Rename lower_fs[] array to fs[], extend its size by one and use index fsid
(instead of fsid-1) to access the fs[] array.
Initialize fs[0] with upper fs values. fsid 0 is reserved even with lower
only overlay, so fs[0] remains null in this case.
Signed-off-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
No code uses the sb returned from this helper, so make it retrun a boolean
and rename it to ovl_same_fs().
The xino mode is irrelevant when all layers are on same fs, so instead of
describing samefs with mode OVL_XINO_OFF, use a new xino_mode state, which
is 0 in the case of samefs, -1 in the case of xino=off and > 0 with xino
enabled.
Create a new helper ovl_same_dev(), to use instead of the common check for
(ovl_same_fs() || xinobits).
Signed-off-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Rename lower_layers[] array to layers[], extend its size by one and
initialize layers[0] with upper layer values. Lower layers are now
addressed with index 1..numlower. layers[0] is reserved even with lower
only overlay.
[SzM: replace ofs->numlower with ofs->numlayer, the latter's value is
incremented by one]
Signed-off-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Current copy-up is not efficient for big sparse file,
It's not only slow but also wasting more disk space
when the target lower file has huge hole inside.
This patch tries to recognize file hole and skip it
during copy-up.
Detail logic of hole detection as below:
When we detect next data position is larger than current
position we will skip that hole, otherwise we copy
data in the size of OVL_COPY_UP_CHUNK_SIZE. Actually,
it may not recognize all kind of holes and sometimes
only skips partial of hole area. However, it will be
enough for most of the use cases.
Additionally, this optimization relies on lseek(2)
SEEK_DATA implementation, so for some specific
filesystems which do not support this feature
will behave as before on copy-up.
Reviewed-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Chengguang Xu <cgxu519@mykernel.net>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
In ovl_llseek() we use the overlay inode rwsem to protect against
concurrent modifications to real file f_pos, because we copy the overlay
file f_pos to/from the real file f_pos.
This caused a lockdep warning of locking order violation when the
ovl_llseek() operation was called on a lower nested overlay layer while the
upper layer fs sb_writers is held (with patch improving copy-up efficiency
for big sparse file).
Use the internal ovl_inode_lock() instead of the overlay inode rwsem in
those cases. It is meant to be used for protecting against concurrent
changes to overlay inode internal state changes.
The locking order rules are documented to explain this case.
Signed-off-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
The WARN_ON() that child entry is always on overlay st_dev became wrong
when we allowed this function to update d_ino in non-samefs setup with xino
enabled.
It is not true in case of xino bits overflow on a non-dir inode. Leave the
WARN_ON() only for directories, where assertion is still true.
Fixes: adbf4f7ea8 ("ovl: consistent d_ino for non-samefs with xino")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.17+
Signed-off-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
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Merge tag 'io_uring-5.5-2020-01-16' of git://git.kernel.dk/linux-block
Pull io_uring fixes form Jens Axboe:
- Ensure ->result is always set when IO is retried (Bijan)
- In conjunction with the above, fix a regression in polled IO issue
when retried (me/Bijan)
- Don't setup async context for read/write fixed, otherwise we may
wrongly map the iovec on retry (me)
- Cancel io-wq work if we fail getting mm reference (me)
- Ensure dependent work is always initialized correctly (me)
- Only allow original task to submit IO, don't allow it from a passed
ring fd (me)
* tag 'io_uring-5.5-2020-01-16' of git://git.kernel.dk/linux-block:
io_uring: only allow submit from owning task
io_uring: ensure workqueue offload grabs ring mutex for poll list
io_uring: clear req->result always before issuing a read/write request
io_uring: be consistent in assigning next work from handler
io-wq: cancel work if we fail getting a mm reference
io_uring: don't setup async context for read/write fixed
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Merge tag 'for-5.5-rc6-tag' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kdave/linux
Pull btrfs fixes from David Sterba:
"A few more fixes that have been in the works during last twp weeks.
