The data being queried isn't always the current profile and a lookup
relative to the current profile should be done.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
The namespace being passed into the replace/remove profiles fns() is
not the view, but the namespace specified by the inode from the
file hook (if present) or the loading tasks ns, if accessing the
top level virtualized load/replace file interface.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Currently lookups are restricted to a single ns component in the
path. However when namespaces are allowed to have separate views, and
scopes this will not be sufficient, as it will be possible to have
a multiple component ns path in scope.
Add some ns lookup fns() to allow this and use them.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Allow userspace to query a profile about permissions, through the
transaction interface that is already used to allow userspace to
query about key,value data.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
The simple_transaction interface is slow. It requires 4 syscalls
(open, write, read, close) per query and shares a single lock for each
queries.
So replace its use with a compatible in multi_transaction interface.
It allows for a faster 2 syscall pattern per query. After an initial
open, an arbitrary number of writes and reads can be issued. Each
write will reset the query with new data that can be read. Reads do
not clear the data, and can be issued multiple times, and used with
seek, until a new write is performed which will reset the data
available and the seek position.
Note: this keeps the single lock design, if needed moving to a per
file lock will have to come later.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
gsettings mediation needs to be able to determine if apparmor supports
label data queries. A label data query can be done to test for support
but its failure is indistinguishable from other failures, making it an
unreliable indicator.
Fix by making support of label data queries available as a flag in the
apparmorfs features dir tree.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
When setting up namespaces for containers its easier for them to use
an fs interface to create the namespace for the containers
policy. Allow mkdir/rmdir under the policy/namespaces/ dir to be used
to create and remove namespaces.
BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1611078
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Add a policy revision file to find the current revision of a ns's policy.
There is a revision file per ns, as well as a virtualized global revision
file in the base apparmor fs directory. The global revision file when
opened will provide the revision of the opening task namespace.
The revision file can be waited on via select/poll to detect apparmor
policy changes from the last read revision of the opened file. This
means that the revision file must be read after the select/poll other
wise update data will remain ready for reading.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Virtualize the apparmor policy/ directory so that the current
namespace affects what part of policy is seen. To do this convert to
using apparmorfs for policy namespace files and setup a magic symlink
in the securityfs apparmor dir to access those files.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
prefixes are used for fns/data that are not static to apparmorfs.c
with the prefixes being
aafs - special magic apparmorfs for policy namespace data
aa_sfs - for fns/data that go into securityfs
aa_fs - for fns/data that may be used in the either of aafs or
securityfs
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
AppArmor policy needs to be able to be resolved based on the policy
namespace a task is confined by. Add a base apparmorfs filesystem that
(like nsfs) will exist as a kern mount and be accessed via jump_link
through a securityfs file.
Setup the base apparmorfs fns and data, but don't use it yet.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
The loaddata sets cover more than just a single profile and should
be tracked at the ns level. Move the load data files under the namespace
and reference the files from the profiles via a symlink.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Dynamically allocating buffers is problematic and is an extra layer
that is a potntial point of failure and can slow down mediation.
Change path lookup to use the preallocated per cpu buffers.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
When using a strictly POSIX-compliant shell, "-n #define ..." gets
written into the file. Use "printf '%s'" to avoid this.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Schneider <qsx@qsx.re>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
We can either return PTR_ERR(NULL) or a PTR_ERR(a valid pointer) here.
Returning NULL is probably not good, but since this happens at boot
then we are probably already toasted if we were to hit this bug in real
life. In other words, it seems like a very low severity bug to me.
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Two single characters (line breaks) should be put into a sequence.
Thus use the corresponding function "seq_putc".
This issue was detected by using the Coccinelle software.
Signed-off-by: Markus Elfring <elfring@users.sourceforge.net>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
A bit of data was put into a sequence by two separate function calls.
Print the same data by a single function call instead.
Signed-off-by: Markus Elfring <elfring@users.sourceforge.net>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Adjusts for ReST markup and moves under LSM admin guide.
Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
CURRENT_TIME macro is not y2038 safe on 32 bit systems.
The patch replaces all the uses of CURRENT_TIME by current_time().
This is also in preparation for the patch that transitions vfs
timestamps to use 64 bit time and hence make them y2038 safe.
current_time() is also planned to be transitioned to y2038 safe behavior
along with this change.
CURRENT_TIME macro will be deleted before merging the aforementioned
change.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1491613030-11599-11-git-send-email-deepa.kernel@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Deepa Dinamani <deepa.kernel@gmail.com>
Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Patch series "kvmalloc", v5.
There are many open coded kmalloc with vmalloc fallback instances in the
tree. Most of them are not careful enough or simply do not care about
the underlying semantic of the kmalloc/page allocator which means that
a) some vmalloc fallbacks are basically unreachable because the kmalloc
part will keep retrying until it succeeds b) the page allocator can
invoke a really disruptive steps like the OOM killer to move forward
which doesn't sound appropriate when we consider that the vmalloc
fallback is available.
As it can be seen implementing kvmalloc requires quite an intimate
knowledge if the page allocator and the memory reclaim internals which
strongly suggests that a helper should be implemented in the memory
subsystem proper.
Most callers, I could find, have been converted to use the helper
instead. This is patch 6. There are some more relying on __GFP_REPEAT
in the networking stack which I have converted as well and Eric Dumazet
was not opposed [2] to convert them as well.
[1] http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170130094940.13546-1-mhocko@kernel.org
[2] http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1485273626.16328.301.camel@edumazet-glaptop3.roam.corp.google.com
This patch (of 9):
Using kmalloc with the vmalloc fallback for larger allocations is a
common pattern in the kernel code. Yet we do not have any common helper
for that and so users have invented their own helpers. Some of them are
really creative when doing so. Let's just add kv[mz]alloc and make sure
it is implemented properly. This implementation makes sure to not make
a large memory pressure for > PAGE_SZE requests (__GFP_NORETRY) and also
to not warn about allocation failures. This also rules out the OOM
killer as the vmalloc is a more approapriate fallback than a disruptive
user visible action.
This patch also changes some existing users and removes helpers which
are specific for them. In some cases this is not possible (e.g.
ext4_kvmalloc, libcfs_kvzalloc) because those seems to be broken and
require GFP_NO{FS,IO} context which is not vmalloc compatible in general
(note that the page table allocation is GFP_KERNEL). Those need to be
fixed separately.
While we are at it, document that __vmalloc{_node} about unsupported gfp
mask because there seems to be a lot of confusion out there.
kvmalloc_node will warn about GFP_KERNEL incompatible (which are not
superset) flags to catch new abusers. Existing ones would have to die
slowly.
[sfr@canb.auug.org.au: f2fs fixup]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170320163735.332e64b7@canb.auug.org.au
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170306103032.2540-2-mhocko@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Dilger <adilger@dilger.ca> [ext4 part]
Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: John Hubbard <jhubbard@nvidia.com>
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Boot parameters are written before apparmor is ready to answer whether
the user is policy_view_capable(). Setting the parameters at boot results
in an oops and failure to boot. Setting the parameters at boot is
obviously allowed so skip the permission check when apparmor is not
initialized.
While we are at it move the more complicated check to last.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Once the loop on lines 836-853 is complete and exits normally, ent is a
pointer to the dummy list head value. The derefernces accessible from eg
the goto fail on line 860 or the various goto fail_lock's afterwards thus
seem incorrect.
