/pkeys/selftests: Stop using assert()
x86/pkeys/selftests: Give better unexpected fault error messages
x86/selftests: Add mov_to_ss test
x86/mpx/selftests: Adjust the self-test to fresh distros that export the MPX ABI
x86/pkeys/selftests: Adjust the self-test to fresh distros that export the pkeys ABI
...
Pull RAS fix from Thomas Gleixner:
"Fix a regression in the new AMD SMCA code which issues an SMP function
call from the early interrupt disabled region of CPU hotplug. To avoid
that, use cached block addresses which can be used directly"
* 'ras-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
x86/MCE/AMD: Cache SMCA MISC block addresses
Pull EFI fixes from Thomas Gleixner:
- Use explicitely sized type for the romimage pointer in the 32bit EFI
protocol struct so a 64bit kernel does not expand it to 64bit. Ditto
for the 64bit struct to avoid the reverse issue on 32bit kernels.
- Handle randomized tex offset correctly in the ARM64 EFI stub to avoid
unaligned data resulting in stack corruption and other hard to
diagnose wreckage.
* 'efi-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
efi/libstub/arm64: Handle randomized TEXT_OFFSET
efi: Avoid potential crashes, fix the 'struct efi_pci_io_protocol_32' definition for mixed mode
Pull core fixes from Thomas Gleixner:
- Unbreak the BPF compilation which got broken by the unconditional
requirement of asm-goto, which is not supported by clang.
- Prevent probing on exception masking instructions in uprobes and
kprobes to avoid the issues of the delayed exceptions instead of
having an ugly workaround.
- Prevent a double free_page() in the error path of do_kexec_load()
- A set of objtool updates addressing various issues mostly related to
switch tables and the noreturn detection for recursive sibling calls
- Header sync for tools.
* 'core-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
objtool: Detect RIP-relative switch table references, part 2
objtool: Detect RIP-relative switch table references
objtool: Support GCC 8 switch tables
objtool: Support GCC 8's cold subfunctions
objtool: Fix "noreturn" detection for recursive sibling calls
objtool, kprobes/x86: Sync the latest <asm/insn.h> header with tools/objtool/arch/x86/include/asm/insn.h
x86/cpufeature: Guard asm_volatile_goto usage for BPF compilation
uprobes/x86: Prohibit probing on MOV SS instruction
kprobes/x86: Prohibit probing on exception masking instructions
x86/kexec: Avoid double free_page() upon do_kexec_load() failure
... into a global, two-dimensional array and service subsequent reads from
that cache to avoid rdmsr_on_cpu() calls during CPU hotplug (IPIs with IRQs
disabled).
In addition, this fixes a KASAN slab-out-of-bounds read due to wrong usage
of the bank->blocks pointer.
Fixes: 27bd595027 ("x86/mce/AMD: Get address from already initialized block")
Reported-by: Johannes Hirte <johannes.hirte@datenkhaos.de>
Tested-by: Johannes Hirte <johannes.hirte@datenkhaos.de>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Yazen Ghannam <yazen.ghannam@amd.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180414004230.GA2033@probook
The x86 mmap() code selects the mmap base for an allocation depending on
the bitness of the syscall. For 64bit sycalls it select mm->mmap_base and
for 32bit mm->mmap_compat_base.
exec() calls mmap() which in turn uses in_compat_syscall() to check whether
the mapping is for a 32bit or a 64bit task. The decision is made on the
following criteria:
ia32 child->thread.status & TS_COMPAT
x32 child->pt_regs.orig_ax & __X32_SYSCALL_BIT
ia64 !ia32 && !x32
__set_personality_x32() was dropping TS_COMPAT flag, but
set_personality_64bit() has kept compat syscall flag making
in_compat_syscall() return true during the first exec() syscall.
Which in result has user-visible effects, mentioned by Alexey:
1) It breaks ASAN
$ gcc -fsanitize=address wrap.c -o wrap-asan
$ ./wrap32 ./wrap-asan true
==1217==Shadow memory range interleaves with an existing memory mapping. ASan cannot proceed correctly. ABORTING.
==1217==ASan shadow was supposed to be located in the [0x00007fff7000-0x10007fff7fff] range.