All have a user visible effect and are stable material:
- scrub: properly update progress after calling cancel ioctl, calling
'resume' would start from the beginning otherwise
- fix subvolume reference removal, after moving out of the original
path the reference is not recognized and will lead to transaction
abort
- fix reloc root lifetime checks, could lead to crashes when there's
subvolume cleaning running in parallel
- fix memory leak when quotas get disabled in the middle of extent
accounting
- fix transaction abort in case of balance being started on degraded
mount on eg. RAID1"
* tag 'for-5.5-rc6-tag' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kdave/linux:
btrfs: check rw_devices, not num_devices for balance
Btrfs: always copy scrub arguments back to user space
btrfs: relocation: fix reloc_root lifespan and access
btrfs: fix memory leak in qgroup accounting
btrfs: do not delete mismatched root refs
btrfs: fix invalid removal of root ref
btrfs: rework arguments of btrfs_unlink_subvol
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Merge tag 'fuse-fixes-5.5-rc7' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mszeredi/fuse
Pull fuse fix from Miklos Szeredi:
"Fix a regression in the last release affecting the ftp module of the
gvfs filesystem"
* tag 'fuse-fixes-5.5-rc7' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mszeredi/fuse:
fuse: fix fuse_send_readpages() in the syncronous read case
The fstest btrfs/154 reports
[ 8675.381709] BTRFS: Transaction aborted (error -28)
[ 8675.383302] WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 31900 at fs/btrfs/block-group.c:2038 btrfs_create_pending_block_groups+0x1e0/0x1f0 [btrfs]
[ 8675.390925] CPU: 1 PID: 31900 Comm: btrfs Not tainted 5.5.0-rc6-default+ #935
[ 8675.392780] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.12.0-59-gc9ba527-rebuilt.opensuse.org 04/01/2014
[ 8675.395452] RIP: 0010:btrfs_create_pending_block_groups+0x1e0/0x1f0 [btrfs]
[ 8675.402672] RSP: 0018:ffffb2090888fb00 EFLAGS: 00010286
[ 8675.404413] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff92026dfa91c8 RCX: 0000000000000001
[ 8675.406609] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffff8e100899 RDI: ffffffff8e100971
[ 8675.408775] RBP: ffff920247c61660 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 8675.410978] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 00000000ffffffe4
[ 8675.412647] R13: ffff92026db74000 R14: ffff920247c616b8 R15: ffff92026dfbc000
[ 8675.413994] FS: 00007fd5e57248c0(0000) GS:ffff92027d800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 8675.416146] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 8675.417833] CR2: 0000564aa51682d8 CR3: 000000006dcbc004 CR4: 0000000000160ee0
[ 8675.419801] Call Trace:
[ 8675.420742] btrfs_start_dirty_block_groups+0x355/0x480 [btrfs]
[ 8675.422600] btrfs_commit_transaction+0xc8/0xaf0 [btrfs]
[ 8675.424335] reset_balance_state+0x14a/0x190 [btrfs]
[ 8675.425824] btrfs_balance.cold+0xe7/0x154 [btrfs]
[ 8675.427313] ? kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x235/0x2c0
[ 8675.428663] btrfs_ioctl_balance+0x298/0x350 [btrfs]
[ 8675.430285] btrfs_ioctl+0x466/0x2550 [btrfs]
[ 8675.431788] ? mem_cgroup_charge_statistics+0x51/0xf0
[ 8675.433487] ? mem_cgroup_commit_charge+0x56/0x400
[ 8675.435122] ? do_raw_spin_unlock+0x4b/0xc0
[ 8675.436618] ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x1f/0x30
[ 8675.438093] ? __handle_mm_fault+0x499/0x740
[ 8675.439619] ? do_vfs_ioctl+0x56e/0x770
[ 8675.441034] do_vfs_ioctl+0x56e/0x770
[ 8675.442411] ksys_ioctl+0x3a/0x70
[ 8675.443718] ? trace_hardirqs_off_thunk+0x1a/0x1c
[ 8675.445333] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x16/0x20
[ 8675.446705] do_syscall_64+0x50/0x210
[ 8675.448059] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
[ 8675.479187] BTRFS: error (device vdb) in btrfs_create_pending_block_groups:2038: errno=-28 No space left
We now use btrfs_can_overcommit() to see if we can flip a block group
read only. Before this would fail because we weren't taking into
account the usable un-allocated space for allocating chunks. With my
patches we were allowed to do the balance, which is technically correct.
The test is trying to start balance on degraded mount. So now we're
trying to allocate a chunk and cannot because we want to allocate a
RAID1 chunk, but there's only 1 device that's available for usage. This
results in an ENOSPC.
But we shouldn't even be making it this far, we don't have enough
devices to restripe. The problem is we're using btrfs_num_devices(),
that also includes missing devices. That's not actually what we want, we
need to use rw_devices.
The chunk_mutex is not needed here, rw_devices changes only in device
add, remove or replace, all are excluded by EXCL_OP mechanism.
Fixes: e4d8ec0f65 ("Btrfs: implement online profile changing")
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
[ add stacktrace, update changelog, drop chunk_mutex ]
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
If scrub returns an error we are not copying back the scrub arguments
structure to user space. This prevents user space to know how much
progress scrub has done if an error happened - this includes -ECANCELED
which is returned when users ask for scrub to stop. A particular use
case, which is used in btrfs-progs, is to resume scrub after it is
canceled, in that case it relies on checking the progress from the scrub
arguments structure and then use that progress in a call to resume
scrub.
So fix this by always copying the scrub arguments structure to user
space, overwriting the value returned to user space with -EFAULT only if
copying the structure failed to let user space know that either that
copying did not happen, and therefore the structure is stale, or it
happened partially and the structure is probably not valid and corrupt
due to the partial copy.
Reported-by: Graham Cobb <g.btrfs@cobb.uk.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/d0a97688-78be-08de-ca7d-bcb4c7fb397e@cobb.uk.net/
Fixes: 06fe39ab15 ("Btrfs: do not overwrite scrub error with fault error in scrub ioctl")
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.1+
Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn <johannes.thumshirn@wdc.com>
Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
Tested-by: Graham Cobb <g.btrfs@cobb.uk.net>
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
If the credentials or the mm doesn't match, don't allow the task to
submit anything on behalf of this ring. The task that owns the ring can
pass the file descriptor to another task, but we don't want to allow
that task to submit an SQE that then assumes the ring mm and creds if
it needs to go async.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Suggested-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Buffered read in fuse normally goes via:
-> generic_file_buffered_read()
-> fuse_readpages()
-> fuse_send_readpages()
->fuse_simple_request() [called since v5.4]
In the case of a read request, fuse_simple_request() will return a
non-negative bytecount on success or a negative error value. A positive
bytecount was taken to be an error and the PG_error flag set on the page.