Reported-by: Julia Lawall <julia.lawall@lip6.fr>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
When building the kernel with clang, the compiler fails to build
security/apparmor/crypto.c with the following error:
security/apparmor/crypto.c:36:8: error: fields must have a constant
size: 'variable length array in structure' extension will never be
supported
char ctx[crypto_shash_descsize(apparmor_tfm)];
^
Since commit a0a77af141 ("crypto: LLVMLinux: Add macro to remove use
of VLAIS in crypto code"), include/crypto/hash.h defines
SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK to work around this issue. Use it in aa_calc_hash()
and aa_calc_profile_hash().
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Iooss <nicolas.iooss_linux@m4x.org>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Add the _APPARMOR substring to reference the intended Kconfig option.
Signed-off-by: Valentin Rothberg <valentinrothberg@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
security/apparmor/lib.c:132:9-10: WARNING: return of 0/1 in function 'aa_policy_init' with return type bool
Return statements in functions returning bool should use
true/false instead of 1/0.
Generated by: scripts/coccinelle/misc/boolreturn.cocci
Signed-off-by: Fengguang Wu <fengguang.wu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Mark all of the registration hooks as __ro_after_init (via the
__lsm_ro_after_init macro).
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
We don't actually need the full rculist.h header in sched.h anymore,
we will be able to include the smaller rcupdate.h header instead.
But first update code that relied on the implicit header inclusion.
Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Add #include <linux/cred.h> dependencies to all .c files rely on sched.h
doing that for them.
Note that even if the count where we need to add extra headers seems high,
it's still a net win, because <linux/sched.h> is included in over
2,200 files ...
Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Pull namespace updates from Eric Biederman:
"There is a lot here. A lot of these changes result in subtle user
visible differences in kernel behavior. I don't expect anything will
care but I will revert/fix things immediately if any regressions show
up.
From Seth Forshee there is a continuation of the work to make the vfs
ready for unpriviled mounts. We had thought the previous changes
prevented the creation of files outside of s_user_ns of a filesystem,
but it turns we missed the O_CREAT path. Ooops.
Pavel Tikhomirov and Oleg Nesterov worked together to fix a long
standing bug in the implemenation of PR_SET_CHILD_SUBREAPER where only
children that are forked after the prctl are considered and not
children forked before the prctl. The only known user of this prctl
systemd forks all children after the prctl. So no userspace
regressions will occur. Holding earlier forked children to the same
rules as later forked children creates a semantic that is sane enough
to allow checkpoing of processes that use this feature.
There is a long delayed change by Nikolay Borisov to limit inotify
instances inside a user namespace.
Michael Kerrisk extends the API for files used to maniuplate
namespaces with two new trivial ioctls to allow discovery of the
hierachy and properties of namespaces.
Konstantin Khlebnikov with the help of Al Viro adds code that when a
network namespace exits purges it's sysctl entries from the dcache. As
in some circumstances this could use a lot of memory.
Vivek Goyal fixed a bug with stacked filesystems where the permissions
on the wrong inode were being checked.
I continue previous work on ptracing across exec. Allowing a file to
be setuid across exec while being ptraced if the tracer has enough
credentials in the user namespace, and if the process has CAP_SETUID
in it's own namespace. Proc files for setuid or otherwise undumpable
executables are now owned by the root in the user namespace of their
mm. Allowing debugging of setuid applications in containers to work
better.
A bug I introduced with permission checking and automount is now
fixed. The big change is to mark the mounts that the kernel initiates
as a result of an automount. This allows the permission checks in sget
to be safely suppressed for this kind of mount. As the permission
check happened when the original filesystem was mounted.
Finally a special case in the mount namespace is removed preventing
unbounded chains in the mount hash table, and making the semantics
simpler which benefits CRIU.
The vfs fix along with related work in ima and evm I believe makes us
ready to finish developing and merge fully unprivileged mounts of the
fuse filesystem. The cleanups of the mount namespace makes discussing
how to fix the worst case complexity of umount. The stacked filesystem
fixes pave the way for adding multiple mappings for the filesystem
uids so that efficient and safer containers can be implemented"
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace:
proc/sysctl: Don't grab i_lock under sysctl_lock.
vfs: Use upper filesystem inode in bprm_fill_uid()
proc/sysctl: prune stale dentries during unregistering
mnt: Tuck mounts under others instead of creating shadow/side mounts.
prctl: propagate has_child_subreaper flag to every descendant
introduce the walk_process_tree() helper
nsfs: Add an ioctl() to return owner UID of a userns
fs: Better permission checking for submounts
exit: fix the setns() && PR_SET_CHILD_SUBREAPER interaction
vfs: open() with O_CREAT should not create inodes with unknown ids
nsfs: Add an ioctl() to return the namespace type
proc: Better ownership of files for non-dumpable tasks in user namespaces
exec: Remove LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP
exec: Test the ptracer's saved cred to see if the tracee can gain caps
exec: Don't reset euid and egid when the tracee has CAP_SETUID
inotify: Convert to using per-namespace limits
Pull security layer updates from James Morris:
"Highlights:
- major AppArmor update: policy namespaces & lots of fixes
- add /sys/kernel/security/lsm node for easy detection of loaded LSMs
- SELinux cgroupfs labeling support
- SELinux context mounts on tmpfs, ramfs, devpts within user
namespaces
- improved TPM 2.0 support"
* 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (117 commits)
tpm: declare tpm2_get_pcr_allocation() as static
tpm: Fix expected number of response bytes of TPM1.2 PCR Extend
tpm xen: drop unneeded chip variable
tpm: fix misspelled "facilitate" in module parameter description
tpm_tis: fix the error handling of init_tis()
KEYS: Use memzero_explicit() for secret data
KEYS: Fix an error code in request_master_key()
sign-file: fix build error in sign-file.c with libressl
selinux: allow changing labels for cgroupfs
selinux: fix off-by-one in setprocattr
tpm: silence an array overflow warning
tpm: fix the type of owned field in cap_t
tpm: add securityfs support for TPM 2.0 firmware event log
tpm: enhance read_log_of() to support Physical TPM event log
tpm: enhance TPM 2.0 PCR extend to support multiple banks
tpm: implement TPM 2.0 capability to get active PCR banks
tpm: fix RC value check in tpm2_seal_trusted
tpm_tis: fix iTPM probe via probe_itpm() function
tpm: Begin the process to deprecate user_read_timer
tpm: remove tpm_read_index and tpm_write_index from tpm.h
...
With previous changes every location that tests for
LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP also tests for LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE making the
LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP redundant, so remove it.
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
I am still tired of having to find indirect ways to determine
what security modules are active on a system. I have added
/sys/kernel/security/lsm, which contains a comma separated
list of the active security modules. No more groping around
in /proc/filesystems or other clever hacks.
Unchanged from previous versions except for being updated
to the latest security next branch.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
The kernel build bot turned up a bad config combination when
CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR is y and CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_HASH is n,
resulting in the build error
security/built-in.o: In function `aa_unpack':
(.text+0x841e2): undefined reference to `aa_g_hash_policy'
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
If this sysctl is set to non-zero and a process with CAP_MAC_ADMIN in
the root namespace has created an AppArmor policy namespace,
unprivileged processes will be able to change to a profile in the
newly created AppArmor policy namespace and, if the profile allows
CAP_MAC_ADMIN and appropriate file permissions, will be able to load
policy in the respective policy namespace.