==1217==Process memory map follows:
0x000000400000-0x000000401000 /home/izbyshev/test/gcc/asan-exec-from-32bit/wrap-asan
0x000000600000-0x000000601000 /home/izbyshev/test/gcc/asan-exec-from-32bit/wrap-asan
0x000000601000-0x000000602000 /home/izbyshev/test/gcc/asan-exec-from-32bit/wrap-asan
0x0000f7dbd000-0x0000f7de2000 /lib64/ld-2.27.so
0x0000f7fe2000-0x0000f7fe3000 /lib64/ld-2.27.so
0x0000f7fe3000-0x0000f7fe4000 /lib64/ld-2.27.so
0x0000f7fe4000-0x0000f7fe5000
0x7fed9abff000-0x7fed9af54000
0x7fed9af54000-0x7fed9af6b000 /lib64/libgcc_s.so.1
[snip]
2) It doesn't seem to be great for security if an attacker always knows
that ld.so is going to be mapped into the first 4GB in this case
(the same thing happens for PIEs as well).
The testcase:
$ cat wrap.c
int main(int argc, char *argv[]) {
execvp(argv[1], &argv[1]);
return 127;
}
$ gcc wrap.c -o wrap
$ LD_SHOW_AUXV=1 ./wrap ./wrap true |& grep AT_BASE
AT_BASE: 0x7f63b8309000
AT_BASE: 0x7faec143c000
AT_BASE: 0x7fbdb25fa000
$ gcc -m32 wrap.c -o wrap32
$ LD_SHOW_AUXV=1 ./wrap32 ./wrap true |& grep AT_BASE
AT_BASE: 0xf7eff000
AT_BASE: 0xf7cee000
AT_BASE: 0x7f8b9774e000
Fixes: 1b028f784e ("x86/mm: Introduce mmap_compat_base() for 32-bit mmap()")
Fixes: ada26481df ("x86/mm: Make in_compat_syscall() work during exec")
Reported-by: Alexey Izbyshev <izbyshev@ispras.ru>
Bisected-by: Alexander Monakov <amonakov@ispras.ru>
Investigated-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Safonov <dima@arista.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Alexander Monakov <amonakov@ispras.ru>
Cc: Dmitry Safonov <0x7f454c46@gmail.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180517233510.24996-1-dima@arista.com
The "336996 Speculative Execution Side Channel Mitigations" from
May defines this as SSB_NO, hence lets sync-up.
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Fix race condition when accessing System Management Network registers
Fix reading critical temperatures on F15h M60h and M70h
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Merge tag 'hwmon-for-linus-v4.17-rc6' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/groeck/linux-staging
Pull hwmon fixes from Guenter Roeck:
"Two k10temp fixes:
- fix race condition when accessing System Management Network
registers
- fix reading critical temperatures on F15h M60h and M70h
Also add PCI ID's for the AMD Raven Ridge root bridge"
* tag 'hwmon-for-linus-v4.17-rc6' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/groeck/linux-staging:
hwmon: (k10temp) Use API function to access System Management Network
x86/amd_nb: Add support for Raven Ridge CPUs
hwmon: (k10temp) Fix reading critical temperature register
Rick bisected a regression on large systems which use the x2apic cluster
mode for interrupt delivery to the commit wich reworked the cluster
management.
The problem is caused by a missing initialization of the clusterid field
in the shared cluster data structures. So all structures end up with
cluster ID 0 which only allows sharing between all CPUs which belong to
cluster 0. All other CPUs with a cluster ID > 0 cannot share the data
structure because they cannot find existing data with their cluster
ID. This causes malfunction with IPIs because IPIs are sent to the wrong
cluster and the caller waits for ever that the target CPU handles the IPI.
Add the missing initialization when a upcoming CPU is the first in a
cluster so that the later booting CPUs can find the data and share it for
proper operation.
Fixes: 023a611748 ("x86/apic/x2apic: Simplify cluster management")
Reported-by: Rick Warner <rick@microway.com>
Bisected-by: Rick Warner <rick@microway.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: Rick Warner <rick@microway.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.DEB.2.21.1805171418210.1947@nanos.tec.linutronix.de
* x86 fixes: PCID, UMIP, locking
* Improved support for recent Windows version that have a 2048 Hz
APIC timer.