This resulted in generic_file_buffered_read() falling back to ->readpage(),
which would repeat the read request and succeed. Because of the repeated
read succeeding the bug was not detected with regression tests or other use
cases.
The FTP module in GVFS however fails the second read due to the
non-seekable nature of FTP downloads.
Fix by checking and ignoring positive return value from
fuse_simple_request().
Reported-by: Ondrej Holy <oholy@redhat.com>
Link: https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/gvfs/issues/441
Fixes: 134831e36b ("fuse: convert readpages to simple api")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v5.4
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
A previous commit moved the locking for the async sqthread, but didn't
take into account that the io-wq workers still need it. We can't use
req->in_async for this anymore as both the sqthread and io-wq workers
set it, gate the need for locking on io_wq_current_is_worker() instead.
Fixes: 8a4955ff1c ("io_uring: sqthread should grab ctx->uring_lock for submissions")
Reported-by: Bijan Mottahedeh <bijan.mottahedeh@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
req->result is cleared when io_issue_sqe() calls io_read/write_pre()
routines. Those routines however are not called when the sqe
argument is NULL, which is the case when io_issue_sqe() is called from
io_wq_submit_work(). io_issue_sqe() may then examine a stale result if
a polled request had previously failed with -EAGAIN:
if (ctx->flags & IORING_SETUP_IOPOLL) {
if (req->result == -EAGAIN)
return -EAGAIN;
io_iopoll_req_issued(req);
}
and in turn cause a subsequently completed request to be re-issued in
io_wq_submit_work().
Signed-off-by: Bijan Mottahedeh <bijan.mottahedeh@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Pull vfs fixes from Al Viro:
"Fixes for mountpoint_last() bugs (by converting to use of
lookup_last()) and an autofs regression fix from this cycle (caused by
follow_managed() breakage introduced in barrier fixes series)"
* 'fixes' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs:
fix autofs regression caused by follow_managed() changes
reimplement path_mountpoint() with less magic
we need to reload ->d_flags after the call of ->d_manage() - the thing
might've been called with dentry still negative and have the damn thing
turned positive while we'd waited.
Fixes: d41efb522e "fs/namei.c: pull positivity check into follow_managed()"
Reported-by: Ian Kent <raven@themaw.net>
Tested-by: Ian Kent <raven@themaw.net>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
... and get rid of a bunch of bugs in it. Background:
the reason for path_mountpoint() is that umount() really doesn't
want attempts to revalidate the root of what it's trying to umount.
The thing we want to avoid actually happen from complete_walk();
solution was to do something parallel to normal path_lookupat()
and it both went overboard and got the boilerplate subtly
(and not so subtly) wrong.
A better solution is to do pretty much what the normal path_lookupat()
does, but instead of complete_walk() do unlazy_walk(). All it takes
to avoid that ->d_weak_revalidate() call... mountpoint_last() goes
away, along with everything it got wrong, and so does the magic around
LOOKUP_NO_REVAL.
Another source of bugs is that when we traverse mounts at the final
location (and we need to do that - umount . expects to get whatever's
overmounting ., if any, out of the lookup) we really ought to take
care of ->d_manage() - as it is, manual umount of autofs automount
in progress can lead to unpleasant surprises for the daemon. Easily
solved by using handle_lookup_down() instead of follow_mount().
Tested-by: Ian Kent <raven@themaw.net>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
If we pass back dependent work in case of links, we need to always
ensure that we call the link setup and work prep handler. If not, we
might be missing some setup for the next work item.
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Merge misc fixes from David Howells.
Two afs fixes and a key refcounting fix.
* dhowells:
afs: Fix afs_lookup() to not clobber the version on a new dentry
afs: Fix use-after-loss-of-ref
keys: Fix request_key() cache
Fix afs_lookup() to not clobber the version set on a new dentry by
afs_do_lookup() - especially as it's using the wrong version of the
version (we need to use the one given to us by whatever op the dir
contents correspond to rather than what's in the afs_vnode).
Fixes: 9dd0b82ef5 ("afs: Fix missing dentry data version updating")
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
afs_lookup() has a tracepoint to indicate the outcome of
d_splice_alias(), passing it the inode to retrieve the fid from.
However, the function gave up its ref on that inode when it called
d_splice_alias(), which may have failed and dropped the inode.
Fix this by caching the fid.
Fixes: 80548b0399 ("afs: Add more tracepoints")
Reported-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
We don't need it, and if we have it, then the retry handler will attempt
to copy the non-existent iovec with the inline iovec, with a segment
count that doesn't make sense.