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Allow a profile to carry extra data that can be queried via userspace.
This provides a means to store extra data in a profile that a trusted
helper can extract and use from live policy.
Signed-off-by: William Hua <william.hua@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
apparmor should be checking the SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT constant. Also
in complain mode make it so apparmor can elect to log a message,
informing of the check.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Allow turning off the computation of the policy hashes via the
apparmor.hash_policy kernel parameter.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Moving the use of fqname to later allows learning profiles to be based
on the fqname request instead of just the hname. It also allows cleaning
up some of the name parsing and lookup by allowing the use of
the fqlookupn_profile() lib fn.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
The aad macro can replace aad strings when it is not intended to. Switch
to a fn macro so it is only applied when intended.
Also at the same time cleanup audit_data initialization by putting
common boiler plate behind a macro, and dropping the gfp_t parameter
which will become useless.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Having ops be an integer that is an index into an op name table is
awkward and brittle. Every op change requires an edit for both the
op constant and a string in the table. Instead switch to using const
strings directly, eliminating the need for the table that needs to
be kept in sync.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Trying to update the task cred while the task current cred is not the
real cred will result in an error at the cred layer. Avoid this by
failing early and delaying the update.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Verify that profiles in a load set specify the same policy ns and
audit the name of the policy ns that policy is being loaded for.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Store loaded policy and allow introspecting it through apparmorfs. This
has several uses from debugging, policy validation, and policy checkpoint
and restore for containers.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Policy management will be expanded beyond traditional unconfined root.
This will require knowning the profile of the task doing the management
and the ns view.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Prepare for a tighter pairing of user namespaces and apparmor policy
namespaces, by making the ns to be viewed available.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Prepare for a tighter pairing of user namespaces and apparmor policy
namespaces, by making the ns to be viewed available and checking
that the user namespace level is the same as the policy ns level.
This strict pairing will be relaxed once true support of user namespaces
lands.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Borrow the special null device file from selinux to "close" fds that
don't have sufficient permissions at exec time.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Commit 9f834ec18d ("binfmt_elf: switch to new creds when switching to new mm")
changed when the creds are installed by the binfmt_elf handler. This
affects which creds are used to mmap the executable into the address
space. Which can have an affect on apparmor policy.
Add a flag to apparmor at
/sys/kernel/security/apparmor/features/domain/fix_binfmt_elf_mmap
to make it possible to detect this semantic change so that the userspace
tools and the regression test suite can correctly deal with the change.
BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1630069
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Instead of testing whether a given dfa exists in every code path, have
a default null dfa that is used when loaded policy doesn't provide a
dfa.
This will let us get rid of special casing and avoid dereference bugs
when special casing is missed.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Newer policy will combine the file and policydb dfas, allowing for
better optimizations. However to support older policy we need to
keep the ability to address the "file" dfa separately. So dup
the policydb as if it is the file dfa and set the appropriate start
state.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
The dfa is currently setup to be shared (has the basis of refcounting)
but currently can't be because the count can't be increased.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Newer policy encodes more than just version in the version tag,
so add masking to make sure the comparison remains correct.
Note: this is fully compatible with older policy as it will never set
the bits being masked out.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
When possible its better to name a learning profile after the missing
profile in question. This allows for both more informative names and
for profile reuse.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
prepare_ns() will need to be called from alternate views, and namespaces
will need to be created via different interfaces. So refactor and
allow specifying the view ns.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Rename to indicate the test is only about whether path mediation is used,
not whether other types of mediation might be used.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Policy namespaces will be diverging from profile management and
expanding so put it in its own file.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Prepare to mark sensitive kernel structures for randomization by making
sure they're using designated initializers. These were identified during
allyesconfig builds of x86, arm, and arm64, with most initializer fixes
extracted from grsecurity.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Calling kmalloc(GFP_NOIO) with order == PAGE_ALLOC_COSTLY_ORDER is not
recommended because it might fall into infinite retry loop without
invoking the OOM killer.
Since aa_dfa_unpack() is the only caller of kvzalloc() and
aa_dfa_unpack() which is calling kvzalloc() via unpack_table() is
doing kzalloc(GFP_KERNEL), it is safe to use GFP_KERNEL from
__aa_kvmalloc().
Since aa_simple_write_to_buffer() is the only caller of kvmalloc()
and aa_simple_write_to_buffer() is calling copy_from_user() which
is GFP_KERNEL context (see memdup_user_nul()), it is safe to use
GFP_KERNEL from __aa_kvmalloc().
Therefore, replace GFP_NOIO with GFP_KERNEL. Also, since we have
vmalloc() fallback, add __GFP_NORETRY so that we don't invoke the OOM
killer by kmalloc(GFP_KERNEL) with order == PAGE_ALLOC_COSTLY_ORDER.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
For some obscure reason apparmor thinks its needs to locally implement
kref primitives that already exist. Stop doing this.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Processes can only alter their own security attributes via
/proc/pid/attr nodes. This is presently enforced by each individual
security module and is also imposed by the Linux credentials
implementation, which only allows a task to alter its own credentials.
Move the check enforcing this restriction from the individual
security modules to proc_pid_attr_write() before calling the security hook,
and drop the unnecessary task argument to the security hook since it can
only ever be the current task.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
After a policy replacement, the task cred may be out of date and need
to be updated. However change_hat is using the stale profiles from
the out of date cred resulting in either: a stale profile being applied
or, incorrect failure when searching for a hat profile as it has been
migrated to the new parent profile.
Fixes: 01e2b670aa (failure to find hat)
Fixes: 898127c34e (stale policy being applied)
Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.suse.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1000287
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
CURRENT_TIME macro is not appropriate for filesystems as it
doesn't use the right granularity for filesystem timestamps.
Use current_time() instead.
CURRENT_TIME is also not y2038 safe.
This is also in preparation for the patch that transitions
vfs timestamps to use 64 bit time and hence make them
y2038 safe. As part of the effort current_time() will be
extended to do range checks. Hence, it is necessary for all
file system timestamps to use current_time(). Also,
current_time() will be transitioned along with vfs to be
y2038 safe.
Note that whenever a single call to current_time() is used
to change timestamps in different inodes, it is because they
share the same time granularity.
Signed-off-by: Deepa Dinamani <deepa.kernel@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Acked-by: Felipe Balbi <balbi@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Steven Whitehouse <swhiteho@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Ryusuke Konishi <konishi.ryusuke@lab.ntt.co.jp>
Acked-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
The newly added Kconfig option could never work and just causes a build error
when disabled:
security/apparmor/lsm.c:675:25: error: 'CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_HASH_DEFAULT' undeclared here (not in a function)
bool aa_g_hash_policy = CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_HASH_DEFAULT;
The problem is that the macro undefined in this case, and we need to use the IS_ENABLED()
helper to turn it into a boolean constant.
Another minor problem with the original patch is that the option is even offered
in sysfs when SECURITY_APPARMOR_HASH is not enabled, so this also hides the option
in that case.
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Fixes: 6059f71f1e ("apparmor: add parameter to control whether policy hashing is used")
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
When proc_pid_attr_write() was changed to use memdup_user apparmor's
(interface violating) assumption that the setprocattr buffer was always
a single page was violated.