* Rename KVM_HINTS_DEDICATED CPUID bit to KVM_HINTS_REALTIME
* Better behaved selftests.
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Merge tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm
Pull kvm fixes from Paolo Bonzini:
- ARM/ARM64 locking fixes
- x86 fixes: PCID, UMIP, locking
- improved support for recent Windows version that have a 2048 Hz APIC
timer
- rename KVM_HINTS_DEDICATED CPUID bit to KVM_HINTS_REALTIME
- better behaved selftests
* tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm:
kvm: rename KVM_HINTS_DEDICATED to KVM_HINTS_REALTIME
KVM: arm/arm64: VGIC/ITS save/restore: protect kvm_read_guest() calls
KVM: arm/arm64: VGIC/ITS: protect kvm_read_guest() calls with SRCU lock
KVM: arm/arm64: VGIC/ITS: Promote irq_lock() in update_affinity
KVM: arm/arm64: Properly protect VGIC locks from IRQs
KVM: X86: Lower the default timer frequency limit to 200us
KVM: vmx: update sec exec controls for UMIP iff emulating UMIP
kvm: x86: Suppress CR3_PCID_INVD bit only when PCIDs are enabled
KVM: selftests: exit with 0 status code when tests cannot be run
KVM: hyperv: idr_find needs RCU protection
x86: Delay skip of emulated hypercall instruction
KVM: Extend MAX_IRQ_ROUTES to 4096 for all archs
KVM_HINTS_DEDICATED seems to be somewhat confusing:
Guest doesn't really care whether it's the only task running on a host
CPU as long as it's not preempted.
And there are more reasons for Guest to be preempted than host CPU
sharing, for example, with memory overcommit it can get preempted on a
memory access, post copy migration can cause preemption, etc.
Let's call it KVM_HINTS_REALTIME which seems to better
match what guests expect.
Also, the flag most be set on all vCPUs - current guests assume this.
Note so in the documentation.
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Expose the new virtualized architectural mechanism, VIRT_SSBD, for using
speculative store bypass disable (SSBD) under SVM. This will allow guests
to use SSBD on hardware that uses non-architectural mechanisms for enabling
SSBD.
[ tglx: Folded the migration fixup from Paolo Bonzini ]
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Add the necessary logic for supporting the emulated VIRT_SPEC_CTRL MSR to
x86_virt_spec_ctrl(). If either X86_FEATURE_LS_CFG_SSBD or
X86_FEATURE_VIRT_SPEC_CTRL is set then use the new guest_virt_spec_ctrl
argument to check whether the state must be modified on the host. The
update reuses speculative_store_bypass_update() so the ZEN-specific sibling
coordination can be reused.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
x86_spec_ctrL_mask is intended to mask out bits from a MSR_SPEC_CTRL value
which are not to be modified. However the implementation is not really used
and the bitmask was inverted to make a check easier, which was removed in
"x86/bugs: Remove x86_spec_ctrl_set()"
Aside of that it is missing the STIBP bit if it is supported by the
platform, so if the mask would be used in x86_virt_spec_ctrl() then it
would prevent a guest from setting STIBP.
Add the STIBP bit if supported and use the mask in x86_virt_spec_ctrl() to
sanitize the value which is supplied by the guest.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
x86_spec_ctrl_set() is only used in bugs.c and the extra mask checks there
provide no real value as both call sites can just write x86_spec_ctrl_base
to MSR_SPEC_CTRL. x86_spec_ctrl_base is valid and does not need any extra
masking or checking.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
x86_spec_ctrl_base is the system wide default value for the SPEC_CTRL MSR.
x86_spec_ctrl_get_default() returns x86_spec_ctrl_base and was intended to
prevent modification to that variable. Though the variable is read only
after init and globaly visible already.
Remove the function and export the variable instead.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Function bodies are very similar and are going to grow more almost
identical code. Add a bool arg to determine whether SPEC_CTRL is being set
for the guest or restored to the host.
No functional changes.