Fixes: f67676d160 ("io_uring: ensure async punted read/write requests copy iovec")
Reported-by: Jonathan Lemon <jonathan.lemon@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
[BUG]
There are several different KASAN reports for balance + snapshot
workloads. Involved call paths include:
should_ignore_root+0x54/0xb0 [btrfs]
build_backref_tree+0x11af/0x2280 [btrfs]
relocate_tree_blocks+0x391/0xb80 [btrfs]
relocate_block_group+0x3e5/0xa00 [btrfs]
btrfs_relocate_block_group+0x240/0x4d0 [btrfs]
btrfs_relocate_chunk+0x53/0xf0 [btrfs]
btrfs_balance+0xc91/0x1840 [btrfs]
btrfs_ioctl_balance+0x416/0x4e0 [btrfs]
btrfs_ioctl+0x8af/0x3e60 [btrfs]
do_vfs_ioctl+0x831/0xb10
create_reloc_root+0x9f/0x460 [btrfs]
btrfs_reloc_post_snapshot+0xff/0x6c0 [btrfs]
create_pending_snapshot+0xa9b/0x15f0 [btrfs]
create_pending_snapshots+0x111/0x140 [btrfs]
btrfs_commit_transaction+0x7a6/0x1360 [btrfs]
btrfs_mksubvol+0x915/0x960 [btrfs]
btrfs_ioctl_snap_create_transid+0x1d5/0x1e0 [btrfs]
btrfs_ioctl_snap_create_v2+0x1d3/0x270 [btrfs]
btrfs_ioctl+0x241b/0x3e60 [btrfs]
do_vfs_ioctl+0x831/0xb10
btrfs_reloc_pre_snapshot+0x85/0xc0 [btrfs]
create_pending_snapshot+0x209/0x15f0 [btrfs]
create_pending_snapshots+0x111/0x140 [btrfs]
btrfs_commit_transaction+0x7a6/0x1360 [btrfs]
btrfs_mksubvol+0x915/0x960 [btrfs]
btrfs_ioctl_snap_create_transid+0x1d5/0x1e0 [btrfs]
btrfs_ioctl_snap_create_v2+0x1d3/0x270 [btrfs]
btrfs_ioctl+0x241b/0x3e60 [btrfs]
do_vfs_ioctl+0x831/0xb10
[CAUSE]
All these call sites are only relying on root->reloc_root, which can
undergo btrfs_drop_snapshot(), and since we don't have real refcount
based protection to reloc roots, we can reach already dropped reloc
root, triggering KASAN.
[FIX]
To avoid such access to unstable root->reloc_root, we should check
BTRFS_ROOT_DEAD_RELOC_TREE bit first.
This patch introduces wrappers that provide the correct way to check the
bit with memory barriers protection.
Most callers don't distinguish merged reloc tree and no reloc tree. The
only exception is should_ignore_root(), as merged reloc tree can be
ignored, while no reloc tree shouldn't.
[CRITICAL SECTION ANALYSIS]
Although test_bit()/set_bit()/clear_bit() doesn't imply a barrier, the
DEAD_RELOC_TREE bit has extra help from transaction as a higher level
barrier, the lifespan of root::reloc_root and DEAD_RELOC_TREE bit are:
NULL: reloc_root is NULL PTR: reloc_root is not NULL
0: DEAD_RELOC_ROOT bit not set DEAD: DEAD_RELOC_ROOT bit set
(NULL, 0) Initial state __
| /\ Section A
btrfs_init_reloc_root() \/
| __
(PTR, 0) reloc_root initialized /\
| |
btrfs_update_reloc_root() | Section B
| |
(PTR, DEAD) reloc_root has been merged \/
| __
=== btrfs_commit_transaction() ====================
| /\
clean_dirty_subvols() |
| | Section C
(NULL, DEAD) reloc_root cleanup starts \/
| __
btrfs_drop_snapshot() /\
| | Section D
(NULL, 0) Back to initial state \/
Every have_reloc_root() or test_bit(DEAD_RELOC_ROOT) caller holds
transaction handle, so none of such caller can cross transaction boundary.
In Section A, every caller just found no DEAD bit, and grab reloc_root.
In the cross section A-B, caller may get no DEAD bit, but since reloc_root
is still completely valid thus accessing reloc_root is completely safe.
No test_bit() caller can cross the boundary of Section B and Section C.
In Section C, every caller found the DEAD bit, so no one will access
reloc_root.
In the cross section C-D, either caller gets the DEAD bit set, avoiding
access reloc_root no matter if it's safe or not. Or caller get the DEAD
bit cleared, then access reloc_root, which is already NULL, nothing will
be wrong.
The memory write barriers are between the reloc_root updates and bit
set/clear, the pairing read side is before test_bit.
Reported-by: Zygo Blaxell <ce3g8jdj@umail.furryterror.org>
Fixes: d2311e6985 ("btrfs: relocation: Delay reloc tree deletion after merge_reloc_roots")
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.4+
Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Signed-off-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
[ barriers ]
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Here is a single fix, for the chrdev core, for 5.5-rc6
There's been a long-standing race condition triggered by syzbot, and
occasionally real people, in the chrdev open() path. Will finally took
the time to track it down and fix it for real before the holidays.
Here's that one patch, it's been in linux-next for a while with no
reported issues and it does fix the reported problem.
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Merge tag 'char-misc-5.5-rc6' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/char-misc
Pull char/misc fix from Greg KH:
"Here is a single fix, for the chrdev core, for 5.5-rc6
There's been a long-standing race condition triggered by syzbot, and
occasionally real people, in the chrdev open() path. Will finally took
the time to track it down and fix it for real before the holidays.
Here's that one patch, it's been in linux-next for a while with no
reported issues and it does fix the reported problem"
* tag 'char-misc-5.5-rc6' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/char-misc:
chardev: Avoid potential use-after-free in 'chrdev_open()'
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Merge tag 'block-5.5-2020-01-10' of git://git.kernel.dk/linux-block
Pull block fixes from Jens Axboe:
"A few fixes that should go into this round.