The size test is not strictly speaking needed as proc_pid_attr_write()
will reject anything larger, but for the sake of robustness we can keep
it in.
SMACK and SELinux look safe to me, but somebody else should probably
have a look just in case.
Based on original patch from Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
modified for the case that apparmor provides null termination.
Fixes: bb646cdb12
Reported-by: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Do not copy uninitalized fields th.td_hilen, th.td_data.
Signed-off-by: Heinrich Schuchardt <xypron.glpk@gmx.de>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
the policy_lock parameter is a one way switch that prevents policy
from being further modified. Unfortunately some of the module parameters
can effectively modify policy by turning off enforcement.
split policy_admin_capable into a view check and a full admin check,
and update the admin check to test the policy_lock parameter.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1592547
If unpack_dfa() returns NULL due to the dfa not being present,
profile_unpack() is not checking if the dfa is not present (NULL).
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
While using AppArmor, SYS_CAP_RESOURCE is insufficient to call prlimit
on another task. The only other example of a AppArmor mediating access to
another, already running, task (ignoring fork+exec) is ptrace.
The AppArmor model for ptrace is that one of the following must be true:
1) The tracer is unconfined
2) The tracer is in complain mode
3) The tracer and tracee are confined by the same profile
4) The tracer is confined but has SYS_CAP_PTRACE
1), 2, and 3) are already true for setrlimit.
We can match the ptrace model just by allowing CAP_SYS_RESOURCE.
We still test the values of the rlimit since it can always be overridden
using a value that means unlimited for a particular resource.
Signed-off-by: Jeff Mahoney <jeffm@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
list_next_entry has been defined in list.h, so I replace list_entry_next
with it.
Signed-off-by: Geliang Tang <geliangtang@163.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
When finding a child profile via an rcu critical section, the profile
may be put and scheduled for deletion after the child is found but
before its refcount is incremented.
Protect against this by repeating the lookup if the profiles refcount
is 0 and is one its way to deletion.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com>
The target profile name was not being correctly audited in a few
cases because the target variable was not being set and gotos
passed the code to set it at apply:
Since it is always based on new_profile just drop the target var
and conditionally report based on new_profile.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com>
Currently logging of a successful profile load only logs the basename
of the profile. This can result in confusion when a child profile has
the same name as the another profile in the set. Logging the hname
will ensure there is no confusion.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com>
currently only the profile that is causing the failure is logged. This
makes it more confusing than necessary about which profiles loaded
and which didn't. So make sure to log success and failure messages for
all profiles in the set being loaded.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com>
Internal mounts are not mounted anywhere and as such should be treated
as disconnected paths.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com>
Bind mounts can fail to be properly reconnected when PATH_CONNECT is
specified. Ensure that when PATH_CONNECT is specified the path has
a root.
BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1319984
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com>
The current behavior is confusing as it causes exec failures to report
the executable is missing instead of identifying that apparmor
caused the failure.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com>
When set atomic replacement is used and the parent is updated before the
child, and the child did not exist in the old parent so there is no
direct replacement then the new child is incorrectly added to the old
parent. This results in the new parent not having the child(ren) that
it should and the old parent when being destroyed asserting the
following error.
AppArmor: policy_destroy: internal error, policy '<profile/name>' still
contains profiles
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com>
The crypto framework can be built as a loadable module, but the
apparmor hash code can only be built-in, which then causes a
link error:
security/built-in.o: In function `aa_calc_profile_hash':
integrity_audit.c:(.text+0x21610): undefined reference to `crypto_shash_update'
security/built-in.o: In function `init_profile_hash':
integrity_audit.c:(.init.text+0xb4c): undefined reference to `crypto_alloc_shash'
This changes Apparmor to use 'select CRYPTO' like a lot of other
subsystems do.
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Main excitement here is Peter Zijlstra's lockless rbtree optimization to
speed module address lookup. He found some abusers of the module lock
doing that too.
A little bit of parameter work here too; including Dan Streetman's breaking
up the big param mutex so writing a parameter can load another module (yeah,
really). Unfortunately that broke the usual suspects, !CONFIG_MODULES and
!CONFIG_SYSFS, so those fixes were appended too.
Cheers,
Rusty.
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Merge tag 'modules-next-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rusty/linux
Pull module updates from Rusty Russell:
"Main excitement here is Peter Zijlstra's lockless rbtree optimization
to speed module address lookup. He found some abusers of the module
lock doing that too.
A little bit of parameter work here too; including Dan Streetman's
breaking up the big param mutex so writing a parameter can load
another module (yeah, really). Unfortunately that broke the usual
suspects, !CONFIG_MODULES and !CONFIG_SYSFS, so those fixes were
appended too"
* tag 'modules-next-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rusty/linux: (26 commits)
modules: only use mod->param_lock if CONFIG_MODULES
param: fix module param locks when !CONFIG_SYSFS.
rcu: merge fix for Convert ACCESS_ONCE() to READ_ONCE() and WRITE_ONCE()
module: add per-module param_lock
module: make perm const
params: suppress unused variable error, warn once just in case code changes.
modules: clarify CONFIG_MODULE_COMPRESS help, suggest 'N'.
kernel/module.c: avoid ifdefs for sig_enforce declaration
kernel/workqueue.c: remove ifdefs over wq_power_efficient
kernel/params.c: export param_ops_bool_enable_only
kernel/params.c: generalize bool_enable_only
kernel/module.c: use generic module param operaters for sig_enforce
kernel/params: constify struct kernel_param_ops uses
sysfs: tightened sysfs permission checks
module: Rework module_addr_{min,max}
module: Use __module_address() for module_address_lookup()
module: Make the mod_tree stuff conditional on PERF_EVENTS || TRACING
module: Optimize __module_address() using a latched RB-tree
rbtree: Implement generic latch_tree
seqlock: Introduce raw_read_seqcount_latch()
...
Most code already uses consts for the struct kernel_param_ops,
sweep the kernel for the last offending stragglers. Other than
include/linux/moduleparam.h and kernel/params.c all other changes
were generated with the following Coccinelle SmPL patch. Merge
conflicts between trees can be handled with Coccinelle.
In the future git could get Coccinelle merge support to deal with
patch --> fail --> grammar --> Coccinelle --> new patch conflicts
automatically for us on patches where the grammar is available and
the patch is of high confidence. Consider this a feature request.
Test compiled on x86_64 against:
* allnoconfig
* allmodconfig
* allyesconfig
@ const_found @
identifier ops;
@@
const struct kernel_param_ops ops = {
};
@ const_not_found depends on !const_found @
identifier ops;
@@
-struct kernel_param_ops ops = {
+const struct kernel_param_ops ops = {
};
Generated-by: Coccinelle SmPL
Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Cc: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: cocci@systeme.lip6.fr
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Luis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Instead of using a vector of security operations
with explicit, special case stacking of the capability
and yama hooks use lists of hooks with capability and
yama hooks included as appropriate.
The security_operations structure is no longer required.
Instead, there is a union of the function pointers that
allows all the hooks lists to use a common mechanism for
list management while retaining typing. Each module
supplies an array describing the hooks it provides instead
of a sparsely populated security_operations structure.