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
The upcoming support for the virtual SPEC_CTRL MSR on AMD needs to reuse
speculative_store_bypass_update() to avoid code duplication. Add an
argument for supplying a thread info (TIF) value and create a wrapper
speculative_store_bypass_update_current() which is used at the existing
call site.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Some AMD processors only support a non-architectural means of enabling
speculative store bypass disable (SSBD). To allow a simplified view of
this to a guest, an architectural definition has been created through a new
CPUID bit, 0x80000008_EBX[25], and a new MSR, 0xc001011f. With this, a
hypervisor can virtualize the existence of this definition and provide an
architectural method for using SSBD to a guest.
Add the new CPUID feature, the new MSR and update the existing SSBD
support to use this MSR when present.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
AMD is proposing a VIRT_SPEC_CTRL MSR to handle the Speculative Store
Bypass Disable via MSR_AMD64_LS_CFG so that guests do not have to care
about the bit position of the SSBD bit and thus facilitate migration.
Also, the sibling coordination on Family 17H CPUs can only be done on
the host.
Extend x86_spec_ctrl_set_guest() and x86_spec_ctrl_restore_host() with an
extra argument for the VIRT_SPEC_CTRL MSR.
Hand in 0 from VMX and in SVM add a new virt_spec_ctrl member to the CPU
data structure which is going to be used in later patches for the actual
implementation.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
The AMD64_LS_CFG MSR is a per core MSR on Family 17H CPUs. That means when
hyperthreading is enabled the SSBD bit toggle needs to take both cores into
account. Otherwise the following situation can happen:
CPU0 CPU1
disable SSB
disable SSB
enable SSB <- Enables it for the Core, i.e. for CPU0 as well
So after the SSB enable on CPU1 the task on CPU0 runs with SSB enabled
again.
On Intel the SSBD control is per core as well, but the synchronization
logic is implemented behind the per thread SPEC_CTRL MSR. It works like
this:
CORE_SPEC_CTRL = THREAD0_SPEC_CTRL | THREAD1_SPEC_CTRL
i.e. if one of the threads enables a mitigation then this affects both and
the mitigation is only disabled in the core when both threads disabled it.
Add the necessary synchronization logic for AMD family 17H. Unfortunately
that requires a spinlock to serialize the access to the MSR, but the locks
are only shared between siblings.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Add a ZEN feature bit so family-dependent static_cpu_has() optimizations
can be built for ZEN.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
The SSBD enumeration is similarly to the other bits magically shared
between Intel and AMD though the mechanisms are different.
Make X86_FEATURE_SSBD synthetic and set it depending on the vendor specific
features or family dependent setup.
Change the Intel bit to X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL_SSBD to denote that SSBD is
controlled via MSR_SPEC_CTRL and fix up the usage sites.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
The availability of the SPEC_CTRL MSR is enumerated by a CPUID bit on
Intel and implied by IBRS or STIBP support on AMD. That's just confusing
and in case an AMD CPU has IBRS not supported because the underlying
problem has been fixed but has another bit valid in the SPEC_CTRL MSR,
the thing falls apart.
Add a synthetic feature bit X86_FEATURE_MSR_SPEC_CTRL to denote the
availability on both Intel and AMD.
While at it replace the boot_cpu_has() checks with static_cpu_has() where
possible. This prevents late microcode loading from exposing SPEC_CTRL, but
late loading is already very limited as it does not reevaluate the
mitigation options and other bits and pieces. Having static_cpu_has() is
the simplest and least fragile solution.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Intel and AMD have different CPUID bits hence for those use synthetic bits
which get set on the respective vendor's in init_speculation_control(). So
that debacles like what the commit message of
c65732e4f7 ("x86/cpu: Restore CPUID_8000_0008_EBX reload")
talks about don't happen anymore.
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Tested-by: Jörg Otte <jrg.otte@gmail.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180504161815.GG9257@pd.tnic
svm_vcpu_run() invokes x86_spec_ctrl_restore_host() after VMEXIT, but
before the host GS is restored. x86_spec_ctrl_restore_host() uses 'current'
to determine the host SSBD state of the thread. 'current' is GS based, but
host GS is not yet restored and the access causes a triple fault.
Move the call after the host GS restore.
Fixes: 885f82bfbc x86/process: Allow runtime control of Speculative Store Bypass
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
a field event. This is increasingly important for the histogram trigger
work that is being extended.