This pull request contains two NVMe fixes via Keith, removal of a dead
function, and a fix for the bio op for read truncates (Ming)"
* tag 'block-5.5-2020-01-10' of git://git.kernel.dk/linux-block:
nvmet: fix per feat data len for get_feature
nvme: Translate more status codes to blk_status_t
fs: move guard_bio_eod() after bio_set_op_attrs
block: remove unused mp_bvec_last_segment
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Merge tag 'io_uring-5.5-2020-01-10' of git://git.kernel.dk/linux-block
Pull io_uring fix from Jens Axboe:
"Single fix for this series, fixing a regression with the short read
handling.
This just removes it, as it cannot safely be done for all cases"
* tag 'io_uring-5.5-2020-01-10' of git://git.kernel.dk/linux-block:
io_uring: remove punt of short reads to async context
- Fix label allocation lifetime/visibility to avoid further mistakes
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Merge tag 'pstore-v5.5-rc6' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux
Pull pstore fix from Kees Cook:
"Cengiz Can forwarded a Coverity report about more problems with a rare
pstore initialization error path, so the allocation lifetime was
rearranged to avoid needing to share the kfree() responsibilities
between caller and callee"
* tag 'pstore-v5.5-rc6' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux:
pstore/ram: Regularize prz label allocation lifetime
Commit 85a8ce62c2 ("block: add bio_truncate to fix guard_bio_eod")
adds bio_truncate() for handling bio EOD. However, bio_truncate()
doesn't use the passed 'op' parameter from guard_bio_eod's callers.
So bio_trunacate() may retrieve wrong 'op', and zering pages may
not be done for READ bio.
Fixes this issue by moving guard_bio_eod() after bio_set_op_attrs()
in submit_bh_wbc() so that bio_truncate() can always retrieve correct
op info.
Meantime remove the 'op' parameter from guard_bio_eod() because it isn't
used any more.
Cc: Carlos Maiolino <cmaiolino@redhat.com>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 85a8ce62c2 ("block: add bio_truncate to fix guard_bio_eod")
Signed-off-by: Ming Lei <ming.lei@redhat.com>
Fold in kerneldoc and bio_op() change.
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
In my attempt to fix a memory leak, I introduced a double-free in the
pstore error path. Instead of trying to manage the allocation lifetime
between persistent_ram_new() and its callers, adjust the logic so
persistent_ram_new() always takes a kstrdup() copy, and leaves the
caller's allocation lifetime up to the caller. Therefore callers are
_always_ responsible for freeing their label. Before, it only needed
freeing when the prz itself failed to allocate, and not in any of the
other prz failure cases, which callers would have no visibility into,
which is the root design problem that lead to both the leak and now
double-free bugs.
Reported-by: Cengiz Can <cengiz@kernel.wtf>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/d4ec59002ede4aaf9928c7f7526da87c@kernel.wtf
Fixes: 8df955a32a ("pstore/ram: Fix error-path memory leak in persistent_ram_new() callers")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
When running xfstests on the current btrfs I get the following splat from
kmemleak:
unreferenced object 0xffff88821b2404e0 (size 32):
comm "kworker/u4:7", pid 26663, jiffies 4295283698 (age 8.776s)
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 10 ff fd 26 82 88 ff ff ...........&....
10 ff fd 26 82 88 ff ff 20 ff fd 26 82 88 ff ff ...&.... ..&....
backtrace:
[<00000000f94fd43f>] ulist_alloc+0x25/0x60 [btrfs]
[<00000000fd023d99>] btrfs_find_all_roots_safe+0x41/0x100 [btrfs]
[<000000008f17bd32>] btrfs_find_all_roots+0x52/0x70 [btrfs]
[<00000000b7660afb>] btrfs_qgroup_rescan_worker+0x343/0x680 [btrfs]
[<0000000058e66778>] btrfs_work_helper+0xac/0x1e0 [btrfs]
[<00000000f0188930>] process_one_work+0x1cf/0x350
[<00000000af5f2f8e>] worker_thread+0x28/0x3c0
[<00000000b55a1add>] kthread+0x109/0x120
[<00000000f88cbd17>] ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40
This corresponds to:
(gdb) l *(btrfs_find_all_roots_safe+0x41)
0x8d7e1 is in btrfs_find_all_roots_safe (fs/btrfs/backref.c:1413).
1408
1409 tmp = ulist_alloc(GFP_NOFS);
1410 if (!tmp)
1411 return -ENOMEM;
1412 *roots = ulist_alloc(GFP_NOFS);
1413 if (!*roots) {
1414 ulist_free(tmp);
1415 return -ENOMEM;
1416 }
1417
Following the lifetime of the allocated 'roots' ulist, it gets freed
again in btrfs_qgroup_account_extent().
But this does not happen if the function is called with the
'BTRFS_FS_QUOTA_ENABLED' flag cleared, then btrfs_qgroup_account_extent()
does a short leave and directly returns.
Instead of directly returning we should jump to the 'out_free' in order to
free all resources as expected.
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.14+
Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Thumshirn <johannes.thumshirn@wdc.com>
[ add comment ]
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
btrfs_del_root_ref() will simply WARN_ON() if the ref doesn't match in
any way, and then continue to delete the reference. This shouldn't
happen, we have these values because there's more to the reference than
the original root and the sub root. If any of these checks fail, return
-ENOENT.