The description includes the element that gets put on
the hook list, avoiding the issues surrounding individual
element allocation.
The method for registering security modules is changed to
reflect the information available. The method for removing
a module, currently only used by SELinux, has also changed.
It should be generic now, however if there are potential
race conditions based on ordering of hook removal that needs
to be addressed by the calling module.
The security hooks are called from the lists and the first
failure is returned.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Add a list header for each security hook. They aren't used until
later in the patch series. They are grouped together in a structure
so that there doesn't need to be an external address for each.
Macro-ize the initialization of the security_operations
for each security module in anticipation of changing out
the security_operations structure.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
The security.h header file serves two purposes,
interfaces for users of the security modules and
interfaces for security modules. Users of the
security modules don't need to know about what's
in the security_operations structure, so pull it
out into it's own header, lsm_hooks.h
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
... except where that code acts as a filesystem driver, rather than
working with dentries given to it.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
most of the ->d_inode uses there refer to the same inode IO would
go to, i.e. d_backing_inode()
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Use d_is_positive(dentry) or d_is_negative(dentry) rather than testing
dentry->d_inode as the dentry may cover another layer that has an inode when
the top layer doesn't or may hold a 0,0 chardev that's actually a whiteout.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
mediated_filesystem() should use dentry->d_sb not dentry->d_inode->i_sb and
should avoid file_inode() also since it is really dealing with the path.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Make it clear this is about kernel_param_ops, not kernel_param (which
will soon have a flags field of its own). No functional changes.
Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Cc: Jean Delvare <khali@linux-fr.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Li Zhong <zhong@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Jon Mason <jon.mason@intel.com>
Cc: Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch>
Signed-off-by: Jani Nikula <jani.nikula@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Since seccomp transitions between threads requires updates to the
no_new_privs flag to be atomic, the flag must be part of an atomic flag
set. This moves the nnp flag into a separate task field, and introduces
accessors.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
The usage of strict_strto*() is not preferred, because
strict_strto*() is obsolete. Thus, kstrto*() should be
used.
Signed-off-by: Jingoo Han <jg1.han@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris:
"In this patchset, we finally get an SELinux update, with Paul Moore
taking over as maintainer of that code.
Also a significant update for the Keys subsystem, as well as
maintenance updates to Smack, IMA, TPM, and Apparmor"
and since I wanted to know more about the updates to key handling,
here's the explanation from David Howells on that:
"Okay. There are a number of separate bits. I'll go over the big bits
and the odd important other bit, most of the smaller bits are just
fixes and cleanups. If you want the small bits accounting for, I can
do that too.
(1) Keyring capacity expansion.
KEYS: Consolidate the concept of an 'index key' for key access
KEYS: Introduce a search context structure
KEYS: Search for auth-key by name rather than target key ID
Add a generic associative array implementation.
KEYS: Expand the capacity of a keyring
Several of the patches are providing an expansion of the capacity of a
keyring. Currently, the maximum size of a keyring payload is one page.
Subtract a small header and then divide up into pointers, that only gives
you ~500 pointers on an x86_64 box. However, since the NFS idmapper uses
a keyring to store ID mapping data, that has proven to be insufficient to
the cause.
Whatever data structure I use to handle the keyring payload, it can only
store pointers to keys, not the keys themselves because several keyrings
may point to a single key. This precludes inserting, say, and rb_node
struct into the key struct for this purpose.
I could make an rbtree of records such that each record has an rb_node
and a key pointer, but that would use four words of space per key stored
in the keyring. It would, however, be able to use much existing code.
I selected instead a non-rebalancing radix-tree type approach as that
could have a better space-used/key-pointer ratio. I could have used the
radix tree implementation that we already have and insert keys into it by
their serial numbers, but that means any sort of search must iterate over
the whole radix tree. Further, its nodes are a bit on the capacious side
for what I want - especially given that key serial numbers are randomly
allocated, thus leaving a lot of empty space in the tree.
So what I have is an associative array that internally is a radix-tree
with 16 pointers per node where the index key is constructed from the key
type pointer and the key description. This means that an exact lookup by
type+description is very fast as this tells us how to navigate directly to
the target key.
I made the data structure general in lib/assoc_array.c as far as it is
concerned, its index key is just a sequence of bits that leads to a
pointer. It's possible that someone else will be able to make use of it
also. FS-Cache might, for example.
(2) Mark keys as 'trusted' and keyrings as 'trusted only'.
KEYS: verify a certificate is signed by a 'trusted' key
KEYS: Make the system 'trusted' keyring viewable by userspace
KEYS: Add a 'trusted' flag and a 'trusted only' flag
KEYS: Separate the kernel signature checking keyring from module signing
These patches allow keys carrying asymmetric public keys to be marked as
being 'trusted' and allow keyrings to be marked as only permitting the
addition or linkage of trusted keys.
Keys loaded from hardware during kernel boot or compiled into the kernel
during build are marked as being trusted automatically. New keys can be
loaded at runtime with add_key(). They are checked against the system
keyring contents and if their signatures can be validated with keys that
are already marked trusted, then they are marked trusted also and can
thus be added into the master keyring.
Patches from Mimi Zohar make this usable with the IMA keyrings also.
(3) Remove the date checks on the key used to validate a module signature.
X.509: Remove certificate date checks
It's not reasonable to reject a signature just because the key that it was
generated with is no longer valid datewise - especially if the kernel
hasn't yet managed to set the system clock when the first module is
loaded - so just remove those checks.
(4) Make it simpler to deal with additional X.509 being loaded into the kernel.
KEYS: Load *.x509 files into kernel keyring
KEYS: Have make canonicalise the paths of the X.509 certs better to deduplicate
The builder of the kernel now just places files with the extension ".x509"
into the kernel source or build trees and they're concatenated by the
kernel build and stuffed into the appropriate section.
(5) Add support for userspace kerberos to use keyrings.
KEYS: Add per-user_namespace registers for persistent per-UID kerberos caches
KEYS: Implement a big key type that can save to tmpfs
Fedora went to, by default, storing kerberos tickets and tokens in tmpfs.
We looked at storing it in keyrings instead as that confers certain
advantages such as tickets being automatically deleted after a certain
amount of time and the ability for the kernel to get at these tokens more
easily.
To make this work, two things were needed:
(a) A way for the tickets to persist beyond the lifetime of all a user's
sessions so that cron-driven processes can still use them.
The problem is that a user's session keyrings are deleted when the
session that spawned them logs out and the user's user keyring is
deleted when the UID is deleted (typically when the last log out
happens), so neither of these places is suitable.
I've added a system keyring into which a 'persistent' keyring is
created for each UID on request. Each time a user requests their
persistent keyring, the expiry time on it is set anew. If the user
doesn't ask for it for, say, three days, the keyring is automatically
expired and garbage collected using the existing gc. All the kerberos
tokens it held are then also gc'd.
(b) A key type that can hold really big tickets (up to 1MB in size).