While auditing trace events, I found that a couple of the xen events
were used as just marking that a function was called, by creating
a static array of size zero. This can play havoc with the tracing
features if these events are used, because a zero size of a static
array is denoted as a special nul terminated dynamic array (this is
what the trace_marker code uses). But since the xen events have no
size, they are not nul terminated, and unexpected results may occur.
As trace events were never intended on being a marker to denote
that a function was hit or not, especially since function tracing
and kprobes can trivially do the same, the best course of action is
to simply remove these events.
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Merge tag 'trace-v4.17-rc4-2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace
Pull tracing fix from Steven Rostedt:
"Some of the ftrace internal events use a zero for a data size of a
field event. This is increasingly important for the histogram trigger
work that is being extended.
While auditing trace events, I found that a couple of the xen events
were used as just marking that a function was called, by creating a
static array of size zero. This can play havoc with the tracing
features if these events are used, because a zero size of a static
array is denoted as a special nul terminated dynamic array (this is
what the trace_marker code uses). But since the xen events have no
size, they are not nul terminated, and unexpected results may occur.
As trace events were never intended on being a marker to denote that a
function was hit or not, especially since function tracing and kprobes
can trivially do the same, the best course of action is to simply
remove these events"
* tag 'trace-v4.17-rc4-2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace:
tracing/x86/xen: Remove zero data size trace events trace_xen_mmu_flush_tlb{_all}
cleanup_trampoline() relocates the top-level page table out of
trampoline memory. We use 'top_pgtable' as our new top-level page table.
But if the 'top_pgtable' would be referenced from C in a usual way,
the address of the table will be calculated relative to RIP.
After kernel gets relocated, the address will be in the middle of
decompression buffer and the page table may get overwritten.
This leads to a crash.
We calculate the address of other page tables relative to the relocation
address. It makes them safe. We should do the same for 'top_pgtable'.
Calculate the address of 'top_pgtable' in assembly and pass down to
cleanup_trampoline().
Move the page table to .pgtable section where the rest of page tables
are. The section is @nobits so we save 4k in kernel image.
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Fixes: e9d0e6330e ("x86/boot/compressed/64: Prepare new top-level page table for trampoline")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180516080131.27913-3-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Eric and Hugh have reported instant reboot due to my recent changes in
decompression code.
The root cause is that I didn't realize that we need to adjust GOT to be
able to run C code that early.
The problem is only visible with an older toolchain. Binutils >= 2.24 is
able to eliminate GOT references by replacing them with RIP-relative
address loads:
https://sourceware.org/git/gitweb.cgi?p=binutils-gdb.git;a=commitdiff;h=80d873266dec
We need to adjust GOT two times:
- before calling paging_prepare() using the initial load address
- before calling C code from the relocated kernel
Reported-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Fixes: 194a9749c7 ("x86/boot/compressed/64: Handle 5-level paging boot if kernel is above 4G")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180516080131.27913-2-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Replace the open coded string fetch from user-space with strncpy_from_user().
Signed-off-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Luis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@suse.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Toshi Kani <toshi.kani@hp.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180515180535.89703-1-andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
The helper returns index of the matching string in an array.
Replace the open coded array lookup with match_string().
Signed-off-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Luis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@suse.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Toshi Kani <toshi.kani@hp.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180515175759.89315-1-andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Anthoine reported:
The period used by Windows change over time but it can be 1
milliseconds or less. I saw the limit_periodic_timer_frequency
print so 500 microseconds is sometimes reached.
As suggested by Paolo, lower the default timer frequency limit to a
smaller interval of 200 us (5000 Hz) to leave some headroom. This
is required due to Windows 10 changing the scheduler tick limit
from 1024 Hz to 2048 Hz.
Reported-by: Anthoine Bourgeois <anthoine.bourgeois@blade-group.com>
Suggested-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Cc: Anthoine Bourgeois <anthoine.bourgeois@blade-group.com>
Cc: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com>
Cc: Jan Kiszka <jan.kiszka@web.de>
Signed-off-by: Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@tencent.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Doing an audit of trace events, I discovered two trace events in the xen
subsystem that use a hack to create zero data size trace events. This is not
what trace events are for. Trace events add memory footprint overhead, and
if all you need to do is see if a function is hit or not, simply make that
function noinline and use function tracer filtering.