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
If we have the following sequence of events
btrfs sub create A
btrfs sub create A/B
btrfs sub snap A C
mkdir C/foo
mv A/B C/foo
rm -rf *
We will end up with a transaction abort.
The reason for this is because we create a root ref for B pointing to A.
When we create a snapshot of C we still have B in our tree, but because
the root ref points to A and not C we will make it appear to be empty.
The problem happens when we move B into C. This removes the root ref
for B pointing to A and adds a ref of B pointing to C. When we rmdir C
we'll see that we have a ref to our root and remove the root ref,
despite not actually matching our reference name.
Now btrfs_del_root_ref() allowing this to work is a bug as well, however
we know that this inode does not actually point to a root ref in the
first place, so we shouldn't be calling btrfs_del_root_ref() in the
first place and instead simply look up our dir index for this item and
do the rest of the removal.
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
btrfs_unlink_subvol takes the name of the dentry and the root objectid
based on what kind of inode this is, either a real subvolume link or a
empty one that we inherited as a snapshot. We need to fix how we unlink
in the case for BTRFS_EMPTY_SUBVOL_DIR_OBJECTID in the future, so rework
btrfs_unlink_subvol to just take the dentry and handle getting the right
objectid given the type of inode this is. There is no functional change
here, simply pushing the work into btrfs_unlink_subvol() proper.
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
We currently punt any short read on a regular file to async context,
but this fails if the short read is due to running into EOF. This is
especially problematic since we only do the single prep for commands
now, as we don't reset kiocb->ki_pos. This can result in a 4k read on
a 1k file returning zero, as we detect the short read and then retry
from async context. At the time of retry, the position is now 1k, and
we end up reading nothing, and hence return 0.
Instead of trying to patch around the fact that short reads can be
legitimate and won't succeed in case of retry, remove the logic to punt
a short read to async context. Simply return it.
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
'chrdev_open()' calls 'cdev_get()' to obtain a reference to the
'struct cdev *' stashed in the 'i_cdev' field of the target inode
structure. If the pointer is NULL, then it is initialised lazily by
looking up the kobject in the 'cdev_map' and so the whole procedure is
protected by the 'cdev_lock' spinlock to serialise initialisation of
the shared pointer.
Unfortunately, it is possible for the initialising thread to fail *after*
installing the new pointer, for example if the subsequent '->open()' call
on the file fails. In this case, 'cdev_put()' is called, the reference
count on the kobject is dropped and, if nobody else has taken a reference,
the release function is called which finally clears 'inode->i_cdev' from
'cdev_purge()' before potentially freeing the object. The problem here
is that a racing thread can happily take the 'cdev_lock' and see the
non-NULL pointer in the inode, which can result in a refcount increment
from zero and a warning:
| ------------[ cut here ]------------
| refcount_t: addition on 0; use-after-free.
| WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 6385 at lib/refcount.c:25 refcount_warn_saturate+0x6d/0xf0
| Modules linked in:
| CPU: 2 PID: 6385 Comm: repro Not tainted 5.5.0-rc2+ #22
| Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.12.0-1 04/01/2014
| RIP: 0010:refcount_warn_saturate+0x6d/0xf0
| Code: 05 55 9a 15 01 01 e8 9d aa c8 ff 0f 0b c3 80 3d 45 9a 15 01 00 75 ce 48 c7 c7 00 9c 62 b3 c6 08
| RSP: 0018:ffffb524c1b9bc70 EFLAGS: 00010282
| RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff9e9da1f71390 RCX: 0000000000000000
| RDX: ffff9e9dbbd27618 RSI: ffff9e9dbbd18798 RDI: ffff9e9dbbd18798
| RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 000000000000095f R09: 0000000000000039
| R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffffb524c1b9bb20 R12: ffff9e9da1e8c700
| R13: ffffffffb25ee8b0 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff9e9da1e8c700
| FS: 00007f3b87d26700(0000) GS:ffff9e9dbbd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
| CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
| CR2: 00007fc16909c000 CR3: 000000012df9c000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
| DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
| DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
| Call Trace:
| kobject_get+0x5c/0x60
| cdev_get+0x2b/0x60
| chrdev_open+0x55/0x220
| ? cdev_put.part.3+0x20/0x20
| do_dentry_open+0x13a/0x390
| path_openat+0x2c8/0x1470
| do_filp_open+0x93/0x100
| ? selinux_file_ioctl+0x17f/0x220
| do_sys_open+0x186/0x220
| do_syscall_64+0x48/0x150
| entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
| RIP: 0033:0x7f3b87efcd0e
| Code: 89 54 24 08 e8 a3 f4 ff ff 8b 74 24 0c 48 8b 3c 24 41 89 c0 44 8b 54 24 08 b8 01 01 00 00 89 f4
| RSP: 002b:00007f3b87d259f0 EFLAGS: 00000293 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000101
| RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f3b87efcd0e
| RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00007f3b87d25a80 RDI: 00000000ffffff9c
| RBP: 00007f3b87d25e90 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
| R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000293 R12: 00007ffe188f504e
| R13: 00007ffe188f504f R14: 00007f3b87d26700 R15: 0000000000000000
| ---[ end trace 24f53ca58db8180a ]---
Since 'cdev_get()' can already fail to obtain a reference, simply move
it over to use 'kobject_get_unless_zero()' instead of 'kobject_get()',
which will cause the racing thread to return -ENXIO if the initialising
thread fails unexpectedly.