The problem is that Active Directory can return huge tickets with lots
of auxiliary data attached. We don't, however, want to eat up huge
tracts of unswappable kernel space for this, so if the ticket is
greater than a certain size, we create a swappable shmem file and dump
the contents in there and just live with the fact we then have an
inode and a dentry overhead. If the ticket is smaller than that, we
slap it in a kmalloc()'d buffer"
* 'for-linus2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (121 commits)
KEYS: Fix keyring content gc scanner
KEYS: Fix error handling in big_key instantiation
KEYS: Fix UID check in keyctl_get_persistent()
KEYS: The RSA public key algorithm needs to select MPILIB
ima: define '_ima' as a builtin 'trusted' keyring
ima: extend the measurement list to include the file signature
kernel/system_certificate.S: use real contents instead of macro GLOBAL()
KEYS: fix error return code in big_key_instantiate()
KEYS: Fix keyring quota misaccounting on key replacement and unlink
KEYS: Fix a race between negating a key and reading the error set
KEYS: Make BIG_KEYS boolean
apparmor: remove the "task" arg from may_change_ptraced_domain()
apparmor: remove parent task info from audit logging
apparmor: remove tsk field from the apparmor_audit_struct
apparmor: fix capability to not use the current task, during reporting
Smack: Ptrace access check mode
ima: provide hash algo info in the xattr
ima: enable support for larger default filedata hash algorithms
ima: define kernel parameter 'ima_template=' to change configured default
ima: add Kconfig default measurement list template
...
Unless task == current ptrace_parent(task) is not safe even under
rcu_read_lock() and most of the current users are not right.
So may_change_ptraced_domain(task) looks wrong as well. However it
is always called with task == current so the code is actually fine.
Remove this argument to make this fact clear.
Note: perhaps we should simply kill ptrace_parent(), it buys almost
nothing. And it is obviously racy, perhaps this should be fixed.
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
The reporting of the parent task info is a vestage from old versions of
apparmor. The need for this information was removed by unique null-
profiles before apparmor was upstreamed so remove this info from logging.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Now that aa_capabile no longer sets the task field it can be removed
and the lsm_audit version of the field can be used.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Mediation is based off of the cred but auditing includes the current
task which may not be related to the actual request.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1235977
The profile introspection seq file has a locking bug when policy is viewed
from a virtual root (task in a policy namespace), introspection from the
real root is not affected.
The test for root
while (parent) {
is correct for the real root, but incorrect for tasks in a policy namespace.
This allows the task to walk backup the policy tree past its virtual root
causing it to be unlocked before the virtual root should be in the p_stop
fn.
This results in the following lockdep back trace:
[ 78.479744] [ BUG: bad unlock balance detected! ]
[ 78.479792] 3.11.0-11-generic #17 Not tainted
[ 78.479838] -------------------------------------
[ 78.479885] grep/2223 is trying to release lock (&ns->lock) at:
[ 78.479952] [<ffffffff817bf3be>] mutex_unlock+0xe/0x10
[ 78.480002] but there are no more locks to release!
[ 78.480037]
[ 78.480037] other info that might help us debug this:
[ 78.480037] 1 lock held by grep/2223:
[ 78.480037] #0: (&p->lock){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff812111bd>] seq_read+0x3d/0x3d0
[ 78.480037]
[ 78.480037] stack backtrace:
[ 78.480037] CPU: 0 PID: 2223 Comm: grep Not tainted 3.11.0-11-generic #17
[ 78.480037] Hardware name: Bochs Bochs, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
[ 78.480037] ffffffff817bf3be ffff880007763d60 ffffffff817b97ef ffff8800189d2190
[ 78.480037] ffff880007763d88 ffffffff810e1c6e ffff88001f044730 ffff8800189d2190
[ 78.480037] ffffffff817bf3be ffff880007763e00 ffffffff810e5bd6 0000000724fe56b7
[ 78.480037] Call Trace:
[ 78.480037] [<ffffffff817bf3be>] ? mutex_unlock+0xe/0x10
[ 78.480037] [<ffffffff817b97ef>] dump_stack+0x54/0x74
[ 78.480037] [<ffffffff810e1c6e>] print_unlock_imbalance_bug+0xee/0x100
[ 78.480037] [<ffffffff817bf3be>] ? mutex_unlock+0xe/0x10
[ 78.480037] [<ffffffff810e5bd6>] lock_release_non_nested+0x226/0x300
[ 78.480037] [<ffffffff817bf2fe>] ? __mutex_unlock_slowpath+0xce/0x180
[ 78.480037] [<ffffffff817bf3be>] ? mutex_unlock+0xe/0x10
[ 78.480037] [<ffffffff810e5d5c>] lock_release+0xac/0x310
[ 78.480037] [<ffffffff817bf2b3>] __mutex_unlock_slowpath+0x83/0x180
[ 78.480037] [<ffffffff817bf3be>] mutex_unlock+0xe/0x10
[ 78.480037] [<ffffffff81376c91>] p_stop+0x51/0x90
[ 78.480037] [<ffffffff81211408>] seq_read+0x288/0x3d0
[ 78.480037] [<ffffffff811e9d9e>] vfs_read+0x9e/0x170
[ 78.480037] [<ffffffff811ea8cc>] SyS_read+0x4c/0xa0
[ 78.480037] [<ffffffff817ccc9d>] system_call_fastpath+0x1a/0x1f
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Use the shash interface, rather than the hash interface, when hashing
AppArmor profiles. The shash interface does not use scatterlists and it
is a better fit for what AppArmor needs.
This fixes a kernel paging BUG when aa_calc_profile_hash() is passed a
buffer from vmalloc(). The hash interface requires callers to handle
vmalloc() buffers differently than what AppArmor was doing. Due to
vmalloc() memory not being physically contiguous, each individual page
behind the buffer must be assigned to a scatterlist with sg_set_page()
and then the scatterlist passed to crypto_hash_update().
The shash interface does not have that limitation and allows vmalloc()
and kmalloc() buffers to be handled in the same manner.
BugLink: https://launchpad.net/bugs/1216294/
BugLink: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=62261
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris:
"Nothing major for this kernel, just maintenance updates"
* 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (21 commits)
apparmor: add the ability to report a sha1 hash of loaded policy
apparmor: export set of capabilities supported by the apparmor module
apparmor: add the profile introspection file to interface
apparmor: add an optional profile attachment string for profiles
apparmor: add interface files for profiles and namespaces
apparmor: allow setting any profile into the unconfined state
apparmor: make free_profile available outside of policy.c
apparmor: rework namespace free path
apparmor: update how unconfined is handled
apparmor: change how profile replacement update is done
apparmor: convert profile lists to RCU based locking
apparmor: provide base for multiple profiles to be replaced at once
apparmor: add a features/policy dir to interface
apparmor: enable users to query whether apparmor is enabled
apparmor: remove minimum size check for vmalloc()
Smack: parse multiple rules per write to load2, up to PAGE_SIZE-1 bytes
Smack: network label match fix
security: smack: add a hash table to quicken smk_find_entry()
security: smack: fix memleak in smk_write_rules_list()
xattr: Constify ->name member of "struct xattr".
...
The apparmor module parameters for param_ops_aabool and
param_ops_aalockpolicy are both based off of the param_ops_bool,
and can handle a NULL value passed in as val. Have it enable the
new KERNEL_PARAM_FL_NOARGS flag to allow the parameters to be set
without having to state "=y" or "=1".
Cc: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Provide userspace the ability to introspect a sha1 hash value for each
profile currently loaded.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com>
Add the dynamic namespace relative profiles file to the interace, to allow
introspection of loaded profiles and their modes.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <kees@ubuntu.com>
Add the ability to take in and report a human readable profile attachment
string for profiles so that attachment specifications can be easily
inspected.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com>
Add basic interface files to access namespace and profile information.