Worse yet, the hack used was:
__array(char, x, 0)
Which creates a static string of zero in length. There's assumptions about
such constructs in ftrace that this is a dynamic string that is nul
terminated. This is not the case with these tracepoints and can cause
problems in various parts of ftrace.
Nuke the trace events!
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180509144605.5a220327@gandalf.local.home
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 95a7d76897 ("xen/mmu: Use Xen specific TLB flush instead of the generic one.")
Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
mm_pkey_is_allocated() treats pkey 0 as unallocated. That is
inconsistent with the manpages, and also inconsistent with
mm->context.pkey_allocation_map. Stop special casing it and only
disallow values that are actually bad (< 0).
The end-user visible effect of this is that you can now use
mprotect_pkey() to set pkey=0.
This is a bit nicer than what Ram proposed[1] because it is simpler
and removes special-casing for pkey 0. On the other hand, it does
allow applications to pkey_free() pkey-0, but that's just a silly
thing to do, so we are not going to protect against it.
The scenario that could happen is similar to what happens if you free
any other pkey that is in use: it might get reallocated later and used
to protect some other data. The most likely scenario is that pkey-0
comes back from pkey_alloc(), an access-disable or write-disable bit
is set in PKRU for it, and the next stack access will SIGSEGV. It's
not horribly different from if you mprotect()'d your stack or heap to
be unreadable or unwritable, which is generally very foolish, but also
not explicitly prevented by the kernel.
1. http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1522112702-27853-1-git-send-email-linuxram@us.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>p
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Michael Ellermen <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Ram Pai <linuxram@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 58ab9a088d ("x86/pkeys: Check against max pkey to avoid overflows")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180509171358.47FD785E@viggo.jf.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
I got a bug report that the following code (roughly) was
causing a SIGSEGV:
mprotect(ptr, size, PROT_EXEC);
mprotect(ptr, size, PROT_NONE);
mprotect(ptr, size, PROT_READ);
*ptr = 100;
The problem is hit when the mprotect(PROT_EXEC)
is implicitly assigned a protection key to the VMA, and made
that key ACCESS_DENY|WRITE_DENY. The PROT_NONE mprotect()
failed to remove the protection key, and the PROT_NONE->
PROT_READ left the PTE usable, but the pkey still in place
and left the memory inaccessible.
To fix this, we ensure that we always "override" the pkee
at mprotect() if the VMA does not have execute-only
permissions, but the VMA has the execute-only pkey.
We had a check for PROT_READ/WRITE, but it did not work
for PROT_NONE. This entirely removes the PROT_* checks,
which ensures that PROT_NONE now works.
Reported-by: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Michael Ellermen <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Ram Pai <linuxram@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 62b5f7d013 ("mm/core, x86/mm/pkeys: Add execute-only protection keys support")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180509171351.084C5A71@viggo.jf.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Clang builds with defconfig started crashing after the following
commit:
fb43d6cb91 ("x86/mm: Do not auto-massage page protections")
This was caused by introducing a new global access in __startup_64().
Code in __startup_64() can be relocated during execution, but the compiler
doesn't have to generate PC-relative relocations when accessing globals
from that function. Clang actually does not generate them, which leads
to boot-time crashes. To work around this problem, every global pointer
must be adjusted using fixup_pointer().
Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: dvyukov@google.com
Cc: kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Cc: md@google.com
Cc: mka@chromium.org
Fixes: fb43d6cb91 ("x86/mm: Do not auto-massage page protections")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180509091822.191810-1-glider@google.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cast val and (val >> 32) to (u32), so that they fit in a
general-purpose register in both 32-bit and 64-bit code.
[ tglx: Made it u32 instead of uintptr_t ]
Fixes: c65732e4f7 ("x86/cpu: Restore CPUID_8000_0008_EBX reload")
Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Mixed mode allows a kernel built for x86_64 to interact with 32-bit
EFI firmware, but requires us to define all struct definitions carefully
when it comes to pointer sizes.
'struct efi_pci_io_protocol_32' currently uses a 'void *' for the
'romimage' field, which will be interpreted as a 64-bit field
on such kernels, potentially resulting in bogus memory references
and subsequent crashes.
Tested-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180504060003.19618-13-ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