Cc: Hillf Danton <hdanton@sina.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Reported-by: syzbot+82defefbbd8527e1c2cb@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191219120203.32691-1-will@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Because ocfs2_get_dlm_debug() function is called once less here, ocfs2
file system will trigger the system crash, usually after ocfs2 file
system is unmounted.
This system crash is caused by a generic memory corruption, these crash
backtraces are not always the same, for exapmle,
ocfs2: Unmounting device (253,16) on (node 172167785)
general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI
CPU: 3 PID: 14107 Comm: fence_legacy Kdump:
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996)
RIP: 0010:__kmalloc+0xa5/0x2a0
Code: 00 00 4d 8b 07 65 4d 8b
RSP: 0018:ffffaa1fc094bbe8 EFLAGS: 00010286
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: d310a8800d7a3faf RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000dc0 RDI: ffff96e68fc036c0
RBP: d310a8800d7a3faf R08: ffff96e6ffdb10a0 R09: 00000000752e7079
R10: 000000000001c513 R11: 0000000004091041 R12: 0000000000000dc0
R13: 0000000000000039 R14: ffff96e68fc036c0 R15: ffff96e68fc036c0
FS: 00007f699dfba540(0000) GS:ffff96e6ffd80000(0000) knlGS:00000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 000055f3a9d9b768 CR3: 000000002cd1c000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
Call Trace:
ext4_htree_store_dirent+0x35/0x100 [ext4]
htree_dirblock_to_tree+0xea/0x290 [ext4]
ext4_htree_fill_tree+0x1c1/0x2d0 [ext4]
ext4_readdir+0x67c/0x9d0 [ext4]
iterate_dir+0x8d/0x1a0
__x64_sys_getdents+0xab/0x130
do_syscall_64+0x60/0x1f0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
RIP: 0033:0x7f699d33a9fb
This regression problem was introduced by commit e581595ea2 ("ocfs: no
need to check return value of debugfs_create functions").
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191225061501.13587-1-ghe@suse.com
Fixes: e581595ea2 ("ocfs: no need to check return value of debugfs_create functions")
Signed-off-by: Gang He <ghe@suse.com>
Acked-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mark@fasheh.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Cc: Changwei Ge <gechangwei@live.cn>
Cc: Gang He <ghe@suse.com>
Cc: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> [5.3+]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
If journal is dirty when mount, it will be replayed but jbd2 sb log tail
cannot be updated to mark a new start because journal->j_flag has
already been set with JBD2_ABORT first in journal_init_common.
When a new transaction is committed, it will be recored in block 1
first(journal->j_tail is set to 1 in journal_reset). If emergency
restart happens again before journal super block is updated
unfortunately, the new recorded trans will not be replayed in the next
mount.
The following steps describe this procedure in detail.
1. mount and touch some files
2. these transactions are committed to journal area but not checkpointed
3. emergency restart
4. mount again and its journals are replayed
5. journal super block's first s_start is 1, but its s_seq is not updated
6. touch a new file and its trans is committed but not checkpointed
7. emergency restart again
8. mount and journal is dirty, but trans committed in 6 will not be
replayed.
This exception happens easily when this lun is used by only one node.
If it is used by multi-nodes, other node will replay its journal and its
journal super block will be updated after recovery like what this patch
does.
ocfs2_recover_node->ocfs2_replay_journal.
The following jbd2 journal can be generated by touching a new file after
journal is replayed, and seq 15 is the first valid commit, but first seq
is 13 in journal super block.
logdump:
Block 0: Journal Superblock
Seq: 0 Type: 4 (JBD2_SUPERBLOCK_V2)
Blocksize: 4096 Total Blocks: 32768 First Block: 1
First Commit ID: 13 Start Log Blknum: 1
Error: 0
Feature Compat: 0
Feature Incompat: 2 block64
Feature RO compat: 0
Journal UUID: 4ED3822C54294467A4F8E87D2BA4BC36
FS Share Cnt: 1 Dynamic Superblk Blknum: 0
Per Txn Block Limit Journal: 0 Data: 0
Block 1: Journal Commit Block
Seq: 14 Type: 2 (JBD2_COMMIT_BLOCK)
Block 2: Journal Descriptor
Seq: 15 Type: 1 (JBD2_DESCRIPTOR_BLOCK)
No. Blocknum Flags
0. 587 none
UUID: 00000000000000000000000000000000
1. 8257792 JBD2_FLAG_SAME_UUID
2. 619 JBD2_FLAG_SAME_UUID
3. 24772864 JBD2_FLAG_SAME_UUID
4. 8257802 JBD2_FLAG_SAME_UUID
5. 513 JBD2_FLAG_SAME_UUID JBD2_FLAG_LAST_TAG
...
Block 7: Inode
Inode: 8257802 Mode: 0640 Generation: 57157641 (0x3682809)
FS Generation: 2839773110 (0xa9437fb6)
CRC32: 00000000 ECC: 0000
Type: Regular Attr: 0x0 Flags: Valid
Dynamic Features: (0x1) InlineData
User: 0 (root) Group: 0 (root) Size: 7
Links: 1 Clusters: 0
ctime: 0x5de5d870 0x11104c61 -- Tue Dec 3 11:37:20.286280801 2019
atime: 0x5de5d870 0x113181a1 -- Tue Dec 3 11:37:20.288457121 2019
mtime: 0x5de5d870 0x11104c61 -- Tue Dec 3 11:37:20.286280801 2019
dtime: 0x0 -- Thu Jan 1 08:00:00 1970
...