The interface files are created when a profile is loaded and removed
when the profile or namespace is removed.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Allow emulating the default profile behavior from boot, by allowing
loading of a profile in the unconfined state into a new NS.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com>
namespaces now completely use the unconfined profile to track the
refcount and rcu freeing cycle. So rework the code to simplify (track
everything through the profile path right up to the end), and move the
rcu_head from policy base to profile as the namespace no longer needs
it.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com>
ns->unconfined is being used read side without locking, nor rcu but is
being updated when a namespace is removed. This works for the root ns
which is never removed but has a race window and can cause failures when
children namespaces are removed.
Also ns and ns->unconfined have a circular refcounting dependency that
is problematic and must be broken. Currently this is done incorrectly
when the namespace is destroyed.
Fix this by forward referencing unconfined via the replacedby infrastructure
instead of directly updating the ns->unconfined pointer.
Remove the circular refcount dependency by making the ns and its unconfined
profile share the same refcount.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com>
remove the use of replaced by chaining and move to profile invalidation
and lookup to handle task replacement.
Replacement chaining can result in large chains of profiles being pinned
in memory when one profile in the chain is use. With implicit labeling
this will be even more of a problem, so move to a direct lookup method.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
previously profiles had to be loaded one at a time, which could result
in cases where a replacement of a set would partially succeed, and then fail
resulting in inconsistent policy.
Allow multiple profiles to replaced "atomically" so that the replacement
either succeeds or fails for the entire set of profiles.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Add a policy directory to features to contain features that can affect
policy compilation but do not affect mediation. Eg of such features would
be types of dfa compression supported, etc.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <kees@ubuntu.com>
This is a follow-up to commit b5b3ee6c "apparmor: no need to delay vfree()".
Since vmalloc() will do "size = PAGE_ALIGN(size);",
we don't need to check for "size >= sizeof(struct work_struct)".
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
vfree() can be called from interrupt contexts now
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
currently apparmor name parsing is only correctly handling
:<NS>:<profile>
but
:<NS>://<profile>
is also a valid form and what is exported to userspace.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
the exec file isn't processing its command arg. It should only set be
responding to a command of exec.
Also cleanup setprocattr some more while we are at it.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
smatch reports
error: potential NULL dereference 'ns'.
this can not actually occur because it relies on aa_split_fqname setting
both ns_name and name as null but ns_name will actually always have a
value in this case.
so remove the unnecessary if (ns_name) conditional that is resulting
in the false positive further down.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
The audit type table is missing a comma so that KILLED comes out as
KILLEDAUTO.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Steve Beattie <sbeattie@ubuntu.com>
The top 8 bits of the base field have never been used, in fact can't
be used, by the current 'dfa16' format. However they will be used in the
future as flags, so mask them off when using base as an index value.
Note: the use of the top 8 bits, without masking is trapped by the verify
checks that base entries are within the size bounds.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <kees@ubuntu.com>
Move the free_profile fn ahead of aa_alloc_profile so it can be used
in aa_alloc_profile without a forward declaration.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <kees@ubuntu.com>
The sid is not going to be a direct property of a profile anymore, instead
it will be directly related to the label, and the profile will pickup
a label back reference.
For null-profiles replace the use of sid with a per namespace unique
id.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <kees@ubuntu.com>
Instead of limiting the setting of the processes limits to current,
relax this to tasks confined by the same profile, as the apparmor
controls for rlimits are at a profile level granularity.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Steve Beattie <sbeattie@ubuntu.com>
The "permipc" command is unused and unfinished, remove it.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <kees@ubuntu.com>
-ESTALE used to be incorrectly used to indicate a disconnected path, when
name lookup failed. This was fixed in commit e1b0e444 to correctly return
-EACCESS, but the error to failure message mapping was not correctly updated
to reflect this change.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Steve Beattie <sbeattie@ubuntu.com>
When policy specifies a transition to a profile that is not currently
loaded, it result in exec being denied. However the failure is not being
audited correctly because the audit code is treating this as an allowed
permission and thus not reporting it.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-By: Steve Beattie <sbeattie@ubuntu.com>
BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1056078
Profile replacement can cause long chains of profiles to build up when
the profile being replaced is pinned. When the pinned profile is finally
freed, it puts the reference to its replacement, which may in turn nest
another call to free_profile on the stack. Because this may happen for
each profile in the replacedby chain this can result in a recusion that
causes the stack to overflow.
Break this nesting by directly walking the chain of replacedby profiles
(ie. use iteration instead of recursion to free the list). This results
in at most 2 levels of free_profile being called, while freeing a
replacedby chain.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
The capability defines have moved causing the auto generated names
of capabilities that apparmor uses in logging to be incorrect.
Fix the autogenerated table source to uapi/linux/capability.h
Reported-by: YanHong <clouds.yan@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Krzysztof Kolasa <kkolasa@winsoft.pl>
Analyzed-by: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Pull user namespace changes from Eric Biederman:
"This is a mostly modest set of changes to enable basic user namespace
support. This allows the code to code to compile with user namespaces
enabled and removes the assumption there is only the initial user
namespace. Everything is converted except for the most complex of the
filesystems: autofs4, 9p, afs, ceph, cifs, coda, fuse, gfs2, ncpfs,
nfs, ocfs2 and xfs as those patches need a bit more review.
The strategy is to push kuid_t and kgid_t values are far down into
subsystems and filesystems as reasonable. Leaving the make_kuid and
from_kuid operations to happen at the edge of userspace, as the values
come off the disk, and as the values come in from the network.
Letting compile type incompatible compile errors (present when user
namespaces are enabled) guide me to find the issues.
The most tricky areas have been the places where we had an implicit
union of uid and gid values and were storing them in an unsigned int.
Those places were converted into explicit unions. I made certain to
handle those places with simple trivial patches.
Out of that work I discovered we have generic interfaces for storing
quota by projid. I had never heard of the project identifiers before.
Adding full user namespace support for project identifiers accounts
for most of the code size growth in my git tree.
Ultimately there will be work to relax privlige checks from
"capable(FOO)" to "ns_capable(user_ns, FOO)" where it is safe allowing
root in a user names to do those things that today we only forbid to
non-root users because it will confuse suid root applications.
While I was pushing kuid_t and kgid_t changes deep into the audit code
I made a few other cleanups. I capitalized on the fact we process
netlink messages in the context of the message sender. I removed
usage of NETLINK_CRED, and started directly using current->tty.
Some of these patches have also made it into maintainer trees, with no
problems from identical code from different trees showing up in
linux-next.
After reading through all of this code I feel like I might be able to
win a game of kernel trivial pursuit."
Fix up some fairly trivial conflicts in netfilter uid/git logging code.