Block 9: Journal Commit Block
Seq: 15 Type: 2 (JBD2_COMMIT_BLOCK)
The following is journal recovery log when recovering the upper jbd2
journal when mount again.
syslog:
ocfs2: File system on device (252,1) was not unmounted cleanly, recovering it.
fs/jbd2/recovery.c:(do_one_pass, 449): Starting recovery pass 0
fs/jbd2/recovery.c:(do_one_pass, 449): Starting recovery pass 1
fs/jbd2/recovery.c:(do_one_pass, 449): Starting recovery pass 2
fs/jbd2/recovery.c:(jbd2_journal_recover, 278): JBD2: recovery, exit status 0, recovered transactions 13 to 13
Due to first commit seq 13 recorded in journal super is not consistent
with the value recorded in block 1(seq is 14), journal recovery will be
terminated before seq 15 even though it is an unbroken commit, inode
8257802 is a new file and it will be lost.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191217020140.2197-1-li.kai4@h3c.com
Signed-off-by: Kai Li <li.kai4@h3c.com>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
Reviewed-by: Changwei Ge <gechangwei@live.cn>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mark@fasheh.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Cc: Gang He <ghe@suse.com>
Cc: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Fix kernel-doc warnings in fs/posix_acl.c.
Also fix one typo (setgit -> setgid).
fs/posix_acl.c:647: warning: Function parameter or member 'inode' not described in 'posix_acl_update_mode'
fs/posix_acl.c:647: warning: Function parameter or member 'mode_p' not described in 'posix_acl_update_mode'
fs/posix_acl.c:647: warning: Function parameter or member 'acl' not described in 'posix_acl_update_mode'
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/29b0dc46-1f28-a4e5-b1d0-ba2b65629779@infradead.org
Fixes: 073931017b ("posix_acl: Clear SGID bit when setting file permissions")
Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Acked-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Cc: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Make to_mnt_ns() static to address the following 'sparse' warning:
fs/namespace.c:1731:22: warning: symbol 'to_mnt_ns' was not declared. Should it be static?
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191209234830.156260-1-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Include linux/proc_fs.h and fs/internal.h to address the following
'sparse' warnings:
fs/nsfs.c:41:32: warning: symbol 'ns_dentry_operations' was not declared. Should it be static?
fs/nsfs.c:145:5: warning: symbol 'open_related_ns' was not declared. Should it be static?
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191209234822.156179-1-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Include fs/internal.h to address the following 'sparse' warning:
fs/direct-io.c:591:5: warning: symbol 'sb_init_dio_done_wq' was not declared. Should it be static?
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191209234544.128302-1-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Merge tag 'for-5.5-rc4-tag' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kdave/linux
Pull btrfs fixes from David Sterba:
"A few fixes for btrfs:
- blkcg accounting problem with compression that could stall writes
- setting up blkcg bio for compression crashes due to NULL bdev
pointer
- fix possible infinite loop in writeback for nocow files (here
possible means almost impossible, 13 things that need to happen to
trigger it)"
* tag 'for-5.5-rc4-tag' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kdave/linux:
Btrfs: fix infinite loop during nocow writeback due to race
btrfs: fix compressed write bio blkcg attribution
btrfs: punt all bios created in btrfs_submit_compressed_write()
LTP memfd_create04 started failing for some huge page sizes
after v5.4-10135-gc3bfc5dd73c6.
The problem is the check introduced to for_each_hstate() loop that
should skip default_hstate_idx. Since it doesn't update 'i' counter,
all subsequent huge page sizes are skipped as well.
Fixes: 8fc312b32b ("mm/hugetlbfs: fix error handling when setting up mounts")
Signed-off-by: Jan Stancek <jstancek@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
This reverts commit 8243186f0c ("fs: remove ksys_dup()") and the
subsequent fix for it in commit 2d3145f8d2 ("early init: fix error
handling when opening /dev/console").
Trying to use filp_open() and f_dupfd() instead of pseudo-syscalls
caused more trouble than what is worth it: it requires accessing vfs
internals and it turns out there were other bugs in it too.
In particular, the file reference counting was wrong - because unlike
the original "open+2*dup" sequence it used "filp_open+3*f_dupfd" and
thus had an extra leaked file reference.
That in turn then caused odd problems with Androidx86 long after boot
becaue of how the extra reference to the console kept the session active
even after all file descriptors had been closed.
Reported-by: youling 257 <youling257@gmail.com>
Cc: Arvind Sankar <nivedita@alum.mit.edu>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
The ram_core.c routines treat przs as circular buffers. When writing a
new crash dump, the old buffer needs to be cleared so that the new dump
doesn't end up in the wrong place (i.e. at the end).
The solution to this problem is to reset the circular buffer state before
writing a new Oops dump.
Signed-off-by: Aleksandr Yashkin <a.yashkin@inango-systems.com>
Signed-off-by: Nikolay Merinov <n.merinov@inango-systems.com>
Signed-off-by: Ariel Gilman <a.gilman@inango-systems.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191223133816.28155-1-n.merinov@inango-systems.com
Fixes: 896fc1f0c4 ("pstore/ram: Switch to persistent_ram routines")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