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace: (107 commits)
userns: Convert the ufs filesystem to use kuid/kgid where appropriate
userns: Convert the udf filesystem to use kuid/kgid where appropriate
userns: Convert ubifs to use kuid/kgid
userns: Convert squashfs to use kuid/kgid where appropriate
userns: Convert reiserfs to use kuid and kgid where appropriate
userns: Convert jfs to use kuid/kgid where appropriate
userns: Convert jffs2 to use kuid and kgid where appropriate
userns: Convert hpfs to use kuid and kgid where appropriate
userns: Convert btrfs to use kuid/kgid where appropriate
userns: Convert bfs to use kuid/kgid where appropriate
userns: Convert affs to use kuid/kgid wherwe appropriate
userns: On alpha modify linux_to_osf_stat to use convert from kuids and kgids
userns: On ia64 deal with current_uid and current_gid being kuid and kgid
userns: On ppc convert current_uid from a kuid before printing.
userns: Convert s390 getting uid and gid system calls to use kuid and kgid
userns: Convert s390 hypfs to use kuid and kgid where appropriate
userns: Convert binder ipc to use kuids
userns: Teach security_path_chown to take kuids and kgids
userns: Add user namespace support to IMA
userns: Convert EVM to deal with kuids and kgids in it's hmac computation
...
Don't make the security modules deal with raw user space uid and
gids instead pass in a kuid_t and a kgid_t so that security modules
only have to deal with internal kernel uids and gids.
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Cc: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Cc: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp>
Cc: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Commit 4fdef2183e ("AppArmor: Cleanup make
file to remove cruft and make it easier to read") removed all traces of
af_names.h from the tree. Remove its entry in AppArmor's .gitignore file
too.
Signed-off-by: Paul Bolle <pebolle@tiscali.nl>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/955892
All failures from __d_path where being treated as disconnected paths,
however __d_path can also fail when the generated pathname is too long.
The initial ENAMETOOLONG error was being lost, and ENAMETOOLONG was only
returned if the subsequent dentry_path call resulted in that error. Other
wise if the path was split across a mount point such that the dentry_path
fit within the buffer when the __d_path did not the failure was treated
as a disconnected path.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/978038
also affects apparmor portion of
BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/987371
The unconfined profile is not stored in the regular profile list, but
change_profile and exec transitions may want access to it when setting
up specialized transitions like switch to the unconfined profile of a
new policy namespace.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Add support for AppArmor to explicitly fail requested domain transitions
if NO_NEW_PRIVS is set and the task is not unconfined.
Transitions from unconfined are still allowed because this always results
in a reduction of privileges.
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
v18: new acked-by, new description
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
With this change, calling
prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0)
disables privilege granting operations at execve-time. For example, a
process will not be able to execute a setuid binary to change their uid
or gid if this bit is set. The same is true for file capabilities.
Additionally, LSM_UNSAFE_NO_NEW_PRIVS is defined to ensure that
LSMs respect the requested behavior.
To determine if the NO_NEW_PRIVS bit is set, a task may call
prctl(PR_GET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 0, 0, 0, 0);
It returns 1 if set and 0 if it is not set. If any of the arguments are
non-zero, it will return -1 and set errno to -EINVAL.
(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS behaves similarly.)
This functionality is desired for the proposed seccomp filter patch
series. By using PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, it allows a task to modify the
system call behavior for itself and its child tasks without being
able to impact the behavior of a more privileged task.
Another potential use is making certain privileged operations
unprivileged. For example, chroot may be considered "safe" if it cannot
affect privileged tasks.
Note, this patch causes execve to fail when PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS is
set and AppArmor is in use. It is fixed in a subsequent patch.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
v18: updated change desc
v17: using new define values as per 3.4
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
It isn't needed. If you don't set the type of the data associated with
that type it is a pretty obvious programming bug. So why waste the cycles?
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
apparmor is the only LSM that uses the common_audit_data tsk field.
Instead of making all LSMs pay for the stack space move the aa usage into
the apparmor_audit_data.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
It just bloats the audit data structure for no good reason, since the
only time those fields are filled are just before calling the
common_lsm_audit() function, which is also the only user of those
fields.
So just make them be the arguments to common_lsm_audit(), rather than
bloating that structure that is passed around everywhere, and is
initialized in hot paths.
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Linus found that the gigantic size of the common audit data caused a big
perf hit on something as simple as running stat() in a loop. This patch
requires LSMs to declare the LSM specific portion separately rather than
doing it in a union. Thus each LSM can be responsible for shrinking their
portion and don't have to pay a penalty just because other LSMs have a
bigger space requirement.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Fix failure in aa_change_onexec api when the request is made from a confined
task. This failure was caused by two problems
The AA_MAY_ONEXEC perm was not being mapped correctly for this case.
The executable name was being checked as second time instead of using the
requested onexec profile name, which may not be the same as the exec
profile name. This mistake can not be exploited to grant extra permission
because of the above flaw where the ONEXEC permission was not being mapped
so it will not be granted.
BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/963756
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Add the base support for the new policy extensions. This does not bring
any additional functionality, or change current semantics.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <kees@ubuntu.com>
Move the path name lookup failure messages into the main path name lookup
routine, as the information is useful in more than just aa_path_perm.
Also rename aa_get_name to aa_path_name as it is not getting a reference
counted object with a corresponding put fn.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <kees@ubuntu.com>
Update aa_dfa_match so that it doesn't result in an input string being
walked twice (once to get its length and another time to match)
Add a single step functions
aa_dfa_next
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <kees@ubuntu.com>
When __d_path and d_absolute_path fail due to the name being outside of
the current namespace no name is reported. Use dentry_path to provide
some hint as to which file was being accessed.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <kees@ubuntu.com>
Post unpacking of policy a verification pass is made on x transition
indexes. When this fails a call to audit_iface is made resulting in an
oops, because audit_iface is expecting a valid buffer position but
since the failure comes from post unpack verification there is none.
Make the position argument optional so that audit_iface can be called
from post unpack verification.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
The returning of -ESATLE when a path lookup fails as disconnected is wrong.
Since AppArmor is rejecting the access return -EACCES instead.
This also fixes a bug in complain (learning) mode where disconnected paths
are denied because -ESTALE errors are not ignored causing failures that
can change application behavior.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
When a chroot relative pathname lookup fails it is falling through to
do a d_absolute_path lookup. This is incorrect as d_absolute_path should
only be used to lookup names for namespace absolute paths.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <kees@ubuntu.com>
The mapping of AA_MAY_META_READ for the allow mask was also being mapped
to the audit and quiet masks. This would result in some operations being
audited when the should not.
This flaw was hidden by the previous audit bug which would drop some
messages that where supposed to be audited.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <kees@ubuntu.com>
If the xindex value stored in the accept tables is 0, the extraction of
that value will result in an underflow (0 - 4).
In properly compiled policy this should not happen for file rules but
it may be possible for other rule types in the future.
To exploit this underflow a user would have to be able to load a corrupt
policy, which requires CAP_MAC_ADMIN, overwrite system policy in kernel
memory or know of a compiler error resulting in the flaw being present
for loaded policy (no such flaw is known at this time).
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <kees@ubuntu.com>
The audit permission flag, that specifies an audit message should be
provided when an operation is allowed, was being ignored in some cases.
This is because the auto audit mode (which determines the audit mode from
system flags) was incorrectly assigned the same value as audit mode. The
shared value would result in messages that should be audited going through
a second evaluation as to whether they should be audited based on the
auto audit, resulting in some messages being dropped.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <kees@ubuntu.com>
The unpacking of struct capsx is missing a check for the end of the
caps structure. This can lead to unpack failures depending on what else
is packed into the policy file being unpacked.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <kees@ubuntu.com>
